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Abstract
In the financial market, almost all traded derivatives only involve two parties. The aim
of this thesis is to design and evaluate financial contracts involving multiple parties. This
is done by utilising and extending concepts from game theory, financial mathematics and
backward stochastic differential equations. The thesis is divided into two parts: multi-player
stochastic competitive games and multi-person financial contracts.
The first part of the thesis proposes two novel classes of multi-period multi-player stop-
ping games: the multi-player redistribution game and the multi-player affine game. Both
formulations are generalisations of the classic two-player Dynkin game, with a focus on
designing the dependence between the payoffs of all players and their stopping decisions.
These games are shown to be weakly unilaterally competitive, and sufficient conditions are
given for the existence of optimal equilibria (a new solution concept motivated by financial
applications), individual values and coalition values.
The second part of the thesis introduces the notion of multi-person financial contracts by
extending the two-person game option. These contracts may involve an arbitrary number of
parties and each party is allowed to make a wide array of decisions, which then determines
the settlement date as well as the payoffs. The generalised Snell envelope is introduced
for the valuation of multi-person contracts and sufficient conditions for the existence of
unique and additive arbitrage prices are provided. Finally, a new class of multi-dimensional
reflected backward stochastic differential equations are proposed to model multi-person
affine game options under market friction.
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Preface
Over the last forty or so years, the financial derivative market had seen tremendous growth,
both in terms of volumes traded as well as product diversity. Countless exotic derivatives
have emerged and evolved to meet the demand of the market. As a result, many sophisti-
cated models have been developed to price and hedge these derivatives in an increasingly
complex environment. Since almost all traded derivatives only involve two parties, all
existing theory and models caters exclusively for two-person contracts.
One may ask the following interesting questions. Is it possible to create derivatives
involving multiple parties, in which each party may make meaningful decisions? How do
we price and hedge such a contract? These are some of the questions this thesis will attempt
to answer. To properly address them, we require the knowledge of both game theory and
derivatives pricing theory.
Historical Background
The background of this thesis can be broadly divided into three categories: Dynkin games,
game options and reflected backward stochastic differential equations (or reflected BSDEs).
A Dynkin game is a zero-sum, optimal stopping game between two players. Each player
can either ‘stop’ the game or ‘continue’. The game is stopped as soon as either player
stops, and the payoff depends on who stops first. The stochastic stopping game, nowadays
known as the Dynkin game, was first introduced by Dynkin [13]. Since then, there has
been a considerable amount of research on Dynkin games and related problems. Some
examples include Ekstro¨m and Peskir [14], Laraki and Solan [33], Peskir [42], Rosenberg
et al. [48], and Touzi and Vieille [53]. Most of the literature focuses on establishing the
existence of optimal stopping times1 as well as value under various models and payoff
assumptions. It is common to assume that the payoff processes of the Dynkin game satisfy
certain inequalities.2 In discrete-time, it is easy to show the existence of optimal stopping
times and value using backward induction arguments. In continuous-time, perhaps the
most important result is due to Lepeltier and Maingueneau [34], who proved the existence
of -optimal stopping times as well as value (see Theorem 2.21).
An interesting financial application of the Dynkin game is in the study of game options,
1In a two-person zero-sum game, optimal stopping times are equivalent to Nash equilibria.
2We refer here to an inequality of the form X ≤ Z ≤ Y (see Chapter 2 for details). We later name this
class of Dynkin games as standard Dynkin games to differentiate from general Dynkin games.
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also known as Israeli options,3 as defined by Kifer [31]. A two-person game option is
a contract between an issuer and a holder, in which the holder may exercise the option
at any time for a payoff and the issuer may cancel the option at any time for a fee. It
is one of the few financial contracts in which the issuer also makes meaningful decisions
affecting the payoff. If we ignore the dependence on the underlying assets and focus on
the relationship between decisions and payoffs, the game option is comparable to a Dynkin
game. Moreover, the cancellation fee is typically assumed to be greater than or equal to
the exercise payoff, echoing the standard payoff inequalities found in Dynkin games. In
both discrete-time and continuous-time models, it was shown by Kifer [31] that the game
option has a unique arbitrage price (see Theorems 6.35 and 6.36). Similar to Dynkin
games, -optimal stopping times may be constructed. It is also proven in [31] that if the
payoff processes satisfy certain semi-continuity conditions, then there exist optimal stopping
times for both parties and they can create super-hedging portfolios starting at the arbitrage
price. Further research on game options, as well as more sophisticated game-type financial
contracts, includes papers by Bielecki et al. [3], Dolinsky and Kifer [12], Dolinsky et al.
[11], Hamade`ne and Zhang [21], Kallsen and Ku¨hn [25, 26], and Kifer [32].
Last but not least, backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs), first introduced
by Bismut [4], refer to a class of one-dimensional or multi-dimensional stochastic equations
in continuous-time with a predetermined terminal condition. BSDEs have found numerous
applications in optimal control theory, studies of non-linear expectations, and mathematical
finance. Pardoux and Peng [41] proved the existence and uniqueness of solutions in general
settings (see Theorem 8.42). A reflected BSDE (RBSDE), first discussed by El Karoui
et al. [15], is a variant of the BSDE which employs an auxiliary reflection process to
maintain the solution process above a reflecting barrier. Reflected BSDEs can be applied
to various obstacle problems, as well as to the pricing of American style options. Dynkin
games and two-person game options, on the other hand, are closely connected to doubly
reflected BSDEs (DRBSDEs). As the name suggests, a doubly reflected BSDE has two
reflecting barriers, bounding the solution process from both above and below. There is a
plethora of publications in this field, to mention a few: Cre´pey and Matoussi [8], Cvitanic´
and Karatzas [9], Hamade`ne and Hdhiri [19], Hamade`ne and Wang [20], and Karatzas and
Li [27]. An important result for a doubly reflected BSDE, borrowed from Cvitanic´ and
Karatzas [9], establishes the existence and uniqueness of solutions under certain continuity
and integrability conditions (see Theorem 8.43).
There are two less-known topics in BSDEs relevant to our work: discrete-time BSDEs
and multi-dimensional reflected BSDEs. The discrete-time analogues of BSDEs are known
as backward stochastic difference equations, also BSDEs. They were introduced by Cohen
and Elliott [6], who established some sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness
of solutions. In contrast to the continuous-time versions, the amount of published work in
the discrete-time case is somewhat scarce. The multi-dimensional extensions of reflected
BSDEs have also attracted relatively little attention. Some notable publications include:
Hamade`ne and Zhang [22], Hu and Tang [24], Petit and Pardoux [43], Ramasubramanian
[46, 47], and a recent work by Nie and Rutkowski [38], which is closely related to the topic
3In some parts of the thesis, we use the name two-person game option instead to distinguish it from
multi-person variants.
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of this thesis.
Original Contributions
This thesis aims to achieve the following objectives:
• To generalise the Dynkin game to a competitive multi-player stopping game which
admits strong solutions and serves as a reasonable model for some economic and
financial scenarios.
• To create a multi-person game contingent claim which is an extension of the two-
person game option.
• To extend the current derivative pricing theory so that a wide class of multi-person
game contingent claims can be defined and coherently evaluated.
• To define a multi-dimensional reflected BSDE which can be used to model multi-player
stopping games and multi-person game contingent claims.
Game Theory and Dynkin Games
We begin by reviewing the basic definitions of stochastic games and introducing a new
solution concept called the optimal equilibrium. The optimal equilibrium is a strengthened
version of the Nash equilibrium. Recall that at a Nash equilibrium, no player may improve
his payoff by unilaterally deviating. At an optimal equilibrium, each player can also guar-
antee his payoff (or more) if the other players deviate. All optimal equilibria are shown to
attain the same payoff value, which is defined to be the value of a game.
Whenever possible, our analysis focuses on pure strategy optimal equilibria, in contrast
to the typical game theoretical approach of investigating mixed strategy Nash equilibria.
Although our approach is more restrictive, pure strategy optimal equilibria are imperative in
the financial application of super-hedging. The property of weakly unilaterally competitive
or WUC, introduced by Kats and Thisse [30] and De Wolf [10], is useful here since it ensures
that any Nash equilibrium is also an optimal equilibrium.
We then move on to two-player Dynkin games, where some original results are presented.
In particular, we examine the class of general Dynkin games whose payoff processes are no
longer constrained by the inequalities of the standard Dynkin games, typically seen in
literature. For both the discrete-time and continuous-time cases, we provide some new
conditions which are sufficient for the existence of the value and optimal stopping times.
The same conditions are then shown to be necessary to ensure the existence of the value in
all possible subgames.
Multi-Player Redistribution Games
In our attempt to generalise the two-player Dynkin game to a competitive multi-player
stopping game, we begin by introducing a novel m-player, single period, deterministic
game, dubbed as the zero-sum redistribution game or ZRG(X,P, α). In this game, the
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players simultaneously decide between one of two possible choices, to either exercise 4 or
do nothing. If no one exercises, each player receives a terminal payoff of Pi. If the set of
exercising players is E 6= ∅, then each exercising player receives an exercise payoff of Xi,
while each of the non-exercising player i /∈ E receives an adjusted payoff of
Pi − wi(E)
∑
j∈E
(Xj − Pj),
where the sum
∑
j∈E(Xj − Pj) represents the discrepancy caused by the decisions of the
exercising players. This discrepancy is redistributed amongst the non-exercising players
according to some weights wi(E), whose relative sizes are determined by the redistribution
quotients α. The weights and redistribution quotients are chosen to ensure that the total
wealth is fixed and the game is WUC. To better understand the game, consider the following
example.
Example 0.1. A small company has three employees, each has a current salary of P1 =
P2 = P3 = $10. The company’s total salary budget is
∑3
i=1 Pi = $30. At the end of the
year, new salary offers are presented to the employees based on their performances. The
offers are as follows:
Mr. Diligent: X1 = $14, Mr. Average: X2 = $9, Mr. Lazy: X3 = $5.
Note that since
3∑
i=1
Xi = $28 < $30 =
3∑
i=1
Pi,
the sum of the offers is well within the budget. Each employee can make one of two choices.
He can either accept the new offer, or reject it and keep his current salary, which is subject
to adjustments due to budgetary constraints.
Let us analyse what each person will do in this situation. Mr. Diligent certainly likes
his new offer and takes the offer of X1 = $14. But this would create a deficit of $4 in the
salary budget. As a result, the other two employees must take pay cuts. For the sake of
argument, let’s say this adjustment is split evenly between Mr. Average and Mr. Lazy.
Their new adjusted salaries are now given by
P2 − 1
2
(X1 − P1) = P3 − 1
2
(X1 − P1) = $10− 1
2
× $4 = $8.
Now Mr. Average realises that the offer of X2 = $9 is actually better than his adjusted
salary of $8. So he takes his offer as well. This creates a further deficit of $1. Since the
salaries of Mr. Diligent and Mr. Average are fixed at their new offers, the $1 must come
out of Mr. Lazy’s salary. So Mr. Lazy’s new adjusted salary is
P3 − (X1 − P1)− (X2 − P2) = $10− $4− (−$1) = $7.
This is still better than his offer of X3 = $5, which he rightfully rejects. The final salaries
are $14, $9 and $7.
4We use here the terminology of ‘exercise’, which is borrowed from financial derivatives, since our ultimate
goal is to create a financial contract based on the redistribution game.
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Example 0.1 is a simple example of the zero-sum redistribution game, where the weights
are chosen to be wi(E) = 1/(3 − |E|) so the wealth is redistributed ‘evenly’. In general,
the redistribution quotients allow for more flexible weights. The final choices of the three
employees in fact correspond to an optimal equilibrium. Moreover, they showcase the three
possible types of behaviours: choosing the exercise payoff outright, choosing the exercise
payoff due to unfavourable redistributions, and choosing the redistributed payoff.
We then prove that the zero-sum redistribution game has a unique value, at which
optimal equilibria resides. The explicit construction of this value as well as the optimal
equilibria is given by the projection of the terminal payoff onto a simplex in a fixed-sum
coordinate system, under a carefully chosen inner product.
In the next step, we extend the redistribution game to non-zero-sum cases, in the form
of a general redistribution game or GRG(X,P, α). The general redistribution game can be
simply understood in the following way. Start with any m+1 player zero-sum redistribution
game, but player m + 1 is a ‘dummy’ player who is not allowed to exercise. The dynamic
between the remaining m players is equivalent to a general redistribution game. We derive
the necessary and sufficient conditions (except for some specials cases) for the general
redistribution game to enjoy the WUC property and admit at least one Nash equilibrium.
All the main results of the zero-sum case are extended to the general redistribution game.
These include the existence of value and optimal equilibria, as well as representing them
explicitly as projections. Furthermore, the results are readily applicable to the stochastic
variant, as long as the definitions of payoffs and equilibria are appropriately modified to
include expectations.
Using the single period games as building blocks, we create a multi-period redistribution
game or MRG(X,α), which is a recursively defined, m-player stochastic stopping game
in discrete-time. In the special case of having only two-players and being zero-sum, the
multi-period redistribution game reduces to the two-player Dynkin game, which is a de-
sired feature. The existence of optimal equilibria and a unique value in the multi-period
redistribution game is also established.
Multi-Player Affine Games
In redistribution games, the payoff discrepancies caused by the exercising players are treated
as a single total before being redistributed into the payoffs of the remaining players. If we
would like control the redistribution on a more granular level, that is, to individually specify
how the discrepancy of each exercising player is redistributed, we must define a new, larger
class of games. As a result, we introduce the class of affine games.
The class of affine games contains the class of redistribution games. Each affine game,
denoted by AG(X,G), is associated with an m × m matrix G. The matrix G effectively
replaces the redistribution quotients and the weights from before. To be more precise, if the
set of exercising players is E , then the payoff deviation (due to redistribution) lies within
the column space of G·E . The following example demonstrates a single period deterministic
affine game.
Example 0.2. Consider a game played by m competing firms, who need to make deci-
sions about their respective business strategies. The m firms share the same market for a
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particular product or service, and would like to maximise their profits Vi.
Each firm i has one of two choices: choice (A) which leads to a fixed profit of Vi = Xi
(e.g., keeping the customers in their current contracts), or choice (B) which leads to a
variable profit Vi (e.g., offering new products or deals) that depends on the choice of the
other firms. If every firm chooses (B), then the forecasted profit is given by Pi.
Now suppose the set of firms choosing (A) is E . For each firm i ∈ E , the profit is Vi = Xi.
For each firm j /∈ E choosing (B), its profit Vj is adjusted from Pj . The exact adjustment
depends linearly on the differences in profits of the firms who chose (A) instead of (B),
or Xi − Pi for i ∈ E . To explain this intuitively, consider a particular firm i that chooses
(A) instead of (B), and how that decision affects the market share. Out of the customers
gained by firm i, a fixed fraction of them comes from another firm j 6= i. Suppose Gii is
the profit per customer of firm i and −Gji is the profit per customer of firm j multiplied by
the fraction of customers moving from j to i. Then the ratio of change in profits between
firms i and j (as a result of firm i’s decision) is given by the constant Gji/Gii.
If we consider the profits as vectors, then the vector V −P must lie in the column space
of G·E where E is the set of firms who chose (A). By using the fact that VE = XE and
solving for V , we arrive at the vector equation
V = P +G·E
(
GEE
)−1(
XE − PE
)
.
This is precisely the payoff function of an affine game.
The single period affine game is also closely related to a well-known class of optimisation
problems known as linear complementarity problems. In fact, we show that finding Nash
equilibria in an affine game is equivalent to finding solutions in a linear complementarity
problem. Using techniques from linear complementarity problems, we are able to identify
sufficient conditions on the matrix G for the existence of Nash equilibria, optimal equilibria,
individual values and coalition values.
The next logical step is to extend the single period affine game to a multi-period stochas-
tic affine stopping game or ASG(X,G). Similar to the multi-period redistribution game, a
recursive formulation is used. This is perhaps best explained with the following example.
Example 0.3. Let us expand upon the scenario described by Example 0.2. Suppose that
the m firms are playing the game at time 0, but the forecasted profit P is taken as the
expected profit if the same game is played at time 1, which in turn depends on the expected
profit from time 2 and so on. Even though the actual decisions are made at time 0 only,
the game now also depends on future scenarios at times 1, 2, . . . , T and thus also on future
‘virtual’ decisions of all players. As a result, the game is now equivalent to an affine stopping
game.
It is important to note that even though the time 0 profits depend on P , which is a
forecast depending on the decisions of the firms at times 1, 2, . . . , T , we assume that each
firm is trying to maximise the profit at time 0, rather than say, sacrificing the time 0 profit
for better future profits. This allows us to set P as the expected value (or solution) of the
game starting at time 1.
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Finally, all results of the single period affine game, regarding the existence of Nash
equilibria, optimal equilibria, individual values and coalition values, are extended to the
multi-period stochastic affine stopping game.
Multi-Person Game Contingent Claims
This is arguably the most important contribution of the thesis. We extend the existing
market models to a new and generalised framework in which a large class of contingent
claims involving multiple parties can be defined and evaluated. This is in stark contrast to
existing theory, which only focuses on contracts involving two parties.
In a multi-person contingent claim, each party is allowed to make a wide array of
decisions at any time, not restricted to simply ‘exercising the option’. The collection of
decisions then determines the settlement time of the claim as well as its payoffs. In fact,
one may draw equivalences between the mechanisms of this contract and a general stochastic
game, hence the name multi-person game contingent claim or multi-person game option.
The generalised framework has several purposes. First of all, it allows for the creation
and valuation of new complex derivatives involving multiple parties. Furthermore, it pro-
vides fresh insights to the valuation of existing exotic derivatives. Finally, the framework
may serve as a starting point to a unified approach in modelling derivatives and other finan-
cial products in the presence of external factors such as credit risk and market frictions. For
example, the occurrence of default may be interpreted as an action of the party involved.
A multi-person game contingent claim, denoted by MGC(G), is associated with a multi-
player stochastic game G. The contract is divided into several tranches,5 which can be
traded separately, but are not independent of one another. The parties involved include
the holders of the tranches as well as an issuer. Since each party is able to observe the actions
of others,6 this information should be incorporated in their decision-making processes and
choices of hedging portfolios. As a result, it is necessary to extend the notion of admissible,
self-financing portfolios to adaptive trading strategies, which are portfolios that react to
the observable actions of others. Arbitrage is then defined as the opportunity to make a
guaranteed profit by holding tranches while maintaining an adaptive trading strategy until
the claim is settled.
We first focus on the pricing of a particular combined tranche, or a fixed collection of
tranches, in both discrete and continuous-time market models which are known to induce
unique martingale measures (i.e., the markets are complete and no arbitrage obtained by
trading primary assets is possible). The notion of generalised Snell envelope is introduced
to account for the current context of a general multi-person game (as opposed to classic
case of a two-person stopping game). We then prove that, under some sensible payoff
conditions, no arbitrage is possible from holding a fixed combined tranche if and only if
its price lies within a particular interval. We also show that bounds of this interval have a
natural financial interpretation in terms of super-hedging strategies.
5The term ‘tranche’ mimics the terminology used to describe a component of a collateralised debt obli-
gation (CDO). It is thus worth stressing that our abstract ‘tranches’ are much more general and should not
be confused with tranches of a CDO.
6It is assumed throughout that G is a perfect information game.
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Next, we provide a detailed study of the interactions between different combined tranches
of a contract. In particular, we demonstrate that the price of the tranches must be additive
in order to avoid a second type of arbitrage, known as reselling arbitrage. This price additiv-
ity also has the desirable feature of eliminating any price disagreement between the parties.
The two main results are Theorems 7.38 and 7.40. Theorem 7.38 specifies the necessary
and sufficient conditions which simultaneously avoid both types of arbitrage. Theorem 7.40
proves that if optimal equilibria exist for the associated game, then the individual tranches
have unique arbitrage prices which match the value of the game. Furthermore, it provides
some sufficient conditions for the existence of unique and additive arbitrage prices for all
combined tranches.
Finally, we provide an important example in the form of the affine game contingent
claim AGC(X,G), which is associated with the affine stopping game ASG(X,G). The
earlier results regarding the existence of optimal equilibria and coalition value in affine
stopping games directly imply the existence of unique and additive arbitrage prices in
affine game contingent claims.
Multi-Dimensional Reflected BSDEs
Our work in BSDEs begins with a demonstration of how a doubly-reflected BSDE in
discrete-time can be used to price two-person game options in the presence of market fric-
tions. We assume that maintaining any portfolio incurs a cost of trading, which affects the
self-financing condition of any trading strategy. Formally, this particular market friction is
reflected by the choice of a driver term in the BSDE. We prove that the arbitrage price of
the two-person game option under market frictions lies within an interval described by the
solutions of two doubly reflected BSDEs.
Next, in order to model multi-person stopping games and multi-person game contingent
claims, we propose a new class of discrete-time multi-dimensional reflected BSDEs, in which
the solution process is restricted to lie within a stochastic convex domain. These reflected
BSDEs are based on a class of problems in optimisation, which are known as variational
inequalities.7 Some examples are given, involving both general convex domains as well as
rectangular regions.
Then we apply the discrete-time multi-dimensional reflected BSDE to affine stopping
games, as well as affine game contingent claims under market frictions. For affine stopping
games, the existence and uniqueness of the value established earlier is reaffirmed using
BSDEs. For affine game contingent claims, we extend the earlier formulation to include the
cost of trading. Due to the recursive definition of the claim, two possible formulations are
presented, depending on the order of payoff settlement and cost deduction. In both cases,
we are able to show that under certain assumptions on the cost function, the individual
tranches of the affine game contingent claim have unique arbitrage prices.
For the continuous-time case, we propose a continuous-time multi-dimensional reflected
BSDE inspired by the earlier discrete-time versions, and provide some sufficient conditions
for the existence and uniqueness of solutions. The extension of the affine stopping game
7Linear complementarity problems are special cases of variational inequalities.
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and the affine game contingent claim to continuous-time frameworks remains an open prob-
lem, but we hope the continuous-time multi-dimensional reflected BSDE will provide some
valuable insights.
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Overview of Chapters
This thesis is organised into two parts. Part I contains Chapters 1 to 5 and focuses on
stochastic games, while Part II contains Chapters 6 to 8 and focuses on financial derivatives
and BSDEs. In terms of content, most of Chapters 1 and 6 are reviews of existing concepts
and results, Chapters 4, 5 and 7 are entirely made up of our original research, and Chapters
3 and 8 contain mixtures of both existing and original results.
Chapter 1: Introduction to Stochastic Games. This chapter contains an overview
of the theory of multi-player stochastic games, with an emphasis on the discrete-time case.
In Section 1.1, we formally introduce a multi-player, perfect information, finite-horizon
stochastic game with finite action space and pure strategies, under a finite-state filtered
probability space in discrete-time. Outcomes or histories are defined to be stochastic se-
quences of actions while strategies map from past histories to current outcomes. Each
strategy can be played to produce an associated outcome. Termination times and payoffs
are then defined, as functions of strategies or outcomes. The section closes with a brief
discussion of the particular class of stopping games.
Section 1.2 studies various solution concepts related to games, including the definition
of optimal equilibria and value. Then Sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 discuss the special classes
of zero-sum games and weakly unilaterally competitive (WUC) games, respectively. A
few preliminary results are presented regarding the existence of equilibria and values in
those cases. Finally, Section 1.3 examines some extensions of the discrete-time game. In
particular, Section 1.3.1 defines continuous-time stochastic games which retain the features
of the discrete-time versions. Section 1.3.2 demonstrates how the current model may be
extended, via filtration enlargements, to contain games with asymmetric information as
well as mixed or randomised strategies.
Chapter 2: Two-Player Stopping Games. This chapter studies the class of Dynkin
games in detail. Sections 2.1.1 and 2.2.1 look at the standard Dynkin game in discrete and
continuous-time, respectively. Well-known results addressing the existence and uniqueness
of value as well as optimal stopping times are presented. In Sections 2.1.2 and 2.2.2, we
discuss the class of general Dynkin games whose payoff processes are not constrained by the
inequalities of the standard case. We derive original results for the general Dynkin game in
both discrete and continuous-time settings. In particular, Theorems 2.16 and 2.32 provide
sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of value and optimal stopping times,
as well as necessary conditions for their existence in all possible subgames.
Chapter 3: A Multi-Player Zero-Sum Game. This chapter introduces the zero-
sum redistribution game, denoted by ZRG(X,P, α), in which each player can either ‘exercise’
for a fixed payoff or do nothing and receive an adjusted payoff based on the decision of
others. In Section 3.1, we formally define the zero-sum redistribution game, discuss its
basic features and establish some preliminary results. In particular, the game enjoys the
WUC property. In Section 3.2, we present the main result of this chapter, Theorem 3.23,
which states that the game has a unique payoff value, where Nash and optimal equilibria are
achieved. The existence of the optimal equilibrium is shown via an explicit construction
and the value of the game is expressed as the projection onto a simplex in a fixed-sum
coordinate system.
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Chapter 4: Multi-Player Redistribution Games. This chapter extends the results
of Chapter 3 to the class of general redistribution games denoted by GRG(X,P, α), which
is equivalent to the zero-sum version if a ‘dummy’ player is added. Section 4.1 formally
defines the general redistribution game. We derive the necessary conditions (except for
some specials cases) for the game to satisfy the WUC property and have at least one Nash
equilibrium. The main results, Theorems 4.7 and 4.16, then show that the same conditions
are sufficient for the existence of the value, which may be expressed as the projection onto
some subset of Rm under an appropriate inner product.
In Section 4.2, we extend the redistribution game to stochastic as well as multi-period
cases. A recursive multi-period stopping game know as the multi-period redistribution game
or MRG(X,α) is introduced. The existence of value and optimal equilibria is established
in Theorem 4.25 by backward induction arguments. Finally Section 4.3 briefly examines a
variant known as a multi-period deterministic quitting game.
Chapter 5: Multi-Player Affine Games. This chapter generalises the redistribu-
tion games from the previous two chapters to the larger class of affine games. In essence,
affine games offers more granular control on how the payoff is redistributed between players,
using the matrix G instead of redistribution quotients. Section 5.1 presents single period
deterministic affine games or AG(X,G) with non-singular matrices while Section 5.2 ex-
tends the games to include singular matrices (which includes zero-sum affine games). There
are three main results in the single period case. Theorems 5.14 and 5.23 identify conditions
on the matrix G under which Nash equilibria, optimal equilibria and values exist. Theorem
5.25 provides some sufficient conditions for the existence of coalition values.
In Section 5.3, a multi-period stochastic affine stopping game or ASG(X,G) is intro-
duced using a recursive formulation similar to the multi-period redistribution game from
Section 4.2. Theorem 5.32 proves the existence of optimal equilibria and value under some
mild assumptions on the matrix G, while Theorem 5.33 further addresses the existence of
coalition values.
Chapter 6: Introduction to Arbitrage Pricing. This chapter reviews the classical
theory in the pricing of European, American and game contingent claims, in preparation
for the more complex framework of Chapter 7. In particular, Section 6.1 examines two
standard market models: the finite state discrete-time model based on the work of Taqqu
and Willinger [52] and the continuous-time Brownian model as presented, for instance,
in the monograph by Karatzas and Shreve [29]. In both cases, the underlying markets
are complete and arbitrage-free in stocks and bonds, thus admitting unique martingale
measures. The section ends with the pricing of European contingent claims, in which the
holder has the right to exercise the contract at a predetermined time.
Then Section 6.2 introduces American contingent claims (Karatzas [29]), where the
holder gains the ability to choose the time of exercise. The pricing of American contingent
claims is done via backward induction in the discrete-time case and via the Snell envelope
in the continuous-time case. Section 6.3 takes it a step further by examining two-person
game contingent claims (also known as Israeli options), which were introduced by Kifer
[31]. The game contingent claim also grants the issuer the ability to cancel the contract
at any time before its expiry date. It can be seen as a financial derivative associated with
the zero-sum two-person Dynkin game, which was discussed in Chapter 2. For the reader’s
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convenience, the main pricing results of the game contingent claim, due to Kifer [31], are
presented for both discrete and continuous-time models
Chapter 7: Multi-Person Game Options. This chapter extends the market models
introduced in Chapter 6 to a new framework under which a wide class of multi-person
contingent claims can be defined and priced using arbitrage arguments. Section 7.1 provides
the definition of a multi-person game contingent claim or MGC(G) associated with an
arbitrary stochastic game G. Fundamental concepts, such as arbitrage and super-hedging,
are redefined to allow for adaptive trading strategies, which replace admissible, self-financing
portfolios. Theorem 7.12 provides some preliminary bounds on the arbitrage prices of a
multi-person game contingent claim.
Section 7.2 focuses on the pricing of a particular combined tranche using the novel
concept of a generalised Snell envelope. The main results of the section are Theorems 7.23
and 7.31, for the discrete and continuous-time case, respectively. They show that, under
some sensible conditions on payoffs, no arbitrage is possible from holding a fixed combined
tranche and trading in primary assets if and only if its price lies within a particular interval.
The bounds of this interval have a natural financial interpretation in terms of super-hedging
strategies for the holder and the issuer.
In Section 7.3, we provide a thorough examination of the interaction between different
combined tranches. In particular, we demonstrate that the price of the tranches must be
additive in order to avoid a second type of arbitrage, which is dubbed the reselling arbitrage.
The two main results are Theorems 7.38 and 7.40. Theorem 7.38 specifies the necessary
and sufficient conditions under which both types of arbitrage are simultaneously avoided.
Theorem 7.40 shows that the existence of an optimal equilibrium in the associated game
implies the existence of unique arbitrage prices for the individual tranches of the multi-
person game contingent claim. Furthermore, this result also furnishes conditions under
which every combined tranche has a unique and additive arbitrage price.
Finally, Section 7.2.3 explains how the results established for the general case can be
applied to the special case of multi-person game contingent claims associated with multi-
person stopping games. Section 7.4.1 provides an important example of such a contract
in the form of the affine game contingent claim or AGC(X,G), which is associated with
the affine stopping game from Section 5.3.2. The pricing results of this claim are given in
Theorem 7.44.
Chapter 8: Multi-Dimensional Reflected BSDEs. This chapter discusses reflected
BSDEs and their applications to stopping games and game options. Section 8.1 provides the
basic definitions and methodologies for discrete-time BSDEs. Then Section 8.2 introduces
the discrete-time doubly reflected BSDE. Aside from modelling the zero-sum two-person
Dynkin game, the doubly reflected BSDE is also used to price two-person game options in
the presence of market frictions or cost of trading. The main result, Theorem 8.16, proves
that the arbitrage price of the two-person game option under market frictions lies within
an interval obtained by solving two doubly-reflected BSDEs.
In Section 8.3, we introduce a general class of multi-dimensional reflected BSDEs in
discrete-time, which closely relates to a class of problems in optimisation known as vari-
ational inequalities. Some examples are given, involving both general convex domains as
well as rectangular regions. Section 8.4 then applies the multi-dimensional reflected BSDE
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to affine stopping games, as well as affine game contingent claims under market frictions.
For affine stopping games, the previously established existence and uniqueness of the value
is reaffirmed using BSDEs. For affine game contingent claims under market frictions, two
possible formulations are presented, depending on the order in which the payoff settlement
and the cost deduction are performed. The main results of the section, Theorems 8.36 and
8.38, prove that under certain assumptions of the cost function, the individual tranches of
the affine game contingent claim have unique arbitrage prices in both formulations.
Finally, Section 8.5 gives a brief survey of the existing results for continuous-time multi-
dimensional BSDEs. Theorem 8.48 proposes a continuous-time, multi-dimensional, re-
flected BSDE inspired by the earlier discrete-time versions, and provides some sufficient
conditions for the existence and uniqueness of solutions. The section closes with a brief
discussion of how the continuous-time RBSDE may be used to motivate continuous-time
extensions of the affine stopping game and the affine game contingent claim.
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Abbreviations
WUC weakly unilaterally competitive
DG Dynkin game
SDG standard Dynkin game
GDG general Dynkin game
RG redistribution game
ZRG zero-sum redistribution game
GRG general redistribution game
MRG multi-period redistribution game
AG affine game
ASG affine stopping game
SOL solution (nash equilibrium payoff) of an affine game
LCP linear complementarity problem
VI variational inequality
ECC European contingent claim
ACC American contingent claim
GCC two-person game contingent claim
AGC affine game contingent claim
MGC multi-person game contingent claim
BSDE backward stochastic differential equation
RBSDE reflected backward stochastic differential equation
DRBSDE doubly reflected backward stochastic differential equation
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Part I
Multi-Player Competitive Games
1

Chapter1
Introduction to Stochastic Games
The principal aim of this thesis is to define and study multi-person financial contracts. The
underlying mechanisms of these contracts, that is, how decisions lead to payoffs, are much
like the dynamics of multi-player stochastic games. This chapter will focus on the definition
of stochastic games as well as some useful properties and solution concepts.
The theory of discrete-time stochastic games is well established in literature. In Section
1.1, we provide the definition of a multi-player, finite-horizon, discrete-time, perfect infor-
mation stochastic game with countable action spaces and pure strategies. Important ideas
such as outcomes, strategies and payoffs are discussed in detail. The section closes with a
brief discussion of the class of stopping games.
Section 1.2 studies various solution concepts related to games. Perhaps the most popular
and well-known candidate is the Nash equilibrium, which is a strategy profile that no player
would deviate from. Since we are also interested in the financial applications, a stronger
notion known as the optimal equilibrium is proposed. The optimal equilibrium is essentially
a saddle point, or a Nash equilibrium where the individual payoffs can be guaranteed. The
ability to guarantee a payoff is imperative in the financial concept of super-hedging. Then
Sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 discuss the special classes of zero-sum games and weakly unilaterally
competitive (WUC) games, respectively.
Section 1.3 examines some extensions of the discrete-time game. In particular, Section
1.3.1 defines continuous-time stochastic games which retain the features of the discrete-
time versions. In general, there are many challenges in the definition of continuous-time
games due to many well-documented pathological issues. For brevity, we shall avoid these
by making some simplifying assumptions while keeping the resulting class of games rich
enough to contain everything relevant to this thesis. Then Section 1.3.2 demonstrates how
the current model may be extended, via filtration enlargements, to capture games with
asymmetric information as well as mixed or randomised strategies. This is done purely for
the reader’s interest and is not the focus of the thesis.
The thesis will be mainly concerned with stopping games. The notable exception is
Chapter 7, in which general stochastic games will be used in the definition and analysis of
general game contingent claims. In any case, presenting the full definition of the general
case shall hopefully provide some fruitful insights for the reader.
3
4 Chapter 1: Introduction to Stochastic Games
1.1 Discrete-Time Games
In the discrete-time framework, games are defined on the time points t = 0, 1, . . . , T , mean-
ing that the players of the game can perform actions only at times 0, 1, . . . , T . In general,
it is possible to define games on an infinite time horizon t = 0, 1, . . ., but for the purpose of
this work we will restrict our attention to games which end no later than a predetermined
time T . For convenience, write [0, t] := {0, 1, . . . , t} and [0, t) := {0, 1, . . . , t− 1}.
Consider a game G with m players, enumerated by the indices 1, 2, . . . ,m. Denote the
set of all players by M = {1, 2, . . . ,m}. Let (Ω,F,P) be the underlying probability space
endowed with the filtration F = {Ft : t = 0, 1, . . . , T}. Note that F captures the randomness
of external factors affecting the game, but not the actions of the players.
Actions and Outcomes
Each player i has an action space Ai, which is a discrete and countable set. It represents
the set of all possible actions available to player i at any time. Define A := ∏i∈MAi. The
game G is called finite if A is finite. At each time t, every player simultaneously chooses
an action based on the information available to them. This sequence of actions over time
is an outcome. It determines the eventual ‘result’ of G pathwise.
Definition 1.1 (Outcomes). The outcome of player i is an F-adapted process hit, t ∈ [0, T ]
which takes values in Ai. It represents the actions of player i over time and is stochastic over
Ω. LetHi be the space of such outcomes for player i. Further let ht = (h1t , . . . , hmt ), t ∈ [0, T ]
and H := ∏i∈MHi denote the m-tuple of outcomes and its space, respectively.
In some situations, the set of actions Ai available to player i may vary during the game.
It may depend on the time, the actions performed so far, and the underlying randomness.
However, it is still possible to use the same action space Ai at all times, even if some
actions may not always be valid. This is achieved by adopting the following convention:
Whenever an invalid action is chosen, the player simply performs a default action, assuming
there exists at least one valid action at any time. A typical default action may be to ‘wait’
or ‘do nothing’. This does create the situation of different elements of A (and hence H)
being equivalent. Formally, it is possible to define a metric to distinguish between different
actions (or outcomes). But for our purposes, it is simpler to just note that equalities between
actions (or outcomes) implicitly take the aforementioned equivalences into account.
It is often useful to only consider the sequence of actions up to a certain time t ≤ T .
For any outcome h ∈ H, let the history at time t be the restriction of h on the time interval
[0, t], denoted by h[0,t]. In other words, h[0,t] is an F-adapted process defined on the time
interval [0, t]. Let the space of such histories be H[0,t]. For each player i, define hi[0,t] and
Hi[0,t] similarly.
Many aspects of the game only depend on the past history and cannot see into the future.
To quantify this notions, we introduce the following terms. Suppose f :H× [0, T ]×Ω→ S
is a random mapping onto some measurable space S.
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• The mapping is non-anticipative in H or H-adapted if for all h, h′ ∈ H and t ∈ [0, T ],
we have the following:
On the event
{
h[0,t] = h
′
[0,t]
}
, ft(h) = ft(h
′), a.s.. (1.1)
• The mapping is H-predictable if for all h, h′ ∈ H and t ∈ [0, T ], we have the following:
On the event
{
h[0,t−1] = h′[0,t−1]
}
, ft(h) = ft(h
′), a.s.. (1.2)
It is clear that H-predictable implies H-adapted. These are comparable to the properties
of F-adapted and F-predictable, which are based on Ω.
Strategies
A game has perfect information if at any time t every player can observe the time t − 1
history h[0,t−1]. These observations are then used to decide the actions at time t. In
other words these decisions are H-predictable. The decision making process is also called
the strategy. Unless stated otherwise, the games we consider are assumed to have perfect
information.
Definition 1.2 (Strategies). For each player i, his strategy is an F-adapted, H-predictable
mapping from the outcomes to the actions, si :H× [0, T ]× Ω→ Ai. Let the space of such
strategies be Si. The m-tuple of strategies s := (s1, . . . , sm) is a strategy profile, and S is
the space of all possible strategy profiles.
Also define the mappings s[0,t] ∈ S[0,t] and si[0,t] ∈ Si[0,t] in the natural way, similar to
those defined for the outcomes h ∈ H.
It is important to note that, strictly speaking, when player i plays the game, he only
observes one particular sample path of the outcome h which is a deterministic sequence
of actions or a deterministic outcome. There is no way for player i to know the value of
h over all possible sample paths ω ∈ Ω, as he does not know the strategy of others. So
it would be more accurate to describe si as a function of deterministic outcomes, rather
than stochastic outcomes. This is in fact necessary in Subsection 1.3.2 when dealing with
an asymmetric information. But for our purposes, where there is no asymmetric informa-
tion, the current definition using stochastic outcomes is sufficient, since the H-predictable
property essentially forces si(h, ω) to only depend on si(h(ω), ω). Moreover, the notation
is simplified by avoiding the introduction of deterministic outcomes.
For any strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sm) ∈ S, there exists an associated outcome h(s) ∈
H defined by ht(s)(ω) = st(·, ω). Despite the seemingly recursive formulation, h(s) is well
defined, because s is H-predictable. To explain this in more detail, h(s) is inductively
generated for each ω ∈ Ω as follows:
1. At time 0, s0(·, ω) does not actually depend on h(s), simply set h0(ω) := s0(·, ω).
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2. At time t ∈ (0, T ], each player i uses the Ft−1-measurable history h[0,t−1](ω) to choose
the Ft-measurable, H-predictable action sit(·, ω). Then set
ht(ω) := st(·, ω) = (s1t (·, ω), . . . , smt (·, ω)).
The time t history h[0,t](ω) is obtained by appending ht(ω) to h[0,t−1](ω).
3. The process continues until time T to generate h[0,T ](ω) = h(ω).
Despite the fact that both the strategy profile s and its associated outcome h(s) map to
the same random sequence of actions, s contains a lot more information. It specifies how
each player should react to the observable actions of other players. This extra information
is not observable by other players. When discussing solution concepts and equilibria (see
Section 1.2), s is much more important than h. In general, for any function f with H as
part of its domain, we will write f(s) instead of f(h(s)) if it is convenient and appropriate.
Remark 1.3. Wherever the player superscript i is used, we can replace it by an arbitrary
player subset N ⊆ M to describe various concepts relating to N . For instance, let hN :=
{hi : i ∈ N} ∈ HN and sN := {si : i ∈ N} ∈ SN denote the outcomes and the strategy
profiles of N respectively. In particular sM = s and hM = h. For convenience, we use
the superscript −N to denote the set M \ N and the superscript −k to denote −{k} or
M\ {k}. Also, we define hN[0,t] ∈ HN[0,t] and sN[0,t] ∈ SN[0,t] in the obvious way.
In some parts of the thesis, if the time parameter t is not important, player superscripts,
such as i and N , may be moved to the subscript position to improve readability.
Consider a scenario where the strategy profile s ∈ S is executed up to and including
time t− 1. It may be useful to consider all possible outcomes or all permissible strategies
for the remainder of the game on the time interval [t, T ]. So we introduce the following
notations. For any s ∈ S and player subset N ⊆M, define
SNt (s) =
{
τ ∈ SN : h[0,t−1](τ, s−N ) = h[0,t−1](s)
} ⊆ SN .
Also write St(s) = SMt (s).
Termination and Payoffs
The game may terminate at any time on the interval [0, T ], depending on how the players
play and the underlying randomness.
Definition 1.4 (Termination Time). Given a strategy profile s ∈ S and its associated
outcome h(s) ∈ H, let ϑ := ϑ(h(s), ω) be the termination time. Formally, ϑ :H×Ω→ [0, T ]
is a mapping such that the function I(h, t, ω) := 1{ϑ(h,ω)≤t} is an F-adapted and H-adapted
mapping. In particular, for all h ∈ H, ϑ(h, ·) is an F-stopping time.
Even though the termination time depends on h and ω, as mentioned earlier, it is useful
to treat it as a function of s instead. Hence we will write ϑ(s) or simply ϑ if there is no
confusion. As the game G terminates, payoffs are distributed to the players. They usually
represent the scores or the benefits of playing the game G. Generally speaking, each player
aims to maximise his expected payoff at time 0.
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Definition 1.5 (Payoffs). Given a strategy profile s ∈ S and the associated outcome
h(s) ∈ H, each player i receives an Fϑ(s)-measurable real-valued payoff V iϑ(s)(h(s)) at time
ϑ(s). For any s, s′ ∈ S, the payoff also satisfies the following:
On the event
{
ϑ(s) = ϑ(s′), h[0,ϑ(s)](s) = h[0,ϑ(s′)](s′)
}
, V iϑ(s)(h(s)) = V
i
ϑ(s′)(h(s
′)), a.s..
For convenience, we may write V iϑ(s) := V
i
ϑ(s)(h(s)).
Let the expected payoff at time t ∈ [0, T ] be V it (s) := EP(V iϑ(s)|Ft). Note that t ≤ ϑ is
not necessary. By a slight abuse of notation, also write V it (s) = V
i
t (s
1, . . . , sm) = V it (s
i, s−i).
Let the vector expected payoffs be Vt(s) := (V
1
t (s), . . . , V
m
t (s)).
Unless explicitly stated otherwise, the termination time represented by the subscript ϑ
in Vϑ(s) is automatically assumed to depend on s. For any subset N ⊆ M of players, let
V Nt (s) :=
∑
i∈N V
i
t (s) be the sum of their expected payoffs. Again, we use the subscript
−N to denote the set M\N and the subscript −k to denote −{k} or M\ {k}.
1.1.1 Stopping Games
A stopping game is a game where each player can either ‘continue’ or ‘stop’, and the game is
stopped as soon as any player chooses to stop. If no one stops before time T , then everyone
is forced to stop at time T .
Formally speaking, the action space is given by Ai = {stop, continue}. At time T both
of the actions are equivalent to ‘stop’. The termination time is given by
ϑ(h, ω) = min
i∈M
(
min{t ∈ [0, T ] : hit(ω) = stop}
)
.
The Fϑ-measurable payoff V iϑ(s) is determined by the set of players E ⊆ M who stopped
at that time
E(h, ω) =
{
i ∈M : ϑ(h, ω) = min{t ∈ [0, T ] : hit(ω) = stop}
}
.
In all games, the values of si and hi after ϑ do not affect the payoffs. In stopping games,
the values of si and hi before ϑ must be ‘continue’. For a fixed ω ∈ Ω, when si is considered
as an H-predictable mapping from H to A, it is sufficient to assume that the history h only
consists of ‘continue’s. This is because any action sit(h, ω) where h[0,t−1](s)(ω) includes at
least one ‘stop’ is never executed. So si is independent of the history h and hence sj for
j 6= i. In other words, the map si contains as much information as the map hi. Due to this
simplification, it is convenient to simply represent si and hi as F-stopping times, capturing
the first instance of ‘stop’.
Remark 1.6 (Stopping Strategy). As a convention, whenever G is a stopping game, the
strategy si : Ω→ [0, T ] is assumed to be an F-stopping time or a stopping strategy. Further-
more, Si = T[0,T ] where T[0,T ] is the set of F-stopping time on [0, T ]. The associated history
hi is also the same F-stopping time hi = si. Under this convention, the termination time ϑ
can be simply written as
ϑ = min
i∈M
si = min
i∈M
hi.
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1.2 Solution Concepts
In this section, many definitions and results involve the payoff function Vt(s). For brevity,
we simply write V (s) since the time t is not important here. Note, however, that if t > 0,
then all statements will be taken in an almost sure sense.
We now focus on the various solution concepts and properties associated with a general
stochastic game. In particular, we will identify useful features for the eventual aim of
designing a financial game contract.
In literature, there is a general consensus on the notion of a solution to a game. Typi-
cally, when one tries to solve a game, the aim is to find Nash equilibria. First introduced
by John Nash [36], it is defined as follows.
Definition 1.7 (Nash Equilibrium). A strategy profile σ = {σ1, . . . , σm} ∈ S is called a
Nash equilibrium, or simply an equilibrium, if no single player can improve his payoff by
altering his own strategy. In other words, for each k ∈M,
V k(σk, σ−k) = ess sup
sk∈Sk
V k(sk, σ−k). (1.3)
Often (1.3) is written as V k(σk, σ−k) ≥ V k(sk, σ−k) for all sk ∈ Sk.
A Nash equilibrium represents a state which no player would deviate from. It gives
some intuition to how players may behave in a game. Furthermore, Nash [36] proved the
following well-known result regarding the existence of the Nash equilibrium (for the concept
of a mixed strategy, see Section 1.3.3).
Theorem 1.8 (Existence of Nash Equilibrium). In any finite game, there exists a Nash
equilibrium in mixed strategy.
Even though Nash equilibrium is widely adopted as the standard solution concept, it
is not necessarily suitable in all situations. For our purposes of defining and evaluating
financial game options, there are several deficiencies. The valuation of options involves
replication of payoffs. But, in general, this is not possible without knowing the action of
the other players. One cannot assume that the other players will converge towards Nash
equilibria, so the equilibrium payoffs are not guaranteed. Furthermore, a game may have
several equilibria with different payoff values, and it is not always clear which one should
be chosen.
1.2.1 Optimal Equilibrium and Value
We introduce a new, stronger concept instead, to address some of the aforementioned issues
with the Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1.9 (Optimal Equilibrium). A Nash equilibrium σ = {σ1, . . . , σm} ∈ S is called
an optimal equilibrium if, for each k ∈M,
V k(σk, σ−k) = ess inf
s−k∈S−k
V k(σk, s−k). (1.4)
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Combining with condition (1.3) of a Nash equilibrium, σ satisfies
V k(σk, σ−k) = ess inf
s−k∈S−k
V k(σk, s−k) = ess sup
sk∈Sk
V k(sk, σ−k), (1.5)
or equivalently,
V k(σk, s−k) ≥ V k(σk, σ−k) ≥ V k(sk, σ−k), ∀ sk ∈ Sk, s−k ∈ S−k, (1.6)
for each k ∈M.
An optimal equilibrium is essentially a saddle point. In addition to the properties
of a Nash equilibrium, each player can guarantee his optimal equilibrium payoff without
knowing the actions of other players. This is crucial in the context of a game option as
it allows for replicating strategies. Furthermore, as shown in Corollary 1.13, all optimal
equilibria achieve the same value.
The optimal equilibrium is one of many ways to strengthen the Nash equilibrium for
multi-person games. It is similar to several existing equilibrium concepts, such as the
strong Nash equilibrium from Aumann [1] and ‘Nash equilibrium with maximin strategies’
as discussed in Pruzhansky [45].
The optimal equilibrium is closely related to the maximin and minimax values of the
game, which we now introduce.
Definition 1.10 (Maximin and Minimax Value). For each player k, define the following:
The lower value or the maximin value V k is the maximum payoff player k can guarantee:
V k := ess sup
sk∈Sk
ess inf
s−k∈S−k
V k(sk, s−k). (1.7)
A maximin strategy for player k is any sˆk ∈ Sk such that ess infs−k∈S−k V k(sˆk, s−k) = V k,
that is, sˆk realises the supremum in (1.7).
The upper value or the minimax value V
k
is the lowest payoff that the other players can
force upon player k:
V
k
:= ess inf
s−k∈S−k
ess sup
sk∈Sk
V k(sk, s−k). (1.8)
A minimax strategy for the player set M \ {k} is any strategy sˆ−k ∈ S−k such that
ess supsk∈Sk V k(sk, sˆ−k) = V
k
, that is sˆ−k realises the infimum in (1.8).
The maximin and minimax values as well as strategies can be analogously defined for any
proper subset N ⊂M of players, by replacing k with N .
In general, the maximin value is less than the minimax value, since the players from
the set M \ {k} cannot force the payoff of player k lower than an amount that can be
guaranteed.
Proposition 1.11. The following statements hold almost surely.
(i) The inequality V
k ≥ V k is valid for all k.
(ii) If σ is a Nash equilibrium, then for all k, V k(σ) ≥ V k.
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(iii) If σ satisfies (1.4), then for all k, V k(σ) ≤ V k.
(iv) If σ is an optimal equilibrium, then for all k, V k(σ) = V
k
= V k.
(v) If σ is an optimal equilibrium, then for all k, σk and σ−k are maximin and minimax
strategies, respectively.
Proof. (i) For every sˆk ∈ Sk and sˆ−k ∈ S−k, we have that
G(sˆ−k) := ess sup
sk∈Sk
V k(sk, sˆ−k) ≥ V k(sˆk, sˆ−k) ≥ ess inf
s−k∈S−k
V k(sˆk, s−k) =: H(sˆk),
and thus G(s−k) ≥ H(sk) for every sk and s−k. Consequently,
V
k
= ess inf
s−k∈S−k
ess sup
sk∈Sk
V k(sk, s−k) = ess inf
s−k∈S−k
G(s−k)
≥ ess sup
sk∈Sk
H(sk) = ess sup
sk∈Sk
ess inf
s−k∈S−k
V k(sk, s−k) = V k.
(ii) If condition (1.3) holds then
V k(σk, σ−k) = ess sup
sk∈Sk
V k(sk, σ−k) ≥ ess inf
s−k∈S−k
ess sup
sk∈Sk
V k(sk, s−k) = V k.
(iii) If condition (1.4) holds then
V k(σk, σ−k) = ess inf
s−k∈S−k
V k(σk, s−k) ≤ ess sup
sk∈Sk
ess inf
s−k∈S−k
V k(sk, s−k) = V k.
(iv) If both conditions (1.3) and (1.4) hold, then by (ii) and (iii),
V k ≥ V k(σ) ≥ V k.
In view of (i), we thus obtain the equality V k(σ) = V
k
= V k.
(v) Combining (iv) with condition (1.6), we have,
V k(σk, s−k) ≥ V k(σk, σ−k) = V k, ∀ s−k ∈ S−k,
V k(sk, σ−k) ≤ V k(σk, σ−k) = V k, ∀ sk ∈ Sk.
Hence σk and σ−k are maximin and minimax strategies, respectively.
Proposition 1.11(i) and (iv) motivate the following definition.
Definition 1.12 (Value). If the equality V
k
= V k holds, then V ∗k := V k = V k is the
value of the game for player k.
Since the equality is not necessarily achieved in Proposition 1.11(i), the existence of
the value is not guaranteed. But by Proposition 1.11(iv), the existence of an optimal
equilibrium implies the existence of the value.
1.2. Solution Concepts 11
Corollary 1.13. (i) If the value exists, then it is unique.
(ii) If there exists an optimal equilibrium σ, then the value exists for all players and
V (σ) = V ∗ = (V ∗1, . . . , V ∗m).
(iii) Every optimal equilibrium achieves the same value.
Proof. Part (i) is implicit in Definition 1.12 and part (ii) follows immediately from Propo-
sition 1.11(iv). Finally part (iii) follows immediately from (i) and (ii).
As illustrated by Corollary 1.13, the value and optimal equilibria have strong but de-
sirable properties. In the study of games from this point onwards, we shall aim to identify
the existence of the value and optimal equilibria whenever possible.
1.2.2 Zero-Sum Games and Coalition Value
Zero-sum games are often used to model situations where the total benefit of the players
are fixed. This is especially important in the context of financial options, where the total
cash flow is zero-sum. We shall present some preliminary results on this class of games.
Definition 1.14. A game is called zero-sum if VM(s) =
∑
i∈M V
i(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S.
In the class of zero-sum games, further properties can be derived.
Proposition 1.15. Suppose the game is zero-sum. Let σ be any strategy profile, the fol-
lowing are equivalent:
(i) For each k ∈M, V k(σk, σ−k) ≤ V k(σk, s−k) for all s−k ∈ S−k.
(ii) For any proper subset N ⊂M, V N (σN , σ−N ) ≤ V N (σN , s−N ) for all s−N ∈ S−N .
(iii) For any proper subset N ⊂M, V N (σN , σ−N ) ≥ V N (sN , σ−N ) for all sN ∈ SN .
(iv) The strategy profile σ is an optimal equilibrium.
Proof. [(i) =⇒ (ii)] Intuitively, if each player k ∈ N can guarantee his payoff by using σk,
then collectively, the players of N can guarantee their total payoff by playing σN . Since
for all s−N ∈ S−N we have (σN\{k}, s−N ) ∈ S−k. By (i),
V k(σN , σ−N ) = V k(σk, σN\{k}, σ−N ) ≤ V k(σk, σN\{k}, s−N ) = V k(σN , s−N ). (1.9)
Summing (1.9) over k ∈ N , we have
V N (σN , σ−N ) =
∑
k∈N
V k(σN , σ−N ) ≤
∑
k∈N
V k(σN , s−N ) = V N (σN , s−N ),
as required.
[(ii) =⇒ (i)] This is immediate by setting N = {k}.
[(ii)⇐⇒ (iii)] Since the game is zero-sum, V N (s) = −V −N (s) for all s ∈ S. Hence
V N (σN , σ−N ) ≤ V N (σN , s−N ), ∀ s−N ∈ S−N ,
⇐⇒ −V −N (σN , σ−N ) ≤ −V −N (σN , s−N ), ∀ s−N ∈ S−N ,
⇐⇒ V −N (σN , σ−N ) ≥ V −N (σN , s−N ), ∀ s−N ∈ S−N . (1.10)
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Relabelling −N as N in (1.10) gives the desired result.
[(i) and (iii) =⇒ (iv)] From Definition 1.9, the definition of an optimal equilibrium, it is
sufficient to check (1.3)
V k(σk, σ−k) ≥ V k(sk, σ−k), ∀ sk ∈ Sk
and (1.4)
V k(σk, s−k) ≥ V k(σk, σ−k), ∀ s−k ∈ S−k.
This is clear as (i) is identical to (1.3), while (iii) reduces to (1.4) after setting N = {k}.
[(iv)⇐⇒ (i)] This is immediate from (1.4) in Definition 1.9.
Note that the equivalence between Proposition 1.15(i) and (ii) does not use the fact
that the game is zero-sum. Also Proposition 1.15(iii) implies (1.3), the Nash equilibrium
condition, but the converse does not hold. In other words, even in zero-sum games, not all
Nash equilibria are optimal equilibria.
So far the definition of value refers to the value of the game to each individual player.
But suppose some subset of players N ⊆ M is playing as a coalition or team, using the
aggregate payoff V N (s) =
∑
i∈N V
i(s). Then a natural way to define the value of the game
for N would be the quantity
V ∗N := ess sup
sN∈SN
ess inf
s−N∈S−N
V N (sN , s−N ) = ess inf
s−N∈S−N
ess sup
sN∈SN
V N (sN , s−N ),
assuming the equality exists in the first place. In general, the value does not necessarily
satisfy the additive property V ∗N =
∑
i∈N V
∗i. However, as the following propositions
shows, if optimal equilibria exist in a zero-sum game, then the additive property holds.
Proposition 1.16. Suppose the game has an optimal equilibrium σ ∈ S with value V ∗ =
V (σ). If either (i) the game is zero-sum, or (ii) VM(σ) = ess sups∈S VM(s), then for all
subsets N ⊆M, the coalition value V ∗N exists and satisfies the following equality,
V N (σ) =
∑
i∈N
V ∗i = V ∗N .
Proof. Since case (ii) includes the zero-sum case (i), it suffices to establish the result for
case (ii) only. Since σ is an optimal equilibrium, each player i ∈ M can guarantee the
payoff V i(σ), in other words,
V i(σ) = ess inf
s−i∈S−i
V i(σi, s−i).
So the players from N can play to guarantee V N (σ) by playing σN ,
V N (σ) =
∑
i∈N
ess inf
s−i∈S−i
V i(σi, s−i) ≤
∑
i∈N
V i(σN , s−N ) = V N (σN , s−N ), ∀ s−N ∈ S−N .
Hence
V N (σ) ≤ ess inf
s−N∈S−N
V N (σN , s−N ) ≤ ess sup
sN∈SN
ess inf
s−N∈S−N
V N (sN , s−N ). (1.11)
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Applying the same argument to the player set −N , they can also guarantee their payoff
V −N (σ),
V −N (σ) ≤ V −N (sN , σ−N ), ∀ sN ∈ SN .
Now by condition (ii) VM(σ) = ess sups∈S VM(s), we must have, for all sN ∈ SN ,
V N (σ) = VM(σ)− V −N (σ) ≥ VM(sN , σ−N )− V −N (sN , σ−N ) = V N (sN , σ−N ).
Hence
V N (σ) ≥ ess sup
sN∈SN
V N (sN , σ−N ) ≥ ess inf
s−N∈S−N
ess sup
sN∈SN
V N (sN , s−N ). (1.12)
Finally, the required result follows immediately by combining (1.11) and (1.12) with the
following fact (see Proposition 1.11(i)),
ess inf
s−N∈S−N
ess sup
sN∈SN
V N (sN , s−N ) ≥ ess sup
sN∈SN
ess inf
s−N∈S−N
V N (sN , s−N ),
completing the proof.
Consider the case of a two player zero-sum game, whereM = {1, 2} and V 1(s) = −V 2(s)
for all s ∈ S. The minimax value of one player is also the maximin value of the other,
because
V
1
= ess inf
s2∈S2
ess sup
s1∈S1
V 1(s1, s2) = ess sup
s1∈S1
ess inf
s2∈S2
(−V 1(s1, s2))
= ess sup
s1∈S1
ess inf
s2∈S2
V 2(s1, s2) = V 2.
Hence a strategy is a minimax strategy if and only if it is a maximin strategy. In other
words, if a player tries to guarantee a lower value on his payoff, he inadvertently enforces
an upper value on the other player’s payoff. Also there is another interesting feature of the
two player zero-sum game.
Proposition 1.17. In a two player zero-sum game, a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium
if and only if it is an optimal equilibrium.
Proof. By Proposition 1.15(iii) and (iv), σ is an optimal equilibrium if and only if, for all
proper subset N ⊂M,
V N (σN , σ−N ) ≥ V N (sN , σ−N ), ∀ sN ∈ SN . (1.13)
SinceM = {1, 2}, the only proper subsets are N = {1} and N = {2}. Hence (1.13) reduces
to the Nash equilibrium condition (1.3) exactly.
Recall from Theorem 1.8, every finite game with mixed strategy has a Nash equilibrium.
In view of Proposition 1.17 and Corollary 1.13, for two player zero-sum games, Nash’s
theorem implies John von Neumann’s minimax theorem [54].
Theorem 1.18 (Minimax Theorem). In any finite, two player, zero-sum game with mixed
strategies, there exists at least one optimal equilibrium and a unique value.
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1.2.3 Weakly Unilaterally Competitive (WUC) Games
In multi-player zero-sum games, the payoff of any particular player is not sufficient to de-
termine the other individual payoffs. Nash equilibria are not necessarily optimal equilibria,
and they may not achieve the same payoff. However, a result similar to the minimax the-
orem exists if the zero-sum condition is strengthened to weakly unilaterally competitive or
WUC, as described in Kats and Thisse [30] and De Wolf [10].
Definition 1.19 (Weakly Unilaterally Competitive). A game is said to be weakly unilat-
erally competitive or WUC if for any k, l ∈M:
V k(sk, s−k) > V k(σk, s−k) =⇒ V l(sk, s−k) ≤ V l(σk, s−k),
V k(sk, s−k) = V k(σk, s−k) =⇒ V l(sk, s−k) = V l(σk, s−k),
for all sk, σk ∈ Sk and s−k ∈ S−k.
WUC explicitly quantifies the concept of competitiveness. If any particular player
deviates from a strategy profile, any change to his payoff is opposite in sign to the changes
of other payoffs. Both Kats and Thisse [30] and De Wolf [10] proved the following theorem,
an analogue of the minimax theorem in multi-person, WUC settings.
Theorem 1.20. In a WUC game, if σ is a Nash equilibrium, then for all k ∈M,
ess inf
s−k∈S−k
V k(σk, s−k) = V k(σk, σ−k). (1.14)
Equivalently, σ is also an optimal equilibrium.
WUC is not a necessary condition for the existence of optimal equilibria, but it elim-
inates the possibilities of Nash equilibria achieving multiple values. WUC is a desirable
condition for the construction of our game.
1.3 Extensions
We end this chapter by briefly presenting various extensions of concepts introduced so far.
1.3.1 Continuous-Time Games
Stochastic games in continuous-time has been an active area of research for a long time,
often in the form of differential games. Unlike the discrete-time case, where we may induc-
tively define strategy and outcomes, there exist many pathological examples which pose
difficulties in the continuous-time realm. For example, if we simply allow a strategy to be
any non-anticipative map from histories to actions, then it is not necessarily true that the
resulting strategy profile can be ‘played out’ to form a well-defined outcome. A famous
example of this is the paradoxical ‘man and lion’ game (see Bolloba´s et al. [5]). In the ex-
isting literature, there are various approaches in handling this conundrum. Typically, the
strategies have to satisfy certain ‘time-independence’ or inertia properties (see for example,
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Bergin and MacLeod [2]), while the space of strategies is restricted to those, which lead to
a unique outcome.
The focus of this thesis is mostly on discrete-time games and continuous-time stopping
games (i.e., ‘simple’ classes of games). For this reason, we will only present a simplified
model of continuous-time games which is sufficient for our purposes.
Most of the notations and conventions can be borrowed from the discrete-time case. We
will only highlight the main differences in the continuous-time case. Begin with a filtered
probability space (Ω,F,P) where the filtration F = {Ft : t ∈ [0, T ]} satisfies the usual
conditions. Note that here t takes value in the continuous interval [0, T ]. Consider a game
G with a player set given by M = {1, 2, . . . ,m}.
Once again, we have the space of actions A = ∏i∈MAi and outcomes H = ∏i∈MHi.
Each Ai is a discrete and countable set, representing the available actions to player i at any
time. Similar to Definition 1.1, the outcome hi ∈ Hi is an F-adapted process which takes
values in Ai. We now make the first assumption specific to the continuous-time case.
Assumption 1.21. Every outcome hi ∈ Hi, where i ∈M, is a right-continuous process.
To see why Assumption 1.21 is sensible, consider a stopping game whose action space
Ai consists of ‘stop’ and ‘continue’. The right-continuity ensures that
τ i = inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : hit = stop}
is a well-defined stopping time.
Much like the discrete-time case, some actions may be equivalent at certain times. We
again adopt the convention where the equalities and the uniqueness of outcomes automat-
ically take this equivalence into consideration. Now the notations hN ,HN , h[0,t), h[0,t] are
defined in the obvious way. The notions of H-adapted and H-predictable are defined as
follows. Suppose f :H× [0, T ]×Ω→ S is a random mapping onto some measurable set S.
• The mapping is non-anticipative in H or H-adapted if for all h, h′ ∈ H and t ∈ [0, T ],
we have the following:
On the event
{
h[0,t] = h
′
[0,t]
}
, ft(h) = ft(h
′), a.s..
• The mapping is H-predictable if for all h, h′ ∈ H and t ∈ [0, T ], we have the following:
On the event
{
h[0,t) = h
′
[0,t)
}
, ft(h) = ft(h
′), a.s..
The next step is to define the space of strategy profiles S = ∏i∈M Si. Similar to
Definition 1.2, for each player i ∈ M, the strategy si ∈ Si is an F-adapted, H-predictable
mapping from the outcomes to the actions, si :H×[0, T ]×Ω→ Ai. In order to be compatible
with Assumption 1.21 as well as avoiding any potential pathologies, we have to make sure
that each strategy profile corresponds to a unique right-continuous outcome.
Assumption 1.22. For every strategy profile s ∈ S, there exists a unique outcome h ∈ H,
such that for all i ∈M and t ∈ [0, T ], sit(h) = hit almost surely. Let this unique outcome h
be the associated outcome of s, or h(s) := h.
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Fix a particular strategy profile s ∈ S. Denote by SNt (s) the set of strategies available
to the players N at time t, if s is played on the interval [0, t), in other words,
SNt (s) =
{
τ ∈ SN : h[0,t)(τ, s−N ) = h[0,t)(s)
} ⊆ SN .
From this point onwards, the remaining definitions are identical to the discrete-time
case. In particular, the definitions of termination time ϑ(s) and payoff function Vϑ(s) can
be found in Definitions 1.4 and 1.5 respectively. The treatment of stopping games can be
found in Section 1.1.1.
Finally, we emphasise that the formulation of continuous-time stochastic games pre-
sented in this subsection, which includes Assumptions 1.21 and 1.22, is not the most gen-
eral formulation possible. It simply represents a suitably large and well-behaved class of
continuous games that is adequate for the purpose of this thesis. In particular it con-
tains the two-person continuous-time stopping games from Chapter 2 and the multi-person
continuous-time games associated with general game contingent claims from Chapter 7.
1.3.2 Asymmetric Information
In any stochastic games, the decisions of the players are made based on the information
available to them. In a perfect information game, at any time t, all players have full
knowledge of Ft and h[0,t).
When discussing stochastic games, the terms ‘information’ and ‘knowledge’ may be
referring to the perception of several different notions: real-world randomness, individual
decision making process, observable player actions, rules and payoffs of the game, etc.
In this subsection, we propose an extended model which addresses information regarding
randomness governing the outcomes of the game and individual decision making. Note that
this extended model is only restricted to the discussion in this subsection. In the rest of
the thesis, we will only be using the standard model introduced in Section 1.1.
Redefine (Ω,F,P) to be the filtered probability space which includes both the random-
ness affecting the game mechanics as well as the players’ decision making processes. Note
that we will still assume that all actions are observable by everyone as soon as they are
made. First we define the filtration F∅ = {F∅t , t ∈ [0, T ]}, which captures the real-world
randomness. For each player i, let Fi = {F it , t ∈ [0, T ]} be the filtration capturing all
information available to player i. This includes observable real-world information (not
necessarily all of it) as well as any private information. We certainly have the inclusions
F∅t ⊆ Ft and F it ⊆ Ft for all t ∈ [0, T ], but in general the inclusions F∅t ⊆ F it or F it ⊆ F∅t
do not have to hold.
As mentioned earlier when defining strategies in Definition 1.2, a strategy is a map-
ping from the past outcomes to current actions. Strictly speaking, when playing the game,
player i only observes a particular outcome (i.e., deterministic) rather than the possible
outcomes over all sample paths ω ∈ Ω. Nevertheless in Definition 1.2, si is an F-adapted,
H-predictable map of the stochastic outcome h. This is perfectly fine in the case where
everyone has identical information, since the H-predictability enforces the required proper-
ties.
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In the current framework where the information is asymmetric, the map sit(h) should
intuitively be F it -measurable since it is based on the information player i has at time t. But
since the stochastic outcome h depends on the information of all players, some of which
aren’t available to player i, the Ft-measurable outcome h will not be F it -measurable. By
treating sit(h) as a function of the stochastic outcome h, it is difficult to impose the desired
F it -measurability.
Instead we will redefine strategies as a function of deterministic outcomes, which as
mentioned is perhaps a more accurate way of defining strategies in the first place. For this
purpose, introduce H˜ ⊆ H as the set of all deterministic outcomes. Since deterministic
outcomes are just sequences of actions, one may view it as H˜ = A[0,T ]. Termination time
and payoff will also be redefined in terms of H˜.
Definition 1.23 (Asymmetric Information). A game with asymmetric information may be
defined by making the following modifications to the stochastic game introduced in Section
1.1.
The strategy si : H˜ × [0, T ] × Ω → Ai is an Fi-adapted, H˜-predictable mapping, where
H˜-predictable means that for all h, h′ ∈ H˜ and t ∈ [0, T ],
h[0,t−1] = h′[0,t−1] =⇒ sit(h) = sit(h′), a.s.. (1.15)
This definition is naturally extended to stochastic outcomes h ∈ H, where sit(h, ω) :=
sit(h(ω), ω). The associated outcome h(s) is defined as before.
The termination time ϑ : H˜×Ω→ [0, T ] is a mapping such that the function I(h, t, ω) :=
1{ϑ(h,ω)≤t} is an F∅-adapted and H˜-adapted mapping. This means that for all h ∈ H˜, ϑ(h) is
an F∅-stopping time. For stochastic outcomes h ∈ H, we may define ϑ(h, ω) := ϑ(h(ω), ω).
Since h is F-adapted, ϑ(h, ·) is an F-stopping time.
The payoff function Vϑ : H˜×Ω→ Rm is a mapping such that Vϑ(h) is F∅ϑ(h)-measurable
and for any h, h′ ∈ H˜
On the event
{
ϑ(h) = ϑ(h′), h[0,ϑ(h)] = h[0,ϑ(h′)]
}
, Vϑ(h) = Vϑ(h
′), a.s..
This definition is extended to stochastic outcomes h ∈ H via Vϑ(h, ω) := Vϑ(h(ω), ω).
For any strategy profile s ∈ S and the associated outcome h(s) ∈ H, write ϑ(s) =
ϑ(h(s)) and Vϑ(s) = Vϑ(h(s)). Note that Vϑ(s) is Fϑ(s)-measurable.
Recall that with asymmetric information, individual players do not observe F. Since
the termination time ϑ(s) is an F-stopping time and the payoff Vϑ(s) is Fϑ-measurable, the
players do not fully observe these quantities. In order to resolve the payoffs, the termination
of the game and the payoffs must be revealed to all players once ϑ(s) is reached. For the
purpose of analysing player behaviours and equilibria, it makes sense to only consider the
expected payoffs from the perspectives of the partially ‘blind’ players. In particular, the
expected payoff of player i, is given by EP
(
Vϑ(s)
∣∣F it) at time t.
So far, the model presented involves defining a personalised filtration for each player.
Some possible ways of further extending the information asymmetry include defining per-
sonalised termination times, payoff functions and probability measures, representing their
respective appearances under the perceptions of individual players. Much of these concepts
and scenarios require further research.
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1.3.3 Mixed Strategies
It is possible to model a game with mixed strategies or randomised strategies as a special case
of the asymmetric information game, as per Definition 1.23. We consider the simple case
where the real world randomness is observable by all players, but individual randomisation
of strategies may not be. With mixed or randomised strategies, instead of choosing a
specific action, each player assigns a probability measure over the possible actions, and
then determine the action through some process of randomisation. Strictly speaking, these
individual randomisations may be correlated to real world events or even to each other, for
example when two players make their decisions based on the same flip of a coin.
One possible formulation is to define the strategy si as a mapping to Λi where Λi is the
space of all probability measures on Ai. The payoff is then defined to be the expectation
of the true payoff under the measure chosen from
∏
i∈M Λ
i. But instead of introducing
these probability measures on Ai, we will simply enlarge the probability space (Ω,F,P) to
include all individual randomisations.
Recall that the filtration F∅ represents the real-world randomness governing the game
mechanics. Since this is assumed to be observable by all players, we have, for each t ∈ [0, T ],
F∅t ⊆ F it ⊆ Ft.
Furthermore, Ft is the refinement Ft =
∨
i∈MF it . Note that F i0 (and hence F0) may not
be {∅,Ω} since individual randomisations can take place even at time 0.
When discussing mixed strategy games, the term expected payoff usually refers to the
quantity
V˜t(s) = EP
(
Vϑ(s)
∣∣F∅t ).
This can also be seen as the expected payoff to members of the public who observe F∅. How-
ever, to each player i, the appropriate expected payoff at time t is once again EP
(
Vϑ(s)
∣∣F it).
A pure strategy from player i is a strategy which is independent to any personal ran-
domisation. In other words, a pure strategy s˜i : H˜ × [0, T ] × Ω → Ai is an F∅-adapted
(instead of Fi-adapted), H˜-predictable mapping. It has the property
EP
(
Vϑ(s˜
i, s−i)
∣∣F∅T ) = EP(Vϑ(s˜i, s−i)∣∣F iT ), ∀ s−i ∈ S−i.
If the entire strategy profile s˜ consists of only pure strategies, then s˜ is a pure strategy
profile. The payoff of a pure strategy profile Vϑ(s˜) is F∅T -measurable.
It is well-known that expected payoff of a mixed strategy lies in the convex hull of pure
strategy payoffs. Due to this, any pure strategy Nash (or optimal) equilibrium is also a
mixed strategy Nash (or optimal) equilibrium. Hence the value of a pure strategy game is
also the value of its mixed strategy extension. Although in general, unlike mixed strategies
(see Theorem 1.8), pure strategy Nash equilibria are not guaranteed to exist. In the rest of
the thesis, we shall on focus on finding equilibria in pure strategies.
Chapter2
Two-Player Stopping Games
A Dynkin game, first introduced by Dynkin [13], is a zero-sum, stochastic stopping game
between two players where either player can stop the game at any time for an observable
payoff. Much research has been done in this field as well as various related problems, for
example, [9, 14, 21, 33, 42, 48, 50, 51, 53]. One interesting application of Dynkin games is
in two-person game contingent claims. The two-person game contingent claim is defined
by Kifer [31], who also proved the existence and uniqueness of its arbitrage price.1 Further
works, such as Hamade`ne and Zhang [21] and Kallsen and Ku¨hn [25], studied various
techniques in its pricing.
Typically the Dynkin game is associated with the payoff processes X,Y and Z. In
particular, the payoff is given by X if the max-player stops first, Y if the min-player stops
first, and Z if both players stop at the same time. Standard Dynkin games, commonly
studied in literature, refer to cases where the inequality X ≤ Z ≤ Y is satisfied. This
chapter will present some new results for general Dynkin games, whose payoff processes are
in arbitrary positions.
Sections 2.1.1 and 2.2.1 examines the standard Dynkin game in a discrete-time set-up.
Well-known results addressing the existence and uniqueness of value as well as optimal
stopping times are presented in Propositions 2.5 and 2.20. In Sections 2.1.2 and 2.2.2, we
establish some original results for the general Dynkin game in both discrete and continuous-
time settings. In particular, the main results are Theorems 2.16 and 2.32, which provide
sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of value and optimal stopping times.
The same conditions are then shown to be necessary for the existence of value in all possible
subgames.
The theory of two-person non-zero-sum Dynkin games is not included here. We instead
refer the reader to Hamade`ne and Zhang [21], Hamade`ne and Hassani [18], Ohtsubo [39, 40],
and Shmaya and Solan [49] for some partial results in this area.
1See Section 6.3 for more details.
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2.1 Discrete-Time Dynkin Games
We first present in Section 2.1.1 the classic results on discrete-time zero-sum Dynkin games.
Subsequently, in Section 2.1.2, we attempt to provide a complete solution to the problem
of existence of a Nash equilibrium for the general zero-sum Dynkin game. It should be
stressed that we only deal with stopping games with a finite time horizon; a large body of
the existing literature is devoted to stopping games with infinite time horizon and thus also
with possibly infinite optimal stopping times.
We will first examine zero-sum stopping games with the random payoff given by
R(τ, σ) = 1{τ<σ}Xτ + 1{σ<τ} Yσ + 1{σ=τ} Zσ, (2.1)
where X,Y and Z are F-adapted and integrable processes. The random times τ and σ are
chosen from the class T[0,T ] of F-stopping times and they are interpreted as the respective
stopping strategies of two players, as was already mentioned in Remark 1.6.
Remark 2.1. By assumption, τ, σ ≤ T and thus the values of XT and YT are irrelevant in
what follows. Therefore, without loss of generality, we adopt the common convention that
XT = ZT = YT .
The following definition deals with the discrete-time case, but its extension to the
continuous-time framework is immediate.
Definition 2.2. For any fixed date t = 0, 1, . . . , T , by the Dynkin game DGt(X,Y, Z)
started at time t and associated with the payoff R(τ, σ), we mean a zero-sum two-person
stochastic game in which the goal of the max-player, who controls a stopping time τt ∈ T[t,T ],
is to maximise the conditional expectation
EP(R(τt, σt) | Ft), (2.2)
while the min-player, controlling a stopping time σt ∈ T[t,T ], wishes to minimise the condi-
tional expectation (2.2). Also denote by DG(X,Y, Z) the family of Dynkin games associated
with R(τ, σ).
For any fixed t and arbitrary stopping times τt and σt from the class T[t,T ], formula (2.1)
yields
EP(R(τt, σt) | Ft) = EP
( T∑
u=t
(
1{u=τt<σt}Xu + 1{u=σt<τt} Yu + 1{u=σt=τt} Zu
) ∣∣∣Ft). (2.3)
We are interested in finding the value process V ∗ of DG(X,Y, Z), that is, an F-adapted
process such that, for all t = 0, 1, . . . , T ,
V ∗t = ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
EP(R(τt, σt) | Ft) = ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
EP(R(τt, σt) | Ft).
In addition, we search for a corresponding Nash (hence also optimal) equilibrium, that is,
any pair (τ∗t , σ∗t ) of optimal stopping times satisfying
V ∗t = EP(R(τ∗t , σ∗t ) | Ft).
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2.1.1 Standard Dynkin Game
We first present well-known results for the special class of two-person, zero-sum stopping
games in the discrete-time framework (see Neveu [37]).
Definition 2.3. By the standard Dynkin game SDG(X,Y, Z), we mean the stochastic
stopping game associated with the payoff R given by (2.1) with processes X,Y and Z
satisfying the following condition: X ≤ Z ≤ Y .
The following definitions introduces candidates for the value process of the standard
zero-sum Dynkin game and the optimal stopping times.
Definition 2.4. The process V is defined by setting VT = ZT and, for any t = 0, 1, . . . , T−1,
Vt = min
{
Yt, max
{
Xt,EP(Vt+1 | Ft)
}}
= max
{
Xt, min
{
Yt,EP(Vt+1 | Ft)
}}
. (2.4)
Furthermore, we set, for any fixed t = 0, 1, . . . , T ,
τ∗t := min
{
u ∈ {t, t+ 1, . . . , T} |Vu = Xu
}
, (2.5)
σ∗t := min
{
u ∈ {t, t+ 1, . . . , T} |Vu = Yu
}
. (2.6)
The assumption that X ≤ Z ≤ Y immediately implies that the second equality in (2.4)
holds and, for t = 0, 1, . . . , T ,
Xt ≤ Vt ≤ Yt, (2.7)
so that the process V is bounded below X and above by Y . The stopping times τ∗t and
σ∗t capture the first moment V hits the lower and upper boundaries, respectively, starting
from time t. Obviously, if V is the value process then we also must have, for t = 0, 1, . . . , T ,
Vt = EP
(
R(τ∗t , σ
∗
t ) | Ft
)
.
The following classic result shows that the process V given by (2.4) is indeed equal
to the value process V ∗ of SDG(X,Y, Z). Recall that we work here under the standing
assumption that X ≤ Z ≤ Y ; this condition will be relaxed in the foregoing subsection.
Proposition 2.5. (i) Let the process V and the stopping times τ∗t , σ∗t be given by Definition
2.4. Then we have, for arbitrary stopping times τt, σt ∈ T[t,T ],
EP
(
R(τ∗t , σt) | Ft
) ≥ Vt ≥ EP(R(τt, σ∗t ) | Ft), (2.8)
and thus also
EP
(
R(τ∗t , σt) | Ft
) ≥ EP(R(τ∗t , σ∗t ) | Ft) ≥ EP(R(τt, σ∗t ) | Ft).
Hence (τ∗t , σ∗t ) is a Nash equilibrium of the standard Dynkin game SDGt(X,Y, Z).
(ii) The process V is the value process of the game SDG(X,Y, Z), that is, for every t =
0, 1, . . . , T ,
Vt = ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σt) | Ft
)
= EP
(
R(τ∗t , σ
∗
t ) | Ft
)
= ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σt) | Ft
)
= V ∗t ,
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and thus τ∗t and σ∗t are optimal stopping times as of time t. In particular, V ∗T = ZT and
for any t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1,
V ∗t = min
{
Yt, max
{
Xt,EP(V ∗t+1 | Ft)
}}
. (2.9)
Proof. (i) We apply the backward induction. The inequalities (2.8) clearly hold for t = T .
Assume that (2.8) holds for some t, that is, for arbitrary τt, σt ∈ T[t,T ],
EP
(
R(τ∗t , σt) | Ft
) ≥ Vt ≥ EP(R(τt, σ∗t ) | Ft). (2.10)
We wish to prove that, for arbitrary τt−1, σt−1 ∈ T[t−1,T ],
EP
(
R(τ∗t−1, σt−1) | Ft−1
) ≥ Vt−1 ≥ EP(R(τt−1, σ∗t−1) | Ft−1). (2.11)
There are essentially two cases, which are dealt with using different arguments.
• First, if the game is stopped at time t−1, then the result can be deduced by analysing
the relative sizes of processes X,Y, Z and V at time t.
• Second, if the game is not stopped at time t− 1, then the analysis is reduced to the
time t case, which is covered by the induction hypothesis.
Note that since the game is symmetric between the two players, it suffices to establish the
upper inequality of (2.11). The lower inequality can be shown using analogous arguments.
For any τt−1, σt−1 ∈ T[t−1,T ], let us write τ˜t−1 := τt−1 ∨ t, σ˜t−1 := σt−1 ∨ t, so that the
stopping times τ˜t−1 and σ˜t−1 belong to T[t,T ].
We proceed to the proof of the upper inequality in (2.11), beginning with the case where
the game is stopped at time t− 1. On the event {τ∗t−1 = t− 1},
EP
(
R(τ∗t−1, σt−1) | Ft−1
)
= 1{σt−1>t}Xt−1 + 1{σt−1=t}Zt−1 ≥ Xt−1 = Vt−1. (2.12)
On the event {σt−1 = t− 1 < τ∗t−1}, using (2.7), we obtain
EP
(
R(τ∗t−1, σt−1) | Ft−1
)
= Yt−1 ≥ Vt−1. (2.13)
Now for the case where the game is not stopped at time t−1. On the event {τ∗t−1∧σt−1 ≥ t},
it follows from Definition 2.4 that τ∗t−1 = τ˜∗t−1 = τ∗t and Vt−1 > Xt−1, and thus
Vt−1 = min
{
Yt−1,EP
(
Vt | Ft−1
)}
. (2.14)
Hence
EP
(
R(τ∗t−1, σt−1) | Ft−1
)
= EP
(
R(τ˜∗t−1, σ˜t−1) | Ft−1
)
= EP
(
EP(R(τ∗t , σ˜t−1) | Ft
) | Ft−1)
≥ EP
(
Vt | Ft−1
)
(2.15)
≥ min{Yt−1,EP(Vt | Ft−1)}
= Vt−1. (2.16)
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Note that inequality (2.15) follows from the induction hypothesis (2.10), while equality
(2.16) is an immediate consequence of (2.14). After combining (2.12), (2.13) and (2.16),
we obtain the upper inequality of (2.11). As mentioned before, the lower inequality can be
(2.11) established by symmetry. The induction is then complete and thus statement (i) is
proven.
(ii) We observe that, from (2.8), the pair (τ∗t , σ∗t ) is a Nash equilibrium of SDGt(X,Y, Z).
Therefore, the process V satisfies Vt = EP
(
R(τ∗t , σ∗t ) | Ft
)
and thus it is the value process
of the standard zero-sum Dynkin game SDG(X,Y, Z). Equality 2.9 now follows easily.
Remark 2.6. It can be easily checked from Definition 2.4 that the stopped process V τ
∗
t ∧σ∗t
is an F-martingale on the time interval [t, T ].
2.1.2 General Dynkin Game
We will now discuss possible generalisations of the standard zero-sum Dynkin game, while
still maintaining the zero-sum property of the game. Specifically, we consider the zero-sum
Dynkin game associated with the random payoff R given by
R(τ, σ) = 1{τ<σ}Xτ + 1{σ<τ} Yσ + 1{σ=τ} Zσ, (2.17)
where X,Y and Z are F-adapted, integrable processes. Note that we no longer impose any
addition assumptions on their relative sizes (such as X ≤ Z ≤ Y ), and thus we deal here
with a general Dynkin game GDG(X,Y, Z). As in Remark 2.1, without loss of generality,
we may and do assume that XT = YT = ZT .
As in the previous section, since the game is zero-sum, by Proposition 1.17, all Nash
equilibria are also optimal equilibria. However, since the processes X,Y and Z are now
unrestricted, it is easy to construct a Dynkin game without a Nash equilibrium. Our aim in
this subsection is to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the following property:
For all t = 0, 1, . . . , T , the Dynkin game GDGt(X,Y, Z) admits a Nash equilibrium.
(2.18)
The idea is to emulate the progression of the previous subsection, while replacing the
inequalities X ≤ Z ≤ Y by a general set of sufficient conditions. When analysing the
existence of a Nash equilibrium, we will employ the backward induction argument, as we
did in the proof of Proposition 2.5. The key argument thus boils down to the thorough
analysis of the embedded single period game, which starts at time t and is either stopped
immediately or it is terminated on the next date.
To motivate the construction of the value process candidate in Definition 2.9, let us
temporarily assume there exists a value process V ∗ for the Dynkin game with the payoff
process R given by (2.17). Also, let τ∗t , σ∗t be any pair of optimal stopping times for the
game starting at time t, so that
V ∗t = EP(R(τ∗t , σ∗t ) | Ft). (2.19)
Let us denote Pt := EP
(
V ∗t+1 | Ft
)
. The next lemma deals with the single period embedded
game.
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Lemma 2.7. The Nash equilibrium property of a pair (τ∗t , σ∗t ) of stopping times is equivalent
to the following conditions:
Yt ≤ V ∗t = Zt ≤ Xt on {τ∗t = t, σ∗t = t},
Pt ≤ V ∗t = Xt ≤ Zt on {τ∗t = t, σ∗t > t},
Zt ≤ V ∗t = Yt ≤ Pt on {τ∗t > t, σ∗t = t},
Xt ≤ V ∗t = Pt ≤ Yt on {τ∗t > t, σ∗t > t}.
Proof. We note that, when written out in full according to definition (2.17) of R, there are
four cases to examine:
V ∗t = Zt on {τ∗t = t, σ∗t = t},
V ∗t = Xt on {τ∗t = t, σ∗t > t},
V ∗t = Yt on {τ∗t > t, σ∗t = t},
V ∗t = Pt on {τ∗t > t, σ∗t > t}.
The stated conditions now follow easily from the definition of the Nash equilibrium.
Let us write Lt := Zt ∧Xt and Ut := Yt ∨ Zt, so that Lt ≤ Zt ≤ Ut for t = 0, 1, . . . , T .
Lemma 2.8. Assume that V ∗ is the value process for GDG(X,Y, Z) and τ∗t , σ∗t are optimal
stopping times for GDGt(X,Y, Z). Then:
(i) Lt ≤ V ∗t ≤ Ut;
(ii) V ∗t = Lt on {τ∗t = t} and V ∗t = Ut on {σ∗t = t};
(iii) Lt ≤ EP
(
V ∗t+1 | Ft
) ≤ Ut on the event {τ∗t ∧ σ∗t > t}.
Proof. From Lemma 2.7, we deduce easily that V ∗t is always bounded below by Lt := Zt∧Xt
and from above by Ut := Yt∨Zt, so that part (i) is valid. This makes sense intuitively since
Xt and Zt (−Yt and −Zt, resp.) are the possible payoffs of the max-player (the min-player,
resp.) if he stops at time t. Parts (ii) and (iii) also follow easily from Lemma 2.7.
We note that these behaviours of L,U, V ∗, τ∗t , σ∗t are reminiscent of Definition 2.4 if
processes X and Y are replaced by L and U , respectively. This observation furnishes a
strong motivation for the following definition.
Definition 2.9. The process V is defined by setting VT = ZT and, for any t = 0, 1, . . . , T−1,
Vt := min
{
Ut, max
{
Lt,EP(Vt+1 | Ft)
}}
= max
{
Lt, min
{
Ut,EP(Vt+1 | Ft)
}}
, (2.20)
where L := X ∧ Z and U := Y ∨ Z. For any fixed t = 0, 1, . . . , T , the stopping times τ∗
and σ∗ from ∈ T[t,T ] are given by
τ∗t := min
{
u ∈ {t, t+ 1, . . . , T} |Vu = Lu
}
, (2.21)
σ∗t := min
{
u ∈ {t, t+ 1, . . . , T} |Vu = Uu
}
. (2.22)
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In the remainder of this section, the process V and stopping times τ∗t , σ∗t are as specified
by Definition 2.9. To justify Definition 2.9, we will show in Lemma 2.10 that the process V
given by (2.20) is in fact the unique candidate for the value process of the general zero-sum
Dynkin game GDG(X,Y, Z). Of course, the existence of the value process for GDG(X,Y, Z)
is not yet ensured and in fact some additional conditions are needed to achieve this goal
(see Assumption 2.11).
Since L ≤ Z ≤ U , it is clear that the second equality in (2.20) holds and, for t =
0, 1, . . . , T ,
Lt ≤ Vt ≤ Ut. (2.23)
Let the modified payoff R˜ be given by the following expression
R˜(τ, σ) := 1{τ<σ} Lτ + 1{σ<τ} Uσ + 1{σ=τ} Zσ. (2.24)
Then the analysis of the previous section shows that
Vt = EP
(
R˜(τ∗t , σ
∗
t ) | Ft
)
, (2.25)
and Proposition 2.5 implies that (τ∗t , σ∗t ) is a Nash equilibrium of the standard zero-sum
Dynkin game SDGt(L,U, Z) associated with the payoff process R˜. Obviously, this does not
mean that they also provide solution to the general zero-sum Dynkin game GDG(X,Y, Z)
with the payoff process R. Nevertheless, the following lemma shows that V is the appro-
priate candidate of the value process for GDG(X,Y, Z).
Lemma 2.10. For t = 0, 1, . . . , T , the following properties are valid:
(i) For any fixed τt, σt ∈ T[t,T ], there exist τ̂t, σ̂t ∈ T[t,T ] such that
R(τ̂t, σt) ≥ R˜(τt, σt) ≥ R(τt, σ̂t). (2.26)
(ii) The variable Vt lies between the minimax and the maximin values of GDGt(X,Y, Z) so
that
ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σt) | Ft
) ≥ Vt ≥ ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σt) | Ft
)
. (2.27)
(iii) If the GDGt(X,Y, Z) has a value then it equals to Vt.
Proof. (i) We will only prove the upper inequality of (2.26), as the lower inequalities follows
by symmetry. To choose a stopping time τ̂ such that R(τ̂t, σt) ≥ R˜(τt, σt), we first compare
R(τt, σt) and R˜(τt, σt). On the following events, R(τt, σt) ≥ R˜(τt, σt) is automatically
satisfied.
{τt = σt}, R(τt, σt) = Zτt = R˜(τt, σt);
{τt < σt}, R(τt, σt) = Xτt ≥ Lτt = R˜(τt, σt);
{σt < τt, Yσt ≥ Zσt}, R(τt, σt) = Yσt = Uσt = R˜(τt, σt).
The problem arises on the event {σt < τt, Zσt > Yσt}, since then
R(τt, σt) = Yσt < Uσt = R˜(τt, σt).
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Let us modify τ by setting
τ̂ = σt1{σt<τt,Zσt>Yσt} + τt
(
1− 1{σt<τt,Zσt>Yσt}
)
.
Then τ̂ is indeed an F-stopping time, since the event {σt < τt, Zσt > Yσt} belongs to Fσt∧τt .
Furthermore, on the event {σt < τt, Zσt > Yσt} we have that
R(τ̂t, σt) = R(σt, σt) = Zσt = Uσt = R˜(τt, σt)
and thus for the stopping time τ̂ the left-hand side inequality in (2.26) is satisfied.
(ii) Again, we only show the upper inequality of (2.27). By Proposition 2.5, Vt is the value
of SDGt(L,U,Z) associated with R˜. Let (τ
∗
t , σ
∗
t ) be a Nash equilibrium of SDGt(L,U, Z).
Hence we have, for any σt ∈ T[t,T ],
EP
(
R˜(τ∗t , σt) | Ft
) ≥ EP(R˜(τ∗t , σ∗t ) | Ft) = Vt.
By part (i), there exists τ̂t ∈ T[t,T ] such that R(τ̂t, σt) ≥ R˜(τ∗t , σt). Consequently,
ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σt) | Ft
) ≥ EP(R(τ̂t, σt) | Ft) ≥ EP(R˜(τ∗t , σt) | Ft) ≥ Vt. (2.28)
Since (2.28) holds for all σt ∈ T[t,T ], we must have
ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σt) | Ft
) ≥ Vt,
as required.
(iii) By the definition of the value (see Definition 1.12), if there exists a value V ∗t for
GDGt(X,Y, Z), it must satisfy
V ∗t = ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σt) | Ft
)
= ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σt) | Ft
)
. (2.29)
In view of part (ii), we conclude that necessarily V ∗t = Vt.
Even though V is the unique value process candidate for GDG(X,Y, Z), the existence
of the value process has not been established. There are two major obstacles to overcome
when attempting to apply the backward induction argument similar to Proposition 2.5 on
the payoff process R.
First, it is not necessarily true that Vt = EP
(
R(τ∗t , σ∗t ) | Ft
)
. In particular, this equality
fails to hold if either of the following occurs:
Zτ∗t = Vτ∗t < Xτ∗t ∧ Yτ∗t on the event {τ∗t < σ∗t }, (2.30)
Zσ∗t = Vσ∗t > Xσ∗t ∨ Yσ∗t on the event {σ∗t < τ∗t }. (2.31)
Second, it is possible that V fails to satisfy any of the necessary conditions on V ∗ established
in Lemma 2.7. An exhaustive check shows that the exceptions are:
Zt ≤ Vt < Xt ∧ Yt, (2.32)
Zt ≥ Vt > Xt ∨ Yt. (2.33)
It is crucial to observe that the undesirable scenarios may only occur when V is either
greater than X ∨ Y or less than X ∧ Y . Therefore, it is natural to introduce the following
additional assumption.
2.1. Discrete-Time Dynkin Games 27
Assumption 2.11. Let X,Y and Z be F-adapted integrable processes and let the associ-
ated process V be given as in Definition 2.9. We postulate that the processes X,Y and V
satisfy, for t = 0, 1, . . . , T ,
Xt ∧ Yt ≤ Vt ≤ Xt ∨ Yt. (2.34)
Assumption 2.11 certainly eliminates the scenarios described in (2.30)–(2.33). Since
V is defined in terms of X,Y and Z, this is really an assumption on X,Y and Z, albeit
its form is somewhat convoluted, since it also refers to formula (2.20). In the foregoing
example, we provide some more explicit conditions that entail Assumption 2.11.
Example 2.12. (i) Let us first consider the conditions from the previous section: XT =
ZT = YT and X ≤ Z ≤ Y . In view of (2.23), it is clear that Assumption 2.11 is satisfied
since L = X = X ∧ Y and U = Y = X ∨ Y . This shows that Assumption 2.11 covers the
case of the standard zero-sum Dynkin game.
(ii) Suppose X,Y and Z satisfy XT = ZT = YT and, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
Xt ∧ Yt > Zt =⇒ Xt ∧ Yt ≤ EP
(
Xt+1 ∧ Ut+1 | Ft
)
,
Xt ∨ Yt < Zt =⇒ Xt ∨ Yt ≥ EP
(
Lt+1 ∨ Yt+1 | Ft
)
.
One can check that Assumption 2.11 is satisfied.
(iii) It should be acknowledged that various generalisations of the standard Dynkin game
were studied in the literature. In particular, Ohtsubo [39] examined the zero-sum Dynkin
game with an infinite time horizon under the assumption that
Xt ∧ Yt ≤ Zt ≤ Xt ∨ Yt. (2.35)
Once again, we see that if (2.35) holds then Assumption 2.11 is satisfied. He established the
existence of a Nash equilibrium for the game starting at any date t under the assumption
that (Xt) and (Yt) are mutually independent sequences of i.i.d. random variables (see
Corollary 3.2 in [39]).
As a special case, Ohtsubo [39] considered also the game with the payoff
R(τ, σ) := 1{τ<σ}Xτ + 1{σ≤τ} Yσ
for arbitrary F-adapted, integrable processes X and Y . Since here Z = Y , so that L = X∧Y
and U = Y , it follows easily from (2.23) that Assumption 2.11 is satisfied. It can be
deduced from Proposition 3.1 in [39] that in the finite horizon case the game admits a Nash
equilibrium and the value process V ∗ satisfies: V ∗T = YT = ZT and, for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1,
V ∗t = Yt 1{Yt≤Xt} + min
{
Yt, max
{
Xt,EP(V ∗t+1 | Ft)
}}
1{Yt>Xt}. (2.36)
This result can be seen as a special case of Proposition 2.14, since for Y = Z equation
(2.20) becomes: VT = ZT = ZT and
Vt := min
{
Yt, max
{
Xt ∧ Yt,EP(Vt+1 | Ft)
}}
,
which indeed coincides with (2.36), so that V = V ∗ where V ∗ is given by (2.36).
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Sufficiency of Assumption 2.11
Our goal is to demonstrate that Assumption 2.11 is the necessary and sufficient condition
for (2.18) to hold. We start by examining the sufficiency of Assumption 2.11. To this end,
we first prove an auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 2.13. Under Assumption 2.11, for each t = 0, 1, . . . , T , the process V satisfies:
(i) {Vt > Yt} ⊆ {τ∗t = t} and {Vt < Xt} ⊆ {σ∗t = t};
(ii) Vt = EP
(
R(τ∗t , σ∗t ) | Ft
)
.
Proof. (i) For the first inclusion, let us suppose that Vt > Yt. Since Assumption 2.11 states
that Vt has to lie in between Xt and Yt, we obtain
Vt ≤ Xt. (2.37)
From (2.23) we obtain Vt ≤ Ut = Yt ∨ Zt, and thus we must also have
Vt ≤ Zt. (2.38)
By combining (2.37) with (2.38), we obtain Vt ≤ Xt ∧ Zt = Lt. Moreover, by noting that
Vt ≥ Lt from (2.23), we conclude that Vt = Lt and thus, by (2.21), the equality τ∗t = t
holds, as required. The second inclusion can be shown using similar arguments.
(ii) It is sufficient to show
Vτ∗t ∧σ∗t = R(τ
∗
t , σ
∗
t ) = 1{τ∗t <σ∗t }Xτ∗t + 1{σ∗t<τ∗t } Yσ∗t + 1{σ∗t=τ∗t } Zσ∗t . (2.39)
On the event {σ∗t = τ∗t }, we have Vσ∗t = Uσ∗t = Lσ∗t = Zσ∗t as required. On the event
{σ∗t < τ∗t }, we have Vσ∗t = Uσ∗t = Zσ∗t ∨ Yσ∗t ≥ Yσ∗t . If Vσ∗t > Yσ∗t , then from (i), we obtain
τ∗t = σ∗t , which is a contradiction. We thus conclude that Vσ∗t = Yσ∗t , as required.
The case of {σ∗t > τ∗t } is similar to the case of {σ∗t < τ∗t }. This establishes (2.39).
We are now in a position to show that Assumption 2.11 implies the existence of Nash
equilibria for the family of Dynkin games GDGt(X,Y, Z), t = 0, 1, . . . , T .
Proposition 2.14. Let the process V and the stopping times τ∗t , σ∗t be given as in Definition
2.9. If Assumption 2.11 holds then for arbitrary stopping times τt, σt ∈ T[t,T ],
EP
(
R(τ∗t , σt) | Ft
) ≥ EP(R(τ∗t , σ∗t ) | Ft) ≥ EP(R(τt, σ∗t ) | Ft)
and thus (τ∗t , σ∗t ) is a Nash equilibrium of GDGt(X,Y, Z). Furthermore, the process V is
the value process of GDG(X,Y, Z), that is, for every t = 0, 1, . . . , T ,
Vt = ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σt) | Ft
)
= EP
(
R(τ∗t , σ
∗
t ) | Ft
)
= ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σt) | Ft
)
= V ∗t ,
and τ∗t , σ∗t are the optimal stopping times as of time t. In particular, V ∗T = ZT and for any
t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1,
V ∗t = min
{
Ut, max
{
Lt,EP(V ∗t+1 | Ft)
}}
.
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Proof. The arguments used in this proof will be very similar to the ones from Proposition
2.5, with the help of Lemma 2.13. In view of part (ii) in Lemma 2.13, it is sufficient to
show that
EP
(
R(τ∗t , σt) | Ft
) ≥ Vt ≥ EP(R(τt, σ∗t ) | Ft). (2.40)
To this end, we proceed by backward induction. The inequalities (2.40) clearly hold for
t = T . Assume now that they are true for some t ≤ T . We wish to prove that, for arbitrary
τt−1, σt−1 ∈ T[t−1,T ],
EP
(
R(τ∗t−1, σt−1) | Ft−1
) ≥ Vt−1 ≥ EP(R(τt−1, σ∗t−1) | Ft−1). (2.41)
We will establish the upper bound of (2.41), the lower bound follows by the symme-
try of the Dynkin game. Again the argument can be split into two main cases: either
GDGt−1(X,Y, Z) is stopped at time t− 1 or it is continued to time t and the induction hy-
pothesis becomes relevant. As before, for any τt−1, σt−1 ∈ T[t−1,T ], we denote τ˜t−1 := τt−1∨t
and σ˜t−1 := σt−1 ∨ t, so that τ˜t−1, σ˜t−1 ∈ T[t,T ].
Let us examine the case where the game is stopped at time t− 1. On the event {τ∗t−1 =
t− 1}, we have
EP
(
R(τ∗t−1, σt−1) | Ft−1
)
= 1{σt−1>t}Xt−1 + 1{σt−1=t}Zt−1 ≥ Lt−1 = Vt−1. (2.42)
On the event {σt−1 = t − 1 < τ∗t−1}, we obtain EP
(
R(τ∗t−1, σt−1) | Ft−1
)
= Yt−1. If Vt−1 >
Yt−1 then, by part (i) in Lemma 2.13, we have that τ∗t−1 = t− 1, which is a contradiction.
Hence Vt−1 ≤ Yt−1 and thus
EP
(
R(τ∗t−1, σt−1) | Ft−1
)
= Yt−1 ≥ Vt−1. (2.43)
Let us now assume that the game is not stopped at time t − 1, that is, we now consider
the event {τ∗t−1 ≥ t, σt−1 ≥ t}. We observe that here τ∗t−1 = τ˜∗t−1 = τ∗t and Vt−1 > Lt−1, so
that (2.20) yields
Vt−1 = min
{
Ut−1,EP
(
Vt | Ft−1
)}
. (2.44)
Consequently,
EP
(
R(τ∗t−1, σt−1) | Ft−1
)
= EP
(
R(τ˜∗t−1, σ˜t−1) | Ft−1
)
= EP
(
EP(R(τ∗t , σ˜t−1) | Ft
) | Ft−1)
≥ EP
(
Vt | Ft−1
)
(2.45)
≥ min{Ut−1,EP(Vt | Ft−1)}
= Vt−1. (2.46)
Note that (2.45) follows from the induction hypothesis (2.40) while (2.46) follows from
(2.44).
Combining (2.42), (2.43) and (2.46) gives the upper inequality of (2.41). As already
mentioned, the lower inequality of (2.41) follows by symmetry. Therefore, (τ∗t , σ∗t ) is a Nash
and optimal equilibrium of GDGt(X,Y, Z) and Vt = EP
(
R(τ∗t , σ∗t ) | Ft
)
is the value.
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Necessity of Assumption 2.11
To prove that Assumption 2.11 is also a necessary condition for property (2.18) to hold,
it suffices to show that if this assumption is violated then there exists t such that the
general Dynkin game GDGt(X,Y, Z) does not have a Nash equilibrium. Recall that the
process V in Definition 2.9 was originally chosen to be the value process of the Dynkin
game SDG(L,U,Z) associated with the payoff process
R˜(τ, σ) := 1{τ<σ} Lτ + 1{σ<τ} Uσ + 1{σ=τ} Zσ.
Next, in Lemma 2.10, it was shown that if the Dynkin game GDG(X,Y, Z) associated with
the payoff process
R(τ, σ) := 1{τ<σ}Xτ + 1{σ<τ} Yσ + 1{σ=τ} Zσ.
has a value process then it has to be a version of V . Finally, we formulated Assumption
2.11, which was shown to ensure that GDG(X,Y, Z) has a value process.
Proposition 2.15. Suppose that Assumption 2.11 is violated at time t ∈ [0, T ], that is,
P
({Vt < Xt ∧ Yt} ∪ {Vt > Xt ∨ Yt}) > 0. (2.47)
Then GDGt(X,Y, Z) does not have a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Since XT = YT = ZT = VT then manifestly (2.47) cannot occur when t = T .
Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that (2.47) holds for some t < T and there is a Nash
equilibrium (τ∗t , σ∗t ). Then, by part (iii) in Lemma 2.10, Vt = V ∗t = EP
(
R(τ∗t , σ∗t ) | Ft
)
is
the value of GDGt(X,Y, Z).
Assume now that either P({Vt < Xt ∧ Yt}) > 0 or P({Vt > Xt ∨ Yt}) > 0. First,
consider the event {Vt < Xt ∧ Yt}. Neither τ∗t = t < σ∗t nor τ∗t = t < σ∗t can occur, as
otherwise we would have that either Vt = Xt or Vt = Yt, respectively. If τ
∗
t = σ
∗
t = t then
R(t, σ∗t ) = Yt > Vt, contradicting the property of the Nash equilibrium. If t < τ∗t ∧ σ∗t then
R(t, σ∗t ) = Xt > Vt, which is also a contradiction.
The same argument can be made for the event {Vt > Xt ∨ Yt}. We conclude there
cannot be a Nash equilibrium for the Dynkin game starting at time t if condition (2.47) is
valid.
Propositions 2.5 and 2.15 can be combined into the following main result of this section,
which explicitly states the condition needed for the existence of a Nash equilibrium for
arbitrary payoff processes X,Y and Z. Theorem 2.16 is thus an essential generalisation of
Proposition 2.5 for the standard zero-sum Dynkin game, which only addressed the case of
X ≤ Z ≤ Y .
Theorem 2.16. Let X,Y and Z be F-adapted, integrable processes and let the process V
be given by: VT := ZT and, for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1,
Vt := min
{
Ut, max
{
Lt,EP(Vt+1 | Ft)
}}
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where L = X ∧ Z and U = Y ∨ Z. The inequality
Xt ∧ Yt ≤ Vt ≤ Xt ∨ Yt
holds for all t = 0, 1, . . . , T if and only if the Dynkin game GDGt(X,Y, Z) starting at time
t and associated with the payoff
R(τ, σ) := 1{τ<σ}Xτ + 1{σ<τ} Yσ + 1{σ=τ} Zσ.
has a Nash equilibrium for all t = 0, 1, . . . , T .
Remark 2.17. Theorem 2.16 answers the question regarding the existence of Nash equilib-
rium in for the set of Dynkin games starting at all times t = 0, 1, . . . , T . For a Dynkin game
starting at a particular value of t, the exact result is unclear. Assumption 2.11 certainly
provides a sufficient condition, but it is not a necessary condition.
2.2 Continuous-Time Dynkin Games
In this section, we deal with continuous-time versions of two-person, zero-sum stopping
games with a finite time horizon. As previously, we focus on conditions under which the
game admits a Nash equilibrium.
2.2.1 Standard Dynkin Game
In this preliminary subsection, we re-examine the standard zero-sum Dynkin game in
continuous-time. We first recall two definitions.
Definition 2.18. Suppose that a game G has a value V k∗ for player k. For  ≥ 0, an
-optimal strategy τ  ∈ Sk for player k guarantees the payoff to within  of the value. In
other words
ess inf
σ∈S−k
V k(σ, τ ) ≥ V k∗ − . (2.48)
Definition 2.19. For  ≥ 0, a strategy profile σ = {σ1, . . . , σm} ∈ S is called an -
equilibrium of a game G if, for each k ∈M,
ess sup
σ∈S−k
V k0 (s
k, σ−k) ≤ V k0 (σk, σ−k) + . (2.49)
Note that a Nash equilibrium is a 0-equilibrium, while an optimal equilibrium is a
0-equilibrium with 0-optimal strategies.
The following result is easy to prove and thus the proof is omitted.
Proposition 2.20. In a two-player, zero-sum game G, the following statements are equiv-
alent.
(i) The game has a value for both players.
(ii) For all  > 0, there exist -optimal strategies for both players.
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(iii) For all  > 0, there exists an -equilibrium.
(iv) For all  > 0, there exists a real number v and a strategy profile (σ, τ ) such that
ess inf
σ∈S2
V 1(σ, τ ) ≥ v ≥ ess sup
τ∈S1
V 1(σ, τ). (2.50)
Let the time parameter t ∈ [0, T ] be continuous and the filtration F be right-continuous.
Let X,Y and Z be F-adapted, ca`dla`g processes satisfying the usual integrability condition.
Consider the standard Dynkin game SDGt(X,Y, Z) starting at t and with payoff given by
R(τ, σ) = 1{τ<σ}Xτ + 1{σ<τ} Yσ + 1{σ=τ} Zσ (2.51)
where τ, σ are F-stopping times and X ≤ Z ≤ Y . We denote by SDG(X,Y, Z) the family of
Dynkin games SDGt(X,Y, Z), t ∈ [0, T ]. As in Section 2.1, without the loss of generality,
we set XT = YT = ZT .
The case of the standard zero-sum continuous-time Dynkin game has been studied
by several authors, for example, Lepeltier and Maingueneau [34]. The following result
summarises some of these findings.
Theorem 2.21. Consider the standard zero-sum Dynkin game SDG(X,Y, Z) associated
with the payoff R given by formula (2.51).
(i) For any t ∈ [0, T ], the standard zero-sum Dynkin game SDGt(X,Y, Z) has a value V ∗t
satisfying
V ∗t = ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σt) | Ft
)
(2.52)
= ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σt) | Ft
)
.
The value process V ∗ of SDG(X,Y, Z) can be chosen to be right-continuous.
(ii) For any t ∈ [0, T ] and any  > 0, the pair of F-stopping times (τ t , σt) ∈ T[t,T ] × T[t,T ]
defined by
σt := inf{u ≥ t : Yu ≤ V ∗u + }, τ t := inf{u ≥ t : Xu ≥ V ∗u − } (2.53)
are -optimal strategies satisfying
ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τ t , σt) | Ft
)
+  ≥ V ∗t ≥ ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σ

t) | Ft
)− . (2.54)
(iii) If we further assume that X and −Y are left upper semi-continuous (only have positive
jumps), then SDGt(X,Y, Z) has a Nash equilibrium (τ
∗
t , σ
∗
t ) ∈ T[t,T ] × T[t,T ] satisfying
σ∗t := lim
→0
σt , τ
∗
t := lim
→0
τ t (2.55)
and
EP
(
R(τ∗t , σt)|Ft
) ≥ EP(R(τ∗t , σ∗t )|Ft) = V ∗t ≥ EP(R(τt, σ∗t )|Ft), ∀ τt, σt ∈ T[t,T ]. (2.56)
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Proof. Theorem 2.21 summarises well know results and thus its proof is omitted.
Observe that there may be other -optimal strategy pairs (resp. Nash equilibria) than
the ones specified by (2.53) (resp. (2.55)). Also σ∗t , τ∗t do not necessarily coincide with
stopping times σ0t , τ
0
t , which are defined by setting  = 0 in (2.53), that is,
σ0t := inf{u ≥ t : Yu ≤ V ∗u }, τ0t := inf{u ≥ t : Xu ≥ V ∗u }.
In general, we have that σ∗t ≤ σ0t and τ∗t ≤ τ0t .
Auxiliary Results
Before moving on to the next subsection, we will first establish several auxiliary properties,
which are consequences of Theorem 2.21.
Lemma 2.22. (i) For any t ∈ [0, T ], we have that Xt ≤ V ∗t ≤ Yt.
(ii) For  ≥ 0, let τ t , σt be as defined in (2.53). Then
Xτt ≥ V ∗τt − , Yσt ≤ V
∗
σt
+ . (2.57)
Proof. (i) The lower bound follows from
V ∗t = ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σt) | Ft
) ≥ ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(t, σt) | Ft
) ≥ Xt.
The upper bound can be shown similarly. Part (ii) follows immediately from the right-
continuity of V ∗, X and Y .
Lemma 2.23. Let G and H be integrable progressively measurable processes. Suppose G is
right lower semicontinuous and H is right-continuous. If for each t ∈ [0, T ], Gt ≤ Ht a.s.,
then for all ρ ∈ T[0,T ], Gρ ≤ Hρ a.s..
Proof. Choose a sequence of decreasing stopping times ρn which takes countably many
values and converge to ρ. Then
Gρ ≤ lim
n→∞Gρn ≤ limn→∞Hρn = Hρ,
as required.
For a fixed σ ∈ T[0,T ], the process Rσt := R(t, σ) is right lower semicontinuous, but not
necessarily continuous. So let us define the right-continuous process
Rˆσt := Xt1{t<σ} + Yσ1{σ≤t}.
Since Y ≥ Z ≥ X, we have that Rˆσt ≥ Rσt . Consequently, by Lemma 2.23, Rˆσρ ≥ Rσρ for all
ρ ∈ T[0,T ]. On the other hand, since Rˆσρ = R(ρ1{ρ<σt} + T1{ρ≥σt}, σ), the following Snell
envelope of Rσt and Rˆ
σ
t
Qσt := ess sup
ρ∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
Rσρ | Ft
)
= ess sup
ρ∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
Rˆσρ | Ft
)
(2.58)
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is a well-defined right-continuous supermartingale. It follows immediately from Lemma
2.23 that, for all τ ∈ T[0,T ],
R(τ, σ) ≤ Qστ . (2.59)
The process Qσ can also be used to demonstrate properties of V ∗.
Proposition 2.24. Let V ∗ be as defined in (2.52) and Qσ be as defined in (2.58).
(i) For all σ, τ ∈ T[0,T ],
V ∗σ∧τ ≤ Qστ . (2.60)
(ii) For  ≥ 0, let σ̂t ∈ T[t,T ] be an arbitrary -optimal strategy for the min-player in
SDGt(X,Y, Z) and τt ∈ T[t,T ] be any F-stopping time. If P is an FT -measurable random
variable satisfying P ≤ Qσ̂tτt , then
EP
(
P | Ft
) ≤ V ∗t + . (2.61)
(iii) For  ≥ 0, let (τ̂t, σ̂t) ∈ T[t,T ] × T[t,T ] be an arbitrary pair of -optimal strategies of
SDGt(X,Y, Z). Then for all σt, τt ∈ T[t,T ],
EP
(
V ∗τ̂t∧σt | Ft
)
+  ≥ V ∗t ≥ EP
(
V ∗σ̂t∧τt | Ft
)− . (2.62)
(iv) If (τ̂t, σ̂t) ∈ T[t,T ] × T[t,T ] is an arbitrary Nash equilibrium of SDGt(X,Y, Z), then V ∗
is a submartingale on [t, τ̂t] and a supermartingale on [t, σ̂t].
(v) For  > 0, if (τ t , σ

t) ∈ T[t,T ] ×T[t,T ] is the pair of -optimal strategies of SDGt(X,Y, Z)
defined by (2.53):
σt = inf{u ≥ t : Yu ≤ V ∗u + }, τ t = inf{u ≥ t : Xu ≥ V ∗u − }, (2.63)
then V ∗ is a submartingale on [t, τ t ] and a supermartingale on [t, σt ].
Proof. (i) Consider the right-continuous process defined by
V σt := V
∗
t 1{t<σ} + Yσ1{σ≤t}.
On the event {t < σ}, we have
V σt = V
∗
t = ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σt) | Ft
) ≤ ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σ) | Ft
)
= Qσt (2.64)
and on the event {σ ≤ t} we obtain
V σt = Yσ = R(T, σ) ≤ ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σ) | Ft
)
= Qσt . (2.65)
By combining (2.64) and (2.65), we obtain V σt ≤ Qσt . Applying Lemma 2.23 we have
V ∗σ∧τ = V
σ
σ∧τ ≤ Qστ
as required.
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(ii) By using the optional sampling theorem on Q and the -strategy property of σ̂t,
EP
(
P | Ft
) ≤ EP(Qσ̂tτt | Ft) ≤ Qσ̂tt = ess sup
ρ∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(ρ, σ̂t) | Ft
) ≤ V ∗t + ,
as required.
(iii) The lower bound of (2.62) follows directly from parts (i) and (ii). The upper bound
also follows by the symmetry of the problem.
(iv) To obtain the required result, it suffices to set  = 0 in part (iii)
(v) Again we will only demonstrate the lower bound. By (2.63), σt is increasing with
respect to . So for any δ ∈ [0, ], we have σδt being an δ-optimal strategy with σt ∈ T[t,σδt ].
Hence by (iii),
EP
(
V ∗σt | Ft
) ≤ V ∗t + δ.
Since this is true for all choice of δ ∈ [0, ], we must have EP
(
V ∗σt | Ft
) ≤ V ∗t as required.
Proposition 2.25. If (τ̂t, σ̂t) is a Nash equilibrium of SDGt(X,Y, Z) then (τ̂t∧ τ0t , σ̂t∧σ0t )
is also a Nash equilibrium, where τ0t , σ
0
t are defined by (2.53).
Proof. We will first show that (τ̂t, σ̂t ∧ σ0t ) is a Nash equilibrium. It is sufficient to show
that
ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τ̂t, σt) | Ft
) ≥ V ∗t ≥ ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σ̂t ∧ σ0t ) | Ft
)
. (2.66)
The upper inequality is clear, since (τ̂t, σ̂t) is a Nash equilibrium. For the lower inequality,
the key is to introduce Q, as defined in (2.58), and then apply Proposition 2.24(i).
There are two cases to examine:
(a) on the event {σ̂t ∧ τt < σ0t }, we obtain
R(τt, σ̂t ∧ σ0t ) = R(τt, σ̂t) = R(τt ∧ σ0t , σ̂t) ≤ Qσ̂tτt∧σ0t , (2.67)
where the last inequality follows from (2.59);
(b) on the event {σ0t ≤ σ̂t ∧ τt}, we have that
R(τt, σ̂t ∧ σ0t ) = Yσ0t or Zσ0t ≤ Yσ0t = V
∗
σ0t
(2.68)
= V ∗τt∧σ0t∧σ̂t ≤ Q
σ̂t
τt∧σ0t
(2.69)
where the last equality of (2.68) follows from Lemma 2.22, and the last inequality of (2.69)
follows from (2.60).
Combining (2.67) and (2.69), we conclude that in both cases
R(τt, σ̂t ∧ σ0t ) ≤ Qσ̂tτt∧σ0t .
Now apply Proposition 2.24(ii), setting P = R(τt, σ̂t ∧ σ0t ) and  = 0,
EP
(
R(τt, σ̂t ∧ σ0t ) | Ft
) ≤ V ∗t .
This establishes (2.66) and thus (τ̂t, σ̂t ∧ σ0t ) is a Nash equilibrium. Finally, using similar
arguments to replace τ̂t by τ̂t ∧ τ0t , we obtain the required result.
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2.2.2 General Dynkin Game
The goal of this section is to study the general Dynkin game GDGt(X,Y, Z) with the payoff
R(τ, σ) = 1{τ<σ}Xτ + 1{σ<τ} Yσ + 1{σ=τ} Zσ. (2.70)
Hence we no longer postulate that X ≤ Z ≤ Y . Similarly as in Section 2.1.2, our goal here
is to find the necessary and sufficient conditions for the following property:
For all t ∈ [0, T ] and  > 0, the Dynkin game GDGt(X,Y, Z) has -optimal strategies.
(2.71)
Furthermore, we would also like to explore the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
following property:
For all t ∈ [0, T ], the Dynkin game GDGt(X,Y, Z) has a Nash equilibrium. (2.72)
Motivated by the discrete-time case examined in Subsection 2.1.2, we begin by defining
L := Z ∧X and U := Z ∨ Y . It is clear that L and U are ca`dla`g processes satisfying the
usual integrability condition and L ≤ Z ≤ U . Again it makes sense to consider the Dynkin
game SDG(L,U, Z) associated with the payoff
R˜(τ, σ) = 1{τ<σ} Lτ + 1{σ<τ} Uσ + 1{σ=τ} Zσ. (2.73)
In light of Theorem 2.21, we introduce the following notation.
Definition 2.26. (i) The process V is given by
Vt = ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R˜(τt, σt) | Ft
)
= ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R˜(τt, σt) | Ft
)
(2.74)
where R˜ is given by (2.73).
(ii) For each t ∈ [0, T ] and  ≥ 0, define the F-stopping times σt , τ t ∈ T[t,T ] by
σt := inf{u ≥ t : Uu ≤ Vu + }, τ t := inf{u ≥ t : Lu ≥ Vu − }. (2.75)
We again note that lim→0 σt ≤ σ0t and lim→0 τ t ≤ τ0t , but equality may fail to hold.
By Theorem 2.21, V is the value process of SDG(L,U, Z) and for  > 0, (σt , τ

t ) ∈
T[t,T ]×T[t,T ] is a pair of -optimal strategies for SDGt(L,U, Z). The goal is to show that V
and (σt , τ

t ) are also the value process and -optimal strategies, respectively, of the Dynkin
game GDG(X,Y, Z).
We begin by observing that an analogue of Lemma 2.10 can be readily applied to the
continuous-time case.
Lemma 2.27. For t ∈ [0, T ], the following properties are valid.
(i) For any fixed τt, σt ∈ T[t,T ], there exist τ̂t, σ̂t ∈ T[t,T ] such that
R(τ̂t, σt) ≥ R˜(τt, σt) ≥ R(τt, σ̂t). (2.76)
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(ii) The value Vt of SDGt(L,U, Z) lies between the minimax and the maximin values of the
game GDGt(X,Y, Z). In other words,
ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σt) | Ft
) ≥ Vt ≥ ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σt) | Ft
)
. (2.77)
(iii) If the GDGt(X,Y, Z) has a value then it equals to Vt.
Proof. (i) The proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 2.10. We will only prove the upper
inequality in (2.76), as the lower inequalities follows by symmetry. To choose a stopping
time τ̂ such that R(τ̂t, σt) ≥ R˜(τt, σt), we first compare R(τt, σt) and R˜(τt, σt). On the
following events, R(τt, σt) ≥ R˜(τt, σt) is automatically satisfied
{τt = σt}, R(τt, σt) = Zτt = R˜(τt, σt),
{τt < σt}, R(τt, σt) = Xτt ≥ Lτt = R˜(τt, σt),
{σt < τt, Yσt ≥ Zσt}, R(τt, σt) = Yσt = Uσt = R˜(τt, σt).
The problem arises on the event {σt < τt, Zσt > Yσt}, since then
R(τt, σt) = Yσt < Uσt = R˜(τt, σt).
Let us modify τ by setting
τ̂ = σt1{σt<τt,Zσt>Yσt} + τt
(
1− 1{σt<τt,Zσt>Yσt}
)
. (2.78)
Then τ̂ is indeed an F-stopping time, since the event {σt < τt, Zσt > Yσt} belongs to Fσt∧τt .
Furthermore, on the event {σt < τt, Zσt > Yσt} we have that
R(τ̂t, σt) = R(σt, σt) = Zσt = Uσt = R˜(τt, σt)
and thus for the stopping time τ̂ the left-hand side inequality in (2.76) is satisfied.
(ii) Again, we only show the upper inequality of (2.77). By Theorem 2.21, Vt is the value
of the game SDGt(L,U, Z). For any  > 0, (τ

t , σ

t) (see Definition 2.26(ii)) is a pair of
-optimal strategy for SDGt(L,U,Z). Hence we have, for any σt ∈ T[t,T ],
EP
(
R˜(τ t , σt) | Ft
) ≥ Vt − .
By part (i), there exists τ̂t ∈ T[t,T ] such that R(τ̂t, σt) ≥ R˜(τ t , σt). Consequently,
ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σt) | Ft
) ≥ EP(R(τ̂t, σt) | Ft) ≥ EP(R˜(τ t , σt) | Ft) ≥ Vt − . (2.79)
Since (2.79) holds for all σt ∈ T[t,T ] and  > 0, we must have
ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σt) | Ft
) ≥ Vt,
as required.
(iii) The proof is the same as in Lemma 2.27. By the definition of the value (see Definition
1.12), if there exists a value V ∗t for the game GDGt(X,Y, Z), then it must satisfy
V ∗t = ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σt) | Ft
)
= ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σt) | Ft
)
. (2.80)
In view of part (ii), we conclude that the equality V ∗t = Vt necessarily holds.
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Based on the intuition of the discrete case (see Subsection 2.1.2), we begin with the
following condition, with the aim of achieving (2.71) and (2.72).
Assumption 2.28. Let X,Y and Z be F-adapted integrable, ca`dla`g processes and let the
associated process V be given as in Definition 2.26(i). We postulate that the processes
X,Y and V satisfy, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
Xt ∧ Yt ≤ Vt ≤ Xt ∨ Yt. (2.81)
Sufficiency of Assumption 2.28
Proposition 2.29. For all t ∈ [0, T ],  ≥ 0, let Vt, σt and τ t be defined as in Definition
2.26. Under Assumption 2.28, we have the following:
(i) For some  ≥ 0, if σt ∈ T[t,T ] satisfies σt ≤ σt , then for all τt ∈ T[t,T ],
R(τt, σt) ≤ Qσ

t
τt . (2.82)
where Qσt is defined by
Qσtu := ess sup
ρ∈T[u,T ]
EP
(
R˜(ρ, σt) | Fu
)
, u ∈ [t, T ].
(ii) The process V is the value process of GDG(X,Y, Z). For all  > 0, the stopping times
σt , τ

t are -optimal strategies of GDGt(X,Y, Z), satisfying
ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τ t , σt) | Ft
)
+  ≥ Vt ≥ ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σ

t) | Ft
)− . (2.83)
(iii) If (τ∗t , σ∗t ) is an arbitrary Nash equilibrium of SDGt(L,U, Z), then (τ∗t ∧ τ0t , σ∗t ∧σ0t ) is
a Nash equilibrium of GDGt(X,Y, Z).
Proof. (i) We will make use of (2.59) and (2.60), that is,
R˜(τt, σt) ∨ Vτt∧σt ≤ Qσtτt
There are a few cases to check:
(a) On the event {σt = τt},
R(τt, σt) = Zσt = R˜(τt, σt) ≤ Qσtτt . (2.84)
(b) On the event {σt < τt},
R(τt, σt) = Yσt ≤ Uσt = R˜(τt, σt) ≤ Qσtτt . (2.85)
(c) On the event {τt < σt}, certainly τt < σt ≤ σt . From the definition of σt in Definition
2.26(ii), we must have
Vτt < Uτt . (2.86)
We now consider the following subcases:
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(c.1) If Yτt ≥ Zτt , then by (2.86) Yτt = Uτt > Vτt . Since Assumption 2.28 requires V to lie
between X and Y , we must have
R(τt, σt) = Xτt ≤ Vτt ≤ Qσtτt . (2.87)
(c.2) If Yτt < Zτt , then by (2.86) Zτt = Uτt > Vτt . Now by Lemma 2.22(i), Vτt ≥ Lτt =
Zτt ∧Xτt . Hence we must have
R(τt, σt) = Xτt = Lτt ≤ Vτt ≤ Qσtτt . (2.88)
In view of (2.84), (2.85), (2.87) and (2.88), we conclude that R(τt, σt) ≤ Qσtτt for all
cases, establishing (2.82).
(ii) By Proposition 2.20 and Lemma 2.27(iii), it is sufficient to establish (2.83), or
ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τ t , σt) | Ft
)
+  ≥ Vt ≥ ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σ

t) | Ft
)− .
We will only establish the lower bound, since the upper bound follows by symmetry. From
part (i), we know that R(τt, σ

t) ≤ Qσ

t
τt for all τt ∈ T[t,T ]. Since σt is an -optimal strategy,
we can apply Proposition 2.24(i). By setting P = R(τt, σ

t), we have, for all τt ∈ T[t,T ],
EP
(
R(τt, σ

t) | Ft
) ≤ V ∗t + .
Hence
ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σ

t) | Ft
) ≤ V ∗t + ,
as required.
(iii) By Proposition 2.25, (τ∗t ∧ τ0t , σ∗t ∧ σ0t ) is also a Nash equilibrium of SDGt(L,U,Z),
satisfying τ∗t ∧τ0t ≤ τ0t and σ∗t ∧σ0t ≤ σ0t . Since a Nash equilibrium is also a pair of 0-optimal
strategies, we can simply use the same argument as before, but with  = 0.
In general, not all -optimal strategies (resp. Nash equilibria) of SDGt(L,U, Z) are
necessarily -optimal strategies (resp. Nash equilibria) of GDGt(X,Y, Z). Proposition 2.29
only applies to -optimal strategies (resp. Nash equilibria) stopping no later than τ t and
σt (resp. τ
0
t and σ
0
t ).
Necessity of Assumption 2.28
Proposition 2.30. Suppose that Assumption 2.28 is violated at time t ∈ [0, T ], that is,
almost surely
{Vt < Xt ∧ Yt} ∪ {Vt > Xt ∨ Yt} 6= ∅. (2.89)
Then there exists  > 0 such that the Dynkin game GDGt(X,Y, Z) does not have -optimal
strategies. In particular, GDGt(X,Y, Z) has no Nash equilibrium.
40 Chapter 2: Two-Player Stopping Games
Proof. Since XT = YT = ZT = VT then manifestly (2.89) cannot occur when t = T .
Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that (2.89) holds for some t < T and there exists a
pair of -optimal strategies (τ t , σ

t) for all  > 0. Then, by Proposition 2.20 and Lemma
2.27(iii), Vt must be the value of GDGt(X,Y, Z).
Assume now that either P(Vt < Xt ∧Yt) > 0 or P(Vt > Xt ∨Yt) > 0. First, consider the
event {Vt < Xt ∧ Yt}. Then there exists  > 0 such that P(Vt +  < Xt ∧ Yt) > 0. On that
event, let us consider
τ ′t = t1{σt>t} + T1{σt=t}.
Then R(τ ′t , σt) is either Xt or Yt. But then
ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σ

t) | Ft
) ≥ EP(R(τ ′t , σt) | Ft) ≥ Xt ∧ Yt > Vt + ,
contradicting the -optimal property of σt . The same argument can be applied to the event
{Vt > Xt ∨ Yt}. Hence there exists  > 0 such that GDGt(X,Y, Z) does not have -optimal
strategies.
Proposition 2.31. Under Assumption 2.28, if (τ∗t , σ∗t ) is an arbitrary Nash equilibrium of
GDGt(X,Y, Z), then it is also a Nash equilibrium of SDGt(L,U, Z).
Proof. We want to prove that, for all σt, τt ∈ T[t,T ],
R˜(τ∗t , σt) ≥ R˜(τ∗t , σ∗t ) ≥ R˜(τt, σ∗t ). (2.90)
By Lemma 2.27(i), there exists τ̂t ∈ T[t,T ] such that
R(τ̂t, σ
∗
t ) ≥ R˜(τt, σ∗t ).
Since (τ∗t , σ∗t ) is a Nash equilibrium of GDGt(X,Y, Z),
Vt = R(τ
∗
t , σ
∗
t ) ≥ R(τ̂t, σ∗t ) ≥ R˜(τt, σ∗t ).
Hence the lower bound of (2.90) is established. The upper bound can be proven similarly.
Therefore, (τ∗t , σ∗t ) is a Nash equilibrium of SDGt(L,U,Z).
To summarise the necessity and sufficiency results of this section, we now combine
Theorem 2.21 with Propositions 2.29, 2.30 and 2.31.
Theorem 2.32. Suppose X,Y, Z are integrable ca`dla`g progressive processes satisfying XT =
YT = ZT and let L = X ∧ Z and U = Y ∨ Z. Consider the family of Dynkin games
GDG(X,Y, Z) associated with the payoff
R(τ, σ) = 1{τ<σ}Xτ + 1{σ<τ} Yσ + 1{σ=τ} Zσ.
(i) The Dynkin game GDGt(X,Y, Z) has a value and a pair of -optimal strategies for all
t ∈ [0, T ] and  > 0 if and only if Assumption 2.28 holds. In particular, the unique value
process V ∗ is given by
V ∗t = ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σt) | Ft
)
= ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
EP
(
R(τt, σt) | Ft
)
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and a pair of -optimal strategies (τ t , σ

t) is given by
σt := inf{u ≥ t : Uu ≤ Vu + }, τ t := inf{u ≥ t : Lu ≥ Vu − }.
(ii) The Dynkin game GDGt(X,Y, Z) has a Nash equilibrium for all t ∈ [0, T ] if and
only if Assumption 2.28 holds and the Dynkin game SDGt(L,U,Z) has a Nash equilibrium
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. If we further assume that L and −U only have positive jumps, then
GDGt(X,Y, Z) has a Nash equilibrium (τ
∗
t , σ
∗
t ) given by
σ∗t = lim
→0
σt , τ
∗
t = lim
→0
τ t .
(iii) Fix t ∈ [0, T ]. If Assumption 2.28 holds, then GDGt(X,Y, Z) has a Nash equilibrium
if and only if SDGt(L,U,Z) has a Nash equilibrium.

Chapter3
A Multi-Player Zero-Sum Game
The purpose of this chapter is to formulate a simple variant of the Dynkin game with more
than two players in a manner that allows for the construction of a multi-person extension of
the financial game option. A zero-sum, simultaneous, multi-player game is introduced, with
a focus on designing the dependence between the payoffs of all players and their stopping
decisions. In effect, we are modelling a multilateral ‘contract’ where all the players are
sharing a fixed total sum of wealth. But each player also has the option to exercise the
contract for a predetermined benefit. The non-exercising players will receive an adjusted
benefit to reflect the discrepancies caused by these exercising decisions. These adjustments
are distributed among the remaining players according to their redistribution quotients, a
predetermined property of each player, to ensure that the total wealth is fixed. For a simple
example of the game, see Example 0.1 of the preface.
Specifically, we present a deterministic zero-sum redistribution game. The main result
of this chapter is Theorem 3.23, which shows that the game has a unique payoff value,
where Nash equilibria, as well as optimal equilibria, are achieved. The uniqueness of this
value (but not its existence and explicit construction) can be seen as a consequence of
the results from Kats and Thisse [30] and De Wolf [10], who showed that, in any weakly
unilaterally competitive game, all Nash equilibria and optimal equilibria achieve the same
value. For completeness, an independent proof of this property is provided for the zero-sum
redistribution game. Then the existence of the optimal equilibrium is shown by explicit
construction and the value of the game is expressed as the projection onto a simplex in a
fixed-sum coordinate system.
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 3.1, we construct the zero-sum redistri-
bution game, discuss its basic features and establish some preliminary results. In Section
3.2, we present the existence and uniqueness of its value by analysing projections in a
fixed sum coordinate system under an appropriate inner product. The explicit construc-
tion of the value is a crucial feature of the zero-sum redistribution game. It is worth noting
that the current chapter is merely a preliminary step towards an analysis of non-zero-sum
multi-player stochastic stopping games in the chapters to follow.
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3.1 Preliminary Results
Let us first recall briefly the mechanism of a two player game option, as defined in Kifer
[31]. The game option is a contract where the buyer can exercise the option at any time
t for a payoff Xt, while the seller can cancel (or also ‘exercise’) the option at any time t
for a cancellation fee of Yt paid to the buyer. In the case of a two player game option, it
is common to postulate that the inequality Xt ≤ Yt holds for every t. In other words, the
cancellation fee should always at least as great as the exercise payoff. This ensures that the
outcome of the contract will always be well defined. When the buyer exercises, it will cost
the seller at least as much if he also cancels. Similarly, when the seller cancels, the buyer
can only lose by exercising. If the players are exercising optimally, simultaneous exercise
only occurs when the equality Xt = Yt is true, in which case the payoff is still well defined.
There are various way to generalise the exercising mechanism of the two player version.
In this work, we restrict ourselves to the special case where the players are only allowed to
exercise at one predetermined time. Another issue is the ‘burden’ of one player exercising.
In the two player version, when one player exercises, the entirety of that payoff (or ‘cost’),
whether positive of negative, is paid for by the other player. In the multi-player version,
this burden will be paid for by all of the non-exercising players. It will be split up according
to the ‘redistribution quotient’ of each player, which is agreed before the game is played.
The restriction Xt ≤ Yt in the two player contract translates to
∑
kXk ≤ 0 with k running
over the set of all players. This is required to prevent the possibility of everyone from
exercising simultaneously without being able to fund the cost of the outcome. In fact, the
value of the sum can be changed from 0 to any constant C, but we still refer to it as a
zero-sum game.
We will now set up the notation for a zero-sum, single period, deterministic game with
m players. There are m players, that is, parties involved in the contract, enumerated by
the indices 1, 2, . . . ,m; the set of all players is denoted by M. The terminal payoff Pk
is the amount received by player k if no player exercises. The vector of terminal payoffs
(P1, . . . , Pm) is denoted by P . The exercise payoff Xk is the amount received by player k
if he exercises at time 0. The vector of exercise payoffs (X1, . . . , Xm) is denoted by X. We
define the total value of the game as the sum of the terminal payoffs and we denote it by
C, that is, C :=
∑
k∈M Pk. Intuitively, the total value of the game can be understood as
the total contribution by the players to enter the game in the first place. The following
standing assumption is crucial, since it ensures that, no matter how the players exercise,
the total payoffs can be financed by the total initial investment C (see Lemma 3.3).
Assumption 3.1. We postulate that∑
k∈M
Xk ≤
∑
k∈M
Pk = C.
The strategy sk ∈ Sk of player k specifies whether player k will exercise, where Sk =
{0, 1} is the space of strategies for player k. In particular, sk = 0 means that player k will
exercise at time 0, whereas sk = 1 means that player k will not exercise. We define
S =
∏
k∈M
Sk
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to be the space of all m-tuples of strategies and we call any s ∈ S a strategy profile. Given a
strategy profile s ∈ S, the exercise set, denoted by E(s), is the set of players who exercised
at time 0.
The main difference between the game introduced here and its counterparts studied
in [18, 50, 51] is the rivalrous nature of the payoffs, meaning that the total value of the
game is fixed and shared between the players. Hence each exercise action causes a suitable
redistribution of the payoffs. The difference due to exercise, denoted by D(s), equals
D(s) =
∑
k∈E(s)
(Xk − Pk).
For any strategy profile s ∈ S, we define the weights wk(s) for all k ∈ M \ E(s) as real
numbers such that wk(s) ≥ 0 and
∑
k∈M\E(s)wk(s) = 1.
Given a strategy profile s ∈ S, the modified payoff of player k, denoted by Vk(s), is the
actual payoff received by player k if a strategy profile u is carried out. By definition, it
equals
Vk(s) =
{
Xk, k ∈ E(s),
Pk(s), k ∈M \ E(s),
where Pk(s) := Pk−wk(s)D(s) specifies the payoff for a non-exercising player k. The vector
of modified payoffs (V1(s), . . . , Vm(s)) is denoted as V (s). We are in a position to define
the class of games examined in this work.
Definition 3.2. The m-player zero-sum redistribution game, denoted by ZRG(X,P, α), is
defined by:
(i) the set of m players M = {1, 2, . . . ,m},
(ii) the real valued exercise and terminal payoffs, Xk and Pk for every k ∈M,
(iii) the class S = ∏k∈M Sk of strategy profiles,
(iv) the weights wk(s) ≥ 0, k ∈ M \ E(s) for any strategy profile s ∈ S, where E(s) is the
exercise set of a strategy profile s,
(v) the modified payoffs Vk(s) for all k ∈M and each strategy profile s.
The following result justifies the term zero-sum used in Definition 3.2.
Lemma 3.3. (i) If a strategy profile s is such that not all players exercise at time 0, that
is, E(s) 6=M, then ∑k∈M Vk(s) = C.
(ii) If all players exercise at time 0, that is, E(s) =M, then ∑k∈M Vk(s) ≤ C.
Proof. The first statement is an immediate consequence of the definition of the vector of
modified payoffs. The second statement follows from Assumption 3.1, since
∑
k∈M Vk(s) =∑
k∈MXk ≤ C.
3.1.1 Nash Equilibrium
Recall that a strategy profile is referred to as a Nash equilibrium if no player can improve
his modified payoff by altering only his own strategy.
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Definition 3.4. A strategy profile s∗ ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium if, for all k ∈M,
Vk(s
∗
k, s
∗
−k) ≥ Vk(sk, s∗−k), ∀ sk ∈ Sk. (3.1)
We will now examine some basic features of a Nash equilibrium for our game. We show,
in particular, that any player, whose terminal payoff is less than his exercise payoff, will
exercise in any Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 3.5. Let a strategy profile s∗ be a Nash equilibrium. Then:
(i)
∑
k∈M Vk(s
∗) = C,
(ii) D(s∗) ≥ 0,
(iii) for each player k ∈M we have that Xk ≤ Vk(s∗),
(iv) for each player k ∈M \ E(s∗) we have that Vk(s∗) ≤ Pk,
(v) if Xk > Pk, then k ∈ E(s∗).
Proof. (i) We argue by contradiction. Assume that s∗ is a Nash equilibrium satisfy-
ing
∑
k∈M Vk(s
∗) < C. Then, by Lemma 3.3, we must have E(s∗) = M, so every
player exercised. If player i decides to not exercise instead, his new payoff becomes
C −∑k 6=i Vk(s∗) > Vi(s∗), which shows that s∗ is not a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Suppose the contrary, that is, D(s∗) < 0. Then there must exists a player k ∈ E(s∗)
with Xk − Pk < 0. Let us write s∗ = (0, s∗−k) and let us consider the modified strategy
profile s′ = (1, s∗−k), meaning that player k chooses not to exercise. Then E(s′) = E(s∗)\{k}
and his modified payoff equals
Pk(s
′) = Pk − wk(s′)
∑
i∈E(s′)
(Xi − Pi).
Since s∗ is a Nash equilibrium, we have Vk(s′) = Pk(s′) ≤ Xk = Vk(s∗). Therefore,
Xk − Pk(s′) = Xk − Pk + wk(s′)
∑
i∈E(s′)
(Xi − Pi) ≥ 0,
which in turn implies that
∑
i∈E(s′)(Xi−Pi) ≥ 0 (since Xk−Pk < 0). Finally, 0 ≤ wk(s′) ≤ 1
and thus
D(s∗) =
∑
i∈E(s∗)
(Xi − Pi) ≥ Xk − Pk + wk(s′)
∑
i∈E(s′)
(Xi − Pi) ≥ 0,
which contradicts the assumption that D(s∗) < 0.
(iii) Assume that Xk > Vk(s
∗) for some k ∈M. Then we have
Vk(s
∗
k, s
∗
−k) < Xk = Vk(0, s
∗
−k)
so that s∗ is not a Nash equilibrium and thus (iii) is valid.
(iv) We note that for every k ∈M \ E(s∗)
Vk(s
∗) = Pk(s∗) = Pk − wk(s∗)D(s∗) ≤ Pk,
since D(s∗) ≥ 0, by part (ii).
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(v) Assume that k ∈ M \ E(s∗), meaning that player k did not exercise. Since s∗ is a
Nash equilibrium, the modified payoff of player k should be at least as great as his exercise
payoff, that is,
Pk(s
∗) = Pk − wk(s∗)D(s∗) ≥ Xk > Pk.
This implies that D(s∗) < 0, which in turn contradicts part (ii).
3.1.2 Optimal Equilibrium
Let us recall the definition of an optimal equilibrium.
Definition 3.6. A strategy profile s∗ ∈ S is an optimal equilibrium if, for all k ∈M,
Vk(s
∗
k, s−k) ≥ Vk(s∗k, s∗−k) ≥ Vk(sk, s∗−k), ∀ sk ∈ Sk, ∀ s−k ∈ S−k. (3.2)
A vector V ∗ ∈ Rm is called a value of the game G if there exists an optimal equilibrium s∗
with V ∗ = V (s∗) = (V1(s∗), . . . , Vm(s∗)).
The right-hand side inequality in (3.2) makes it clear that an optimal equilibrium is
a Nash equilibrium. Let us examine the basic features of an optimal equilibrium in the
present context.
Lemma 3.7. Let s∗ be any optimal equilibrium. For each player k, it is not possible to
guarantee a payoff greater than Vk(s
∗).
Proof. Assume, on the contrary, that it is possible for player k to guarantee a payoff greater
than Vk(s
∗) with some strategy s′k ∈ Sk, that is,
min
s−k∈S−k
Vk(s
′
k, s−k) > Vk(s
∗
k, s
∗
−k) = Vk(s
∗). (3.3)
Consider the strategy profile s′ = (s′k, s
∗
−k+1), where every other player uses their optimal
equilibrium strategy. In view of (3.3), we should thus have Vk(s
′) > Vk(s∗).
By the left-hand side inequality in (3.2), Vi(s
′) ≥ Vi(s∗) for all i 6= k. By Lemma 3.3, the
inequality
∑
i∈M Vi(s
′) ≤ C holds, whereas part (i) in Proposition 3.5 yields∑i∈M Vi(s∗) =
C. Consequently,
Vk(s
′) ≤ C −
∑
i 6=k
Vi(s
′) ≤ C −
∑
i 6=k
Vi(s
∗) = Vk(s∗),
which contradicts the inequality Vk(s
′) > Vk(s∗). Hence the assertion of the lemma follows.
Proposition 3.8. The value V ∗ = (V ∗1 , . . . , V ∗m) of the game G is unique. Moreover, the
vector V ∗ satisfies Xk ≤ V ∗k and
∑
k∈M V
∗
k = C.
Proof. Assume there exists a value V ∗ = V (s∗) with a corresponding optimal equilibrium
s∗. If there is a second value V ′ = V (s′) 6= V ∗, corresponding to an optimal equilibrium
s′, then there must exist a player k for which Vk(s∗) 6= Vk(s′). Without loss of generality,
we may assume that Vk(s
′) > Vk(s∗). By Lemma 3.7, it is not possible for player k to
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guarantee a payoff greater than Vk(s
∗). However, since s′ is an optimal equilibrium, it is
possible to guarantee a payoff of Vk(s
′) > Vk(s∗), yielding an immediate contradiction. In
view of Proposition 3.5, the value V ∗ satisfies Xk ≤ V ∗k and
∑
k∈M V
∗
k = C.
There are a couple of other properties worth noting. We will merely state these prop-
erties, since their proofs are immediate consequences of definitions.
Proposition 3.9. (i) A strategy profile s∗ ∈ S is an optimal equilibrium if and only if for
any proper subset E ⊂M we have that∑
k∈E
Vk(s
∗
E , s
∗
−E) ≥
∑
k∈E
Vk(sE , s∗−E), ∀ sE ∈ SE :=
∏
k∈E
Sk.
(ii) If there exists an optimal equilibrium s∗, then the corresponding unique value V ∗ =
V (s∗) satisfies
Vk(s
∗) = V ∗k = min
s−k∈S−k
max
sk∈Sk
Vk(sk, s−k) = max
sk∈Sk
min
s−k∈S−k
Vk(sk, s−k)
where S−k =
∏
i 6=k Si.
At the intuitive level, the ‘fair value’ of the game for player k is the highest amount
one would offer to take up the position of player k. We claim that this value is equal
to the unique value V ∗k , provided that it exists. Indeed, by the definition of an optimal
equilibrium, this amount not only can be guaranteed by player k by playing optimally no
matter what the decisions of all other players are, but it is also the highest possible payoff
for player k, if everyone else also plays perfectly.
3.1.3 Weakly Unilaterally Competitive Games
In order to proceed further, we need to be more explicit about the way in which the weights
wk(s) are specified. We find it convenient to express them in terms of players’ redistribution
quotients. The redistribution quotient of each player is used to compute the weight and
thus to determine how the payoffs are redistributed among non-exercising players. For the
rest of this chapter, we work under the following standing assumption.
Assumption 3.10. For any strategy profile s ∈ S and any k ∈M\E(s), the weight wk(s)
is given by the equality
wk(s) =
αk∑
i∈M\E(s) αi
, (3.4)
where, for each i ∈ M, a strictly positive number αi represents the redistribution quotient
of player i.
In the distribution of the difference due to exercise, D(s), the weights given by (3.4)
induce an important property. Assume some players change their strategies from non-
exercising to exercising, thus changing the strategy profile from s to s′. Instead of recal-
culating the distribution of D(s′), we can simply split up D(s′) − D(s) according to the
redistribution quotients and adjust the modified payoffs of the remaining non-exercising
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players. These weights can also be described to be invariant under projection, allowing for
the construction of subgames (see Section 3.2.3).
Recall that a game is said to be weakly unilaterally competitive (see Kats and Thisse
[30]) if for arbitrary k 6= l ∈M and all sk, s′k ∈ Sk and s−k ∈ S−k
Vk(sk, s−k) > Vk(s′k, s−k) =⇒ Vl(sk, s−k) ≤ Vl(s′k, s−k),
Vk(sk, s−k) = Vk(s′k, s−k) =⇒ Vl(sk, s−k) = Vl(s′k, s−k).
As shown in [30], in a weakly unilaterally competitive game, all Nash equilibria must have
the same value, where optimal equilibria are also achieved. When the weights are defined
in terms of redistribution quotients through formula (3.4), it is easy to check that the game
introduced in Definition 3.2 is weakly unilaterally competitive, irrespective of a choice of
the exercise and terminal payoffs (see Section 4.1.1 for the proof of this fact). Consequently,
the Nash equilibria must coincide with the optimal equilibria in terms of the value. For
the sake of completeness, we present in the next section an independent proof of this result
for our game. More importantly, we provide also explicit constructions of the game’s value
and an optimal equilibrium.
3.2 Construction of an Optimal Equilibrium
The goal of this section is to establish the existence and uniqueness of the game’s value.
We first examine, in Theorem 3.11, the case of the degenerate game. Next, in Proposition
3.22, any Nash equilibrium is shown to also be an optimal equilibrium. Finally, we show
in Theorem 3.23 that an optimal equilibrium always exists and any optimal equilibrium
attains the unique value. We also provide an explicit construction of the value by projection
and we propose an algorithm for finding an optimal equilibrium. Recall that we work under
the standing Assumptions 3.1 and 3.10.
3.2.1 Value of the Degenerate Game
Recall that the strategy of each player consists of a binary choice of whether to exercise at
time 0 or not. Hence the map E : S → 2M is a bijection between the class of all strategy
profiles and the class of all exercise sets. The degenerate game is characterised by the
equality
∑
k∈MXk = C where C :=
∑
k∈M Pk. It is worth noting that Theorem 3.11 can
be seen as a special case of Theorem 3.23 when the simplex S and the hyperplane HM,
introduced in Section 3.2.2 below, are degenerate, specifically, S = HM = X. This feature
motivates the terminology degenerate game.
Theorem 3.11. If
∑
k∈MXk = C, then the unique value V
∗ to the game ZRG(X,P, α)
satisfies V ∗ = X. Moreover, the strategy profile s∗ = (0, . . . , 0) is an optimal equilibrium.
Proof. The uniqueness is a consequence of Proposition 3.8, but we will demonstrate it
anyway for this case. Assume there exists an optimal equilibrium s∗ with
V (s∗) = (V1(s∗), . . . , Vm(s∗)) 6= (X1, . . . , Xm) = X.
50 Chapter 3: A Multi-Player Zero-Sum Game
By part (i) in Proposition 3.5,
∑
k∈M Vk(s
∗) = C =
∑
k∈MXk, so that Vi(s
∗) < Xi for some
i ∈ M (indeed, otherwise Vk(s∗) = Xk for all k ∈ M, which contradicts the assumption).
By part (iii) in Proposition 3.5, a strategy profile s∗ cannot be an optimal equilibrium.
To show the existence of an optimal equilibrium, let us consider the strategy profile
s∗ = (0, . . . , 0) that corresponds to all players exercising at time 0. Since each player
exercises, his payoff is guaranteed to be Xk, regardless of the other players’ decisions. In
fact, one easily check that (3.2) holds, that is, s∗ is an optimal equilibrium. It is also
obvious that s∗ attains the required values, since manifestly V (s∗) = X = V ∗.
Remark 3.12. Let us stress that when
∑
k∈MXk = C not every strategy profile s such
that V (s) = V ∗ is an optimal equilibrium. Consider, for instance, the two player game
where P = (0, 0) and X = (1,−1). An optimal equilibrium occurs when both players
exercise, so that s∗ = (0, 0), and the value is V ∗ = (1,−1). But if only player 2 exercises,
so that s = (1, 0), the same value is reached since V (s) = (1,−1). The strategy profile s
is not an optimal equilibrium, however, as player 2 could now do better by not exercising.
Indeed, for the strategy profile s′ = (1, 1) we obtain V (s′) = (0, 0), and thus V2(s′) > V2(s).
3.2.2 Value Space and Projections
Our next goal is to examine the non-degenerate game, meaning that
∑
k∈MXk < C. Recall
that P and V can be seen as vectors in Rm. We define the hyperplane
H =
{
x ∈ Rm :
m∑
k=1
xk = C
}
, (3.5)
so that P lies on H. In addition, by part (i) in Proposition 3.5 and Definition 3.6, any value
V of the game must also lie on H. The value space of the game G is the hyperplane H in
Rm.
We endow the space Rm with the norm ‖ · ‖ generated by the following inner product
〈x, y〉 =
m∑
k=1
(
xkyk
αk
)
.
The following auxiliary result summarises some standard properties of projections.
Lemma 3.13. For any vector P and any closed convex set K in Rm, there exists a unique
projection of P onto K, denoted by piK(P ), such that piK(P ) ∈ K and
‖piK(P )− P‖ ≤ ‖Q− P‖, ∀Q ∈ K.
If H is a hyperplane, then the projection is orthogonal, that is, piH(P ) is the unique vector
in H such that
〈piH(P )− P,Q− piH(P )〉 = 0, ∀Q ∈ H.
Let K be a closed convex subset of the hyperplane H. Then for any vector P we have
piK(P ) = piK(piH(P )).
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For any proper subset E ⊂M, we define the hyperplane
HE =
{
x ∈ Rm : xi = Xi for all i ∈ E and
m∑
k=1
xk = C
}
. (3.6)
It is clear from (3.5) that H∅ = H and HE ⊆ H. For completeness, we also denote
HM =
{
x ∈ Rm : xi = Xi for all i ∈M
}
= X.
Observe that HM = X /∈ H, unless the equality
∑
k∈MXk = C holds.
Lemma 3.14. Let E be a proper subset of M and let ci, i ∈ E and c be any real numbers.
Then the vector v = (v1, . . . , vm) is orthogonal to the hyperplane Ĥ given by
Ĥ =
{
x ∈ Rm : xi = ci for all i ∈ E and
∑
k∈M\E
(
vkxk
αk
)
= c
}
.
Proof. It suffices to check that for every x1, x2 ∈ Ĥ we have that 〈x1 − x2, v〉 = 0.
Proposition 3.15 gives us an elegant and alternate way of representing and computing
the modified payoffs when the exercise set is known. It also justifies ex post our choice of
the norm.
Proposition 3.15. Let s ∈ S be any strategy profile such that E(s) is a proper subset of
M. Then the vector V (s) of modified payoffs equals
V (s) = piHE(s)(P ).
Proof. For the sake of brevity, we denote E := E(s). If E =M then, clearly, the equalities
V (s) = X = HM hold. If E is a proper subset of M, then the vector V (s) equals
V (s) =
[
Vi(s) = Xi, i ∈ E , Vi(s) = Pi(s) = Pi − wi(s)D(s), i ∈M \ E
]
.
Note that V (s) lies on HE since, by Lemma 3.3(i),
∑
i∈M Vi(s) = C. Let
v := P − V (s) = [vi = Pi −Xi, i ∈ E , vi = wi(s)D(s), i ∈M \ E].
Upon setting ci = Xi and
c =
D(s)
(
C −∑i∈E Xi)∑
i∈M\E αi
,
we deduce from Lemma 3.14 that v = P − V (s) is orthogonal to HE . We conclude that
V (s) is the orthogonal projection of P onto HE , as required.
Consider the simplex S given by the formula
S =
{
x ∈ Rm : xk ≥ Xk, 1 ≤ k ≤ m and
m∑
k=1
xk = C
}
. (3.7)
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Remark 3.16. In the case where
∑
k∈MXk < C, the simplex S is non-degenerate. If, on
the contrary,
∑
k∈MXk = C then S = HM = X.
By Proposition 3.5, if a strategy profile s∗ is a Nash equilibrium, then necessarily
V (s∗) ∈ S. Moreover, by Proposition 3.8, the unique value V ∗ of the game G belongs
to S.
Let us observe that, for any proper subset E ⊂M, we have that HE ∩ S 6= ∅. Note also
that the inclusions HE ⊂ S and S ⊂ HE do not hold, in general. The following auxiliary
results will be used in the proof of the main result of this work, Theorem 3.23. Lemma
3.17 shows that the projection of a point inside the simplex still lies in the simplex. From
Lemma 3.18, it follows that if a point lies on the side of a face opposite the simplex, then
the projection must lie on that face. Finally, Lemma 3.19 demonstrates that projecting
onto the simplex is the same as projecting onto a particular hyperplane of the simplex.
Lemma 3.17. Assume that P ∈ S. Then piHE (P ) ∈ S for any proper subset E ⊂M.
Proof. By Proposition 3.15, the projection piHE (P ) corresponds to the modified payoff when
E is the set of exercising players. Let u be the corresponding strategy profile. In particular,
for any i ∈ E
[piHE (P )]i = Xi ≤ Pi
and thus D(s) =
∑
i∈E(Xi − Pi) ≤ 0. Consequently, for any i ∈M \ E
[piHE (P )]i = Vi(s) = Pi − wi(s)D(s) ≥ Pi ≥ Xi
and thus piHE (P ) ∈ S.
Lemma 3.18. Let k ∈ M. If piS(P ) /∈ H{k} then Pk > Xk. Equivalently, if Pk ≤ Xk then
piS(P ) ∈ H{k}.
Proof. Suppose that Pk ≤ Xk and assume that piS(P ) /∈ H{k}. Then the projection Q =
piH{k}(piS(P )) is still in S (by Lemma 3.17) and it is distinct from piS(P ) (since piS(P ) /∈ H{k}).
We will show that
‖P −Q‖ < ‖P − piS(P )‖, (3.8)
which contradicts the definition of piS(P ). In the case of Pk = Xk, we have P,Q ∈ H{k}
and piS(P )−Q being orthogonal to P −Q. Hence
‖P −Q‖2 < ‖P −Q‖2 + ‖piS(P )−Q‖2 = ‖P − piS(P )‖2.
To establish (3.8) in the case Pk < Xk, we introduce a hyperplane Ĥ{k} parallel to H{k} by
setting
Ĥ{k} =
{
x ∈ Rm : xk = Pk and
m∑
i=1
xi = C
}
,
so that, in particular, P ∈ Ĥ{k}. Let R = piĤ{k}(piS(P )), so that also
R = piĤ{k}
(
piH{k}(piS(P ))
)
= piĤ{k}
(Q).
3.2. Construction of an Optimal Equilibrium 53
Since Pk < Xk, R ∈ Ĥ{k} and piS(P ) ∈ S \ H{k} lie on opposite sides of the hyperplane
H{k}. It is thus clear that
‖R−Q‖ < ‖R−Q‖+ ‖Q− piS(P )‖ = ‖R− piS(P )‖. (3.9)
Finally, since P −R is orthogonal to both R−Q and R− piS(P ), we have
‖P −Q‖2 = ‖P −R‖2 + ‖R−Q‖2
and
‖P − piS(P )‖2 = ‖P −R‖2 + ‖R− piS(P )‖2.
Therefore, (3.9) implies (3.8), as required.
Lemma 3.19. For any P , there exists a proper subset E ⊂M such that piS(P ) = piHE (P ).
In particular, if P ∈ S then E = ∅, so that HE = H∅ = H.
Proof. For P ∈ S the statement is trivial. For P /∈ S, we will proceed by induction with
respect to m. The base case when the number of players m = 2 is easily verified.
Let us assume that P /∈ S. Then, by definition of S, there exists k ∈ M such that
Pk < Xk, and thus, by Lemma 3.18, the projection piS(P ) ∈ H{k}. Hence by Lemma 3.13
piS(P ) = piS∩H{k}(P ) = piS∩H{k}
(
piH{k}(P )
)
.
By applying the induction hypothesis to P ′ = piH{k}(P ) and S
′ = S ∩ H{k}, while working
under the domain of H{k} (instead of Rm), we can find E ′ ⊂M\ {k} such that
piS′
(
P ′
)
= piHE′∩H{k}
(
P ′
)
= piHE′∩H{k}
(
piH{k}(P )
)
= piHE′∩H{k}(P ) = piHE′∪{k}(P ).
To complete the induction step, it suffices to set E = E ′ ∪ {k}.
3.2.3 Subgames
Consider a proper subset E ⊂ M and assume that every player in E exercises at time 0.
Then the game G = ZRG(X,P, α) reduces to a subgame GM\E for players from M \ E .
Let us denote by SM\E the class of all strategy profiles for G such that si = 0 for i ∈ E .
Formally, by the subgame GM\E we mean the game G = ZRG(X,P, α) with the reduced
class SM\E of strategy profiles. Since xi = Xi for i ∈ E , the value space of the subgame
GM\E is equal to HE .
Lemma 3.20. The subgame GM\E is equivalent to an (m− |E|)-player zero-sum redistri-
bution game whose terminal payoff can be identified with P ′ = piHE (P ).
Proof. Let s be any strategy profile of G = ZRG(X,P, α) such that E(s) is a proper
subset of M such that E ⊆ E(s). This means, in particular, that s belongs to SM\E . Set
E ′(s) = E(s) \ E . By Proposition 3.15, the vector of modified payoffs V (s) is given by
V (s) = piHE(s)(P ) = piHE∪E′(s)(P ).
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Since HE∪E ′(s) ⊆ HE are both hyperplanes, from Lemma 3.13, we obtain
V (s) = piHE∪E′(s)(piHE (P )) = piHE∪E′(s)
(
P ′
)
.
By applying again Proposition 3.15, we conclude that we may identify the vector P ′ with
the vector of terminal payoffs of the subgame GM\E .
According to Lemma 3.20, the subgame GM\E can be seen as the game with the class
SM\E of strategy profiles (i.e., with active players from M \ E) and the terminal payoffs
piHE (P ). In other words, GM\E is equivalent to ZRG(XM\E , piHE (P )M\E , α
′) for some ad-
justed redistribution quotients α′. In view of Lemma 3.20, the following result can be easily
checked by the definition of an optimal (or Nash) equilibrium.
Proposition 3.21. Let s∗ = (s∗1, . . . , s∗m) ∈ S be an optimal (or Nash) equilibrium of
G = ZRG(X,P, α). If for some proper subset E ⊂ M the inclusion E ⊆ E(s∗) holds, then
s∗ is an optimal (or Nash) equilibrium of the subgame GM\E , that is, the game with the
class SM\E of strategy profiles and the terminal payoffs piHE (P ).
3.2.4 Value of the Non-Degenerate Game
The following result shows that any Nash equilibrium s∗ is also an optimal equilibrium. In
other words, if player k chooses his Nash equilibrium strategy s∗k, he is guaranteed a payoff
at least as much as the value payoff, regardless of other players’ strategies.
Proposition 3.22. Let s∗ = (s∗1, . . . , s∗m) be a Nash equilibrium of the game ZRG(X,P, α).
Then it is also an optimal equilibrium, meaning that for any k ∈M, we also have that
Vk(s
∗
k, s−k) ≥ Vk(s∗k−1, s∗k, s∗−k) (3.10)
for all s−k ∈ S−k.
Proof. Consider a particular player k. If s∗k = 0, then he is exercising at time 0 and his
payoff Xk is then independent of the decisions of other players, so that (3.10) is valid.
If s∗k = 1, we will argue by contradiction. Suppose there exists s = (1, s−k) such that
Vk(s) < Vk(s
∗). We proceed by induction on the number of players. For the base case of
m = 2 players, it can be easily verified that such a u does not exist.
Let us then consider any m ≥ 3. Assume first that E(s) ∩ E(s∗) 6= ∅. Then there exists
j ∈ E(s) ∩ E(s∗), meaning that player j is exercising under both s and s∗ and, obviously,
j 6= k. Hence we can consider the reduced subgame G{−j} in which we deal with decisions
of m−1 remaining players. By Lemma 3.20, the vector of terminal payoffs for the subgame
G{−j} can be identified with piH{j}(P ). Next, by Proposition 3.21, any optimal equilibrium
in G = ZRG(X,P, α) is also an optimal equilibrium in G{−j}, after considering exercise
decision of player j. By the induction hypothesis on G{−j}, which only has m− 1 players,
the inequality Vk(s) ≥ Vk(s∗) holds, and thus we arrive at a contradiction.
Assume now that E(s) ∩ E(s∗) = ∅, so that for every i ∈ E(s) we have that i /∈ E(s∗).
By the contra-positive of part (v) in Proposition 3.5, Pi ≥ Xi for every i ∈ E(s). Then the
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difference due to exercising
D(s) =
∑
i∈E(s)
(Xi − Pi) ≤ 0.
Consequently, the payoff for player k equals
Vk(s) = Pk − wk(s)D(s) ≥ Pk ≥ Vk(s∗),
where the last inequality follows from part (iv) in Proposition 3.5. This again yields a
contradiction.
We are in a position to establish the main result of this chapter, which shows that the
unique value of the game can be computed by projecting P on the simplex S. Recall that
we now assume that
∑
k∈MXk < C.
Theorem 3.23. (i) A strategy profile s∗ ∈ S is an optimal equilibrium for the game
ZRG(X,P, α) if and only if the set of exercising players E(s∗) is such that
piHE(s∗)(P ) = piS(P ). (3.11)
(ii) A strategy profile s∗ satisfying (3.11) always exists and the unique value of the game
ZRG(X,P, α) equals
V ∗ = V (s∗) = (V1(s∗), . . . , Vm(s∗)) = piS(P ).
Proof. We first demonstrate part (i) of the theorem.
[⇐= ] Let s∗ ∈ S be any strategy profile, such that E(s∗) satisfies
piS(P ) = piHE(s∗)(P ) = V (s
∗),
where the second equality follows from Proposition 3.15. We will prove that s∗ is a Nash
equilibrium and thus, by Proposition 3.22, it is also an optimal equilibrium. Let us fix
k ∈M. We need to show that condition (3.1) is satisfied.
We first assume that k is not in E(s∗), so that s∗k = 1. Observe that, by the definition
of S, the condition V (s∗) = piS(P ) ∈ S implies that Vk(s∗) ≥ Xk. Consequently,
Vk(1, s
∗
−k) = Vk(s
∗) ≥ Xk = Vk(0, s∗−k)
and thus (3.1) holds. Suppose now that k belongs to E(s∗), so that s∗k = 0. We need to
show that
Vk(0, s
∗
−k) = Xk ≥ Vk(1, s∗−k) = Vk(s′), (3.12)
where s′ is the strategy profile where k no longer exercises, whereas all other players follow
the strategy profile s∗. We thus have that E(s′) = E(s∗) \ {k} and V (s′) = piHE(s′)(P ) is the
new modified payoff. It is clear that (3.12) fails to hold whenever Vk(s
′) > Xk. To complete
the proof of the first implication, it thus suffices to show that the inequality Vk(s
′) > Xk
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leads to a contradiction. To this end, it suffices to show that there exists R ∈ S ∩ HE(s′)
such that ∥∥R− V (s′)∥∥ < ∥∥V (s∗)− V (s′)∥∥. (3.13)
Indeed, let us suppose that such an R exists. Then, by Proposition 3.15, V (s′) = piHE(s′)(P )
and thus P − V (s′) is orthogonal to HE(s′). Recall that R, V (s′) ∈ HE(s′) and also V (s∗) ∈
HE(s∗) ⊂ HE(s′). Consequently,
‖P −R‖ < ‖P − V (s∗)‖,
and this clearly contradicts the assumption that piS(P ) = V (s
∗). We conclude that a
strategy profile s∗ is an equilibrium, as desired.
It thus remains to show that if Vk(s
′) > Xk then there exists R ∈ S ∩ HE(s′) such that
(3.13) holds. Let Q be the point representing the zero-dimensional hyperplane HM\{k},
that is,
Q =
(
X1, . . . , Xk−1, X̂k, Xk+1, . . . , Xm
)
,
where X̂k = C −
∑
i∈M\{k}Xi > 0. Since the simplex S is non-degenerate, Q and V (s′)
both lie on the same side of H{k}.
Q
V (s∗)
V (s′)
R
H{k}
Figure 3.1: A plane containing Q,V (s∗) and V (s′) when they are collinear
If Q,V (s∗) and V (s′) are collinear, as shown in Figure 3.1, Q and V (s′) must lie on
the same side of V (s∗) and distinct from V (s∗). Choose R to be any point on the interval
joining V (s′) and V (s∗). Then (3.13) is manifestly satisfied.
If Q,V (s∗) and V (s′) are not collinear, as shown in Figure 3.2, let the two-dimensional
plane containing them be A. Note that A is a subset of HE(s′). Let the intersection of A
and H{k} be the line `. Now, by an application of Lemma 3.13, we obtain
V (s∗) = piHE(s∗)(P ) = piH{k}∩HE(s′)
(
piHE(s′)(P )
)
= piH{k}∩HE(s′)
(
V (s′)
)
= pi`
(
V (s′)
)
.
The last equality holds because V (s∗) ∈ ` and
` =
(
H{k} ∩ A
) ⊂ (H{k} ∩HE(s′)).
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Q
V (s′)
V (s∗)
R
`
B
Figure 3.2: The plane A when Q,V (s∗) and V (s′) are not collinear
Therefore, V (s∗) is the orthogonal projection of V (s′) onto `.
Consider the closed ball on A, centered at V (s′) with radius ‖V (s∗)− V (s′)‖, name it
B. Under our norm, B is an ellipse and ` is the tangent at V (s∗). Since Q lies on the
same side of ` as V (s′), the interval joining Q and V (s∗) must contain a point R lying on
the interior of B. Hence ‖R− V (s′)‖ < ‖V (s∗)− V (s′)‖, which completes this part of the
proof.
[ =⇒ ] We start by noting that Lemma 3.19 yields the existence of a strategy profile s∗
such that piHE(s∗)(P ) = piS(P ). The first part of this proof implies that s
∗ is also an optimal
equilibrium. Suppose that there exists another optimal equilibrium s′ corresponding to the
value V (s′). From Proposition 3.8, we deduce that V (s′) = V (s∗). Consequently,
piS(P ) = V (s
′) = piHE(s′)(P ),
where the last equality follows from Proposition 3.15. Part (ii) is an immediate consequence
of Lemma 3.19, Proposition 3.8 and Proposition 3.15.
Recall that in the degenerate case, we have S = X = HM (see Remark 3.16). Hence for
any P we obtain piS(P ) = X = piHM(P ). This shows that Theorem 3.11 can be reformulated
as a special case of Theorem 3.23. The result for the non-degenerate case
∑
k∈MXk < C
is similar to the result obtained for the degenerate case
∑
k∈MXk = C, except that in the
former case any strategy profile u corresponding to the value V ∗ is an equilibrium, which
is not necessarily true in the latter case (see Remark 3.12 for a counterexample). Recall
also that, by Lemma 3.7, for any optimal equilibrium s∗, the value payoff of Vk(s∗) is the
highest payoff player k can guarantee. Player k can ensure this payoff by carrying out his
optimal equilibrium strategy s∗k implicit in the strategy profile s
∗. To summarise, the game
has the unique value V ∗ at which the equilibria are achieved. The value V ∗ also represents
the highest possible payoff each player can guarantee, irrespective of strategies of other
players. Hence the value V ∗ is also the unique value of the game at time 0. Furthermore,
V ∗ is financed precisely by the total initial investment, that is,
∑
k∈M Vk(s
∗) = C.
Remark 3.24. An algorithm of finding an optimal equilibrium s∗ with the property
piHE(s∗)(P ) = piS(P ) can be inferred from Lemma 3.19 and its proof. Basically, if P does
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not belong to S then there exists k ∈ M with Pk < Xk. This means that s∗k = 0 and
thus player k should exercise at time 0. The game is then reduced to the subgame G{−k}
with one less player, with the new terminal payoff piH{k}(P ), the value space H{k} and the
sub-simplex S ∩ H{k}. This is repeated recursively until the point lies inside the simplex,
which will occur within m− 1 iterations.
Chapter4
Multi-Player Redistribution
Games
We essentially extend the zero-sum redistribution game of Chapter 3 to the class of non-
zero-sum general redistribution games. The general redistribution game can be simply
understood in the following way. Start with any m + 1 player zero-sum redistribution
game, but player m + 1 is a ‘dummy’ player who is not allowed to exercise. The dynamic
between the remaining m players is equivalent to a general redistribution game. We then
derive the necessary and sufficient conditions (except for some special cases) for the general
redistribution game to enjoy the WUC property and admit at least one Nash equilibrium.
All the main results of the zero-sum case are extended to the general redistribution game.
These include the existence of value and optimal equilibria, as well as representing them
explicitly as projections. Furthermore, the results are readily applicable to the stochastic
variant, as long as the definitions of payoffs and equilibria are appropriately modified to
include expectations.
Using the single period games as building blocks, we create a multi-period redistribution
game, which is a recursively defined, m-player stochastic stopping game in discrete-time.
In the special case of having only two-players and being zero-sum, the multi-period redis-
tribution game reduces to the two-player Dynkin game, which is a desired feature. The
existence of optimal equilibria and a unique value in the multi-period redistribution game
is also established.
The multi-period redistribution games can be readily applied to multi-person finan-
cial game options, where the properties of the optimal equilibrium become imperative in
the pricing arguments. Apart from multi-person game options, the redistribution games
presented here may find interpretation in other economic contexts, for example, as a con-
sumption model with bounded resources.
This chapter has some overlap with Chapter 3 in terms of results and techniques. It is
organised as follows. Section 4.1 formally defines the general redistribution game and proves
its WUC property. The main results, Theorems 4.7 and 4.16, establish the existence of the
value and an optimal equilibrium, and express them in terms of projection. In Section
4.2, we extend the redistribution game to stochastic and multi-period cases, producing
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the multi-period redistribution game. The existence of value and optimal equilibria in
the multi-period game is established in Theorem 4.25 by backward induction arguments.
Finally Section 4.3 briefly examines a variant known as a multi-period deterministic quitting
game.
4.1 Single Period Deterministic Redistribution Games
Once again, the game option terminology of ‘exercise’ will be utilised when referring to the
action of stopping the game by a player and the corresponding payoff from doing so will
be called the ‘exercise payoff’. We begin by setting up a single period deterministic game
with m players indexed by the set M = {1, 2, . . . ,m}, where early exercising (and thus
stopping the game) is only allowed at time 0. If no one exercises at time 0, then all players
are assumed to exercise at time 1.
Definition 4.1. A single period deterministic m-player redistribution game G is specified
by the following inputs:
(a) the vector X = (X1, . . . , Xm), where Xk is received by player k if she exercises at time
0,
(b) the vector P = (P1, . . . , Pm), where Pk is received by player k if no player exercises at
time 0,
and the rules of the game:
(i) the strategy sk ∈ Sk := {0, 1} of player k specifies whether player k exercises, namely,
sk = 0 (sk = 1, resp.) means that player k exercises (does not exercise, resp.) at time 0;
given a strategy profile s ∈ S := ∏i∈M Si, the exercise set E(s) is the set of players who
exercise at time 0,
(ii) for any s ∈ S, the outcome of the game G is the payoff vector V (s) = (V1(s), . . . , Vm(s))
where the payoff Vk(s) received by player k if a strategy profile s is carried out equals
Vk(s) =
{
Xk, k ∈ E(s),
Pk − wk(E(s))D(s), k ∈M \ E(s),
where D(s) =
∑
i∈E(s)(Xi−Pi) is the difference due to exercise and wk(E(s)) is the weight
function, which will be specified in Subsection 4.1.1.
Note that the payoffs Vk(s) are linear functions of Xi and Pi. This salient feature implies
that most results for the deterministic case can be easily extended to a stochastic setting.
The difference due to exercise, D(s), represents the effect of exercise and it negatively
affects the payoffs of non-exercising players, provided that the weights are positive. As will
be seen later in Theorem 4.2, the positivity of weights will be a crucial condition for the
game to be weakly unilaterally competitive or WUC (see Definition 1.19).
4.1.1 Weights and the WUC Property
In order to proceed further, we need to be more explicit about the way in which the weights
are specified. In general wk(E) is defined for non-empty subsets E ⊂M, E 6=M and k /∈ E .
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Consider the class of all redistribution games with fixed weight functions wk(E), but with
all possible choices of X and P . The goal of this section is to find weight functions fulfilling
two conditions:
(C.1) every game in the class is WUC,
(C.2) every game in the class has at least one equilibrium in pure strategies.
Recall that a game is said to be weakly unilaterally competitive (WUC) if, for any k, l ∈M,
Vk(sk, s−k) > Vk(s′k, s−k) =⇒ Vl(sk, s−k) ≤ Vl(s′k, s−k),
Vk(sk, s−k) = Vk(s′k, s−k) =⇒ Vl(sk, s−k) = Vl(s′k, s−k),
We make the standing assumption that wk(E) 6= 0 for all non-empty proper subset
E ⊂ M and every k /∈ E . This will ensure that the decision of any exercising player will
always affect the payoffs of all non-exercising players. It also eliminates various degenerate
cases. The WUC condition further refines the restrictions on the weights, as shown in
Proposition 4.2, which deals with the case m ≥ 4 (for the cases m = 2 and m = 3, see
Remark 4.5).
Proposition 4.2. Let m ≥ 4. Assume that the weights satisfy wk(E) 6= 0 for all k =
1, 2, . . . ,m. Then the game G is WUC for all X,P ∈ Rm if and only if the weights can be
represented as follows, for all E,
wk(E) = αk
1−∑i∈E αi where αk > 0 and
∑
i 6=k
αi < 1 for all k = 1, 2, . . . ,m. (4.1)
Before proving Proposition 4.2, we require the following lemmas.
Lemma 4.3. Given a subset E ⊂ M with 0 ≤ |E(s)| ≤ m − 2 and i, j /∈ E(s), we set
E ′ = E ∪ {j}. If s and s′ are strategy profiles with E(s) = E and E(s′) = E ′, then
Vi(s)− Vi(s′) + wi(E ′)(Vj(s)− Vj(s′)) =
(
wi(E ′)[1− wj(E)]− wi(E)
)
D(s). (4.2)
Proof. Note that player j exercises in s′, but not in s. We have that D(s′) = D(s)+Xj−Pj .
Furthermore,
Vi(s)− Vi(s′) = wi(E ′)D(s′)− wi(E)D(s) = (wi(E ′)− wi(E))D(s) + wi(E ′)(Xj − Pj)
and
wi(E ′)(Vj(s)− Vj(s′)) = wi(E ′)(Pj − wj(E)D(s)−Xj)
= −wi(E ′)wj(E)D(s)− wi(E ′)(Xj − Pj).
Adding these expressions yields the desired result.
Lemma 4.4. The game G is WUC for all X,P ∈ Rm if and only if the following conditions
hold:
(i) for any E ⊂M such that 1 ≤ |E| ≤ m− 2 and i, j /∈ E, we have
wi(E ∪ {j})(1− wj(E)) = wi(E),
(ii) for any E ′ ⊂M such that 1 ≤ |E ′| ≤ m− 1 and i /∈ E ′, we have wi(E ′) > 0.
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Proof. We prove the statement in three steps.
Step 1: [WUC =⇒ (i)] Take s and s′ to be strategy profiles with E(s) = E and E(s′) =
E ′ = E ∪ {j}. If the game G is WUC for all X,P ∈ Rm, then
Vj(s) = Vj(s
′) =⇒ Vi(s) = Vi(s′).
Using Lemma 4.3, we thus obtain(
wi(E ′)(1− wj(E))− wi(E)
)
D(s) = 0.
When |E| ≥ 1, we can chooseX,P ∈ Rm so thatD(s) 6= 0. Hence wi(E ′)(1−wj(E)) = wi(E),
and thus condition (i) is proven.
Step 2: [WUC and (i) =⇒ (ii)] Now assume condition (i) holds, hence wi(E ′)(1−wj(E))−
wi(E) = 0 if |E| ≥ 1. Note that if |E| = 0, then D(s) = 0. In either case, (4.2) always
simplifies to
Vi(s)− Vi(s′) = wi(E ′)(Vj(s′)− Vj(s)).
ButG being WUC requires that the inequality Vj(s
′)−Vj(s) > 0 implies that Vi(s)−Vi(s′) ≥
0. Since the weights are required to be non-zero, we have wi(E ′) > 0 for all 1 ≤ |E ′| ≤ m−1
and thus condition (ii) holds as well.
Step 3: [(i) and (ii) =⇒ WUC] As before, condition (i) yields
Vi(s)− Vi(s′) = wi(E ′)(Vj(s′)− Vj(s)).
When condition (ii) also holds, it is easy to check that the game has indeed the WUC
property.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Recall that we consider here the case where m ≥ 4. It is sufficient
to completely solve the system under conditions (i)–(ii) of Lemma 4.4. By condition (ii),
we have 0 < wi({j}) < 1 for all i 6= j. By condition (i),
wi({j})
1− wk({j}) = wi({j, k}) =
wi({k})
1− wj({k}) ⇐⇒
wi({j})
wi({k}) =
1− wk({j})
1− wj({k}) .
Since only the left-hand side depend on i, we have, for i, j, k, l all distinct,
wi({j})
wi({k}) =
wl({j})
wl({k}) .
This system of equations is known to admit the parametric solution wi({j}) = αiβj with
αi, βi 6= 0. Substituting back, we obtain
αiβj
1− αkβj =
αiβk
1− αjβk ⇐⇒ αj +
1
βj
= αk +
1
βk
⇐⇒ αi + 1
βi
= c
where c is a constant for all i. Solving for βj yields wi({j}) = αiβj = αic−αj . After scaling
all αis by a factor of 1/c, we get
wi({j}) = αi
1− αj .
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Substituting into condition (i), while recursively incrementing the size of E , we obtain
wk(E) = αk
1−∑i∈E αi .
Condition (ii) adds the following restrictions: αk > 0 and
∑
i 6=k αi < 1. This solution can
easily be checked to always satisfy conditions (i) and (ii).
Remark 4.5. When m = 2 or m = 3, the same arguments as in the proof above show
that if the weights are defined as in Proposition 4.2, then the game is always WUC. The
converse is not necessarily true, however. Specifically, there exist other choices of weights,
which also lead to WUC games. They may be found by solving the system described by
conditions (i) and (ii) of Lemma 4.4.
Let us first examine the case m = 2. Then condition (i) of Lemma 4.4 is not applicable
and thus the required weights are precisely given by condition (ii), that is, w1({2}) > 0 and
w2({1}) > 0. It is possible to parameterise them by w1({2}) = a11−a2 and w2({1}) = a21−a1 ,
but in this case there is no reason for a1 and a2 to lie between 0 and 1.
It remains to study the case when m = 3. After writing wij = wi({j}), conditions (i)
and (ii) of Lemma 4.4 can be reduced to: 0 < wij < 1 and
w12(1− w23) = w13(1− w32), w23(1− w31) = w21(1− w13), w31(1− w12) = w32(1− w21).
We may parameterise the left-side variables by w12 =
a1
1−a2 , w23 =
a2
1−a3 and w31 =
a3
1−a1 .
The constraint 0 < wij < 1 translates to a1, a2, a3 > 0 and a1+a2 < 1, a2+a3 < 1, a1+a3 <
1. Now, the required system of equations is given by: 0 < wij < 1 and
a1(1− a2 − a3)
(1− a2)(1− a3) = w13(1− w32),
a2(1− a1 − a3)
(1− a1)(1− a3) = w21(1− w13),
a3(1− a1 − a2)
(1− a1)(1− a2) = w32(1− w21).
It is clear that if w13 is known in terms of a1, a2 and a3, then the other variables, w32 and
w21, are uniquely determined. Eliminating w32 and w21, we arrive at a quadratic equation
in w13. The exact quadratic is omitted for brevity, but its two solutions can be easily
verified to be:
(w13, w21, w32) =
(
a1
1− a3 ,
a2
1− a1 ,
a3
1− a2
)
or
(
1− a2 − a3
1− a3 ,
1− a1 − a3
1− a1 ,
1− a1 − a2
1− a2
)
.
The first solution coincides with the conclusion in Proposition 4.2. The second solution
leads to the following set of conditions on weights: wi({j}) > 0 and
w1({3}) + w2({3}) = w1({2}) + w3({2}) = w2({1}) + w3({1}) = 1,
w1({2, 3}) = w2({1, 3}) = w3({1, 2}) = 1.
This describes a class of zero-sum games, which strictly contains the class of zero-sum
redistribution games (when m = 3), which are discussed in Section 4.1.3 below.
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For the purpose of this chapter, redistribution games will only use the weights defined by
Proposition 4.2, which works for an arbitrary number of players. The games corresponding
to the alternative weights for m = 2 and 3 belong to a wider class of games known as affine
stopping games, which are analysed in Chapter 5.
We shift our focus back onto the weights as described by Proposition 4.2. In (4.1), the
relative sizes of αks determine the weights wk(E) used to redistribute D(s). By Proposition
4.2, the game G with weights defined by (4.1) is always WUC, so that condition (C.1)
holds. For condition (C.2), further restrictions are needed.
Proposition 4.6. Let the weights be defined by (4.1). If
∑
i∈M αi > 1, then there exist
X,P ∈ Rm such that no equilibrium exists in pure strategies. In particular, it suffices to
take X = (0, 0, . . . , 0) and P = (1,−1, 0, . . . , 0).
Proof. We first note that, for i 6= j,
wi(M\ {i}) = αi
1−∑j 6=i αj > 1.
Moreover, as before, wi(E) < 1 if |E| ≤ m − 2. We will simply check all the possibilities.
If {3, . . . ,m} ⊆ E or if there are only two players, then we need to examine the following
cases:
• If both players 1 and 2 exercise, then V1 = V2 = 0, but player 2 can receive w2(M\
{2})− 1 > 0 if she does not exercise.
• If only player 1 exercises, then V1 = 0, but player 1 can receive P1 = 1 if she does not
exercise.
• If only player 2 exercises, then V1 = 1 − w1(M\ {1}) < 0, but player 1 can receive
X1 = 0 if she also exercises.
• If neither player 1 or 2 exercises, then V2 = −1, but player 2 can receive X2 = 0 if
she also exercises.
If some player k 6= 1, 2 does not exercise, so that k /∈ E , then the cases are the following.
• If both players 1 and 2 exercise, then V1 = V2 = 0, but |E \ {1}| ≤ m− 2 and player
1 can receive 1− w1(E \ {1}) > 0 if she does not exercise.
• If only player 1 exercises, then |E| ≤ m− 2 and V2 = w1(E)− 1 < 0, but player 2 can
receive X2 = 0 if she exercises.
• If only player 2 exercises, then Vk = 0− wk(E) < 0, but player k can receive Xk = 0
if she also exercises.
• If neither player 1 or 2 exercises, then V2 = −1, but player 2 can receive X2 = 0 if
she also exercises.
We conclude that no equilibrium exists in pure strategy profiles.
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4.1.2 Existence of the Value
We henceforth work under the following standing assumption ensuring that the redistribu-
tion game has the value, which is achieved by all Nash and optimal equilibria (see Theorem
4.7). The class of redistribution games G that satisfy Assumption (A.1) is denoted as
RG(X,P, α).
Assumption (A.1). For each non-empty subset E ⊂ M, E 6= M and k /∈ E , the weight
wk(E) is given by
wk(E) = αk
1−∑i∈E αi
where α1, . . . , αm are real numbers satisfying αi > 0 and
∑
i∈M αi ≤ 1. In particular,
0 < wk(E) ≤ 1.
The main result of this subsection is the following theorem.
Theorem 4.7. The redistribution game G = RG(X,P, α) has at least one optimal equilib-
rium. Hence the game has the value.
The proof of Theorem 4.7 is preceded by two lemmas. Consider a subset E ⊂ M and
assume that every player in E exercises at time 0, while the players from M′ = M \ E
are still free to make choices. The possible outcomes of the game for the players from M′
define a subgame of the game G = RG(X,P, α), which we denote by G′. The next lemma
shows that the game G′ has the same features as RG(X,P, α), but with suitably modified
parameters.
Lemma 4.8. The subgame G′ is equivalent to a game GM′ = RG(X ′, P ′, α′) with:
(i) the set of players M′ =M\ E,
(ii) X ′k = Xk for k ∈M′,
(iii) P ′k = Pk − wk(E)
∑
i∈E(Xi − Pi) for k ∈M′,
(iv) the weights defined by α′k = wk(E) for k ∈M′,
(v) the strategy profiles s′ = (s′k, k ∈M′) ∈ SM′.
Proof. Let s′ ∈ SM′ be any strategy profile of the subgame GM′ and E ′ = E(s′) be the
corresponding set of exercising players. Let s ∈ S be the matching strategy profile of the
original game G, that is,
s = (sk = s
′
k, k ∈M′; sk = 0, k /∈M′)
and E(s) = E ∪ E ′. It is sufficient to check that for any k ∈ M′, the payoff V ′k(s′) of the
subgame matches the payoff Vk(s) of the original game. We first note that the weights of
GM′ can be written as
w′k(E ′) =
α′k
1−∑i∈E ′ α′i = wk(E)1−∑i∈E ′ wi(E) (4.3)
=
αk
1−∑i∈E αi
1−∑i∈E ′ αi1−∑j∈E αj =
αk
1−∑i∈E∪E ′ αi = wk(E(s)). (4.4)
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If k ∈ E ′, then V ′k(s′) = X ′k = Xk = Vk(s). Otherwise,
V ′k(s
′) = P ′k − w′k(E ′)
∑
i∈E ′
(X ′i − P ′i )
= Pk − wk(E)
∑
i∈E
(Xi − Pi)− w′k(E ′)
∑
i∈E ′
(
Xi − Pi + wi(E)
∑
j∈E
(Xj − Pj)
)
= Pk −
(
wk(E) + w′k(E ′)
∑
i∈E ′
wi(E)
)∑
i∈E
(Xi − Pi)− w′k(E ′)
∑
i∈E ′
(Xi − Pi). (4.5)
Rearranging (4.3) as wk(E) + w′k(E ′)
∑
i∈E ′ wi(E) = w′k(E ′), we can rewrite (4.5) as follows
V ′k(s
′) = Pk − w′k(E ′)
∑
i∈E
(Xi − Pi)− w′k(E ′)
∑
i∈E ′
(Xi − Pi)
= Pk − w′k(E ′)
∑
i∈E(s)
(Xi − Pi)
= Pk − wk(E(s))
∑
i∈E(s)
(Xi − Pi) (by (4.4))
= Vk(s),
as was required to show.
We will also need Lemma 4.9, which asserts that the difference due to exercise has to
be positive under any Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 4.9. In the game RG(X,P, α), if s∗ is an equilibrium, then D(s∗) =
∑
i∈E(s∗)(Xi−
Pi) ≥ 0.
Proof. Assume the contrary, so D(s∗) < 0. Then there must exists a player k ∈ E(s∗) for
which Xk − Pk < 0. Assuming that player k chooses not to exercise at time 0, her payoff
will be
Vk(s
′) = Pk − wk(E(s′))
∑
i∈E(s′)
(Xi − Pi)
where s′ is the modified strategy profile. Note that s′ = (1, s∗−k) and s
∗ = (0, s∗−k) and
thus E(s′) = E(s∗) \ {k}. Since s∗ is an equilibrium, we have Vk(s′) ≤ Vk(s∗) = Xk.
Consequently, we obtain
Xk − Vk(s′) = Xk − Pk + wk(E(s′))
∑
i∈E(s′)
(Xi − Pi) ≥ 0. (4.6)
Since Xk − Pk < 0, equality (4.6) implies
∑
i∈E(s′)(Xi − Pi) ≥ 0. Recall that Assumption
(A.1) postulates that 0 < wk(E(s′)) ≤ 1. Therefore,
D(s∗) =
∑
i∈E(s∗)
(Xi − Pi) ≥ Xk − Pk + wk(E(s′))
∑
i∈E(s′)
(Xi − Pi) ≥ 0,
contradicting the assumption of D(s∗) < 0.
4.1. Single Period Deterministic Redistribution Games 67
Proof of Theorem 4.7. Kats and Thisse [30] have shown that in any WUC game all Nash
equilibria are optimal equilibria and attain the same value. It is thus sufficient to construct
a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
We proceed by induction on the number of players. Note that the game is still well-
defined as a single-player game when m = 1 and, obviously, all single-player games have at
least one equilibrium. In particular, s∗ = 1 if P1 > X1 or s∗ = 0 if P1 ≤ X1.
Let us now assume that m ≥ 2. If Pi > Xi for all i, then s∗ = 1 is an equilibrium.
If Pk ≤ Xk for some k, we consider the m − 1 player subgame G{−k}. Let s′ be an
equilibrium of G{−k}, which exists by the induction hypothesis. Consider the strategy
profile s∗ = (1, s−k = s′); we will show it is an equilibrium of G.
By construction, s′ is an equilibrium of G{−k}, so any player i 6= k cannot improve her
payoff by changing her strategy. Hence it is sufficient to check that player k cannot improve
by not exercising, or Vk(s
∗) = Xk ≥ Vk(s) = Pk − wk(E)D(s) where s = (0, s−k = s′) and
E(s′) = E(s) = E . To this end, let us write D(s) in terms of the subgame G{−k} variables
P ′i and D
′(s′) (see Lemma 4.8)
D(s) =
∑
i∈E
(Xi − P ′i ) + (P ′i − Pi) = D′(s′)−
∑
i∈E
wi({k})(Xk − Pk). (4.7)
Substituting (4.7) back, we want the following expression to be non-negative,
Xk − (Pk − wk(E)D(s))
= Xk − Pk + wk(E)D′(s′)− wk(E)(Xk − Pk)
∑
i∈E
wi({k})
= wk(E)D′(s′) + (Xk − Pk)
(
1− wk(E)
∑
i∈E
wi({k})
)
. (4.8)
From Lemma 4.9 applied to the subgame G{k}, we obtain D′(s′) ≥ 0. Recall that wk(E) ≥ 0
and Xk − Pk ≥ 0, by assumptions. It remains to examine the last term in (4.8), which can
be represented as follows
1− wk(E)
∑
i∈E
wi({k}) = 1− αk
1−∑i∈E αi
∑
i∈E αi
1− αk =
1− αk −
∑
i∈E αi(
1−∑i∈E αi)(1− αk) ≥ 0
where the inequality holds since αk +
∑
i∈E αi ≤
∑
i∈M αi ≤ 1. We have thus shown that
Xk ≥ Vk(s). Consequently, s∗ is an equilibrium and the induction is complete.
4.1.3 Explicit Constructions of Optimal Equilibria
The main result of this section, Theorem 4.16, furnishes an explicit construction of the value
and an optimal equilibrium of the redistribution game. The construction is motivated by
results of Chapter 3, where we examined the case of the zero-sum redistribution game
and we expressed its value and an optimal equilibrium in terms of a suitable projection.
Subsection 4.1.3 will briefly revisit these results; in Subsection 4.1.3, they will be extend to
the case of the general redistribution game.
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Let us fix X ∈ Rm. For any subset E ⊆M, we define the hyperplane HE(X) as
HE(X) :=
{
x ∈ Rm : xi = Xi, ∀ i ∈ E
}
.
In particular, H∅(X) = Rm and HM(X) = {X}. The hyperplane HE(X) contains all the
possible payoffs if all players in E exercise. We also define the orthant O(X)
O(X) :=
{
x ∈ Rm : xi ≥ Xi, ∀ i ∈M
}
.
Lemma 4.10. The value V ∗ of the redistribution game G belongs to the orthant O(X).
Proof. Given any equilibrium s∗, the payoff of each player should be at least as great as
her exercise payoff, so that Vk(s
∗) ≥ Xk for all k ∈M. Hence V ∗ ∈ O(X).
Zero-Sum Redistribution Game
We will only present the main results for the zero-sum (or constant sum) game established
in Chapter 3. Analogous results for the nonzero-sum game will be derived in Subsection
4.1.3 (see Lemma 4.15 and Theorem 4.16). Only in this subsection, we add the constraint∑
i∈M αi = 1 to Assumption (A.1).
Definition 4.11. Assume that the equality
∑
i∈M αi = 1 holds in Assumption (A.1). Then
the game is called the zero-sum redistribution game and it is denoted as ZRG(X,P, α).
We have that ∑
i/∈E
wi(E) =
∑
i/∈E αi
1−∑j∈E αj = 1, ∀ E ⊂M, E 6= ∅. (4.9)
If E(s) =M, then ∑i∈M Vi(s) = ∑i∈MXi. Otherwise,∑
i∈M
Vi(s) =
∑
i∈E
Xi +
∑
i/∈E
(
Pi − wi(E)
∑
j∈E
(Xj − Pj)
)
and thus ∑
i∈M
Vi(s) =
∑
i∈E
Xi +
∑
i/∈E
Pi −
∑
j∈E
(Xj − Pj) =
∑
i∈M
Pi.
This means that the payoffs of the game ZRG(X,P, α) have a constant sum c :=
∑m
i=1 Pi,
except when everyone exercises so that the sum of payoffs equals
∑m
i=1Xi.
Let us fix the vectors X,P ∈ Rm. All possible payoffs, except one, lie on the hyperplane
H(c) :=
{
x ∈ Rm :
m∑
i=1
xi = c
}
.
In particular, the game ZRG(X,P, α) is almost zero-sum if the equality
∑
i∈M Pi = 0 holds,
and thus we decided to use the most commonly used term ‘zero-sum game’, rather than
the more precise name ‘constant-sum game’.
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For any proper subset E ⊂M, we define the hyperplane
HE(X, c) := HE(X) ∩H(c) =
{
x ∈ Rm :
m∑
i=1
xi = c and xi = Xi, ∀ i ∈ E
}
.
In particular, H∅(X, c) = H(c). By convention, we also set HM(X, c) := HM(X) = {X}.
We endow the space Rm with the inner product 〈·, ·〉0 given by
〈x, y〉0 =
m∑
i=1
(
xiyi
αi
)
(4.10)
and the associated norm ‖ · ‖0. This choice of the norm will be justified by Lemma 4.12,
which gives a very handy way of representing and computing the payoff vector, provided
that the exercise set is known. Given a normed vector space Rm, for any vector P and any
closed convex set K, we denote by piK(P ) the projection of P onto K.
Lemma 4.12. In the game ZRG(X,P, α), for any strategy profile s ∈ S, the payoff vector
V (s) equals
V (s) = pi0HE(s)(X,c)(P )
where
pi0HE(s)(X,c) : R
m → HE(s)(X, c)
is the projection under the norm ‖ · ‖0.
Consider the (possibly empty) simplex S(X, c) given by the formula
S(X, c) := O(X) ∩H(c) =
{
x ∈ Rm :
m∑
i=1
xi = c and xi ≥ Xi, ∀ i ∈M
}
.
As observed in Lemma 4.10, the value V ∗ must belong to O(X). Since all the payoffs of
ZRG(X,P, α), but one, lie on H(c), we expect V ∗ to belong to S(X, c) (if it is non-empty).
The following theorem (see Chapter 3) shows that the value V ∗ coincides with the
projection of P onto S(X,P ).
Theorem 4.13. Consider the single period zero-sum redistribution game ZRG(X,P, α). If∑m
i=1Xi ≤ c, then the value V ∗ equals
V ∗ = V (s∗) = pi0S(X,c)(P ) = pi
0
HE(s∗)(X,c)(P )
where the projection pi0 is taken under the norm ‖ · ‖0 induced by the inner product (4.10)
and an optimal equilibrium s∗ = (s∗1, . . . , s∗m) is characterised by
s∗i = 0 ⇐⇒
[
pi0S(X,c)(P )
]
i
= Xi.
If
∑m
i=1Xi > c, then the value of the game ZRG(X,P, α) equals V
∗ = V (s∗) = X with an
optimal equilibrium given by s∗ = (0, . . . , 0).
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Nonzero-Sum Redistribution Game
This subsection extends the projection representation of the value and an optimal equilib-
rium to the case of a game that is not zero-sum (or constant sum). In other
Definition 4.14. Assume that the strict inequality
∑
i∈M αi < 1 holds in Assumption
(A.1). Then the game is called the general redistribution game and it is denoted as
GRG(X,P, α).
Given an m-player game GRG(X,P, α), we construct the associated (m + 1)-player
zero-sum redistribution game G˜ = ZRGm+1(X,P, α) by adding the dummy player with the
following attributes:
(a) no exercising allowed,
(b) Pm+1 is arbitrary, but, for simplicity, we set Pm+1 = −
∑
i∈M Pi so that G
′ is zero-sum,
(c) the weights wm+1(E) = αm+11−∑i∈E αi where αm+1 = 1−∑i∈M αi > 0,
(d) the payoff function satisfies
Vm+1(s) = Pm+1 − wm+1(E(s))
∑
i∈E(s)
(Xi − Pi).
The following properties are easy to check:
(i) the space of strategy profiles in G˜ coincides with the space S in GRG(X,P, α),
(ii) the payoffs of all players in M do not change in G˜,
(iii) any Nash/optimal equilibrium for the game G˜ is also a Nash/optimal equilibrium of
GRG(X,P, α) and vice versa,
(iv) the value of GRG(X,P, α) is equal to the value of G˜, after restricting to the first m
coordinates.
Since the game G˜ is zero-sum, Vm+1(s)+
∑
i∈M Vi(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S. Hence the space
of payoff vectors for G˜ is the hyperplane
H˜(0) :=
{
x ∈ Rm+1 :
m+1∑
i=1
xi = 0
}
,
which is endowed with the inner product 〈·, ·〉0 given by
〈x, y〉0 =
m∑
i=1
(
xiyi
αi
)
+
(−∑mi=1 xi)(−∑mi=1 yi)
αm+1
. (4.11)
Rewriting αm+1 in terms of α1, . . . , αm, formula (4.11) motivates the following inner product
〈x, y〉 =
m∑
i=1
(
xiyi
αi
)
+
(
∑m
i=1 xi)(
∑m
i=1 yi)
1−∑mi=1 αi (4.12)
and the associated norm ‖ · ‖. For any subset E ⊆M, we denote
H˜E(X) :=
{
x ∈ Rm+1 : xi = Xi, ∀ i ∈ E
}
and
O˜(X) :=
{
x ∈ Rm+1 : xi ≥ Xi, ∀ i ∈M
}
.
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Consider the isometry φ : H˜(0) → Rm, which discards the (m + 1)th coordinate. For any
E ⊆ M, it maps H˜E(X, 0) = H˜E(X) ∩ H˜(0) and S˜(X, 0) := O˜(X) ∩ H˜(0) to HE(X) and
O(X), respectively. Equipped with the new inner product 〈·, ·〉, we can in fact discard the
dummy player and return to the space Rm and the original game GRG(X,P, α).
Lemma 4.15 and Theorem 4.16 are counterparts of Lemma 4.12 and Theorem 4.13,
respectively. Recall that we consider here the case when
∑
i∈M αi < 1.
Lemma 4.15. In the game GRG(X,P, α), for any strategy profile s ∈ S, the payoff vector
V (s) equals
V (s) = piHE(s)(X)(P )
where piHE(s)(X) : R
m → HE(s)(X) is the projection under the norm ‖ · ‖.
Proof. Let us denote HE(s) = HE(s)(X). We observe that the vector V (s) equals
V (s) =
[
Vi(s) = Xi, i ∈ E(s), Vi(s) = Pi − wi(E(s))D(s), i /∈ E(s)
]
and thus it certainly belongs to the hyperplane
HE(s) =
{
x ∈ Rm : xi = Xi, ∀ i ∈ E(s)
}
.
Therefore, it is sufficient to check that the vector v(s) given by
v(s) := P − V (s) = [vi = Pi −Xi, i ∈ E(s), vi = wi(E(s))D(s), i /∈ E(s)]
is orthogonal to HE(s). Let u =
(
u ∈ Rm : ui = 0, i ∈ E(s)
)
= x − y for arbitrary vectors
x, y ∈ HE(s). Then
〈u, v(s)〉
=
∑
i/∈E(s)
uiwi(E(s))D(s)
αi
+
(∑
i/∈E(s) ui
)(∑
i∈E(s)(Pi −Xi) +
∑
i/∈E(s)wi(E(s))D(s)
)
1−∑mi=1 αi
=
∑
i/∈E(s) uiD(s)
1−∑i∈E(s) αi +
(∑
i/∈E(s) ui
)(
−D(s) +
∑
i/∈E(s) αi
1−∑i∈E(s) αiD(s)
)
1−∑mi=1 αi
=
∑
i/∈E(s) uiD(s)
1−∑i∈E(s) αi
1 + −
(
1−∑i∈E(s) αi)+∑i/∈E(s) αi
1−∑mi=1 αi

=
∑
i/∈E(s) uiD(s)
1−∑i∈E(s) αi (1− 1) = 0,
as required.
The existence of the value for the game G was first established in Theorem 4.7. Theorem
4.16 reaffirms that result by providing an explicit representation using a concise notation.
The chosen optimal equilibrium s∗ is determined by identifying the exercise set E(s∗) from
the hyperplanes that are implicitly and uniquely specified by the equality of projections
piO(X)(P ) = piHE(s∗)(X)(P ).
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Theorem 4.16. The value of the game GRG(X,P, α) is given by
V ∗ = V (s∗) = (V1(s∗), . . . , Vm(s∗)) = piO(X)(P ) = piHE(s∗)(X)(P )
where the projection pi is taken under the norm ‖ · ‖ and an optimal equilibrium s∗ =
[s∗1, . . . , s∗m] is given by
s∗i = 0 ⇐⇒
(
piO(X)(P )
)
i
= Xi.
In the proof Theorem 4.16, we will employ three lemmas. The first lemma is elementary
and thus its proof is omitted.
Lemma 4.17. If H ⊂ Rm is a hyperplane, then the projection pi is orthogonal, that is,
piH(P ) is the unique vector in H such that
〈piH(P )− P,Q− piH(P )〉 = 0, ∀Q ∈ H.
Furthermore, if K is a convex subset of the hyperplane H, then piK(P ) = piK(piH(P )).
Lemma 4.18. Assume that P ∈ O(X). Then piHE(X)(P ) ∈ O(X) for any subset E ⊆M.
Proof. We denote HE = HE(X). In view of Lemma 4.15, the projection piHE (P ) corresponds
to the payoff vector when E is the set of exercising players. Let s be the corresponding
strategy profile. In particular, for any i ∈ E
(piHE (P ))i = Xi ≤ Pi
and thus D(s) =
∑
i∈E(Xi − Pi) ≤ 0. Consequently, for any j ∈M \ E ,
(piHE (P ))j = Pj − wj(E(s))(s)D(s) ≥ Pj ≥ Xj ,
and thus piHE (P ) ∈ O(X).
Lemma 4.19. For any k ∈ M, if piO(X)(P ) /∈ H{k}(X) =
{
x ∈ Rm : xk = Xk
}
then
Pk > Xk. Equivalently, if Pk ≤ Xk then piO(X)(P ) ∈ H{k}(X).
Proof. For brevity, we write O = O(X) and H{k} = H{k}(X). We will argue by contradic-
tion. Let us then suppose that Pk ≤ Xk and assume that piO(P ) /∈ H{k}. The projection
Q := piH{k}
(
piO(P )
)
is still in O (by Lemma 4.18) and it is distinct from piO(P ) (since, by
assumption, piO(P ) /∈ H{k}). We will show that
‖P −Q‖ < ‖P − piO(P )‖, (4.13)
which, since Q ∈ O, contradicts the definition of the projection piO(P ).
Case 1: In the case of Pk = Xk, we have P,Q ∈ H{k} and thus, by Lemma 4.17, the vector
piO(P )−Q is orthogonal to P −Q ∈ H{k}. Therefore,
‖P −Q‖2 < ‖P −Q‖2 + ‖piO(P )−Q‖2 = ‖P − piO(P )‖2.
Case 2: To establish (4.13) when Pk < Xk, we introduce the auxiliary hyperplane Ĥ{k}
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P
piO(X)(P )
Q
H{k}
Figure 4.1: Case Pk = Xk
P
piO(P )
Q
R
H{k}
Ĥ{k}
Figure 4.2: Case Pk < Xk
parallel to H{k} by setting
Ĥ{k} :=
{
x ∈ Rm : xk = Pk
}
,
so that, manifestly, P ∈ Ĥ{k}. We observe that for all x ∈ O
piĤ{k}
(
piH{k}(x)
)
= piĤ{k}
(x).
Hence for R := piĤ{k}
(piO(P )), we obtain
R = piĤ{k}
(
piH{k}(piO(P ))
)
= piĤ{k}
(Q)
where the second equality follows from the definition of Q. Since Pk < Xk, the vectors
R ∈ Ĥ{k} and piO(P ) ∈ O \ H{k} lie on opposite sides of the hyperplane H{k}. It is thus
clear that
‖R−Q‖ < ‖R−Q‖+ ‖Q− piO(P )‖ = ‖R− piO(P )‖. (4.14)
Finally, since P −R ∈ Ĥ{k} is orthogonal to both R−Q = piĤ{k}(Q)−Q and R− piO(P ) =
piĤ{k}
(piO(P ))− piO(P ), we have
‖P −Q‖2 = ‖P −R‖2 + ‖R−Q‖2
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and
‖P − piO(P )‖2 = ‖P −R‖2 + ‖R− piO(P )‖2.
Therefore, (4.14) implies (4.13), which completes the proof of the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 4.16. We begin by noting that in the subgame GM′ defined in Lemma
4.8, the variables P ′k can be rewritten as
P ′k = Pk − wk(E)
∑
i∈E
(Xi − Pi) =
[
piHE (P )
]
k
where we also used Lemma 4.15. The map φ : HE → Rm−|E|, defined by discarding the
coordinates with indices in E , is an isometry to the space of GM′ payoffs. Let us endow
Rm−|E| with the norm
‖x‖′ =
(∑
i∈M′
(
x2i
α′i
)
+
(∑
i∈M′ xi
)2
1−∑i∈M′ α′i
) 1
2
and let pi′ be the corresponding projection map.
As before, we denote O = O(X). To establish the assertion of the theorem, it is sufficient
to show that the strategy profile s∗ defined by
s∗i = 0 ⇐⇒
(
piO(P )
)
i
= Xi
is a Nash equilibrium (hence an optimal equilibrium, since the game GRG(X,P, α) is
WUC). This goal will be achieved using the induction arguments used in the proof of
Theorem 4.7, but with a few additions. The base case of m = 1 can be easily checked. Let
us this consider m ≥ 2. If Pi > Xi for all i, then P lies in the interior of O. Therefore,
piO(P ) = P and s
∗ = 1 is an equilibrium. If Pk ≤ Xk for some k, then we consider the
m − 1 player subgame G{−k}. By the induction hypothesis, the strategy profile s′ ∈ S−k
defined by
s′i = 0 ⇐⇒
(
pi′O′(P
′)
)
i
= Xi, ∀ i ∈M \ {k}
is an equilibrium of G{−k}. By applying the isometry φ−1 and using Lemma 4.17, we obtain(
pi′O′
(
P ′
))
i
=
(
piO∩H{k}(piH{k}(P ))
)
i
=
(
piO∩H{k}(P )
)
i
, ∀ i ∈M \ {k}.
By Lemma 4.19, the inequality Pk ≤ Xk implies that piO(P ) ∈ H{k}. Hence we have
piO∩H{k}(P ) = piO(P ) and s
′ can be rewritten as follows
s′i = 0 ⇐⇒
(
piO(P )
)
i
= Xi, ∀ i ∈M \ {k}.
Finally,
(
piO(P )
)
k
= Xk implies that s
∗
k = 0 and thus s
∗ = (s∗k = 0, s
∗
−k = s
′). By the proof
of Theorem 4.7, we conclude that s∗ is an equilibrium of GRG(X,P, α), as was required to
show.
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4.1.4 Extended Projection
If the original game is already a zero-sum game ZRG(X,P, α), then the introduction of the
dummy player m+1 is problematic. Division by zero occurs because αm+1 = 1−
∑
i∈M αi =
0, and thus the game G˜ and the inner product 〈·, ·〉0 from Subsection 4.1.3 are no longer
well defined. However, Lemma 4.15 and Theorem 4.16 can still be applied to this case if the
following conventions are adopted. Let us fix  > 0 sufficiently small, and let us consider
the (m+ 1)-player game G, where α1, . . . , αm and αm+1 are replaced by
αi = αi −

m
> 0, i ∈M, αm+1 = 1−
∑
i∈M
αi = .
We then take G˜ to be the limit of G as  ↓ 0. Since for any fixed k ∈ M and any fixed
s ∈ S, the G payoff V k (s) is continuous (in fact, linear) in , the limit lim→0 V k (s) is
indeed the desired payoff of G˜. Furthermore, the quantities
V k = maxsk
min
s−k
V k (sk, s−k), V

k = mins−k
max
sk
V k (sk, s−k)
are also continuous in , so the value of G converges to the value of G˜ as well. Once again,
the payoffs and the value of the m-player game ZRG(X,P, α) are obtained from G˜ after
discarding the (m + 1)th coordinate. Although ‖ · ‖ is not well defined, Lemma 4.15 and
Theorem 4.16 can still be recovered by redefining the projection pi. To this end, we formally
adopt the following definition of the extended projection pi for the remainder of this chapter.
Obviously, this definition covers the case of an arbitrary game RG(X,P, α).
Definition 4.20. When
∑
i∈M αi < 1, then we define pi as the projection under the norm
‖ · ‖ given by (4.12). When ∑i∈M αi = 1, then we define the projection pi on HE where
E ⊆M and O as follows, for all P ∈ Rm,
piHE (P ) = lim
↓0
piHE (P ), piO(P ) = lim↓0
piO(P ),
where pi is the projection under the norm
‖x‖ =
(
m∑
i=1
(
x2i
αi − m
)
+
(
∑m
i=1 xi)
2

) 1
2
. (4.15)
4.2 Stopping Games with Redistribution of Payoffs
In this section, we study the multi-period stochastic extension of the single period deter-
ministic game. The multi-period stopping game is rarely WUC, even when its single period
building blocks are. Nevertheless, we attempt to identify multi-period stochastic stopping
games where optimal equilibria and value still exist. All of the following definitions are taken
under the probability space (Ω,F ,P) endowed with the filtration F = {Ft : t = 0, 1, . . . , T}
representing the information flow observed by all the players. As usual, the players are
indexed by the set M = {1, 2, . . . ,m}. In the present multi-period set-up, each player has
the right to exercise at any time in the interval [t, T ] := {t, t+1, . . . , T} and the game stops
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as soon as anyone exercises. In addition, if no player exercises before time T , then everyone
must exercise at time T . Further details about the specification of the multi-period game
is given in the foregoing definition (see also Remarks 4.26–4.27 for additional comments).
Recall that we work under the standing Assumption (A.1).
Definition 4.21. For t = 0, 1, . . . , T , the m-player multi-period redistribution game Gt =
MRGt(X,α) is defined on the time interval [t, T ] and specified by the inputs:
(a) the F-adapted, Rm-valued process Xu = (X1u, . . . , Xmu ) where u = t, t+ 1, . . . , T ,
(b) the weights wk(E) = αk1−∑i∈E αi for k /∈ E ⊂ M where αi > 0 is deterministic and∑
i∈M αi ≤ 1,
and the rules of the game:
(i) the strategy skt of player k is a stopping time from the space Skt of F-stopping times with
values in [t, T ]; hence the strategy profile st = (s
1
t , . . . , s
m
t ) ∈ St is an m-tuple of stopping
times; we denote by ϑt = s
1
t ∧· · ·∧smt the minimal stopping time, also an F-stopping time,
(ii) for each strategy profile st ∈ St, the outcome of the game Gt is the expected payoff
vector Vt(st) = (V
1
t (st), . . . , V
m
t (st)), which is given by
V kt (st) = EP
(
Xkϑt1{k∈E(st)} + X̂
k
ϑt1{k/∈E(st)}
∣∣Ft) (4.16)
where the exercise set E(st) = {i ∈ M : sit = ϑt} is the random set of earliest stopping
players and
X̂kϑt = V
∗k
ϑt+1 − wk(E(st))
∑
i∈E(st)
(
Xiϑt − V ∗iϑt+1
)
, ϑt < T, (4.17)
where V ∗u = (V ∗1u , . . . , V ∗mu ) is the value of the game Gu = MRGu(X,α) for u = t + 1, t +
2, . . . , T .
Remark 4.22. Since the game is stopped at time ϑt, the indicator functions in (4.16)
separate the exercising players from the others, specifically, Xkϑt is the payoff for an exer-
cising player while X̂kϑt is the payoff for a non-exercising player. The game Gϑt+1 can be
considered as the continuation of the current game if it does not stop at time ϑt. Note
that in (4.17), the quantity X̂kϑt is undefined for ϑt = T . This does not matter, however,
because if the game is stopped at T , then every player must exercise and receive the payoff
XkT , rather than X̂
k
T .
The following lemma, which deals with the case of the single period m-player stochastic
stopping game, follows easily from results of preceding sections by taking expected values,
and thus its proof is omitted. Note that the orthant O(X0) may be random if the σ-field
F0 is non-trivial.
Lemma 4.23. The single period m-player stochastic redistribution game G0 has the unique
value given by V (s∗) = piO(X0)(EP(X1 | F0)) where O(X0) is the orthant defined by
O(X0) =
{
x ∈ Rm : xi ≥ Xi0, 1 ≤ i ≤ m
}
and the projection pi is given by Definition 4.20. A possible optimal equilibrium s∗ =
[s∗1, . . . , s∗m] is given by
s∗i = 0 ⇐⇒
(
piO(X0)
(
EP(P | F0)
))
i
= Xi0.
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We now proceed to the analysis of a multi-period m-player stochastic redistribution
game MRG(X,α). The following lemma is an immediate consequence of Definition 4.21
and Lemma 4.15.
Lemma 4.24. The expected payoff Vt(st) = [V
1
t (st), . . . , V
m
t (st)] can be represented using
the projection
Vt(st) = EP
(
piHE(st)(V
∗
ϑt+1)1{ϑt<T} +XT1{ϑt=T}
∣∣∣Ft)
where HE(st) is the Fϑt-measurable hyperplane
HE(st) =
{
x ∈ Rm : xi = Xiϑt , ∀ i ∈ E(st)
}
.
Theorem 4.25. Define recursively the F-adapted process U = [U1, . . . , Um] by setting
UT = XT and
Ut = piO(Xt)
(
EP(Ut+1 | Ft)
)
, ∀ t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1, (4.18)
where O(Xt) is the Ft-measurable orthant
O(Xt) =
{
x ∈ Rm : xi ≥ Xit , 1 ≤ i ≤ m
}
(4.19)
and the extended projection pi is given by Definition 4.20. Define τ∗t = (τ∗1t , . . . , τ∗mt ) be
F-stopping times given by
τ∗it = min
{
u ∈ [t, T ] : U iu = Xiu
}
. (4.20)
Then:
(i) the equality Ut = Vt(τ
∗
t ) holds for every t = 0, 1, . . . , T ,
(ii) τ∗t is an optimal equilibrium of the m-player redistribution game Gt = MRGt(X,α) and
Ut = V
∗
t is the value of the game for every t = 0, 1, . . . , T .
Proof. Both statements are proven by the backward induction. For t = T , we have τ∗T =
(T, . . . , T ). The game GT is always stopped at time T with the payoff vector XT = UT =
VT (τ
∗) = V ∗T yields the value. Let us now assume that statements (i) and (ii) are valid for
the game Gt+1, so that its value is given by
V ∗t+1 = Ut+1 = Vt+1(τ
∗). (4.21)
Note throughout the proof that if the game Gt is stopped at time t, then it is reduced to
a single period stochastic game with payoff vectors Xt and V
∗
t+1. Let us denote this single
period game by G′. Let us also write τ̂t = τ∗1t ∧ · · · ∧ τ∗mt . We first show that part (i) holds
at time t.
Case 1: If τ̂t = t, then the game is stopped at time t. By Lemma 4.23 and (4.20), τ
∗
t is an
optimal equilibrium of the single period game G′, whose value is
Ut = piO(Xt)
(
EP(Ut+1 | Ft)
)
= piO(Xt)
(
EP(V ∗t+1 | Ft)
)
= piHE(τ∗t )
(
EP(V ∗t+1 | Ft)
)
.
The result then follows from Lemma 4.24, noting that HE(τ) is Ft-measurable, so that
Ut = piHE(τ∗t )
(
EP(V ∗t+1 | Ft)
)
= piHE(τ∗t )
(
EP(V ∗τ̂t+1 | Ft)
)
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Case 2: If τ̂t ≥ t+ 1, then the game is not stopped at time t. By (4.18), (4.19) and (4.20),
we obtain U it > X
i
t and thus the vector Ut lies in the interior of O(Xt) (a.s.). The induction
hypothesis (4.21) yields
Ut = piO(Xt)
(
EP(Ut+1 | Ft)
)
= EP
(
Ut+1
∣∣Ft) = EP(Vt+1(τ∗t ) ∣∣Ft).
It is thus sufficient to show Vt(τ
∗
t ) = EP
(
Vt+1(τ
∗
t )
∣∣Ft). To establish this equality, we note
that τ̂t ≥ t+ 1 and we apply Lemma 4.24, to obtain Vt(τ
∗
t ) = EP
(
EP
(
piHE(τ∗t )
(V ∗τ̂t+1)
∣∣Ft+1) ∣∣Ft) = EP(Vt+1(τ∗t ) ∣∣Ft), if τ̂t < T,
Vt(τ
∗
t ) = EP
(
EP
(
XT
∣∣Ft+1) ∣∣Ft) = EP(Vt+1(τ∗t ) ∣∣Ft), if τ̂t = T.
This completes the proof of part (i) for the game Gt.
It remains to establish part (ii). By part (i), (4.18), and the induction hypothesis (4.21),
we have
Vt(τ
∗
t ) = Ut = piO(Xt)
(
EP(Ut+1 | Ft)
)
= piO(Xt)
(
EP(V ∗t+1 | Ft)
)
.
To check that τ∗t is an optimal equilibrium, we need to show that, for each k ∈ M, the
inequalities
V kt
(
τ∗kt , s−k
) ≥ (piO(Xt)(EP(V ∗t+1 | Ft)))k ≥ V kt (sk, τ∗,−kt )
hold for all sk ∈ Sk and s−k ∈ S−k. Let thus s′ =
(
τ∗kt , s−k
)
and s′′ =
(
sk, τ
∗,−k
t
)
be
alternative strategy profiles with the respective minimal stopping times ϑ′ and ϑ′′.
Case 1: Assume first that ϑ′ = ϑ′′ = t. Then both s′ and s′′ can be interpreted as strategy
profiles of the single period game G′. Hence the result follows from Lemma 4.23, because(
piO(Xt)
(
EP(V ∗t+1 | Ft)
))
k
is value of the game G′ for player k.
Case 2: Assume now that ϑ′ ≥ t + 1, so that s′ is a valid strategy profile of Gt+1. Also
we deduce that τ∗kt ≥ t+ 1 is a maximin strategy, in view of the induction hypothesis and
because it belongs to an optimal equilibrium of Gt+1 by (4.20). From Lemma 4.24, we
obtain{
Vt(s
′) = EP
(
EP
(
piHE(s′)(V
∗
ϑ′+1)
∣∣Ft+1) ∣∣Ft) = EP(Vt+1(s′) ∣∣Ft), if ϑ′ < T,
Vt(s
′) = EP
(
EP
(
XT
∣∣Ft+1) ∣∣Ft) = EP(Vt+1(s′) ∣∣Ft), if ϑ′ = T.
Using the fact that τ∗kt is a maximin strategy, we obtain
V kt (s
′) = EP
(
V kt+1(s
′)
∣∣Ft) = EP(V kt ([τ∗kt , s−k]) ∣∣Ft) ≥ EP(V ∗kt+1 ∣∣Ft). (4.22)
Since τ∗kt ≥ t+ 1, by (4.20), we must have(
piO(Xt)
(
EP(V ∗t+1 | Ft)
))
k
=
(
piO(Xt)
(
EP(Ut+1 | Ft)
))
k
> Xkt . (4.23)
By Lemma 4.23 and (4.23), player k does not exercise in the optimal equilibrium of the
single period game G′. Interpreting EP
(
V ∗kt+1
∣∣Ft) as the expected payoff of player k if no
one exercises and using the definition of optimal equilibrium, we find that
EP
(
V ∗kt+1
∣∣Ft) ≥ (piO(Xt)(EP(V ∗t+1 | Ft)))k. (4.24)
4.2. Stopping Games with Redistribution of Payoffs 79
From (4.22) and (4.24), we obtain V kt (s
′) ≥ (piO(Xt)(EP(V ∗t+1 | Ft)))k, as required.
Case 3: For ϑ′′ ≥ t+ 1, by arguments similar to the ones used for (4.22), we get
V kt (s
′′) = EP
(
V kt+1(s
′′)
∣∣Ft) ≤ EP(V ∗kt+1 ∣∣Ft). (4.25)
For all i 6= k, since τ∗it ≥ t+ 1, by (4.20), we have(
piO(Xt)
(
EP(V ∗t+1 | Ft)
))
i
=
(
piO(Xt)
(
EP(Ut+1 | Ft)
))
i
> Xit . (4.26)
By Lemma 4.23, if i 6= k then player i does not exercise in the optimal equilibrium of the
single period game G′. Again, interpreting EP
(
V ∗kt+1
∣∣Ft) as the expected payoff of player k
if no one exercises and using the definition of an optimal equilibrium, we conclude that
EP
(
V ∗kt+1
∣∣Ft) ≤ (piO(Xt)(EP(V ∗t+1 | Ft)))k. (4.27)
Finally, formulae (4.25) and (4.27) imply that
V kt (s
′′) ≤ (piO(Xt)(EP(V ∗t+1 | Ft)))k
and thus the proof is completed.
Remark 4.26. It is straightforward to further generalise the game by making the weights
(hence the coefficients αi) to be F-adapted processes. The random weights at time ϑ are
thus applied when the game is stopped. Theorem 4.25 will still hold with the projection pi
also made time-dependent and randomised. For continuous-time counterparts of Definition
4.21 and Theorem 4.25, see Nie and Rutkowski [38] who solve the problem through a
judiciously chosen multi-dimensional BSDE with oblique reflection at the boundary of a
stochastic orthant.
Remark 4.27. One could argue that the stopping game described by Definition 4.21 is
perhaps not the most obvious generalisation of the single period game of Definition 4.1.
A more straightforward, but not necessarily more practically appealing, extension would
be for the non-exercising player k to receive the expected payoff based on the following
expression
XkT − wk(E(st))
∑
i∈E(st)
(
Xiϑt −XkT
)
, ϑt < T,
when the game is stopped, that is, using XkT in the right-hand side of (4.17) instead of
the value V ∗kϑt+1 of Gt+1. However, even in the deterministic case, this convention does not
always produce an optimal equilibrium in pure strategies. Let us consider, for example, the
two-period 3-player stopping game with
X0 = (−1,−1, 0), X1 = (−2,−2, 4), X2 = (0, 0, 0),
and α1 = α2 = α3 = 1/3. Player 3 will always want to exercise at time 1, while there is a
prisoner’s dilemma between players 1 and 2 at time 0. This game has two Nash equilibria
with different payoffs, but no optimal equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
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4.3 Quitting Games with Redistribution of Payoffs
A quitting game is an alternative extension of a general redistribution game to the multi-
period set-up. As opposed to a stopping game, a quitting game does not terminate when
one of the players decides to exercise. Instead, the non-exercising players continue the
game and may exercise at a later date. We focus on the deterministic case here, as the
stochastic case does not always produce optimal equilibria (see Remark 4.30). A strategy
profile s = (s1, . . . , sm) thus belongs to [0, T ]
m.
Definition 4.28. A deterministic m-player multi-player quitting game G on the interval
[0, T ] is specified by the inputs:
(a) the vectors Xt = (X
1
t , . . . , X
m
t ) where Xt ∈ Rm for t = 0, 1, . . . , T ,
(b) the weights wk(E) = αk1−∑i∈E αi where αi > 0 and ∑i∈M αi ≤ 1,
and the following rules:
(i) if player k exercises at time t ≤ T − 1 (i.e., sk = t ≤ T − t), then she receives a payoff
of Xkt ,
(ii) if player k does not exercise before time T (i.e., sk = T ), then she receives at time T
the payoff
XkT − wk(E(s))
∑
i∈E(s)
(Xit −XiT )
where s = (s1, . . . , sm) and E(s) is the set of players exercising before time T ; in other
words, the payoff vector V (s) = (V 1(s), . . . , V m(s)) is given by
V k(s) =
{
Xksk , if sk < T,
XkT − wk(E(s))
∑
i∈E(s)(X
i
si −XiT ), if sk = T.
4.3.1 Value and Optimal Equilibrium
Let us denote Mt = max0≤u≤tXiu. The following result corresponds to Theorem 4.25.
Theorem 4.29. The quitting game G has a unique value given by V ∗ = piO(MT−1)(XT )
where O(MT−1) is the orthant defined by
O(MT−1) :=
{
x ∈ Rm : xi ≥M iT−1, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
}
and the projection pi is given by Definition 4.20. A possible optimal equilibrium s∗ =
[s∗1, . . . , s∗m] is given by
s∗i = min
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : [piO(MT−1)(XT )]i ≤ Xit}.
Proof. Consider a single period redistribution game G′ with X ′k = M
k
T−1 and P
′
k = X
k
T for
all k ∈ M. By Theorem 4.16, the vector V ∗ = piO(MT−1)(XT ) is the value of G′. If player
k exercises, then
piO(MT−1)(XT ) = X
′
k = M
k
T−1.
If player k does not exercise, then (recall that D(s∗) ≥ 0 since s∗ is an equilibrium; see
Lemma 4.9)
V ∗k = X
k
T − wk(E(s∗))D(s∗) ≤ XkT .
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Either way, the strategy s∗k is well defined and the exercise decision corresponds to the
optimal equilibrium of G′. It is thus easy to check that the equality V ∗ = V (s∗) holds.
To prove s∗ is an optimal equilibrium of the quitting game G, we will first check that
it is a Nash equilibrium, that is,
Vk(s
∗
k, s
∗
−k) ≥ Vk(sk, s∗−k), ∀ sk ∈ Sk.
If s∗k < T and player k exercises, then she cannot improve her payoff by exercising at
another time since Xks∗k
is maximal. Moreover, she cannot improve by not exercising since
s∗ corresponds to a Nash equilibrium in G′. If instead s∗k = T and player k does not
exercise, it is sufficient to check that she cannot improve by exercising at any time, or
V ∗k ≥ MkT−1 = X ′k. This is certainly true since, once again, s∗ corresponds to a Nash
equilibrium in G′. We conclude that s∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G.
To complete the proof, it remains to check that
Vk(s
∗
k, s−k) ≥ Vk(s∗k, s∗−k), ∀ s−k ∈ S−k.
If s∗k = t < T so that player k exercises at time t, then her payoff is fixed and thus it cannot
be decreased by the action of other players. Finally, suppose that s∗k = T so that k does
not exercise. If we write s = (s∗k, s−k) for an arbitrary s−k ∈ S−k, then we obtain
Vk(s) = X
k
T − wk(E(s))
∑
i∈E(s)
(Xisi −XiT )
≥ XkT − wk(E(s))
∑
i∈E(s)
(
M iT−1 −XiT
)
(4.28)
= P ′k − wk(E(s))
∑
i∈E(s)
(X ′i − P ′i ) = Vk(s′)
where by s′ we denote the strategy profile in which any exercising player under s chooses
to exercise for the maximal payoff X ′i instead. But s
′ corresponds to a strategy profile
in G′ with player k not exercising and thus, since s∗ is an optimal equilibrium of G′, we
have that Vk(s
′) ≥ Vk(s∗). When combined with (4.28), it implies that Vk(s) ≥ Vk(s∗), as
required.
Remark 4.30. In the stochastic case, unfortunately, a quitting game G may fail to have
an equilibrium in pure strategies. As a counter-example, one may consider the two-period
quitting game with αi = 1/3, i = 1, 2, 3, the probability space Ω = {ω1, ω2} endowed with
the filtration F0 = {∅,Ω}, F1 = F2 = 2Ω and the probability P(ω1) = P(ω2) = 1/2, and
the payoffs given by:
X0 = (2.1, 3.5,−50),
X1(ω) =
{
(−50,−50,−5.05), ω = ω1,
(4,−50,−50), ω = ω2,
X2 = (0, 5,−5).
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Since our ultimate goal is to design multi-period stochastic games with redistribution of
payoffs for which optimal equilibria in pure strategies exist, we conclude that stochastic
quitting games (at least when they are specified as in Definition 4.28) are unsuitable as
potential models for multi-person financial game options. Nevertheless, they may be of
interest in other economic applications where a weaker concept of an equilibrium could be
seen as a sufficient tool.
4.3.2 Subgame Perfect Optimal Equilibrium
It is worth noting that Theorem 4.29 does not specify the amount of information available to
the players regarding the exercise decisions of others. Unlike a stopping game, the strategies
in a quitting game can also depend on the observable actions of other players. However, if we
denote the information flow available to player k by the filtration Ak = {Akt , t = 0, . . . , T},
then the strategy sk is a Ak-stopping time. Theorem 4.29 shows that, in the quitting
game, regardless of how much or little any player observes about the actions of others, the
value of the game is fixed and an optimal equilibrium attaining the value can be chosen
independently of the information flows available to players.
Let A = (A1,A2, . . . ,Am) be the information structure of the game. We will show that
if G = (G,A) is a perfect information quitting game, that is, when for each k the filtration
Ak is generated by the observations of actions of all other players, then a subgame perfect
optimal equilibrium can be constructed. Denote the set of exercising player up to time t−1
by Et−1(s) and the set of remaining players by M†t :=M\ Et−1(s).
By Lemma 4.8, the quitting subgame (G†t ,M†t) on the interval [t, T ] is the quitting game
amongst the remaining players M†t with the following modifications:
(i) the exercise payoffs satisfy X†ku = Xku for all t ≤ u ≤ T − 1 and k ∈M†t ,
(ii) the payoffs at T are given by, for every k ∈M†t ,
X†kT = X
k
T − wk(Et−1(s))
∑
i∈Et−1(s)
(Xisi −XiT ),
(iii) the weights w†k(E) for every E ⊂ M†t are specified using the modified coefficients α†ks,
for all k ∈M†t ,
α†k := wk(Et−1(s)) =
αk
1−∑i∈Et−1(s) αi ,
(iv) a strategy profile st = sM†t ∈ St := [t, T ]
mt where mt := |M†t |.
Proposition 4.31. In a perfect information quitting game G, a subgame perfect optimal
equilibrium exists.
Proof. A subgame perfect optimal equilibrium s† is an optimal equilibrium for any reachable
subgame of G. In particular, it is also an optimal equilibrium and it attains the value of
the game, that is, V (s†) = V ∗. The optimal equilibrium s∗ constructed in Theorem 4.29 is
not necessarily subgame perfect, as the strategy s∗k of player k does not take the actions of
other players into account. For example, let us assume that another player, say i, deviates
from s∗i by exercising too early. The strategy s
∗
k does not adjust to punish the mistake.
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Consequently, even though the value of V ∗k is still guaranteed, player k misses the chance
to guarantee an even higher payoff, created by the sub-optimal deviation of player i.
The subgame perfect optimal equilibrium can be constructed in a recursive way, using
the backward induction with respect to both time and remaining set of players. Specifically,
for the quitting subgame (G†t ,M†t), the subgame perfect optimal equilibrium s†t =
[
s†kt , k ∈
M†t
]
is given by: s†kT = T and, for all t < T ,
s†kt =
{
t, if [piOt(MT−1)(X
†
T )]k = X
k
t ,
s†kt+1, if [piOt(MT−1)(X
†
T )]k > X
k
t ,
where Ot(MT−1) =
{
xi ≥ M iT−1, i ∈ M†t
}
is an orthant in Rmt , the projection pi is
given by Definition 4.20 with an obvious modification for M†t , and s†kt+1 is the subgame
perfect optimal equilibrium strategy for player k in the subgame (G†t+1,M†t) . Then s† :=
s†0 is the subgame perfect optimal equilibrium of the quitting game G with the perfect
information.
We conclude by noting that in the quitting game with imperfect information, where
the players’ actions are partially or completely hidden to others, it is not always possible
to determine the current subgame (G†t ,M†t). Consequently, the subgame perfect optimal
equilibria may not exist. However, by using the same idea as above, each player can
construct a strategy that is the optimal equilibrium strategy in all observable subgames.
And, as was already mentioned, the lack of subgame perfection does not change the value
of the quitting game G.

Chapter5
Multi-Player Affine Games
In Chapter 3, we introduced an m-player zero-sum redistribution game with explicit depen-
dencies between the payoffs of all players and their decisions. Each player can either exercise
for a predetermined payoff, or do nothing and receive an adjusted payoff, which reflects the
discrepancies caused by any exercising decisions of other players. These adjustments are
judiciously designed to ensure that the total wealth is fixed. Chapter 4 then extended the
zero-sum redistribution game to general, non-zero-sum settings while preserving most of
the payoff structures.
In this chapter, we generalise the redistribution games to the larger class of affine
games. The key feature of an affine game is that the payoff discrepancies caused by different
exercising players have separate effects to the payoff redistribution. Instead of weights or
redistribution quotients (see Section 4.1), the payoff redistribution is driven by an m ×m
matrix G. In particular, if the set of exercising players is E , then the payoff deviation lies
within the column space of G·E . A simple interpretation of the affine game can be found
in Example 0.2 of the preface. The affine game is also closely connected with the class of
optimisation problems known as linear complementarity problems.
Section 5.1 presents single period deterministic affine games with non-singular matrices
while Section 5.2 extends the game to cover singular matrices (which includes zero-sum
games). Theorems 5.14 and 5.23 identify conditions on G under which Nash equilibria,
optimal equilibria and the value for the affine game exist. In addition, Theorem 5.25
addresses the existence of coalition values.
Several practically important extensions are then discussed in Section 5.3. First, all
single period results can be immediately applied to the stochastic case where both terminal
and exercise payoffs are random, as long as expectations are incorporated into the definitions
of value and equilibria. Next, a multi-period stochastic affine stopping game is introduced
using a recursive formulation similar to the multi-period redistribution game from Section
4.2. The main result, Theorem 5.32, proves the existence of optimal equilibria and value
under mild assumptions on the matrix G. Theorem 5.33 examines the existence of coalition
values. The multi-period affine stopping game can be readily applied to the multi-person
affine game option (see Section 7.4.1), where the properties of the optimal equilibrium
become imperative in the pricing arguments.
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5.1 Affine Games with Non-Singular Matrices
We first examine the case of a single period deterministic game. Let X ∈ Rm be the exercise
payoff and let P ∈ Rm be the terminal payoff. We denote by s ∈ {0, 1}m a strategy profile
where 0 means ‘exercise’ and 1 means ‘not exercise’. Let E(s) = {i ∈ M : si = 0} be the
set of exercising players. We use V (s) ∈ Rm to denote the vector of payoffs if the strategy
profile s is carried out.
To specify the payoffs more explicitly, we introduce a matrix G ∈ Rm×m, such that the
kth column of G corresponds to player k. Let G·E(s) be the submatrix obtained from G by
taking columns with indices from E(s). If E(s) ∈ M is the set of exercising players, then
the payoff deviation V (s) − P is assumed to lie in the column space of the matrix G·E(s).
Put another way, we postulate that the payoff function V (s) can be implicitly written as
follows: 
Vi(s) = Xi, ∀ i ∈ E(s),
V (s)− P = Ga(s), a(s) ∈ Rm,
ai(s) = 0, ∀ i /∈ E(s).
(5.1)
Alternatively, one could write V (s) − P = ∑i∈E(s)G·iai(s) for some real numbers ai(s).
By scaling ai appropriately, we may assume, without loss of generality, that G has only
positive diagonal terms.
Lemma 5.1. Let G ∈ Rm×m be a matrix with a positive diagonal and non-zero principle
minors. Then the payoff function V (s) can be written in terms of X,P and G,
V (s) = P +G·E(s)
(
GE(s)E(s)
)−1
(XE − PE). (5.2)
Proof. We need to solve for V (s) in (5.1). In the case where only one person, say player
i, exercises, this is rather straightforward. The exercise set E(s) = {i} with ai(s) being
the only non-zero component of a(s) and thus V (s) = P + G·iai(s). Since for player i,
Vi(s) = Xi, we find that ai(s) =
1
Gii
(Xi − Pi). Hence the payoff function can be written in
terms of X,P and G,
V (s) = P +
G·i
Gii
(Xi − Pi). (5.3)
In the case of two or more players stopping simultaneously, the same argument can still
be applied. Recall that E(s) is the set of exercising players. From (5.1), the payoff vector
can be initially written as
V (s) = P +G·E(s)aE(s)(s),
where subscript of E(s) means to restrict to terms with indices in E(s). As in (5.3), we
would like to express the payoff in terms of X,P and G while eliminating terms involving
a(s). Since any player i ∈ E(s) should receive the exercise payoff Vi(s) = Xi, we obtain
aE(s)(s) =
(
GE(s)E(s)
)−1
(XE(s) − PE(s)).
Note that the submatrix GE(s)E(s) is non-singular by assumption. Hence for any s ∈ S the
payoff V (s) can be explicitly written as in (5.2).
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Remark 5.2. In Chapter 4, the single period game GRG(X,P, α) has the property where
the payoff vector can be written as the projection piHE (P ). In particular, the vector piHE (P )−
P lies in the vector space orthogonal to the hyperplane HE , which we will denote by H⊥E .
Since the hyperplane HE can be written as the intersection HE =
⋂
i∈E H{i}, H⊥E is also the
subspace spanned by {H⊥{i} : i ∈ E}. In other words, the vector piHE (P )−P can be written
as a linear combination of {piH{i}(P ) − P : i ∈ E}. Hence the affine games form a larger
class of discrete-time games with this linearity property (see Lemma 5.17). Note also that
the representation V (s) − P = ∑i∈E(s)G·iai(s) is linked to the BSDE from Section 8.3,
where a corresponds to the increments of the reflection process.
In view of Lemma 5.1, we propose the following definition of an affine game.
Definition 5.3 (Affine Games). Let X,P ∈ Rm be vectors and G ∈ Rm×m be a matrix with
a positive diagonal and non-zero principle minors. An m-player affine game AG(X,P,G)
is a single period deterministic game in which each player i can either choose to exercise
(si = 0) or not exercise (si = 1). For any strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sm), the payoff vector
V (s) = (V1(s), . . . , Vm(s)) is given by
V (s) := P +G·E(s)
(
GE(s)E(s)
)−1
(XE − PE)
where E(s) := {i ∈M : si = 0} is the set of exercising players.
In Chapter 4, the payoff of the general redistribution game GRG(X,P, α) was expressed
in terms of projections. A similar result can be obtained for the affine game AG(X,P,G).
The following lemma is elementary.
Lemma 5.4. Let pi be the projection mapping induced by the inner product 〈·, ·〉 in Rm.
Let x ∈ Rm be any vector and K ⊆ Rm be any closed, convex set. Suppose that y ∈ K.
Then y = piK(x) if and only if
〈y − x, z − y〉 ≥ 0, ∀ z ∈ K. (5.4)
Proposition 5.5. (i) For any strategy profile s ∈ S, the payoff V (s) of AG(X,P,G) may
be represented as follows: there exists a(s) ∈ Rm such that
V (s) = P +Ga(s),
Vi(s) = Xi, ∀ i ∈ E(s),
ai(s) = 0, ∀ i /∈ E(s).
(5.5)
(ii) The payoff function V (s) satisfies V (s) ∈ HE(s) and(
G−1(V (s)− P ))T (y − V (s)) = 0, ∀ y ∈ HE(s), (5.6)
where
HE(s) :=
{
x ∈ Rm : xi = Xi, ∀ i ∈ E(s)
}
.
(iii) If G is a positive definite symmetric matrix, then
V (s) = piG
−1
HE(s)(P ) (5.7)
where the projection is taken under the inner product 〈x, y〉G−1 = xTG−1y.
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Proof. Part (i) is obvious by the initial construction of AG(X,P,G) (see (5.1)). By part
(i), (5.6) of part (ii) can be rewritten as
a(s)T (y − V (s)) = 0, ∀ y ∈ HE(s), (5.8)
where a(s) satisfies ai(s) = 0 for all i /∈ E(s). For all i ∈ E , yi − Vi(s) = Xi − Xi = 0.
So (5.8) clearly holds. If G is a positive definite symmetric matrix, then (5.7) of part (iii)
follows immediately from the property of projection given by Lemma 5.4.
For the reader’s convenience, we recall the definitions of Nash and optimal equilibria.
In particular, a strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σm) ∈ S is called a Nash equilibrium, or simply
an equilibrium, if no single player can improve her payoff by altering her own strategy. In
other words, for each k ∈M,
Vk(σk, σ−k) = sup
sk∈Sk
Vk(sk, σ−k). (5.9)
Equivalently, we may write Vk(σk, σ−k) ≥ Vk(sk, σ−k) for all sk ∈ Sk.
On the other hand, a strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σm) ∈ S is called an optimal equilib-
rium if, for each k ∈M,
Vk(σk, σ−k) = inf
s−k∈S−k
Vk(σk, s−k) = sup
sk∈Sk
Vk(sk, σ−k) (5.10)
or, equivalently,
Vk(σk, s−k) ≥ Vk(σk, σ−k) ≥ Vk(sk, σ−k), ∀ sk ∈ Sk, ∀ s−k ∈ S−k. (5.11)
The next natural step is to investigate the existence of Nash and optimal equilibria in
AG(X,P,G). We will address the following questions:
(A) Which choice of G ensures that AG(X,P,G) has the WUC property for all X and P?
(B) Which choice of G guarantees a Nash equilibrium in AG(X,P,G) for all X and P?
For both questions, we will first attempt to gain some preliminary insight by analysing the
case where only one player exercises.
Starting with (A), recall that the WUC property requires that, for any k, l ∈M,
Vk(sk, s−k) > Vk(σk, s−k) =⇒ Vl(sk, s−k) ≤ Vl(σk, s−k),
Vk(sk, s−k) = Vk(σk, s−k) =⇒ Vl(sk, s−k) = Vl(σk, s−k),
for all sk, σk ∈ Sk and s−k ∈ S−k. Consider the strategy profiles s and s′ corresponding to
E(s) = ∅ and E(s′) = {k}. Applying the WUC condition, we obtain, for all l 6= k,
Vk(s) > Vk(s
′) =⇒ Vl(s) ≤ Vl(s′),
Vk(s) < Vk(s
′) =⇒ Vl(s) ≥ Vl(s′),
Vk(s) = Vk(s
′) =⇒ Vl(s) = Vl(s′).
Since V (s) = P , V (s′) = P + G·k(Xk − Pk) and Gkk > 0, it follows that Glk ≤ 0. Hence
every G must be a Z-matrix where every off-diagonal term is non-positive. This is simply
a necessary condition for WUC and it is by no means sufficient.
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For (B), again consider the strategy profiles s and s′ corresponding to E(s) = ∅ and
E(s′) = {k}. If s′ is a Nash equilibrium, then
Xk = Vk(s
′) ≥ Vk(s) = Pk
and hence ak(s
′) = (Gkk)−1(Xk − Pk) ≥ 0. Furthermore, it is clear that Vi(s′) ≥ Xi for all
i ∈M. Adding these constraints to (5.5), we are facing the problem that is reminiscent to
what is known as the linear complementarity problem.
5.1.1 Linear Complementarity Problems
For the detailed analysis of the linear complementarity problem, the reader is referred to
Cottle et al. [7] and Facchinei and Pang [16]. We shall give a brief overview of the relevant
definitions and results.
Definition 5.6. Given q ∈ Rm and M ∈ Rm×m, the linear complementarity problem
LCP(q,M) is to find a vector z ∈ Rm satisfying
z ≥ 0,
q +Mz ≥ 0,
zT (q +Mz) = 0,
(5.12)
where the inequalities are taken component-wise.
Remark 5.7. It is common to define w = q +Mz, and equivalently state the problem as:
to find vectors z, w ∈ Rm satisfying 
w = q +Mz,
z ≥ 0, w ≥ 0,
zTw = 0.
(5.13)
In the remainder of this chapter, unless specified otherwise, we refer to the pair (z, w)
whenever the solution of LCP(q,M) is mentioned.
The following definition is borrowed from Fiedler and Pta´k [17].
Definition 5.8. Let M be a real square matrix.
(i) If the principal minors of M are all positive, then it is a P-matrix.
(ii) If the off-diagonal terms of M are all non-positive, then it is a Z-matrix.
(iii) If M is both a P-matrix and a Z-matrix, then it is a K-matrix.
The following auxiliary lemma, due to Fiedler and Pta´k [17], furnishes a useful charac-
terisation of P-matrices. It can be interpreted as follows: M is a P-matrix if and only if
M does not ‘reverse the sign’ of any non-zero vector.
Lemma 5.9. An m ×m real matrix M is a P-matrix if and only if, for every non-zero
vector x ∈ Rm and y = Mx, there exists i such that xiyi > 0.
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The next result shows that the existence and uniqueness result for the solution of the
LCP(q,M) holds whenever M is a P-matrix. For the proof of Proposition 5.10, see Section
3.3 in Cottle et al. [7].
Proposition 5.10. The problem LCP(q,M) has a unique solution z ∈ Rm for all q if and
only if M is a P-matrix. In other words, there exists vectors z and w satisfying (5.13).
Remark 5.11. The arguments used in the proof of Proposition 5.10 may be adapted to the
linear complementarity problem in a general rectangular region. That is, given l, u ∈ Rm
and M ∈ Rm×m with li < ui for all i ∈M, the system
w = q +Mz,
l ≤ z ≤ u,
1{zi>li}1{wi>0} = 1{zi<ui}1{wi<0} = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
(5.14)
has a solution pair (z, w) ∈ Rm × Rm for all q ∈ Rm if and only if M is a P-matrix.
Furthermore, the bounds li and ui may be set to −∞ and ∞, respectively.
Remark 5.12. If we set w = V (s)−X, q = P −X, z = a(s) and M = G, then LCP(q,M)
resembles the system of equations associated with the affine game AG(X,P,G). It is still
not clear, however, whether a solution of LCP(q,M) necessarily correspond to a Nash
equilibrium of the game AG(X,P,G). This issue will be addressed in Theorem 5.14.
5.1.2 Projection
Another tool closely connected to linear complementarity problems is the concept of pro-
jection. In Chapter 4, the payoff and value of a general redistribution game were expressed
in terms of projections. We now show that the solution of LCP(q,M) can also be written
in terms of projections.
Proposition 5.13. Let us fix q ∈ Rm and M ∈ Rm×m. For any z ∈ Rm, let us set
w = q +Mz.
(i) The following statements are equivalent:
(a) The pair (z, w) is a solution to LCP(q,M).
(b) The pair (z, w) satisfies z = piRm+ (z − w).
(c) The pair (z, w) satisfies wT (y − z) ≥ 0,∀ y ∈ Rm+ .
(d) The pair (z, w) satisfies w = piRm+ (w − z).
(e) The pair (z, w) satisfies zT (y − w) ≥ 0,∀ y ∈ Rm+ .
Here the projection pi : Rm → Rm+ is taken under the Euclidean norm and Rm+ = {x ∈ Rm :
x ≥ 0}.
(ii) Let M be a positive definite symmetric matrix. If (z, w) is a solution to LCP(q,M),
then
z = piMRm+ (−M
−1q), w = piM
−1
Rm+ (q), (5.15)
where the projections piM : Rm → Rm+ and piM
−1
: Rm → Rm+ are taken under the inner
products 〈x, y〉M = xTMy and 〈x, y〉M−1 = xTM−1y, respectively.
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Proof. We first prove part (i).
[(a)⇐⇒ (b)] Since, for i = 1, . . . ,m,
zi − (piRm+ (z − w))i = zi −max(zi − wi, 0) = min(wi, zi).
We thus see that
z = piRm+ (z − w) ⇐⇒ min(wi, zi) = 0, i = 1, . . . ,m ⇐⇒ z ≥ 0, w ≥ 0, zTw = 0
as required.
[(b)⇐⇒ (c)] This follows immediately from the property of projection in Lemma 5.4.
[(a) ⇐⇒ (d) ⇐⇒ (e)] Noting the symmetry between z and w, it suffices to repeat the
previous arguments.
For part (ii), we observe that, by statements (c) and (e) in part (i), the pair (z, w)
satisfies w = q +Mz and(
M(M−1q + z)
)T
(y − z) ≥ 0, (M−1(w − q))T (y − w) ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ Rm+ . (5.16)
Since M and M−1 are positive-definite symmetric matrices, (5.15) follows immediately from
another application of Lemma 5.4 to (5.16).
5.1.3 Subgame and Value
As already mentioned earlier, in order for the game AG(X,P,G) to enjoy the WUC prop-
erty, it is necessary for the off-diagonal terms to have opposite signs to the diagonal terms in
the respective columns. The following result clarifies the connections between P-matrices
(or K-matrices) and the properties of the affine game AG(X,P,G).
Theorem 5.14. Suppose X,P ∈ Rm are arbitrary vectors and G ∈ Rm×m is a P-matrix.
Then:
(i) The affine game AG(X,P,G) has at least one Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, all Nash
equilibria of AG(X,P,G) attain the same payoff V ∗.
(ii) The Nash equilibrium payoff V ∗ satisfies(
G−1(V ∗ − P ))T (y − V ∗) ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ O(X), (5.17)
where O(X) := {x ∈ Rm : x ≥ X}. If G is a positive definite symmetric matrix, then
V ∗ = piG
−1
O(X)(P ) (5.18)
where the projection piG
−1
: Rm → O(X) is taken under the inner product 〈x, y〉G−1 =
xTG−1y.
(iii) If G is a K-matrix, then the affine game AG(X,P,G) has the WUC property. Fur-
thermore the Nash equilibrium payoff V ∗ is also the unique value of the game.
Before establishing Theorem 5.14, we prove some auxiliary lemmas, which deal with the
relevant properties of subgames. Recall that the payoff is given by V (s) = P + Ga(s). If
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m ∈ E(s), then player m exercises and Vm(s) = Xm, so that Xm = Pm + Gm·a(s). After
rearranging, we obtain
am(s) =
Xm − Pm −GmM′aM′(s)
Gmm
where M′ =M\ {m}. Consequently, we may represent the payoffs of players from M′ in
the following form:
VM′(s) = PM′ +GM′mam(s) +GM′M′aM′(s)
= PM′ +
GM′m
Gmm
(Xm − Pm) +
(
GM′M′ − GM
′mGmM′
Gmm
)
aM′(s)
= VM′(σ) +
(
GM′M′ − GM
′mGmM′
Gmm
)
aM′(s), (5.19)
where the strategy profile σ ∈ S corresponds to E(σ) = {m}. Here we have used the fact
that V (σ) = P + G·mGmm (Xm − Pm) is the payoff if player m is the only exercising player.
Lemma 5.15. Let G be a real m ×m matrix with positive diagonal entries and non-zero
principal minors. If player m exercises in the game AG(X,P,G), then the subgame amongst
the players in M′ = M\ {m} is given by AG(XM′ , VM′(σ), G˜) where σ ∈ S corresponds
to E(σ) = {m} and G˜ is the (m− 1)× (m− 1) matrix defined by
G˜ij = Gij − GimGmj
Gmm
, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m− 1. (5.20)
In particular, if sm = 0, then VM′(s) = V˜ (sM′) and aM′(s) = a˜(sM′) where V˜ and a˜ are
the AG(XM′ , VM′(σ), G˜) counterparts to V and a.
Proof. See equation (5.19).
Lemma 5.15 shows that if player m exercises, the subgame between the remaining
players is an affine game associated with the matrix G˜. The next lemma, Lemma 5.16, will
show that the matrix G˜ in fact retains the useful properties of G.
Lemma 5.16. Let G be a real m×m matrix such that Gmm 6= 0 and let the (m−1)×(m−1)
matrix G˜ be given by (5.20). Then:
(i) If G is a P-matrix, then G˜ is a P-matrix.
(ii) If G is a Z-matrix and Gmm > 0, then G˜ is a Z-matrix.
(iii) If G is a K-matrix, then G˜ is a K-matrix.
Proof. To prove part (i), we construct the m×m matrix A by setting
A =
(
G˜ GM′m
0 Gmm
)
or, more explicitly,
A =

G11 − G1mGm1Gmm · · · G1(m−1) −
G1mGm(m−1)
Gmm
G1m
...
. . .
...
...
G(m−1)1 − G(m−1)mGm1Gmm · · · G(m−1)(m−1) −
G(m−1)mGm(m−1)
Gmm
G(m−1)m
0 · · · 0 Gmm
.
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It is clear that A can be obtained from G via the column operations A·j = G·j − G·mGmjGmm
for j = 1, . . . ,m− 1. Hence for any E ⊆M with m ∈ E ,
det
(
GEE
)
= det
(
AEE
)
= Gmm det
(
G˜E\{m},E\{m}
)
.
Since Gmm > 0, the principal minors of G˜ must all be positive, as required. For part (ii), it
suffices to observe that, for i 6= j and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m− 1, we have that G˜ij = Gij − GimGmjGmm ≤
Gij ≤ 0. Finally, part (iii) is an immediate consequence of (i) and (ii).
Now we return to the proof of Theorem 5.14.
Proof of Theorem 5.14. We first prove part (i). By Proposition 5.5, for any s ∈ S, we may
write V (s) = P +Ga(s) with (Vi(s)−Xi)ai(s) = 0 for all i ∈ M. We will now show that
s is a Nash equilibrium if and only if Vi(s) ≥ Xi and ai(s) ≥ 0 for all i ∈M.
For any i /∈ E(s), if player i chooses to exercise instead, she should not be able to
improve her payoff if s was a Nash equilibrium, which in turn means that Vi(s) ≥ Xi.
For any i ∈ E(s), we consider the case where player i decides to not exercise; let the
corresponding strategy profile be s′ so that E(s′) = E(s) \ {i}. Then
VE(s)(s)− VE(s)(s′) = GE(s)E(s)(aE(s)(s)− aE(s)(s′)).
On the left-hand side, for j ∈ E(s), j 6= i, we have Vj(s)−Vj(s′) = Xj−Xj = 0. Therefore,
if we solve for the ith component of aE(s)(s)− aE(s)(s′) using Cramer’s rule, the expression
can be easily simplified to
ai(s)− ai(s′) =
(Vi(s)− Vi(s′)) det(GE(s′)E(s′))
det(GE(s)E(s))
.
Recalling that ai(s
′) = 0 (because i /∈ E(s′)), we obtain
Vi(s)− Vi(s′) =
det(GE(s)E(s))
det(GE(s′)E(s′))
ai(s).
Since G has positive principal minors, we conclude that Vi(s) ≥ Vi(s′) if and only if ai(s) ≥
0.
We thus see that a strategy profile s is a Nash equilibrium if and only if (z, w) =
(a(s), V (s) − X) is a solution to LCP(P − X,G). By Proposition 5.10, there is a unique
solution pair (z∗, w∗). Therefore, all Nash equilibrium must attain the unique payoff value
V ∗ = V (s∗) = w∗ +X and one such Nash equilibrium s∗ is given by: s∗i = 0 if and only if
w∗i = 0.
Part (ii) is a direct consequence of Proposition 5.13. Indeed, it suffices to translate the
problem by X to obtain the required result.
Let us now prove part (iii). We will prove the WUC property by induction on the
number of players. For two players, the WUC property is easy to check. Consider the case
of m > 2 players. We will compare the strategy profiles s and s′, where k ∈ E(s′) and
E(s) = E(s′) \ {k}.
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If E(s) = ∅, then for all l 6= k
Vl(s
′)− Vl(s) = Glk
Gkk
(Xk − Pk) = Glk
Gkk
(Vk(s
′)− Vk(s)).
It is clear that the WUC condition holds since Gkk > 0 ≥ Glk.
If |E(s)| ≥ 1, by rearranging the player indices, we can assume, without loss of generality,
that m ∈ E ,m 6= k. Then, by Lemma 5.15, the game AG(X,P,G) can be reduced to the
subgame AG(X−m, VM′(σ), G˜) over the set of player M′ = M \ {m}, where G˜ is the
(m− 1)× (m− 1) matrix given by
G˜ij = Gij − GimGmj
Gmm
, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m− 1. (5.21)
Lemma 5.16 showed that G˜ is also a K-matrix. Hence by the induction assumption, the
subgame AG(X−m, VM′(σ), G˜) is WUC. In particular, Vl(s′) − Vl(s) can be written as a
non-positive multiple of Vk(s
′)− Vk(s) for l 6= k.
We conclude that the game AG(X,P,G) is WUC. It was shown by Kats and Thisse [30]
that in a WUC game, all Nash equilibria are also optimal equilibria (see Theorem 1.20).
Since all K-matrices are also P-matrices, by part (i), AG(X,P,G) must have an optimal
equilibrium and hence a unique value.
5.1.4 Redistribution Games as Affine Games
We will now show that a general redistribution game GRG(X,P, α), where α = (α1, . . . , αm)
with αi > 0 and
∑m
i=1 αi < 1 is a special case of an affine game. Let the matrix D̂ be given
by
D̂ :=

α1 − α21 −α1α2 · · · −α1αm
−α2α1 α2 − α22 · · · −α2αm
...
...
. . .
...
−αmα1 −αmα2 · · · αm − α2m
. (5.22)
Lemma 5.17. The general redistribution game GRG(X,P, α) is identical to the affine game
AG(X,P, D̂).
Proof. One can check that the inverse D̂, denoted by D = D̂−1, is given by
D =
1
1−∑mi=1 αi

1 +
1−∑mi=1 αi
α1
1 · · · 1
1 1 +
1−∑mi=1 αi
α2
· · · 1
...
...
. . .
...
1 1 · · · 1 + 1−
∑m
i=1 αi
αm
. (5.23)
Recall the payoff in AG(X,P, D̂) is given in Definition 5.3 as
V (s) = P + D̂·E(s)
(
D̂E(s)E(s)
)−1
(XE(s) − PE(s)).
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The inverse
(
D̂E(s)E(s)
)−1
is similar to D, except it only contains αi where i ∈ E(s) and
1−∑mi=1 αi is replaced by 1−∑i∈E(s) αi. It is clear that for i ∈ E(s), we have Vi(s) = Xi.
For k /∈ E(s), we obtain
Vk(s) = Pk + D̂kE(s)
(
D̂E(s)E(s)
)−1
(XE(s) − PE(s))
= Pk +
∑
i∈E(s)(−αkαi)
(
1−∑j∈E(s) αj
αi
(Xi − Pi) +
∑
j∈E(s)(Xj − Pj)
)
1−∑i∈E(s) αi
= Pk − αk
1−∑i∈E(s) αi
((
1−
∑
j∈E(s)
αj
) ∑
i∈E(s)
(Xi − Pi) +
∑
i∈E(s)
αi
∑
j∈E(s)
(Xj − Pj)
)
= Pk − αk
1−∑i∈E(s) αi
∑
i∈E(s)
(Xi − Pi).
Recall that the weights wk(E(s)) are given by the equality wk(E(s)) = αk1−∑i∈E(s) αi . There-
fore, the payoff Vk(s) can be represented as follows
Vk(s) =
{
Xk, k ∈ E(s),
Pk − wk(E(s))
∑
i∈E(s)(Xi − Pi), k ∈M \ E(s),
so that it matches the payoff function of GRG(X,P, α), as required.
We already know that a general redistribution game GRG(X,P, α) is a WUC game
with a unique value. To reaffirm these properties using Theorem 5.14(iii), it suffices to
show that the matrix D̂ associated with the general redistribution game is K-matrix.
Lemma 5.18. The matrix D̂ given by (5.22) is a K-matrix.
Proof. It is clear that D̂ is a Z-matrix because −αiαj < 0. To show that D̂ is also a
P-matrix, it suffices to check that det D̂ > 0, since its principle submatrices have the same
structure. Note that we can write det D̂ = det(I −B)∏mi=1 αi where
B :=

α1 α1 · · · α1
α2 α2 · · · α2
...
...
. . .
...
αm αm · · · αm

is a rank 1 matrix whose non-zero eigenvalue is given by tr(B) =
∑m
i=1 αi. Hence the
characteristic polynomial of B is
det(λI −B) = λm−1
(
λ−
m∑
i=1
αi
)
.
By setting λ = 1, we obtain
det D̂ = det(I −B)
m∏
i=1
αi =
(
1−
m∑
i=1
αi
) m∏
i=1
αi > 0.
Therefore, D̂ is indeed a K-matrix.
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Since D̂ is symmetric, it is in fact a positive definite matrix. In Theorem 5.14(ii), we
have shown that the value of GRG(X,P, α) = AG(X,P, D̂) can also be written as projection
under the inner product 〈x, y〉D = xTDy. Hence the inner product is
〈x, y〉D = xTDy =
m∑
i=1
(
xiyi
αi
)
+
(
∑m
i=1 xi)(
∑m
i=1 yi)
1−∑mi=1 αi .
As expected, this coincides with the inner product introduced in Chapter 4 (see formula
(4.12)), thus confirming also the projection results previously obtained in Chapter 4.
5.2 Affine Games with Singular Matrices
In the preceding section, we established the connection between the affine game AG(X,P,D)
and the general redistribution game GRG(X,P, α) from Chapter 4. But so far the notion of
an affine game cannot be applied to the zero-sum redistribution game ZRG(X,P, α) from
Chapter 3, because the corresponding matrix D̂ is singular when
∑m
i=1 αi = 1. In order to
unify these ideas, we need to extend Definition 5.3 of an affine game to be compatible with
singular matrices
Definition 5.19. Fix X,P ∈ Rm and let G ∈ Rm×m be a matrix with positive diagonal
and non-zero ‘proper’ principal minors (so det(G) = 0 is allowed). An m-player affine
game AG(X,P,G) is a single period deterministic in which each player i can choose either
to exercise (si = 0) or not exercise (si = 1). For any strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sm), the
payoff vector V (s) = (V1(s), . . . , Vm(s)) is given by
V (s) =
{
P +G·E(s)
(
GE(s)E(s)
)−1
(XE(s) − PE(s)), E(s) 6=M,
X, E(s) =M.
where E(s) = {i ∈ M : si = 0} is the set of exercising players. Equivalently, we may
represent the payoff function as follows: for any strategy profile s and any k ∈M,
Vk(s) =
{
Xk, k ∈ E(s),
Pk +GkE(s)
(
GE(s)E(s)
)−1
(XE(s) − PE(s)), k /∈ E(s),
so that the calculation of
(
GE(s)E(s)
)−1
= G−1 is not required when E(s) = M. Another
method of avoiding this problem is to adopt the convention of G·M
(
GMM
)−1
= I.
Of course, when G is non-singular then the Definition 5.19 is consistent with Definition
5.3. Therefore, all the results established so far and regarding the game AG(X,P,G) with a
non-singular matrix G still apply. In this subsection, we will only focus on the cases where
G is singular.
Definition 5.20. A square matrix M is called a P†-matrix if it has non-negative determi-
nant and positive proper principal minors. Furthermore, M is said to be a K†-matrix if it
is a P†-matrix as well as a Z-matrix.
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Remark 5.21. It is worth noting that P† is not the same to the well-known classes of P0
and P1. The exact differences are as follows:
(i) a P0-matrix is one with non-negative principal minors,
(ii) a P1-matrix is a P0-matrix where exactly one of the principal minors is zero.
So we have the proper inclusions P†  P1 ∪ P  P0.
The following result is borrowed from Cottle et al. [7] (for part (i), see Theorem 3.4.4
on Page 155; for part (ii), see Theorem 4.1.13 on Page 235).
Proposition 5.22. Assume that M is a P†-matrix. Then:
(i) Fix q ∈ Rm. If LCP(q,M) has at least one solution (z, w), then all solutions of
LCP(q,M) are unique in w.
(ii) If for some q ∈ Rm, LCP(q,M) does not have a solution, then there exists a fixed
v ∈ Rm satisfying
v > 0, vTM = 0,
such that LCP(q,M) has a solution if and only if vT q ≥ 0.
Theorem 5.23. (i) If G is a P†-matrix, then AG(X,P,G) has a Nash equilibrium and a
unique Nash equilibrium payoff.
(ii) If G is a K†-matrix, then AG(X,P,G) is WUC and has a unique value.
Proof. (i) Let us first consider the case where LCP(P −X,G) has at least one solution. By
Proposition 5.22(i), there exists a solution pair (z, w) where w is unique. Now the same
argument from Theorem 5.14 (used for P-matrices) can be used to show that w is the
unique Nash equilibrium payoff.
Assume now that LCP(P − X,G) does not have a solution. Then, by Proposition
5.22(ii), there exists v > 0 such that vTG = 0 and vT (P −X) < 0. Consider the strategy
profile s corresponding to E(s) = M. We will show that s is in fact a Nash equilibrium.
To do this, it suffices to show that Xi ≥ Vi(s′) for all i ∈ M where s′ = (s−i, 1). Keep in
mind that for j 6= i, Vj(s′) = Xj . By Definition 5.19, since E(s′) =M\ {i} 6=M, we may
write V (s′) = P +Ga(s′) for some a(s′). Now
vT (P −X) = vT (V (s′)−Ga(s′)−X) = vT (V (s′)−X) = vi(Vi(s′)−Xi).
Since vi > 0 and v
T (P −X) < 0, we must have Xi > Vi(s′), as required.
(ii) The same argument from Theorem 5.14(iii) for K-matrices can be applied to K†-
matrices.
5.2.1 Affine Game with the Additivity Property
So far, the definition of value refers to the value of the game to each individual player. The-
orems 5.14 and 5.23 established the existence of the value for the affine game AG(X,P,G)
where G is a K†-matrix. But suppose some subset of players N ⊆M is playing as a coali-
tion, using the aggregated payoff VN (s) =
∑
i∈N Vi(s). Then a natural way to define the
value of the game for the coalition N is to set
V ∗N := ess sup
sN∈SN
ess inf
s−N∈S−N
VN (sN , s−N ) = ess inf
s−N∈S−N
ess sup
sN∈SN
VN (sN , s−N ), (5.24)
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assuming the second equality of (5.24) holds in the first place. In general, even if (5.24)
holds and the coalition value exists, it does not necessarily satisfy the additivity property
V ∗N =
∑
i∈N V
∗
i . However, as Proposition 1.16 showed, if optimal equilibria exist in a zero-
sum game, then all coalition values exist and satisfy the additive property holds. We shall
restate this result for convenience.
Proposition 5.24. Suppose the game is zero-sum and has an optimal equilibrium σ ∈ S
with the value V ∗ = V (σ). Then for all subsets N ⊆M, the following equality holds
VN (σ) =
∑
i∈N
V ∗i = V
∗
N .
Proof. See the proof of Proposition 1.16.
Although affine games are not necessarily zero-sum, we may once again introduce a
dummy player to create a zero-sum extended game. Then we may apply Proposition 5.24,
in order to show that the additive property also holds for certain subclass of affine games.
Theorem 5.25. Consider the affine game AG(X,P,G) where X,P ∈ Rm and G is a
K†-matrix. Suppose that the column sums of G are non-negative, that is,
m∑
i=1
Gij ≥ 0, ∀ j ∈M. (5.25)
Then for any N ⊆M, the value V ∗N exists and is additive, in the sense that V ∗N =
∑
i∈N V
∗
i .
Proof. We introduce a dummy player with index m + 1 to create a zero-sum extended
game. The dummy player has the terminal payoff Pm+1 = −
∑
i∈M Pi and is not allowed
to exercise. By convention, we define her exercise payoff to be Xm+1 = −
∑
i∈MXi and we
use the following notation
P˜ = (P1, . . . , Pm, Pm+1), X˜ = (X1, . . . , Xm, Xm+1).
For the matrix G, we append an extra row and column to form the matrix G˜
G˜ =

G11 · · · G1m 0
...
. . .
... 0
Gm1 · · · Gmm 0
−∑mi=1Gi1 · · · −∑mi=1Gim 0
.
Note that since the dummy player does not exercise, the last column of G˜ is in fact irrelevant;
the column of 0s was chosen to simplify later arguments. From condition (5.25), we see
that the off-diagonal terms in G˜ are non-positive and thus G˜ is a Z-matrix.
We consider the extended affine game AG(X˜, P˜ , G˜) with the payoff function given by
V˜ (s) =
{
P˜ + G˜·E(s)
(
G˜E(s)E(s)
)−1
(X˜E(s) − P˜E(s)), E(s) 6=M,
X˜, E(s) =M.
Note that M does not contain the dummy player.
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To see that AG(X˜, P˜ , G˜) is a zero-sum game, it suffices to note that the vectors P˜ , X˜
as well as the columns of G˜ lie in the subspace
{
x ∈ Rm+1 : ∑m+1i=1 xi = 0}. It is also easy
to see that for players 1, . . . ,m, the payoff function of the extended game AG(X˜, P˜ , G˜) is
identical to the original game AG(X,P,G). So we may set V˜m+1(s) = −
∑
i∈M Vi(s) for all
s ∈ S.
Let s∗ be an optimal equilibrium of the original game AG(X,P,G). Since the dummy
player only has the action of ‘not exercising’, it is clear that s∗ is a Nash equilibrium of
AG(X˜, P˜ , G˜). In order to show that s∗ is also an optimal equilibrium of AG(X˜, P˜ , G˜), by
the result of Kats and Thisse [30], it suffices to show that AG(X˜, P˜ , G˜) is WUC. Since G
is a K†-matrix and the additional entries in G˜ are non-positive, we may employ the same
argument from Theorem 5.14(iii) to conclude that AG(X˜, P˜ , G˜) is indeed WUC.1 Finally,
since s∗ is an optimal equilibrium in the zero-sum game AG(X˜, P˜ , G˜), the required result
follows immediately from Proposition 5.24.
Remark 5.26. Recall that the redistribution game RG(X,P, α) (where X,P, α ∈ Rm,
a > 0 and
∑m
i=1 αi ≤ 1) is equivalent to AG(X,P, D̂) where D̂ is given by (5.22). The sum
of column i in D is given by αi −
∑m
j=1 αiαj = αi(1 −
∑m
j=1 αj) ≥ 0. Hence by Theorem
5.25, RG(X,P, α) = AG(X,P, D̂) satisfies the additive property V ∗N =
∑
i∈N V
∗
i (s) for all
N ⊆M.
5.3 Multi-Period Stochastic Affine Games
We now present an extension of the single period deterministic affine game to the multi-
period stochastic framework. Most of the results are direct consequences of Theorem 5.23.
To better explain the arguments in the upcoming section, we introduce the following nota-
tion.
Definition 5.27. Suppose G is a P†-matrix and X,P ∈ Rm are given vectors. We de-
note by SOL(X,P,G) the unique Nash equilibrium payoff of the single period affine game
AG(X,P,G).
The notation of SOL was originally used to denote the solution of a linear complemen-
tarity problem. This is consistent with our usage, since SOL(X,P,G) is indeed the solution
of LCP(P − X,G) if G is non-singular. If G is singular, then LCP(P − X,G) may not
have a solution. Nevertheless we use SOL(X,P,G) to denote the Nash equilibrium payoff
of AG(X,P,G), for convenience. So far, we have used V ∗ when referring to SOL(X,P,G).
But in the upcoming discussions, SOL(X,P,G) is more appropriate since it explicitly shows
the dependence on X and P . In the special case of G being a positive-definite symmetric
matrix, we have the equality SOL(X,P,G) = piG
−1
O(X)(P ), as shown in Theorem 5.14.
1In particular, the induction step will remove the mth (not (m + 1)th) column and row from the (m +
1)× (m+ 1) matrix G˜ to obtain a smaller matrix with the same Z-matrix properties.
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5.3.1 Single Period Stochastic Affine Stopping Game
The affine game can be extended to a stochastic setting, where the vectors X and P are not
known at the time of exercise. All of the following definitions are taken under the probability
space (Ω,F ,P) endowed with the filtration F = {Ft : t = 0, 1}. We now assume that we
are given the F1-measurable random vectors P = (P1, . . . , Pm) and X = (X1, . . . , Xm)
and a deterministic m ×m matrix G with non-zero proper principal minors, that is, with
det(GEE) 6= 0 for all proper subsets E ⊂M.
Definition 5.28. In an m-player single period stochastic affine game AG(X,P,G) each
player can only exercise at time 0 and the payoffs are distributed at time 1. The space
of strategy profiles is S = ∏i∈M Si, where Sk = {0, 1} is the space of pure strategies for
player k with sk = 0 meaning player k exercises at time 0. For any s ∈ S, the outcome of
the game is the expected payoff vector V (s) = (V1(s), . . . , Vm(s)), defined by
Vk(s) = EP
(
Xk1{k∈E(s)} + X̂k1{k/∈E(s)}
)
,
where E(s), s ∈ S is the set of exercising players and
X̂k = Pk +GkE(s)
(
GE(s)E(s)
)−1
(XE(s) − PE(s)).
By the linearity of the payoff function Vk(s), the stochastic game is essentially equivalent
the deterministic affine game AG(EP(X),EP(P ), G). The following corollary to Theorem
5.14 is thus straightforward.
Corollary 5.29. Consider the single period stochastic affine game AG(X,P,G). Then:
(i) If G is a P†-matrix, then V ∗ = SOL (EP(X),EP(P ), G) is the unique Nash equilibria
payoff and a possible Nash equilibrium s∗ = (s∗1, . . . , s∗m) is given by
s∗i = 0 ⇐⇒ SOL
(
EP(X),EP(P ), G
)
i
= EP(Xi).
(ii) If G is a positive definite symmetric matrix, then V ∗ = piG−1O(X)(EP(P )) where O(X) is
the orthant given by
O(X) :=
{
x ∈ Rm : xi ≥ EP(Xi), 1 ≤ i ≤ m
}
,
and the projection is taken under the inner product 〈x, y〉G−1 = xTG−1y.
(iii) If G is a K†-matrix, then the game AG(X,P,G) is WUC. All Nash equilibria are also
optimal equilibria and V ∗ is also the unique value.
5.3.2 Multi-Period Stochastic Affine Stopping Game
In the final subsection, we extend the affine game to a multi-period affine stopping game
and solve it by backward induction. We work under the probability space (Ω,F ,P) endowed
with the filtration F = {Ft : t = 0, 1, . . . , T} representing the information flow. For brevity,
we write [t, T ] = {t, t+ 1, . . . , T}.
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Definition 5.30. For each t = 0, 1, . . . , T , a multi-period affine stopping game ASGt(X,G)
is defined on the time interval [t, T ]. It is specified by the following inputs:
(a) the set of m players M = {1, 2, . . . ,m},
(b) the family of F-adapted processes Xt = (X1t , . . . , Xmt ) for t = 0, 1, . . . , T ,
(c) the m×m deterministic K†-matrix G,
and the following rules of the game:
(i) each player can exercise at any time in the interval [t, T ] and the game stops as soon as
anyone exercises; if no one exercises before T , then everyone must exercise at T ,
(ii) the strategy skt of player k is chosen from the space Skt = T[t,T ] of F-stopping times with
values in [t, T ]; hence a strategy profile st = (s
1
t , . . . , s
m
t ) ∈ St is an m-tuple of F-stopping
times,
(iii) for each strategy profile st ∈ St, the outcome of the game is the expected payoff vector
Vt(st) = (V
1
t (st), . . . , V
m
t (st)), defined by
V kt (st) = EP
(
Xkϑt1{k∈E(st)} + X̂
k
ϑt1{k/∈E(st)}
∣∣Ft), (5.26)
where ϑt = s
1
t ∧ · · · ∧ smt is the minimal stopping time and E(st) = {i ∈M : sit = ϑt} is the
random set of earliest stopping players; furthermore,
X̂kϑt = V
∗k
ϑt+1 +GkE(st)
(
GE(st)E(st)
)−1(
X
E(st)
ϑt
− V ∗E(st)ϑt+1
)
, ϑt < T, (5.27)
where V ∗u = (V ∗1u , . . . , V ∗mu ) is the value of the game ASGu(X,G) for u = t+ 1, t+ 2, . . . , T .
As the game is stopped at time ϑt, the indicator functions in (5.26) separate the exer-
cising players from the others: Xkϑt is the payoff for an exercising player, while X̂
k
ϑt
is the
payoff for a non-exercising player. Intuitively, the game ASGϑt+1(X,G) can be considered
as the continuation of the current game if it does not stop at time ϑt. Note also that, in
formula (5.27), the term X̂kϑt is not defined for ϑt = T . This does not matter, however,
because if the game is stopped at T , then every player must exercise and receive XkT , not
X̂kT .
Remark 5.31. It is obvious that Definition 5.30 is in fact recursive. Since ϑt + 1 > t, the
payoff of ASGt(X,G) depends on the values of ASGt+1(X,G), . . . ,ASGT (X,G), which can
also be seen as subgames of ASGt(X,G). It is also possible to view the stopping game as a
sequence of single period games. If ASGt(X,G) is stopped at t, then the exercising players
receive Xkt while the other players receive
EP
(
V ∗kt+1
∣∣Ft)+GkE(GEE)−1(XEt − EP(V ∗Et+1 ∣∣Ft)). (5.28)
If ASGt(X,G) is not stopped at time t, then it is reduced to the game ASGt+1(X,G). And,
finally, the game ASGT (X,G) always stops at time T as everyone exercises.
At this moment, it is not clear that the game introduced in Definition 5.30 is well-
defined, since it is not yet known whether the games ASGu(X,G) for u = t + 1, . . . , T
always have values. The following theorem shows that this is indeed the case.
Theorem 5.32. Let Xt = (X
1
t , . . . , X
m
t ) be an F-adapted processes and G be a deterministic
K†-matrix. Recursively define the Ft-measurable vector Ut = (U1t , . . . , Umt ) by setting UT :=
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XT and
Ut := SOL
(
Xt,EP
(
Ut+1
∣∣Ft), G), t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1. (5.29)
Define the F-stopping times τ∗t = (τ∗1t , . . . , τ∗mt ) by
τ∗it := inf
{
u ∈ [t, T ] : U iu = Xiu
}
. (5.30)
Then:
(i) the equality Ut = Vt(τ
∗
t ) holds for all t,
(ii) the strategy profile τ∗t is an optimal equilibrium of ASGt(X,G) and Ut = V ∗t is the
value.
Proof. This proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.25. Throughout the proof, we will
use the following properties of the game:
(a) If the game ASGt(X,G) is stopped at time t, then the payoff function coincides with
the single period affine game AG(Xt,EP(V ∗t+1 | Ft), G). This follows from Definition 5.30
and formula (5.28).
(b) If the game ASGt(X,G) is not stopped at time t under some strategy profile st ∈ St,
then st is also a strategy profile of ASGt+1(X,G), so that st ∈ St+1. Furthermore, by the
definition of Vt(st) in (5.26), the equality Vt(st) = EP(Vt+1(st) | Ft) holds.
(c) By equalities (5.29)–(5.30) and Corollary 5.29, the stopping time τ∗t corresponds to
an optimal equilibrium of the single period stochastic affine game AG(Xt,EP(Ut+1 | Ft), G)
and Ut = SOL
(
Xt,EP(Ut+1 | Ft), G
)
is the corresponding value.
The statements (i) and (ii) will be proven simultaneously by the backward induction.
For t = T , we have that τ∗T = (T, . . . , T ). The affine stopping game ASGT (X,G) is always
stopped at time T with the payoff vector XT = UT = VT (τ
∗
T ) = V
∗
T also being the value.
Let us now assume the statements are true for the game ASGt+1(X,G), so its value is given
by V ∗t+1 = Ut+1.
We first prove part (i). Let us denote ϑ∗t = τ∗1t ∧ · · · ∧ τ∗mt . If ϑ∗t = t, the game
is stopped at time t. By (c), Ut is the payoff of τ
∗
t in AG(Xt,EP(Ut+1 | Ft), G). By the
induction hypothesis Ut+1 = V
∗
t+1 and property (a), it follows that Ut = Vt(τ
∗
t ).
If ϑ∗t ≥ t+ 1, then the game is not stopped at time t. By the definition of τ∗t , we have
that U it > X
i
t for all i ∈M. From property (c), we see that no one exercises in the optimal
equilibrium of AG(Xt,EP(Ut+1 | Ft), G) and thus Ut = EP(Ut+1 | Ft). Combining this with
property (b) and the induction hypothesis, we obtain
Ut = EP(Ut+1 | Ft) = EP(Vt+1(τ∗t ) | Ft) = Vt(τ∗t ).
We proceed to the proof of part (ii). From part (i), we know that
Vt(τ
∗
t ) = Ut = SOL
(
Xt,EP(Ut+1 | Ft), G
)
= SOL
(
Xt,EP(V ∗t+1 | Ft), G
)
.
To check that τ∗t is an optimal equilibrium, we require for each k ∈M,
V kt (τ
∗k
t , s
−k
t ) ≥ SOL
(
Xt,EP(V ∗t+1 | Ft), G
)
k
≥ V kt (skt , τ∗,−kt ), ∀ skt ∈ Skt , ∀ s−kt ∈ S−kt .
(5.31)
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Let s′t = (τ∗kt , s
−k
t ) and s
′′
t = (s
k
t , τ
∗,−k
t ) be alternative strategy profiles with the minimal
stopping times ϑ′t, ϑ′′t , respectively. We need to examine three cases.
Case 1: If ϑ′t = ϑ′′t = t, then, by property (a), both s′t and s′′t can be interpreted as strategy
profiles of the single period affine game AG(Xt,EP(V ∗t+1 | Ft), G). Hence the validity of
(5.31) can be deduced from property (c), because SOL
(
Xt,EP(V ∗t+1 | Ft), G
)
is the value of
the game AG(Xt,EP(V ∗t+1 | Ft), G) for player k.
Case 2: If ϑ′t ≥ t+ 1, then, by property (b), we have that Vt(s′t) = EP(Vt+1(s′t) | Ft). By an
application of the induction hypothesis, we obtain
V kt (s
′
t) = EP
(
V kt+1(s
′
t)
∣∣Ft) ≥ EP(V ∗kt+1 ∣∣Ft).
Since τ∗kt ≥ t + 1, property (c) tells us that player k does not exercise in the optimal
equilibrium of the game AG(Xt,EP(V ∗t+1 | Ft), G). Interpreting EP(V ∗kt+1 | Ft) as the expected
payoff of player k if no one exercises, we have
SOL
(
Xt,EP(V ∗t+1 | Ft), G
)
k
≤ EP(V ∗kt+1 | Ft) ≤ V kt (s′t),
as required.
Case 3: If ϑ′′t ≥ t+ 1, then the argument is similar to Case 2. Again, by property (b) and
the induction hypothesis, we obtain
V kt (s
′′
t ) = EP
(
V kt+1(s
′′
t )
∣∣Ft) ≤ EP(V ∗kt+1 ∣∣Ft).
Since τ∗it ≥ t+ 1 for all i 6= k, property (c) tells us that none of the players from M\ {k}
exercises in the optimal equilibrium of the game AG(Xt,EP(V ∗t+1 | Ft), G). Interpreting
EP(V ∗kt+1 | Ft) as the expected payoff of player k if no one exercises, we get
SOL
(
Xt,EP(V ∗t+1 | Ft), G
)
k
≥ EP(V ∗kt+1 | Ft) ≥ V kt (s′t),
as required.
We conclude that in all three cases, (5.31) is valid. Therefore, Ut is the value and τ
∗
t is
an optimal equilibrium of ASGt(X,G).
In Theorem 5.25, we saw that in the affine game AG(X,P,G), under certain conditions
on G, the value V ∗N for a coalition of players N ⊆ M has the additive property V ∗N =∑
i∈N V
∗i. It is straightforward to generalise those arguments to the affine stopping game
ASGt(X,G).
Theorem 5.33. Consider the multi-period affine stopping game ASGt(X,G) where G is a
K†-matrix. Suppose that the column sums of G are non-negative, that is, ∑mi=1Gij ≥ 0 for
j = 1, . . . ,m. Then for any N ⊆M, the value V ∗Nt exists and satisfies
V ∗Nt = ess sup
sNt ∈SNt
ess inf
s−Nt ∈S−Nt
V Nt (s
N
t , s
−N
t ) = ess inf
s−Nt ∈S−Nt
ess sup
sNt ∈SNt
V Nt (s
N
t , s
−N
t ) =
∑
i∈N
V ∗it .
Proof. As in Theorem 5.25, we introduce the extended game with a dummy player who
cannot exercise and has the payoff function V m+1t (s) = −
∑
i∈M V
i
t (st) for all st ∈ St.
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Suppose that τ∗t is an optimal equilibrium of ASGt(X,G); we will show that τ∗t is also an
optimal equilibrium of the extended game.
Since the dummy player cannot make any choices, it is clear that τ∗t is a Nash equilibrium
of the extended game and has the optimal equilibrium property for players 1, 2, . . . ,m. To
check that τ∗t has the optimal equilibrium property for the dummy player, it is enough to
show that V m+1t (τ
∗
t ) = ess infst∈St V
m+1
t (st) or, equivalently,∑
i∈M
V it (τ
∗
t ) =
∑
i∈M
V ∗it = ess sup
st∈St
∑
i∈M
V it (st). (5.32)
We will prove (5.32) through the backward induction. For t = T , property (5.32) is trivially
satisfied. Let us now assume that the result is true for the game ASGt+1(X,G), so that
EP
(∑
i∈M
V ∗it+1
∣∣∣Ft) ≥ EP(∑
i∈M
V it+1(st+1)
∣∣∣Ft) = ∑
i∈M
V it (st+1), ∀ st+1 ∈ St+1. (5.33)
For any particular st ∈ St, let the miminal stopping time be ϑt = s1t ∧ · · · ∧ smt . There are
two cases to examine.
Case 1: On the event {ϑt = t}, we recall that the game on the time interval [t, t + 1] is
equivalent to the single period affine game AG(Xt,EP(V ∗t+1 | Ft), G). In particular, its value
is also given by Vt(τ
∗
t ) = V
∗
t . From the proof of Theorem 5.25, since the matrix G satisfies
the appropriate conditions, the optimal equilibrium property is preserved with the addition
of the dummy player. Therefore, we must have∑
i∈M
V it (τ
∗
t ) ≥
∑
i∈M
V it (st).
Case 2: On the event {ϑt ≥ t+1}, a strategy profile st can also be seen as a strategy in St+1
and thus the induction hypothesis (5.33) can be applied. Furthermore, since EP(V ∗t+1 | Ft) is
the payoff vector of the single period affine game AG(Xt,EP(V ∗t+1 | Ft), G) if no one exercises,
using the same argument as before and the induction hypothesis (5.33), we obtain∑
i∈M
V it (τ
∗
t ) ≥
∑
i∈M
EP(V ∗it+1 | Ft) ≥
∑
i∈M
V it (st).
In both cases, we have shown that the inequality∑
i∈M
V it (τ
∗
t ) ≥
∑
i∈M
V it (st)
holds for all st ∈ St. Hence (5.32) is established and the induction is complete.
We note that is possible to further generalise the game by making the matrix G time-
dependent and F-adapted, so that we deal with a matrix-valued process Gt, t = 0, 1, . . . , T ,
where the random matrix Gt is almost surely a K†-matrix. In this version of the multi-
period affine stopping game, the payoff function would be given by the following expression
V kt (st) = EP
(
Xkϑt1{k∈E(st)} + X̂
k
ϑt1{k/∈E(st)}
∣∣Ft)
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where
X̂kϑt = V
∗k
ϑt+1 +G
kE(st)
ϑt
(
G
E(st)E(st)
ϑt
)−1(
X
E(st)
ϑt
− V ∗E(st)ϑt+1
)
, ϑt < T.
It is rather clear that if we adjust the definition of Ut by setting UT = XT and
Ut = SOL
(
Xt,EP
(
Ut+1
∣∣Ft), Gt), t = 0, 1, . . . , T,
then the proofs (and thus also conclusions) of Theorems 5.32 and 5.33 will still hold.
Remark 5.34. The stopping game described by Definition 5.30 is perhaps not the most
obvious generalisation of the single period stochastic affine game. A more natural general-
isation would be for the non-exercising player k to receive, for any st ∈ St,
Xk,T +GkE(st)
(
GE(st)E(st)
)−1(
X
E(st)
ϑt
−XE(st)T
)
, ϑt < T,
when the game is stopped, that is, using X
E(st)
T instead of the value V
∗E(st)
ϑt+1
. However, even
in deterministic cases, this does not always produce optimal equilibria in pure strategies.
For example, let us consider a game with
X0 =
−1−1
0
, X1 =
−2−2
4
, X2 =
00
0
, G =
 2/9 −1/9 −1/9−1/9 2/9 −1/9
−1/9 −1/9 2/9
.
It is clear that player 3 will always want to exercise at time 1, while there is a prisoner’s
dilemma between players 1 and 2 at time 0. This game has two Nash equilibria (with
different payoffs), but no optimal equilibria in pure strategies.

Part II
Multi-Person Game Options
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Chapter6
Introduction to Arbitrage Pricing
Over the last forty or so years, the financial derivative market had seen some tremendous
growth, both in terms of volumes traded as well as product diversity. Countless exotic
derivatives, such as convertible bonds, defaultable options and swing options have emerged
and evolved to meet the demand of the market. As a result, many sophisticated models have
been produced to price and hedge these derivatives in an increasingly complex environment.
An important goal of this thesis is to design a generalised framework under which we may
define and evaluate multi-person financial contingent claims (or options) associated with
multi-player competitive stochastic games. This is a drastic departure from the existing
theory which only considers claims involving only two parties, the issuer and the holder.
But before we attempt this, it is important to revisit the classical theory in the valuation of
simpler derivatives, such as European and American options. The purpose of this chapter is
to closely study fundamental concepts such as arbitrage, replication, and the Snell envelope,
in preparation for the more complex framework of Chapter 7.
In particular, Section 6.1 examines two standard market models: the finite state state
discrete-time model based on the seminal paper by Taqqu and Willinger [52] and the
continuous-time model driven by Brownian motions (see, e.g., Karatzas and Shreve [29]
or Musiela and Rutkowski [35]). In both cases, payoffs are replicated using admissible
portfolios of primary assets (i.e., stocks and bonds). The underlying markets are complete
and arbitrage-free, inducing unique martingale measures. The section ends with the pric-
ing of European options, in which the holder has the right to exercise the contract at a
predetermined time.
Section 6.2 introduces American options (see, e.g., Karatzas [29]) which grant the holder
the flexibility of choosing the exercise time. The pricing of American options is done via
backward induction in the discrete-time case and via the Snell envelope in the continuous-
time case. Section 6.3 takes it a step further by recalling the concept of two-person game
options or Israeli options, introduced by Kifer [31], in which the issuer gains the right to
cancel the contract at any time. The two-person game option can be seen as a contingent
claim associated with the two-person Dynkin game from Chapter 2. The main pricing
results are presented.
Even though the current chapter only summarises well-known results, it constructs the
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basic models and tools required for the multi-person framework of Chapter 7. Moreover, the
incremental complexities of European, American and game options will serve as stepping
stones towards the understanding of multi-person game contingent claims.
6.1 European Options
In this chapter, we make the standard assumption that the financial market is frictionless.
Some brief discussions on models with market friction can be found in Chapter 8. For
the discrete-time model, we will consider a market generated by a finite number states.
For the continuous-time case, we will describe the standard Black-Scholes model generated
by a multi-dimensional Brownian motion. We begin by describing some features that are
common to both discrete-time and continuous-time models.
There are d + 1 primary assets B,S1, . . . , Sd in the market. In particular, the bond B
is a riskless asset while the stocks S1, . . . , Sd are d risky assets. Denote the vector of stocks
by S = (S1, . . . , Sd). Occasionally, we may use the notation S0 = B for convenience.
Aside from the primary assets, there are also other securities available for trading, such
as options, futures, swaps, and so on. In general, a security refers to a contract which
specifies transactions between two parties. If the values of these transactions depend on
the stock prices, then the securities are called stock derivatives. We will initially restrict
our attention to the class of securities called contingent claims.
Definition 6.1. A contingent claim Xτ is a contract between an issuer and a holder, such
that at the settlement date τ , the issuer has to pay the holder the payoff Xτ . In particular,
if F = {Ft : t ∈ [0, T ]} is the underlying filtration specified by the model, then τ is an
F-stopping time and Xτ is an Fτ -measurable random variable. Both the maturity τ and
the payoff Xτ are specified as part of the contract.
A European contingent claim (ECC) or European option is a type of a contingent claim
whose settlement date is at a fixed time τ = t ∈ [0, T ]. Note, however, according to
Definition 6.1 and for the purpose of our work, an American contingent claim (or American
option) is not a contingent claim! The reason is that in American options, the settlement
date τ is chosen by the holder rather than predetermined in the contract. Even though
the class of European contingent claims is the natural starting point for most models, we
have chosen to begin with a slightly more general situation (the settlement date being a
stopping time) because it allows for an easier transition into the discussion of American and
(more importantly) game contingent claims in the next sections. The underlying intuition
behind pricing European contingent claims and our (general) contingent claims are much
the same.
As part of the frictionless market assumption, it is possible to hold any positive or
negative quantity of any contingent claim Xτ before time τ . Note that the effective roles
of the issuer and the holder may be exchanged if we simply consider the claim −Xτ . In
fact, investors may hold any combination of bonds, stocks and securities, constructing a
portfolio. A dynamic portfolio of stocks and bonds over time is known as a trading strategy.
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An important concept in the theory of derivative pricing is the notion of arbitrage. In
simple terms, an arbitrage is an opportunity to make a guaranteed profit from a clever
choice of trading strategies. For this section, the definition of arbitrage will be restricted to
self-financing trading strategies of stock and bonds and their wealth processes. Note that
the exact definition of self-financing strategy is different for discrete-time and continuous-
time models and thus it will be given later.
Definition 6.2. An arbitrage in (B,S) is a self-financing trading strategy φ of stocks and
bonds such that its wealth process Z(φ) satisfies:
Z0(φ) = 0, P(ZT (φ) ≥ 0) = 1, P(ZT (φ) > 0) > 0.
The market model is said to be arbitrage-free if no such arbitrage exists.
It is well-known that a consequence of an arbitrage-free market is the existence of a risk-
neutral probability measure or martingale measure. Both of these concepts will be formally
defined and discussed later.
The goal of our models is to identify the arbitrage price process of a contingent claim
Xτ . The arbitrage price process represents the price at which Xτ can be traded before its
maturity date without creating an arbitrage opportunity in the extended market. To make
this concept precise, we first need to extend the definition of arbitrage. One such extension
may be:
Definition 6.3. Suppose the contingent claim Xτ is traded at the price Yt for some t ∈
[0, τ ], then an arbitrage in (B,S,Xτ ) would be an admissible trading strategy φ and a
constant c such that, on some event E ⊂ Ft with positive measure,
Zt(φ) + cYt < 0, Zτ (φ) + cXτ ≥ 0.
For the purpose of this section, we will only use this extended definition implicitly. The
basic approach is to replicate Xτ by an admissible trading strategy and then match the
arbitrage price process with the wealth process of the replicating strategy. This approach
is well-known to be equivalent to pricing Xτ by the absence of extended arbitrage involving
trading in the asset represented by the cash flow Xτ .
To simplify notations, we introduce the concept of discounted values. In our market
model, any funds not invested in stocks in are automatically held as bonds. It is thus
often convenient to work with the discounted value of assets, securities, and portfolios. In
particular, we denote the discounted prices of stocks by Ŝit = S
i
t/Bt, i = 1, 2, . . . , d and
Ŝt = (Ŝ
1
t , . . . , Ŝ
d
t ) for all t. The same notation will be used for all other discounted values.
For example, if Zt(φ) is the time t value of a portfolio then Ẑt(φ) = Zt(φ)/Bt represents
its discounted value.
6.1.1 Discrete-Time Market Model
In the discrete-time set-up, all activities in the market may only occur on a discrete set of
times {0, 1, . . . , T}. We work under the probability space (Ω,F,P), where:
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• Ω represents all possible states of the market; in the discrete-time model, we assume
Ω to be a finite set ;
• F = {F0, . . . ,FT } is the filtration representing the information (regarding the states
of the market) available to market participants over time;
• P represents the real-world probability of each state occurring.
Definition 6.4. A trading strategy in the discrete-time model is an F-adapted, Rd+1-valued
process φt = (φ
0
t , φ
1
t , . . . , φ
d
t ), t ∈ [0, T ]. In particular, φit for t ∈ [0, T ] represents the amount
of Si held from t to t + 1 for i = 0, 1, . . . , d. The wealth process of a trading strategy φ,
denoted by Z(φ), is the F-adapted process defined by
Zt(φ) =
d∑
i=0
φitS
i
t , t ∈ [0, T ].
It is clear that the wealth process represents the total value of φ based on the values
at which the primary assets are traded. One important class of trading strategies are the
self-financing trading strategies. Aside from the initial investment, these trading strategies
do not require additional injections (or withdrawals) of funds to maintain the required
positions in stocks and bonds.
Definition 6.5. A trading strategy φ is said to be self-financing if for any t = 0, . . . , T −1,
we have
d∑
i=0
φitS
i
t+1 =
d∑
i=0
φit+1S
i
t+1.
As mentioned, the goal is to price contingent claims by replicating its payoff by a self-
financing trading strategy. In particular, the value of the trading strategy should match the
payoff of the contingent claim at the settlement date. This motivates the following notion
of attainability of a contingent claim.
Definition 6.6. We say that a contingent claim Xτ is attainable if there exists a self-
financing trading strategy φ such that
Zτ (φ) = Xτ .
The trading strategy φ is also known as a replicating strategy for Xτ . The market is said
to be complete if every European contingent claim is attainable.
The property of market completeness is given in terms of the attainability European
contingent claims (or contingent claim where τ is at a fixed time t). As it turns out, it is
equivalent to consider the attainability of all contingent claims.
Proposition 6.7. The market is complete if and only if every contingent claim is attain-
able.
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Proof. The implication (⇐=) is trivial. For the converse, we will prove by induction on t
that market completeness implies Xτ is attainable for τ ∈ T[0,t]. The base case of t = 0
is immediate. Consider a contingent claim Xτ where τ ∈ T[0,t+1]. Write τ ′ = τ ∧ t and
construct the following contingent claims:
Xτ ′ = Xτ1{τ≤t}, Xt+1 = Xτ1{τ=t}.
It is clear that Xτ ′ is a contingent claim on [0, t], Xt+1 is a European contingent claim, and
Xτ = Xτ ′ + Xt+1. By assumption, there exist replicating strategies for Xτ ′ and Xt+1, so
it suffices to note that the sum of these strategies is a replicating strategy for Xτ . This
completes the induction.
Proposition 6.8. Suppose that the market is arbitrage-free, as in Definition 6.2. Let Xτ
be an attainable contingent claim with settlement date τ . Then all replicating strategies of
Xτ must have the same wealth process Z(φ) on [0, τ ].
Proof. Let φ and ψ be two replicating strategies of Xτ with different wealth processes.
Without loss of generality, the inequality Zt(φ) > Zt(ψ) occurs with positive probability,
that is,
P
( T⋃
t=0
{
Zt(φ) > Zt(ψ), t < τ
})
> 0.
We will construct an arbitrage in (B,S). To this end, we define the stopping time
ρ = min
{
t ∈ [0, τ ] : Zt(φ) > Zt(ψ)
}
,
with the convention of setting ρ = τ if the set is empty. In view of our assumption,
P(ρ < τ) > 0. Consider the trading strategy φ′ where we do nothing up to time ρ. At time
ρ, we short sell the portfolio φρ − ψρ while buying (Zρ(φ) − Zρ(ψ))/Bρ = Ẑρ(φ) − Ẑρ(ψ)
units of the bond B, and we keep them until time τ . Finally, at time τ , we convert stocks
into bonds and hold until time T . Then the wealth of φ′ satisfy
Zt(φ
′) =

0, 0 < t ≤ ρ,
Zt(ψ)− Zt(φ) +
(
Ẑρ(φ)− Ẑρ(ψ)
)
Bt, ρ < t ≤ τ,(
Ẑτ (ψ)− Ẑτ (φ)
)
Bt +
(
Ẑρ(φ)− Ẑρ(ψ)
)
Bt, τ < t ≤ T.
It is also clear that φ′ is self-financing. Let us examine the value of φ′ at time T . On the
event {ρ = τ}, clearly ZT (φ′) = 0. On the event {ρ < τ}, we recall that Zτ (ψ) = Zτ (φ) =
X, so that we obtain
ZT (φ
′) =
BT
Bρ
(Zρ(φ)− Zρ(ψ)) > 0.
Since P(ρ < τ) > 0, we conclude that φ′ is an arbitrage in (B,S). This contradicts the
arbitrage-free assumption.
Motivated by Proposition 6.8, we propose the following definition for the arbitrage price
of a contingent claim.
114 Chapter 6: Introduction to Arbitrage Pricing
Definition 6.9. Let Xτ be an attainable contingent claim. The arbitrage price process of
Xτ , denoted by pit(Xτ ), t ∈ [0, τ ], is defined by the unique wealth process Zt(φ), t ∈ [0, τ ],
where φ is any replicating strategy of Xτ .
We are in a position to state a well-known version of the Fundamental Theorem of Asset
Pricing.
Theorem 6.10. (i) A market is arbitrage-free if and only if there exists a probability
measure Q equivalent to P under which Ŝ is a Q-martingale. This measure Q is called a
risk-neutral measure or an equivalent martingale measure.
(ii) A market is arbitrage-free and complete if and only if there exists a unique risk-neutral
measure.
In a complete and arbitrage free market, often the risk-neutral measure will be simply
called the unique martingale measure if there is no confusion. Next we introduce the notion
of Q-admissible strategies where Q is the risk neutral measure. In the discrete-time model,
it is easy to show that Q-admissible strategies are equivalent to self-financing strategies.
This terminology is chosen to be consistent with the continuous-time case.
Definition 6.11. A self-financing trading strategy φ is said to be Q-admissible if the
discounted wealth process Ẑ(φ) is a Q-martingale. If the probability measure Q is clear
from the context, we may simply say φ is admissible.
Lemma 6.12. Let Q be a risk-neutral measure. Then all self-financing strategies are Q-
admissible.
Finally, we have the main pricing result of the discrete-time market model.
Theorem 6.13. Suppose the market is complete and arbitrage-free. Then the arbitrage
price process of any contingent claim Xτ is given by the formula
pit(Xτ ) = Bt EQ
(
B−1t Xτ
∣∣Ft), ∀ t ∈ [0, τ ],
where Q is the unique risk-neutral measure.
Proof. Since the market is complete, the claim Xτ is attainable. By Proposition 6.8, the
arbitrage price process pi(Xτ ) is given by pi(Xτ ) = Z(φ) where φ is a replicating strategy
for X. Hence, by Lemma 6.12,
pit(Xτ ) = Zt(φ) = BtẐt(φ) = Bt EQ
(
Ẑτ (φ)
∣∣Ft) = Bt EQ(B−1t Xτ ∣∣Ft), ∀ t ∈ [0, τ ],
as required.
From Theorem 6.13, it makes sense to set the following standing assumptions. It will
be automatically assumed whenever we refer to the discrete-time market model.
Assumption 6.14. We make the following standing assumptions:
(i) the market is arbitrage-free, that is, no arbitrage opportunity exists,
(ii) the market is complete, that is, every contingent claim has a replicating strategy.
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6.1.2 Continuous-Time Market Model
The previous subsection described a finite-state discrete-time market model. The settings
were general, in the sense that the underlying states space (Ω,F) was not explicitly given. As
a result, assumptions of arbitrage-free and completeness were made to ensure the existence
of a unique arbitrage price process for every contingent claim. In the continuous-time
case, we will be more specific in our choice and focus on the standard multi-dimensional
Black-Scholes model. Instead of invoking the fundamental theorem of asset pricing, the
risk-neutral measure will be explicitly constructed. We remark that it is possible to obtain
similar results in more general models, as long as appropriate assumptions on the market
are made.
In the continuous-time model, market activity may occur at any time t on the con-
tinuous interval [0, T ]. We work under the filtered probability space (Ω,F,P) in which F
is augmented filtration generated by the standard d-dimensional Brownian motion Wt =
(W 1t , . . . ,W
d
t ), t ∈ [0, T ], which consists of d independent one-dimensional Brownian mo-
tions. The probability measure P represents the real-world measure.
As part of the standard Black-Scholes model, we make the following assumptions on
the riskless bond B = S0 and the risky stocks S = (S1, . . . , Sd):
• The bond price S0 = B is given by
Bt = B0 +
∫ t
0
ruBu du, (6.1)
where rt, t ∈ [0, T ], is a real-valued deterministic function of t.
• For i = 1, . . . , d, the stock price process Si follows the dynamic of a multi-dimensional
geometric Brownian motion, that is, it satisfies the following stochastic differential
equation (SDE):
Sit = S
i
0 +
∫ t
0
µiuS
i
u du+
d∑
j=1
∫ t
0
σiju S
i
u dW
j
u , (6.2)
where µit, σ
ij
t are bounded, real-valued, deterministic functions of t for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ d.
If we further define
µt =

µ1t
µ2t
...
µdt
, σt =

σ11t σ
12
t · · · σ1kt
σ21t σ
22
t · · · σ2kt
...
...
. . .
...
σk1t σ
k2
t · · · σkkt .
, Dt =

S1t 0 · · · 0
0 S2t · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · Sdt
,
then equation (6.2) may be written as
St = S0 +
∫ t
0
Duµu du+
∫ t
0
Duσu dWu.
• We assume that the d × d matrix σt is non-singular for all t ∈ [0, T ] and σ−1t is
bounded.
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It is clear that equation (6.1) yields the following expression for the bond price:
Bt = B0 exp
{∫ t
0
ru du
}
.
On the other hand, equation (6.2) governing the stock price Si contains an Itoˆ integral. To
solve the stochastic differential equation (6.2), we require Itoˆ’s Lemma.
Lemma 6.15 (Itoˆ’s Lemma). Suppose that X = (X1, . . . , Xd) is a d-dimensional, contin-
uous semimartingale and g :Rd → R is a twice continuously differentiable function. Then
we have the following formula
g(Xt) = g(X0) +
d∑
i=1
∫ t
0
gxi(Xu) dX
i
u +
1
2
d∑
i,j=1
∫ t
0
gxixj (Xu) d〈Xi, Xj〉u.
Proposition 6.16. For i = 1, . . . , d, the risky asset price Si is given by the formula
Sit = S
i
0 exp
{∫ t
0
(
µiu −
1
2
d∑
j=1
(σiju )
2
)
du+
d∑
j=1
∫ t
0
σiju dW
j
u
}
.
Proof. We first note that the quadratic variation of Si is given by
〈Si〉t =
d∑
j=1
∫ t
0
(σiju S
i
u)
2 d〈W j〉u =
d∑
j=1
∫ t
0
(σiju S
i
u)
2 du.
Let us define g :R→ R by g(x) = lnx. An applications of Lemma 6.15 yields
ln(Sit) = ln(S
i
0) +
∫ t
0
1
Siu
dSiu +
1
2
d∑
j=1
∫ t
0
−1
(Siu)
2
d〈Si〉u
= ln(Si0) +
(∫ t
0
µiu du+
d∑
j=1
∫ t
0
σiju dW
j
u
)
− 1
2
d∑
j=1
∫ t
0
(σijt )
2 du.
By exponentiating both sides, we obtain the required result.
A trading strategy in the continuous-time market model is an F-progressively measur-
able, Rd+1-valued process φt = (φ0t , φ1t , . . . , φdt ), t ∈ [0, T ]. In particular, φit for t ∈ [0, T ]
represents the number of shares of Si held instantaneously at time t ∈ (0, T ]. Further-
more, the wealth process of a trading strategy φ, denoted by Z(φ), is the F-adapted process
defined by
Zt(φ) =
d∑
i=0
φitS
i
t , ∀ t ∈ [0, T ].
Again, it is useful to consider the class of self-financing trading strategies, that is, trading
strategies which do not require additional injection (or withdrawal) of funds to maintain
the required position in bonds and stocks.
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Definition 6.17 (Self-Financing). A trading strategy φ is self-financing if its wealth pro-
cess Z(φ) satisfies the following condition,
Zt(φ) = Z0(φ) +
d∑
i=0
∫ t
0
φiu dS
i
u, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ].
In the discrete-time case, under the arbitrage-free condition, the wealth process of any
self-financing strategy is a martingale under a risk-neutral measure. Recall that a risk-
neutral measure is one under which the discounted stock prices are martingales. We propose
the following analogue for the continuous-time case.
Definition 6.18. A probability Q on (Ω,F), equivalent to P, is called a risk-neutral measure
or a martingale measure for Ŝ if the discounted stock prices Ŝ is a Rd-valued local martingale
under Q.
As one would expect, the wealth processes of self-financing strategies are also local
martingales under Q.
Lemma 6.19. A probability measure Q is a risk-neutral measure if and only if the discount
wealth process Ẑ(φ) of any self-financing trading strategy φ is a local martingale.
Proof. The (⇐=) direction is trivial. For the (=⇒) direction, write Ẑ = Ẑ(φ). By Lemma
6.15,
dẐt = d(ZtB
−1
t ) = Zt dB
−1
t +B
−1
t dZt
=
(
φ0tBt +
d∑
i=1
φitS
i
t
)
dB−1t +B
−1
t
(
φ0t dBt +
d∑
i=1
φit dS
i
t
)
= φ0t (Bt dB
−1
t +B
−1
t dBt) +
d∑
i=1
φit(S
i
t dB
−1
t +B
−1
t dS
i
t)
= φ0t d(BtB
−1
t ) +
d∑
i=1
φit d(S
i
tB
−1
t ) =
d∑
i=1
φit dŜ
i
t .
Hence the discounted Ẑ(φ) satisfies
Ẑt(φ) = Ẑ0(φ) +
d∑
i=1
∫ t
0
φiu dŜ
i
u, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ].
It now suffices to make use of the local martingale property of the Itoˆ integral.
It is important to note that, under the risk-neutral measure Q, the discounted wealth
process Ẑ(φ) of a self-financing strategy φ is not necessarily a martingale, but only a local
martingale. This is not quite enough to eliminate the possibility of arbitrage. To overcome
this problem, an additional property is required.
Definition 6.20 (Admissibility). A self-financing trading strategy φ is said to be Q-
admissible if the discounted wealth process Ẑ(φ) is a Q-martingale. If the probability
measure Q is clear from the context, then we may simply say φ is admissible.
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We will now identify the risk-neutral measure Q, which satisfies the properties men-
tioned above. Instead of invoking the fundamental theorem of asset pricing, we will explic-
itly construct a risk-neutral measure in the Black-Scholes model using the dynamics of the
stock price. The discounted stock price Ŝ is given by the equation
Ŝit = Ŝ
i
0 exp
{∫ t
0
(
µiu − ru −
1
2
d∑
j=1
(σijt )
2
)
du+
d∑
j=1
∫ t
0
σiju dW
j
u
}
.
This is equivalent to
Ŝit = Ŝ
i
0 +
∫ t
0
(µiu − ru)Ŝiu du+
d∑
j=1
∫ t
0
σiju Ŝ
i
u dW
j
u . (6.3)
By the property of the Itoˆ integral, for Ŝi to be a local martingale, we require the drift
term to be 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Since µiu − ru is non-zero, in general, we need to perform a
change of measure under which the drift term vanishes. This can be easily achieved by an
application of the classic version of Girsanov’s theorem.
Lemma 6.21. (i) The unique martingale measure Q for Ŝ is given by the Radon-Nikody´m
derivative
dQ
dP
= exp
(∫ t
0
σ−1u (ru1− µu) dWu −
1
2
∫ t
0
∣∣σ−1u (ru1− µu)∣∣2 du), a.s..
(ii) For i = 1, . . . , d, the discounted stock price Ŝi satisfies, under the martingale measure
Q,
Ŝit = Ŝ
i
0 +
d∑
j=1
∫ t
0
σiju S
i
u dŴ
j
u ,
where Ŵ = (Ŵ 1, . . . , Ŵ d) is a standard Brownian motion on the probability space (Ω,F,Q)
satisfying
Ŵt = Wt −
∫ t
0
σ−1u (ru1− µu) du, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. Let γ be an F-progressively measurable, Rd-valued process. We may define a prob-
ability measure Q on (Ω,F) by the following Radon-Nikody´m derivative,
dQ
dP
= exp
(∫ t
0
γu dWu − 1
2
∫ t
0
∣∣γu∣∣2 du), a.s..
Girsanov’s theorem states the measure Q is equivalent to P. Moreover, the process Ŵ ,
which is given by
Ŵt = Wt −
∫ t
0
γu du, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ],
is a standard Brownian motion on the probability space (Ω,F,Q).
Applying Girsanov’s theorem to the current problem, we seek a process γ = (γ1, . . . , γd)
such that when the differential dWt = dŴt + γt dt is substituted into the discounted stock
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price (6.3), the processes Ŝi for i = 1, 2, . . . , d are local martingales. The SDE in question
is
dŜit =
(
µit − rt +
d∑
j=1
γjt σ
ij
t
)
Ŝit dt+
d∑
j=1
σijt Ŝ
i
t dŴ
i
t , Ŝ
i
0 = S
i
0.
To annihilate the drift term, we need to solve for γ in the following equation
µt − rt1 + σtγt = 0, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ].
Since we assumed that the matrix σt is non-singular, this equation has the unique solution
γt = σ
−1
t (rt1− µt), which is a bounded deterministic Rd-valued process. Hence the proba-
bility Q is indeed well-defined and equivalent to P. The required result hence follows.
Now we are in the position to find the arbitrage price process of a contingent claim.
First we formalise the notion of attainability and replicating strategies.
Definition 6.22. A contingent claim Xτ is said to be attainable if there exists an admissible
trading strategy replicating its payoff, that is,
Zτ (φ) = Xτ .
Here φ is known as a replicating strategy for Xτ .
Definition 6.23. Let Xτ be an attainable contingent claim with a replicating strategy φ.
Then its arbitrage price process is defined as the wealth process Zt(φ), t ∈ [0, τ ].
Instead of assuming the completeness of the market, the attainability of any contingent
claim in the Black-Scholes model can be shown directly by the martingale representation
theorem and the non-singularity of σt.
Theorem 6.24 (Martingale Representation Theorem). Let M be any real valued (F,P)-
martingale. There exists a unique d-dimensional F-predictable process γ = (γ1, . . . , γd) such
that
∫ T
0 |γt|2 dt <∞ and, for every t ∈ [0, T ],
Mt = M0 +
d∑
j=1
∫ t
0
γju dW
j
u .
Theorem 6.25. Under the Black-Scholes model, any contingent claim Xτ which satisfies
EQ
(
B−1τ |Xτ |
)
< ∞ is attainable. Furthermore, the arbitrage price process of Xτ is given
by the formula
pit(Xτ ) = Bt EQ
(
B−1τ Xτ
∣∣Ft), ∀ t ∈ [0, τ ],
where Q is the unique risk-neutral measure.
Proof. Consider the F-adaptedQ-martingaleMt, t ∈ [0, T ] defined byMt = EQ
(
B−1τ Xτ
∣∣Ft).
By the martingale representation theorem, there exists a unique F-predictable, Rd-valued
process γ such that
Mt = M0 +
d∑
j=1
∫ t
0
γju dŴ
j
u .
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We may use γ to construct a trading strategy φ. Specifically, we set
(φ1t , . . . , φ
d
t ) = γ
′
tσ
−1
t D̂
−1
t , φ
0
t = Mt −
d∑
i=1
φitŜ
i
t ,
where γ′t is the transpose of γt and D̂t is the diagonal matrix of the discounted stock prices
Ŝ1, . . . , Ŝd. We claim that φ is a replicating strategy for Xτ . Let us write φ
S
t = (φ
1
t , . . . , φ
d
t ).
Then the following equality holds,
φSt · dŜt = φSt · (D̂tσt dŴt) = γt · dŴt.
To check that φ is self-financing, we first note that,
dMt =
d∑
j=1
γjt dŴ
j
t =
d∑
j=1
φjt dŜ
j
t .
Consequently, we obtain,
dZt(φ) = d(BtMt) = Bt dMt +Mt dBt
= Bt
d∑
i=1
φit dŜ
i
t +
(
φ0t +
d∑
i=1
φitŜ
i
t
)
dBt
= φ0t dBt +
d∑
i=1
φit(Bt dŜ
i
t + Ŝ
i
t dBt)
= φ0t dBt +
d∑
i=1
φit dS
i
t ,
thus proving that φ is indeed self-financing.
Finally, to check that φ replicates Xτ , it suffices to note that
Zτ (φ) = φ0Bτ +
d∑
i=1
φitS
i
τ = Bτ
(
φ0 +
d∑
i=1
φitŜ
i
τ
)
= BτMτ = Xτ .
We conclude that the arbitrage price process of Xτ is given by
pit(Xτ ) = Zt(φ) = BtMt = Bt EQ
(
B−1τ Xτ
∣∣Ft),
which completes the proof.
Remark 6.26. The assumption that σt is non-singular ensures that the model is com-
plete and admits a unique martingale measure. Suppose instead that we work with a
d-dimensional Brownian motion and k stocks. Then there are several cases:
• if rank(σt) < d, then the market is incomplete;
• if r1− µ /∈ col(σt), then the market contains arbitrage;
• if r1−µ ∈ col(σt) and rank(σt) < k, then at least one stock is redundant, in the sense
that it can be replicated by the other primary assets.
Since σt is a k × d matrix, in order to avoid all of the above cases, we postulated that
rank(σt) = k = d.
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6.2 American Options
An American contingent claim or American option does not fall into the class of contin-
gent claims as per Definition 6.1. The main difference is that the holder of an American
contingent claim chooses the time at which the contract is stopped.
Definition 6.27. An American contingent claim Xa (denoted as ACC(Xa)) is a contract
between an issuer and a holder, such that the holder exercises or selects an F-stopping
time τ ∈ T[0,T ] and the issuer has to pay the holder the amount of Xaτ at time τ . Here the
F-adapted process Xat , t ∈ [0, T ] is the payoff process specified by the contract.
Unlike the European contingent claim, the American contingent claim is not symmetric
between the holder and the issuer. At time t ∈ [0, T ], if the American contingent claim is
traded at time t, then we assume that it has not yet been exercised, and the set of exercise
times available to the holder would be the class T[t,T ] of stopping times. Intuitively, if the
stopping time τ is chosen, then the payoff Xaτ is identical to a normal contingent claim. In
the models discussed in the previous section, the arbitrage price process is given by
pit(X
a) = Bt EQ(B−1τ Xaτ | Ft).
This can also be seen as the time t ‘value’ of the contract to the holder. If the holder behaves
‘rationally’, he may choose a stopping time which maximises this quantity. According to
this argument, a reasonable guess of the price may be
pit(X
a) = ess sup
τ∈T[t,T ]
Bt EQ(B−1τ Xaτ | Ft).
This conjecture turns out to be the correct. But instead of quantifying the ‘rationality’ of
the holder, we will derive this equality by arbitrage arguments. In the case of the American
option, due to the additional flexibility attributed to the holder, it is necessary to extend
the definition of arbitrage.
Definition 6.28. Consider a market in which an ACC(Xa) is traded at the price Yt at
time t. A holder’s arbitrage in (B,S,Xa) is a pair (φ, τ) ∈ Ψ×T[t,T ] for which there exists
an event E ∈ Ft with a positive probability and such that on E:
Zt(φ) + Yt < 0, Zτ (φ) +X
a
τ ≥ 0.
An issuer’s arbitrage in (B,S,Xa) is an admissible strategy φ ∈ Ψ for which there exists
an event E ∈ Ft with a positive probability and such that on E:
Zt(φ)− Yt < 0, Zτ (φ)−Xaτ ≥ 0, ∀ τ ∈ T[t,T ].
6.2.1 Discrete-Time Case
The main pricing result for American options in the discrete-time market model is as follows.
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Proposition 6.29. Define the process V a recursively by VT = X
a
T and
V at = max
{
Xat , Bt EQ(B−1t+1V
a
t+1 | Ft)
}
, t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1. (6.4)
Furthermore, we set, for any fixed t = 0, 1, . . . , T ,
τat = min
{
u ∈ [t, T ] : V au = Xau
}
. (6.5)
Then we have the following:
(i) V at = Bt EQ(B−1τat X
a
τat
| Ft) on [t, τat ];
(ii) V at = ess supτ∈T[t,T ] Bt EQ(B
−1
τ X
a
τ | Ft);
(iii) the arbitrage price process is given by pit(X
a) = V at ;
(iv) there exists an admissible trading strategy φa, which satisfies
Zt(φ
a) = V at , on [0, τ
a
t ], Zτ (φ
a) ≥ V aτ ≥ Xaτ , ∀ τ ∈ T[t,T ].
Proof. We prove all statements by backward induction on t. For t = T , the payoff and
the arbitrage price of the American contingent claim is piT (X
a) = V aT = X
a
T and the only
available stopping time is τaT = T . Now we show that the result holds at time t by assuming
the result at time t + 1. To prove (i), we consider two cases. On the event {τat = t}, by
(6.5),
V at = X
a
t = Bt EQ(B−1τat X
a
τat
| Ft).
Otherwise on the event {τat ≥ t+ 1}, by (6.4) and (6.5), we have
τat = τ
a
t+1, V
a
t = Bt EQ(B−1t+1V
a
t+1 | Ft).
Applying the induction hypothesis of V at+1 = Bt+1 EQ(B
−1
τat+1
Xaτat+1
| Ft+1), we have
V at = Bt EQ(B−1τat+1X
a
τat+1
| Ft) = Bt EQ(B−1τat X
a
τat
| Ft).
In both cases, (i) is established.
In view of (i), to establish (ii), it suffices to check that for any τ ∈ T[t,T ], we have
V at ≥ Bt EQ(B−1τ Xaτ | Ft).
Again the same two cases are considered. On the event {τ = t}, by (6.4),
V at ≥ Xat = Bt EQ(B−1τ Xaτ | Ft).
Otherwise on the event {τ ≥ t+ 1}, τ ∈ T[t+1,T ]. By applying the induction hypothesis of
V at+1 ≥ Bt+1 EQ(B−1τ Xaτ | Ft+1), we obtain
V at ≥ Bt EQ(B−1t+1V at+1 | Ft) ≥ Bt EQ(EQ(B−1τ Xaτ | Ft+1) | Ft) = Bt EQ(B−1τ Xaτ | Ft),
and thus the proof of (ii) is completed.
For (iii), suppose the American contingent claim is traded at time t for Yt. If P(Yt <
V at ) > 0, we will show that there exists a holder’s arbitrage. Let φ be the replicating
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strategy of the European contingent claim with payoff BTB
−1
τat
Xaτat
at T . Then we have, on
[0, τat ],
Zt(φ) = Bt EQ(B−1τat X
a
τat
| Ft) = V at .
We claim that (−φ, τat ) is a holder’s arbitrage. Indeed, on the event {Yt < V at },
Zt(−φ) + Yt = −V at + Yt < 0,
Zτat (−φ) +Xaτat = −X
a
τat
+Xaτat ≥ 0,
as required.
If P(Yt > V at ) > 0, we will show that there exists an issuer’s arbitrage. By (6.4), it can
be easily checked that V̂ a is a supermartingale. By Doob’s decomposition theorem, there
exists an (F,Q)-martingale M and an F-predictable, non-decreasing process A such that,
for all t = 0, 1, . . . , T ,
V̂ at = Mt −At, A0 = 0.
Let φa be a replicating strategy of the contingent claim BT (MT − At). By the martingale
property of M , we have the following inequality for all u ∈ [t, T ],
Zu(φ
a) = Bu EQ(B−1T BT (MT −At) | Fu) = Bu(Mu −At) = V au + (Au −At) ≥ V au .
In the discrete-time model, this implies Z(φa) ≥ V a. Also note that Zt(φa) = Bt(Mt−At) =
V at . Hence φ
a satisfies the requirements of part (iv).
Finally, we claim that φa is an issuer’s arbitrage. Recall that, by (ii), on the event
{Yt > V at },
Zt(φ
a)− Yt = V at − Yt < 0,
Zτ (φ
a)−Xaτ ≥ V aτ −Xaτ ≥ 0, ∀ τ ∈ T[t,T ],
which shows that φa is indeed an issuer’s arbitrage. We conclude that the arbitrage price
process is given by pit(X
a) = V at and thus (iii) holds. Property (iv) was also established.
6.2.2 Continuous-Time Case
In the continuous-time case, we will only focus on American options with well-behaved
payoff processes.
Definition 6.30. An F-adapted ca`dla`g process X is said to be regular if, for every τ ∈
T[0,T ], Xτ is integrable and, for every non-decreasing sequence of stopping times τn, n =
1, 2, . . . with limit τ = limn→∞ τn, we have limn→∞ E(Xτn) = E(Xτ ).
Note that the regularity is defined with respect to a particular probability measure P. In
particular, all continuous integrable processes are regular. Next, we introduce an important
concept for the pricing of American options, known as the Snell envelope.
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Theorem 6.31. Let Y be an F-progressively measurable process. Then there exists a uni-
formly integrable F-supermartingale J with the properties:
(i) J ≥ Y and for every F-supermartingale J ′ such that J ′ ≥ Y , we have J ′ ≥ J .
(ii) For every t ∈ [0, T ], we have
Jt = ess sup
τ∈T[t,T ]
E
(
Yτ
∣∣Ft).
(iii) If Y is ca`dla`g, then J has a ca`dla`g modification. Furthermore, if Y is regular, then
so is J , and there exists an optimal stopping time
τ∗ := inf{t ≥ 0 : Jt = Yt} ∧ T
such that Jτ∗ = Yτ∗ and J is a martingale on [0, τ
∗].
The process J is known as the Snell envelope of Y .
Now we present the main pricing result of American options in the continuous-time
market model.
Theorem 6.32. Suppose Xa is a continuous, integrable process. If the market has no
arbitrage, then the arbitrage price of ACC(Xa) is given by
pit(X
a) = V at = ess sup
τ∈T[t,T ]
Bt EQ(B−1τ Xaτ | Ft).
The optimal stopping time is given by
τat := inf{u ≥ t : V au = Xu} ∧ T.
Furthermore, there exists an admissible trading strategy φa which satisfies
Zt(φ
a) = V at , Zτ (φ
a) ≥ V aτ ≥ Xaτ , ∀ τ ∈ T[t,T ]. (6.6)
Proof. Consider the Snell envelope of X̂a in (Ω,F,Q)
Jt = ess sup
τ∈T[t,T ]
EQ
(
X̂aτ
∣∣Ft).
It is clear that by definition that Jt = V̂
a
t . Since J is a ca`dla`g regular supermartingale,
it admits a unique Doob-Meyer decomposition V̂ a = J = M − A, A0 = 0, where M is
a continuous, square-integrable Q-martingale (under the Brownian filtration) and A is a
right-continuous, non-decreasing process.
The rest of the argument is similar to the discrete-time case. Suppose the American
contingent claim is traded at time t for Yt. If P(Yt < V at ) > 0, we will show that there
exists a holder’s arbitrage. Let φ be the replicating strategy of the contingent claim Xaτat
.
By the regularity of Xa, J is a martingale on [t, τat ] and thus
Zt(φ) = Bt EQ(B−1τat X
a
τat
| Ft) = Bt EQ(Jτat | Ft) = BtJt = V at .
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We claim that (−φ, τat ) is a holder’s arbitrage. Indeed, on the event {Yt < V at },
Zt(−φ) + Yt = −V at + Yt < 0,
Zτat (−φ) +Xaτat = −X
a
τat
+Xaτat = 0.
If P(Yt > V at ) > 0, we will show that there exists an issuer’s arbitrage. Let φa be a
replicating strategy of the contingent claim BT (MT − At). By the martingale property of
M , for any u ∈ [t, T ], we have
Zu(φ
a) = Bu EQ(B−1T BT (MT −At) | Fu) = Bu(Mu −At) = V au + (Au −At) ≥ V au .
Also note that Zt(φ) = Bt(Mt −At) = V at . Now by the right-continuity of V̂ a = J, M and
A, we must have Z(φa) ≥ V a. Hence φa satisfies (6.6). Finally, we claim that φa is an
issuer’s arbitrage. By the definition of the Snell envelope, on the event {Yt > V at },
Zt(φ
a)− Yt = V at − Yt < 0,
Zτ (φ
a)−Xaτ ≥ V aτ −Xaτ ≥ 0, ∀ τ ∈ T[t,T ],
so that φa is indeed an issuer’s arbitrage. We conclude that the arbitrage price process is
given by pit(X
a) = V at .
6.3 Two-Person Game Options
Two-person game contingent claims, also known as Israeli options or simply game options,
is an extension of American options first proposed by Kifer [31]. Aside from the holder’s
ability to exercise at any time, the issuer of the option also has the ability to cancel the
option at any time and pay the holder a cancellation fee. Typically the cancellation fee is
greater than or equal to the exercise payoff at any time. When the holder and the issuer
exercise and cancel at the same time, the holder is given the precedence. Equivalently, the
game option can be seen as a financial contract based on a two-person zero-sum Dynkin
game, which was discussed in Chapter 2. The main results of Chapter 2, Proposition 2.5
and Theorem 2.21, are used in the pricing of game options. In this section, we follow the
work of Kifer [31]. We begin by formally defining the game (or Israeli) option.
Definition 6.33. Let X and Y be F-adapted processes satisfying Y ≥ X. A game contin-
gent claim GCC(X,Y ) is a contract between an issuer and a holder. The holder exercises
the contract by selecting an F-stopping time τ ∈ T[0,T ] while the issuer cancels by selecting
an F-stopping time σ ∈ T[0,T ]. The contract is terminated at time σ ∧ τ , where the issuer
pays the holder the payoff of
R(τ, σ) = Xτ1{τ≤σ} + Yσ1{σ<τ}
Here the F-adapted processes X and Y specified by the contract are known as the exercise
payoff process and the cancellation fee process respectively.
In the notation of Chapter 2, the game option corresponds to the standard Dynkin game
SDG(X̂, Ŷ , X̂) where X̂ = B−1X and Ŷ = B−1Y are the discounted processes. Since we
have Ŷ ≥ X̂, we are only dealing with the most basic version of the Dynkin game.
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Before we can find the arbitrage price of GCC(X,Y ), we again have to redefine arbitrage
to include this new type of contract. Just as in American options, it is necessary to
separately define arbitrage from the perspectives of the holder and the issuer. However,
unlike in the case of an American option, there is a clear symmetry between the two
counterparties in a game option.
Definition 6.34. Consider a market in which a game contingent claim GCC(X,Y ) is
traded at Zt at time t. A holder’s arbitrage in GCC(X,Y ) is a pair (φ, τ) ∈ Ψ× T[t,T ] for
which there exists an event E ∈ Ft with positive measure such that, on the event E,
Zt(φ) + Zt < 0, Zτ∧σ(φ) +R(τ, σ) ≥ 0, ∀σ ∈ T[t,T ].
An issuer’s arbitrage in GCC(X,Y ) is an admissible strategy φ ∈ Ψ for which there exists
an event E ∈ Ft with positive measure such that, on the event E,
Zt(φ)− Zt < 0, Zτ∧σ(φ)−R(τ, σ) ≥ 0, ∀ τ ∈ T[t,T ].
As it was in the previous section, when discussing the arbitrage price at time t, we
implicitly assume that the game option has not been cancelled nor exercised before time t.
6.3.1 Discrete-Time Case
In the discrete-time case, we will apply Proposition 2.5. Define the discounted process V̂
by setting V̂T = X̂T and, for any t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1,
V̂t = min
{
Ŷt, max
{
X̂t, EQ(V̂t+1 | Ft)
}}
= max
{
X̂t, min
{
Ŷt, EQ(V̂t+1 | Ft)
}}
. (6.7)
Furthermore, for any fixed t = 0, 1, . . . , T , we define the optimal stopping times by
τ∗t := min
{
u ∈ {t, t+ 1, . . . , T} | V̂u = X̂u
}
, (6.8)
σ∗t := min
{
u ∈ {t, t+ 1, . . . , T} | V̂u = Ŷu
}
. (6.9)
Then for every t = 0, 1, . . . , T , V̂t is the unique value of the Dynkin game Gt(X̂, Ŷ , X̂) in
the sense that
V̂t = ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
EQ
(
R̂(τt, σt) | Ft
)
= ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
EQ
(
R̂(τt, σt) | Ft
)
, (6.10)
and (σ∗t , τ∗t ) is an optimal equilibrium, which means that
EQ
(
R̂(τ∗t , σt)|Ft
) ≥ V̂t = EQ(R̂(τ∗t , σ∗t )|Ft) ≥ EQ(R̂(τt, σ∗t )|Ft), ∀σt, τt ∈ T[t,T ]. (6.11)
It is not surprising that V̂t is also the unique discounted arbitrage price of the game
option GCC(X,Y ), as we will now show.
Theorem 6.35. Consider the game option GCC(X,Y ) with payoff function
R(τ, σ) = Xτ1{τ≤σ} + Yσ1{σ<τ}
where X and Y are integrable F-adapted processes satisfying Y ≥ X. The discounted
arbitrage price process pit = B
−1pit is given by
pit = ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
EQ
(
R̂(τt, σt) | Ft
)
= ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
EQ
(
R̂(τt, σt) | Ft
)
.
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Proof. In view of (6.10) and (6.11), it suffices to show the equality
pit = V̂t = EQ
(
R̂(τ∗t , σ
∗
t ) | Ft
)
.
where V̂t, σ
∗
t and τ
∗
t are as defined in (6.7)–(6.9). Recall that we have the property
EQ
(
R̂(τ∗t , σt)|Ft
) ≥ V̂t = EQ(R̂(τ∗t , σ∗t )|Ft) ≥ EQ(R̂(τt, σ∗t )|Ft), ∀σt, τt ∈ T[t,T ]. (6.12)
Suppose now that P(pit > V̂t) > 0. We will construct an issuer’s arbitrage in GCC(X,Y ).
Consider an American option on [t, T ] whose discounted payoff is given by
Ûτ = R̂(τ, σ
∗
t ) = X̂τ1{τ≤σ∗t } + Ŷσ∗t 1{σ∗t<τ}.
By Proposition 6.29, there exists an admissible trading strategy φ such that
Ẑt(φ) = ess sup
τ∈T[t,T ]
EQ
(
Ûτ | Ft
)
= V̂t, Ẑτ (φ) ≥ Ûτ , ∀ τ ∈ T[t,T ].
Now note that
Ûτ = X̂τ1{τ≤σ∗t } + Ŷσ∗t 1{σ∗t<τ} ≥ X̂τ1{τ≤σ∗t } + X̂σ∗t 1{σ∗t<τ} = X̂τ∧σ∗t = Ûτ∧σ∗t .
Furthermore, since Ẑ(φ) is a martingale, we obtain
Ẑτ∧σ∗t (φ) = EQ
(
Ẑτ (φ) | Fτ∧σ∗t
) ≥ EQ(Ûτ | Fτ∧σ∗t ) ≥ Ûτ∧σ∗t .
So the pair (φ, σ∗t ) is indeed an issuer’s arbitrage in GCC(X,Y ) on the event {pit > V̂t}.
Since the game option is symmetric, similar arguments show the existence of a holder’s
arbitrage if P(pit < V̂t) > 0. This completes the proof.
6.3.2 Continuous-Time Case
Recall Theorem 2.21, in the standard Dynkin game SDG(X̂, Ŷ , X̂), the unique value V̂
process is given by
V̂t = ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
EQ
(
R̂(τt, σt) | Ft
)
= ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
EQ
(
R̂(τt, σt) | Ft
)
. (6.13)
The value process V̂ can be chosen to be right-continuous. Moreover, for any t ∈ [0, T ] and
any  > 0, the pair of F-stopping times (τ t , σt) ∈ T[t,T ] × T[t,T ] defined by
σt := inf{u ≥ t : Ŷu ≤ V̂u + }, τ t := inf{u ≥ t : X̂u ≥ V̂u − } (6.14)
are -optimal strategies satisfying
ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
EQ
(
R̂(τ t , σt) | Ft
)
+  ≥ V̂t ≥ ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
EQ
(
R̂(τt, σ

t) | Ft
)− . (6.15)
The main pricing result of the game option in continuous-time is given by Theorem
6.36. The lengthy and technical derivation of Theorem 6.36 relies Theorem 2.21, as well as
ideas from the discrete-time case. We shall simply present the result here without proof.
For more details, the reader is referred to Kifer [31].
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Theorem 6.36. Consider the game option GCC(X,Y ) with payoff function
R(τ, σ) = Xτ1{τ≤σ} + Yσ1{σ<τ}
where X and Y are integrable F-adapted ca`dla`g processes satisfying Y ≥ X. The discounted
arbitrage price process pit = B
−1pit is given by
pit = ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
EQ
(
R̂(τt, σt) | Ft
)
= ess sup
τt∈T[t,T ]
ess inf
σt∈T[t,T ]
EQ
(
R̂(τt, σt) | Ft
)
.
Proof. See Kifer [31].
Chapter7
Multi-Person Game Options
In financial markets, almost all traded derivatives (or contingent claims) effectively involve
only two parties, the issuer and the holder. Furthermore, in most cases, the only meaningful
decision lies with the holder in the form of exercising the contract. Some exceptions to this
include the two-person game options introduced by Kifer [31] (in particular, convertible
bonds) in which the issuer also has decisions to make. Understandably, all existing theory
on derivative pricing are built around these two-person contracts.
The aim of this chapter, as well as the entire thesis, is to design a new and generalised
framework in which we may define and evaluate multi-person contingent claims. In such
a claim, an arbitrary number of parties is involved and each of them is allowed to make a
wide array of decisions at any time, not restricted to simply ‘exercising the option’. The
collection of decisions then determines the settlement time of the claim as well as its payoffs.
In fact, one may draw equivalences between the mechanisms of this contract and a general
stochastic game, hence we propose the name multi-person game contingent claim.
The generalised framework has several purposes. First of all, it allows for the creation
and valuation of new complex derivatives involving multiple parties. Also, it provides fresh
insights to the valuation of existing exotic derivatives. Finally, the framework may serve as
a starting point to a unified approach of modelling derivatives and other financial products
in the presence of external factors such as credit risk and market frictions. For example,
the occurrence of default may be interpreted as an action of the party involved.
We work within the discrete or continuous-time market model introduced in Chapter 6,
with the intention of adding multi-person game contingent claims to the market. Section
7.1 provides the definition of a multi-person game contingent claim, which is associated
with a multi-player stochastic game of perfect information from Chapter 1. The claim
involves several ‘holders’ of tranches, as well as its ‘issuer’. Since each party is able to
observe the actions of others, this information should be reflected in their decisions and
hedging portfolios. As a result, admissible trading strategies are redefined as adaptive
trading strategies, which react to the observable actions. Arbitrage is redefined as the
opportunity to make a guaranteed profit by holding tranches along with an adaptive trading
strategy until the claim is settled. Theorem 7.12 provides some preliminary bounds on the
arbitrage prices of the claim.
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Section 7.2 focuses on the pricing of a particular combined tranche (a fixed collection of
tranches). The notion of the generalised Snell envelope is introduced to cover the current
context. The main results of the section are Theorems 7.23 and 7.31, for the discrete
and continuous-time case respectively. They show that, under some sensible conditions on
payoffs, no arbitrage is possible from holding a fixed combined tranche if and only if its
price lies within a particular interval. The bounds of this interval are then interpreted in
terms of super-hedging strategies.
In Section 7.3, we consider the interaction between different combined tranches. In
particular, we demonstrate that the price of the tranches must be additive in order to avoid
a second type of arbitrage known as reselling arbitrage. The additivity also eliminates
any price disagreement between the parties. The two main results are Theorems 7.38 and
7.40. Theorem 7.38 specifies the necessary and sufficient conditions which simultaneously
avoid both types of arbitrage. Theorem 7.40 proves that if optimal equilibria exist for the
associated game, then the individual tranches have unique arbitrage prices, which match
the value of the game. Furthermore, if the payoffs satisfy a sub-zero-sum condition, then
the every combined tranche has a unique and additive arbitrage price.
Section 7.2.3 explains how the results and notations of the general case apply to multi-
person game contingent claims associated with multi-person stopping games. Section 7.4.1
provides an important example in the form of the affine game contingent claim, which is
associated with the affine stopping game from Section 5.3.2. The pricing results for this
claim are given in Theorem 7.44.
As a final note, before reading this chapter, the reader is encouraged to be familiar with
the basic notations of stochastic games from Chapter 1 as well as the market models from
Chapter 6.
7.1 Game Options and Adaptive Trading Strategies
The two-person game options discussed in Section 6.3 can be seen as a financial contract
based on the two-player Dynkin game from Chapter 2. The choices available and the
resulting payoffs for both parties are identical in both the game option and the Dynkin
game. One of the main purposes of this work is to explore the possibilities of defining
general multi-person financial contracts based on the concept of a general multi-player
stochastic game, as defined in Chapter 1.
All of the following definitions are taken under the probability space (Ω,F ,P) endowed
with the filtration F = {Ft : t = 0, 1, . . . , T} representing the information flow observed by
all market participants. We denote by B,S1, . . . , Sd the F-adapted processes representing
prices of primary traded assets. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, we do not postulate
that the market model is arbitrage-free and complete.
Let us consider a generic multi-player gameG in discrete or continuous-time with actions
A, outcomes H and strategies S. Given a strategy s ∈ S, recall that ϑ(s) denotes the
termination time and Vϑ(s) = (V
1
ϑ (s), . . . , V
m
ϑ (s)) denotes the vector of random payoffs at
time ϑ(s). For detailed definitions, refer to Section 1.1 for discrete-time and Section 1.3.1
for continuous-time.
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In the current context, we also write V̂ϑ(s) = B
−1
ϑ(s)Vϑ(s) to denote the vector of dis-
counted payoffs. We first formulate a very general definition of a multi-person game con-
tract. Each particular payoff V iϑ(s) is now identified with a single tranche of a contract.
Hence in the classic case of the two-person game option, one deals with two tranches: the
one held by a holder and the one held by an issuer. Despite being attributed different
names, the roles and rights of the holder and issuer are here identical. It is thus worth to
emphasise that in the case of a multi-person game claim the role played by the issuer will
be essentially different from that of ordinary holders.
Definition 7.1. A multi-person game contingent claim MGC(G) is a contract on [0, T ],
which consists of m tranches, between an issuer and up to m holders. At time 0, the
(prospective) holder of tranche i has to pay the issuer some fee (perhaps negative) to
enter the contract. Denote this amount by pii0(G). Any individual party, even including
the issuer, is allowed to hold any combination of tranches. Once the contract starts, the
holder of tranche i may choose a strategy si ∈ Si, which in turn forms a strategy profile
s = (s1, . . . , sm). Finally, the contract is settled at time ϑ(s) ∈ T[0,T ], where the issuer pays
the holder of tranche i the amount of V iϑ(s) for all i = 1, . . . ,m.
Let MGCt(G, s) denote the game contingent claim on [t, T ] after the strategy profile
s[0,t) ∈ S[0,t) was played during [0, t). Strictly speaking, MGCt(G, s) only depends on
the history h[0,t)(s), meaning that on the event {h[0,t)(s) = h[0,t)(s′)}, the game claims
MGCt(G, s) and MGCt(G, s
′) are in fact identical. Denote each single tranche i ∈ M by
MGCi(G) and the collection of single tranches N ⊆ M, or a combined tranche N , by
MGCN (G). We will simply use the term tranche when no ambiguity may arise. For each
i ∈ M and N ⊆M, let MGCit(G, s) and MGCNt (G, s) denote tranche i and tranche N at
time t, respectively. To simplify things, we implicitly work under the event {ϑ(s) ≥ t} when
dealing with MGCt(G, s). In other words, we only consider the case where MGCt(G, s) has
not been settled before time t.
In real world contracts, all cash flows are zero-sum in nature. Since the game G is not
zero-sum in general, the role of the issuer in MGC(G) is to absorb any surpluses or cover
any deficits both at time 0 and ϑ(s), so that the net cash flow between the holders of the m
tranches and the issuer is zero (this is similar to the role of the dummy player mentioned
earlier in Section 4.1.3). We may reinterpret the issuer as the holder of an issuer’s tranche,
so that MGC(G) becomes a contract with m + 1 tranches. Just like the dummy player,
the holder of the issuer’s tranche cannot perform any actions. Formally, the analysis then
reduces to one about a zero-sum game.
Remark 7.2. If G was zero-sum in the first place, that is
∑
i∈M V
i
ϑ(s) = 0 for all s ∈
S, then the issuer is somewhat redundant (indeed, his role then reduces to serving as a
clearinghouse or intermediation). In principle, the holders can strike the deal between
themselves at time 0 and then settle the payoffs between themselves at time ϑ(s). Of
course, this observation implicitly assumes the existence of a sensible price vector pi0(G) =
(pi10(G), . . . , pi
m
0 (G)), which was not yet established.
Let us now consider trading arrangements after the contract’s initiation. At any time
t before the settlement time (that is, so long as the contract is still alive), all tranches (of
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MGCt(G, s)) may be freely traded. At time t, the holder of tranche i, may sell it to a new
holder. The new holder then continues the game with the other current holders, with the
ability to choose a strategy si ∈ Sit(s) from time t onwards. Denote the time t price of
tranche i by piit(G, s), and the time t price of tranche N by piNt (G, s). Note that at this
moment, the existence of such a price vector pit(G, s) is an open problem. As mentioned
before, anyone, including the issuer, is allowed to hold any number of tranches at any time.
In fact, everything will still be consistent if we allow the issuer’s tranche to be tradeable at
any time. But, for the sake of simplicity, we will prevent that possibility for now.
As already mentioned, Definition 7.1 is a generalisation of the two-person game contin-
gent claim from Section 6.3. To see this, simply consider the case where G is a standard
Dynkin stopping game between two players. The holder holds the tranche which allows
for exercising, while the second holder (dubbed the issuer) holds tranche which allows for
cancellation. There is no need to introduce an issuer in the sense of Definition 7.1 since
the two-person contingent claim corresponds to a zero-sum game. Aside from the number
and roles of parties involved, Definition 7.1 also generalises the two-person game contingent
claim by allowing greater complexity in the underlying game G. In particular, we are no
longer restricted to the case of stopping games.
Just as before, the pricing of game options will involve arbitrage arguments and either
replication or super-hedging of payoffs. In the current framework, all parties (an issuer and
holders) may hold a portfolio of stock and bonds in order to replicate or super-hedge their
future liabilities represented by cash flows V iϑ(s). Since G is a perfect information game, in
which actions exist before ϑ(s) and are observable by all parties, it is natural for the issuer
and the holders to adapt their replicating strategies according to their current and past
observations. In particular, if the strategy profile s ∈ S is played, a trading strategy should
have some non-anticipative dependency on the observable history h(s) ∈ H. The next
definition formalises this concept. The basic idea behind the adaptive trading strategies is
that one may change the portfolio allocation based on past observable actions.
Definition 7.3. An adaptive trading strategy φ :H× [0, T ]×Ω→ Rd+1 is mapping which
satisfies the following conditions:
(i) For every every s ∈ S, φ(s) = φ(h(s)) is an admissible (hence self-financing) trading
strategy.
(ii) The corresponding wealth process Z, which is defined by the equality
Zt(φ(s)) =
d∑
i=0
φit(s)S
i
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
is H-predictable in the following sense: for all t ∈ [0, T ] and s, s′ ∈ S
Zt
(
φ(s)
)
= Zt
(
φ(s′)
)
a.s. on the event
{
h[0,t)(s) = h[0,t)(s
′)
}
.
This means that the value of the portfolio at time t only depends on the actions before
time t. The class of all such adaptive trading strategies is denoted by Ψ(H).
Remark 7.4. It should be noted that the property of adaptiveness is not the same as (in
fact weaker than) H-adaptedness. However, as shown later in Propositions 7.20 and 7.29,
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for any givenH-predictable wealth process Z(φ), it is possible to choose an adaptive trading
strategy φ which has a certain ‘H-uniqueness’ property. In particular, in the discrete-time
set-up, a process φ can be chosen to be H-adapted, meaning that φ[0,t](s) is almost surely
unique if h[0,t](s) is given. In the continuous-time case, φ[0,t](s) is shown to be unique in
the sense of L2(W ) if h[0,t)(s) is given.
Let us extend Definition 7.3 a little further. Recall that for a fixed σ ∈ S−N , we denote
by Hσ the set of all outcomes reachable when σ is played, that is,
Hσ = {h ∈ H : h = h(σ, τ), τ ∈ SN}.
In some situations, where the set of possible outcomes are restricted to Hσ, we may be only
interested in adaptive trading strategies with the same restrictions.
Definition 7.5. The class Ψ(Hσ) is the set of adaptive strategies φ :Hσ×[0, T ]×Ω→ Rd+1
whose wealth processes are Hσ-predictable in the following sense: for all t ∈ [0, T ] and
τ, τ ′ ∈ SN
Zt
(
φ(σ, τ)
)
= Zt
(
φ(σ, τ ′)
)
a.s. on the event
{
h[0,t)(σ, τ) = h[0,t)(σ, τ
′)
}
.
An important concept in multi-person game contingent claims is the ability to hold a
collection of tranches N ⊆M. For example, a person holding tranches i and j simultane-
ously has possibly greater payoff earning potential than two separate people hold tranches
i and j without collusion. This is due to the fact that the holder of tranches i and j may
coordinate the strategies si and sj to improve the combined payoff V i0 (s) + V
j
0 (s). As a re-
sult, the price of tranches {i, j} is not necessarily equal to the sum of the individual prices,
even though intuitively this additive property seems to be desirable. This important issue
will be further explored in Section 7.3.
7.1.1 Arbitrage Opportunities and Super-Hedging Strategies
As a first step, we redefine the arbitrage from the perspective of a holder of any combined
tranches, as well as the issuer (who also may be holding some combined tranche). Recall the
notation sN = (si, i ∈ N ) and V Nϑ (s) =
∑
i∈N V
i
ϑ(s) for any subset N ⊆M. Note that in
the rest of this section, a date t, tranche N and a strategy profile s representing the history
via h[0,t)(s) are fixed. The following definition describes possible arbitrage opportunities
for the issuer and the holders of the game contingent claim.
Definition 7.6 (Arbitrage). Consider a fixed combined tranche N ⊆ M of the game
contract MGCt(G, s) at a fixed time t ∈ [0, T ]. Suppose that the combined tranche N is
traded at time t for the price of piNt (G, s). An issuer’s arbitrage in (B,S, piNt (G, s)) is a
pair (φ, σ) ∈ Ψ(Hσ)×S−Nt (s) for which there exists an event E ∈ Ft with positive measure
such that on the event E:
Zt(φ)− piNt (G, s) < 0, Zϑ(σ,τ)(φ)− V Nϑ (σ, τ) ≥ 0, ∀ τ ∈ SNt (s), a.s..
A holder’s arbitrage in (B,S, piNt (G, s)) is a pair (φ, τ) ∈ Ψ(Hτ ) × SNt (s) for which there
exists an event E ∈ Ft with positive measure such that on the event E:
Zt(φ) + pi
N
t (G, s) < 0, Zϑ(σ,τ)(φ) + V
N
ϑ (σ, τ) ≥ 0, ∀σ ∈ S−Nt (s), a.s..
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The market is said to have no arbitrage in (B,S, piNt (G, s)) if there is neither the issuer’s
nor the holder’s arbitrage in (B,S, piNt (G, s)). We may simply write (B,S,N ) instead of
(B,S, piNt (G, s)) if there is no confusion.
The arbitrage opportunities described by Definition 7.6 consist of ‘enter-and-hold’ strate-
gies, where the tranches are kept from time t until settlement time. A holder’s arbitrage in
(B,S,N ) is a trading strategy which guarantees a profit for the holder of tranche N . An
issuer’s arbitrage in (B,S,N ) is a trading strategy which guarantees a profit for issuer who
also holds tranche −N . So effectively, the issuer has a short position in tranche N .
In practice, even if the issuer does not hold tranche −N , the issuer’s arbitrage in
(B,S,N ) should still be avoided. This is because it can also be interpreted as a ’guaranteed
loss’ for the holder of tranche N , if the actual holders of tranche −N choose the strategy σ
for whatever reason. This guaranteed loss should not exist in the fair pricing of the game
contingent claim. So Definition 7.6 is not restricted to two-person scenarios (holder of N
and issuer who also holds −N ). It is applicable to contracts with up to m+ 1 parties.
Remark 7.7. Even though the arbitrage definition from Definition 7.6 focuses on particular
combined tranche N , our intention is to price tranches in way which simultaneously avoids
arbitrage in (B,S,N ) for all possible N ⊆M. Thus no guaranteed profit or loss should be
possible by holding any combined tranche.
We may use the terminology of arbitrage price from Chapter 6 to describe the price
piNt (G, s) at which tranche N may be traded without creating a holder’s arbitrage or an
issuer’s arbitrage in (B,S,N ). In general, it is not necessary to have a unique arbitrage price
if G is an arbitrary game. Section 7.2 will establish upper and lower bounds on the arbitrage
price under the discrete-time and continuous-time market models introduced in Chapter 6.
Section 7.3 will explore how the arbitrage prices of different tranches relate to one another.
Since Section 7.3 introduces another type of arbitrage, to avoid confusion, we will refrain
to use the term arbitrage price to describe piNt (G, s). Instead, we will explicitly state the
type of arbitrage (e.g., in (B,S,N )) avoided by the price piNt (G, s) when appropriate.
Another important concept in the valuation of contingent claims is perfect hedging,
that is, replication. In European contingent claims, the payoff can be frequently replicated
by an admissible portfolio. In game contingent claims, since it is not possible to anticipate
the action of others, replication is typically not possible. Instead, the parties involved may
attempt to super-hedge their positions.
The definition of super-hedging trading strategies is very similar to conventional options.
Definition 7.8 (Super-hedging). Consider the time t game contingent claim MGCt(G, s).
Suppose the issuer also holds tranche −N . An issuer’s super-hedging strategy is a pair
(φσ, σ) ∈ Ψ(Hσ)× S−Nt (s) such that
Zϑ(σ,τ)(φ
σ) ≥ V Nϑ (σ, τ), ∀ τ ∈ SNt (s), a.s..
For the holder of tranche N , a holder’s super-hedging strategy is a pair (φτ , τ) ∈ Ψ(Hτ )×
SNt (s) such that
Zϑ(σ,τ)(φ
τ ) ≥ −V Nϑ (σ, τ), ∀σ ∈ S−Nt (s), a.s..
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Remark 7.9. Similarly to the definition of arbitrage opportunities, the super-hedging
strategies are defined symmetrically for the issuer and the holder. Consider first the issuer,
which is also assumed here to hold tranche −N . Then the portfolio φσ allows him to fulfill
his obligation to holders of tranche N by covering the payoff V Nϑ (σ, τ). For the holder of
tranche N , the payoff V Nϑ (σ, τ) can be equivalently interpreted as a ‘loss’ of −V Nϑ (σ, τ),
which is covered by a strategy φτ .
As one might expect, super-hedging strategies are closely related to arbitrage prices of
game contingent claims. The following proposition follows immediately from the definitions
of arbitrage and super-hedging.
Proposition 7.10. Suppose that tranche N of the game contract MGCt(G, s) is traded at
time t ∈ [0, T ] at the price of piNt (G, s). If there is no issuer’s arbitrage in (B,S,N ), then
for any issuer’s super-hedging strategy (φσ, σ) ∈ Ψ(Hσ)× S−Nt (s), we must have
Zt(φ
σ) ≥ piNt (G, s), a.s.. (7.1)
If there is no holder’s arbitrage in (B,S,N ), then for any holder’s super-hedging strategy
(φτ , τ) ∈ Ψ(Hτ )× SNt (s), we must have
Zt(φ
τ ) ≥ −piNt (G, s), a.s.. (7.2)
Proof. We will prove that if the upper bound (7.1) is violated, then there exists an issuer’s
arbitrage. A similar argument can be used to show that the violation of the lower bound
(7.2) leads to a holder’s arbitrage. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume the upper
bound of (7.1) is not satisfied. On the event
{
piNt (G, s) > Zt(φσ)
}
, by the definition of
super-hedging strategies, we obtain
Zt(φ
σ) < piNt (G, s), Zϑ(σ,τ)(φ
σ) ≥ V Nϑ (σ, τ), ∀ τ ∈ SNt (s), a.s..
Hence (φσ, σ) is an issuer’s arbitrage in (B,S,N ), which is a contradiction.
7.1.2 Preliminary Bounds on Arbitrage Prices
All the definitions and results considered thus far were ‘model-free’, in the sense that they
did not rely on the underlying market model (B,S) being complete or free of arbitrage.
However, in order to make further progress, we shall henceforth work within the framework
of models of Sections 6.1.1 (discrete-time) and 6.1.2 (continuous-time). In particular, the
market model (B,S) is now assumed to be complete and arbitrage-free. This means any
European claim can be replicated by an admissible trading strategy and there exists a
unique martingale measure Q. We also make the following integrability assumption on the
payoff of G.
Assumption 7.11. The discounted payoff of the gameG satisfies the following integrability
condition with respect to the martingale measure Q. For every N ⊆M, we have
EQ
(
ess sup
s∈S
∣∣∣V̂ Nϑ (s)∣∣∣) <∞.
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Assumption 7.11 is a sensible condition which allows us to compute the expected payoffs
of the underlying game G. It will be taken as a standing assumption for the remainder of
this chapter.
Proposition 7.10 suggests that, in order to find the best bounds for the price piNt (G, s),
we have to find the ‘cheapest’ super-hedging portfolios at time t. As a first step, we will
consider the simpler case of non-adaptive trading strategies, where the trading strategy
φ(s) only depends on s[0,t), but not s[t,T ]. This will allow us to determine some preliminary
(and weak) bounds on the arbitrage price process.
Theorem 7.12. Consider the discrete-time or continuous-time market model (see Chapter
6) in which Q is the martingale measure. Suppose that the tranche N of the game contract
MGCt(G, s) is traded at time t and there is no arbitrage in the market (B,S,N ). Then
the discounted price of tranche N , denoted by piNt (G, s) = B−1t piNt (G, s), must satisfy the
following inequalities:
ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
EQ
(
ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ)
∣∣∣Ft) ≤ piNt (G, s) ≤ ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
EQ
(
ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ)
∣∣∣Ft)
(7.3)
where V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ) = B
−1
ϑ(σ,τ)V
N
ϑ (σ, τ) is the discounted payoff at the settlement time ϑ(σ, τ).
Proof. We only prove the upper bound of (7.3), since the lower bound follows by similar
arguments. For any σ ∈ S−Nt (s), let φσ ∈ Ψ be a replicating strategy for the following
FT -measurable payoff
ZT (φ
σ) = BT ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ). (7.4)
Note that the replication of (7.4) is possible because the model is complete. We will show
that (φσ, σ) is an issuer’s super-hedging strategy. For every τ ∈ SNt (s), since V Nϑ (σ, τ) is
Fϑ(σ,τ)-measurable, we obtain
Zϑ(σ,τ)(φ
σ) = Bϑ(σ,τ)EQ
(
ess sup
τ ′∈SNt (s)
V̂ Nϑ
(
σ, τ ′
) ∣∣∣Fϑ(σ,τ))
≥ Bϑ(σ,τ)EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ)
∣∣∣Fϑ(σ,τ))
= V Nϑ (σ, τ).
Hence (φσ, σ) is indeed an issuer’s super-hedging strategy. Applying Proposition 7.10, we
have
piNt (G, s) ≤ Ẑt(φσ) = EQ
(
ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ)
∣∣∣Ft), a.s.. (7.5)
Since (7.5) holds for any choice of σ ∈ S−Nt (s), by the definition of the essential infimum,
the upper bound of (7.3) is established, as required.
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7.1.3 Adaptive vs. Non-Adaptive Strategies
Recall that the two-person game option in Section 6.3 can be seen as a game contingent
claim based on a two-player Dynkin game. Since the Dynkin game is a stopping game, no
trading strategies are dependent upon H. In Theorem 7.12, the bounds are also established
using non-adaptive trading strategies. But if we compare the result for general game con-
tingent claims given by (7.3) with the well-known result for two-person game options (see
Section 6.3), then we get the following inclusion:
piNt (G, s) ∈
[
ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ)
∣∣∣Ft), ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ)
∣∣∣Ft)]
⊆
[
ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
EQ
(
ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ)
∣∣∣Ft), ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
EQ
(
ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ)
∣∣∣Ft)].
The inclusion may be strict for some situations, as shown in Example 7.13. We thus see
that the two-person game option result is stronger than Theorem 7.12. As Theorem 7.23
shows, if adaptive trading strategies are used, the stronger bounds can be obtained in the
discrete-time market model. If some additional regularity conditions are satisfied by the
underlying game G, then one can show that the strong result holds in the continuous-time
model as well (see Theorem 7.31).
The following simple example illustrates the basic idea behind adaptive replicating
strategies.
Example 7.13. Let the sample space be Ω = {ω1, ω2} with Q(ω1) = Q(ω2) = 0.5. We
define the filtration by setting F0 = {∅,Ω},F1 = {∅, ω1, ω2,Ω}. Consider a one-person
game over time t = {0, 1} in which he chooses a strategy from S = {s1, s2} at time 0, and
the payoff at time 1 is given by
V (ω1, s1) = 1, V (ω2, s1) = 0, V (ω1, s2) = 0, V (ω2, s2) = 1.
The two relevant time 0 expected upper bounds satisfy
EQ
(
max
s∈S
V (s)
)
= 1 >
1
2
= max
s∈S
EQ
(
V (s)
)
.
Note that the game is not a stopping game and the inequality is strict. Now assume the
interest rate is 0 and consider how an issuer will super-hedge the relevant game option in
two different scenarios.
• If the issuer cannot use any adaptive replicating strategies (e.g., if the time 0 choice
of the holder is hidden until time 1), then his trading strategy φ needs to satisfy
Z1(φ)(ω1) = Z1(φ)(ω2) = 1
in order to meet his payoff obligations. The time 0 capital required is given by
Z0(φ) = 1.
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• If the issuer can adapt his trading strategy φ(s) to the choice of the holder at time
0, then he would construct φ(s) so that
Z1(φ(s1))(ω1) = 1, Z1(φ(s1))(ω2) = 0, Z1(φ(s2))(ω1) = 0, Z1(φ(s2))(ω2) = 1.
Now this adaptive replicating strategy allows the issuer to deliver the payoff in all
situations and the time 0 capital required is
max
(
Z0(φ(s1)), Z0(φ(s2))
)
= max
(1
2
,
1
2
)
=
1
2
.
As we can see from the two scenarios, by selecting a trading strategy which adapts to the
holder’s actions, the issuer can construct a cheaper super-hedging portfolio. This, in turn,
will lead to better bounds for the price of the option.
7.2 Pricing Bounds of a Fixed Tranche
In this section, we shall restrict our attention to the pricing of MGCNt (G, s) for some fixed
t ∈ [0, T ], s ∈ S and N ⊆M. In particular, we attempt to answer the following question:
• Consider the game contingent claim MGC(G) and suppose that s[0,t) has been played
up to time t. At time t, a new holder purchases tranche N from its previous
holder(s) for the price of piNt (G, s) and plans to hold it until the settlement time
ϑ(s). What possible values can piNt (G, s) take if neither issuer’s nor holder’s arbitrage
in (B,S,MGCNt (G, s)) may occur?
Implicitly, we work under the event of {ϑ(s) ≥ t}, otherwise the above question would be
meaningless.
Let us recall that Definition 7.6 specifies the concept of issuer’s and holder’s arbitrages
in (B,S,MGCNt (G, s)), or simply (B,S,N ). In short, a holder’s arbitrage refers to a
guaranteed profit for the (new) holder of N on [t, ϑ(s)] and an issuer’s arbitrage refers to
a guaranteed profit for issuer of MGC(G) who sold tranche N at time t and holds tranche
−N until time ϑ(s). Even though it is unlikely for the issuer to be in that position, it can
be seen as a ‘worst case scenario’ for the holder of N (e.g., when everyone else is acting
as a coalition against him). Surely, this scenario cannot be ruled out by the holder of N
without additional information.
Before we begin, it is worth reminding that we are now working under models (B,S)
(discrete or continuous-time) which are complete and arbitrage-free. Hence the existence
of a unique martingale measure Q is ensured.
7.2.1 Generalised Snell Envelope
An important tool used in the valuation of American and game options is the Snell envelope,
introduced in Theorem 6.31. Given a stochastic process Y , the Snell envelope J is the
minimal supermartingale dominating Y , given by Jt = ess supτ∈T[t,T ] E(Yτ | Ft). At time t,
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the Snell envelope Jt represents the maximal expected value of the stopped process Yτ over
all possible choices of the stopping time τ ∈ T[t,T ].
A similar notion will be developed here in the context of a general game option MGC(G).
It involves maximising an expected value over the set of all possible strategies (rather than
the set of all possible stopping times). Recall that the subset N ∈M is now fixed and thus
we deal with a combined tranche, specifically, a collection of single tranches for all i ∈ N .
Let us fix N ∈M and s = (σ, τ) ∈ S.
Definition 7.14. Consider the combined tranche MGCN (G) in the game option MGC(G).
For any fixed σ ∈ S−N , define the generalised Snell envelope as the map Uσ(h(σ, τ)) :Hσ×
[0, T ]× Ω→ R by setting
Uσt (h(σ, τ)) := ess sup
τ ′∈SNt (σ,τ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ
′)
∣∣∣Ft). (7.6)
For convenience, we also write Uσt (σ, τ) = U
σ
t (h(σ, τ)).
We first show that (7.6) is well-defined. Recall that the class SNt (σ, τ) is defined by
SNt (σ, τ) =
{
τ ′ ∈ SN : h[0,t)(σ, τ ′) = h[0,t)(σ, τ)
}
. (7.7)
Since σ is fixed, Uσt (σ, τ) only depends on h[0,t)(σ, τ). Hence (7.6) is indeed a well-defined
map of h(σ, τ) ∈ Hσ (rather than the strategy (σ, τ)). Also note that the definition of
Uσt (σ, τ) is not restricted to the event {ϑ(σ, τ) ≥ t}. On the event {ϑ(σ, τ) < t}, we simply
have Uσt (σ, τ) = V̂
N
ϑ (σ, τ).
The generalised Snell envelope Uσ(σ, τ) has the following interpretation: suppose that
the holder of −N plays the strategy σ ∈ S−N on [0, T ] while the holder of N plays the
strategy τ ∈ SN on [0, t). Then Uσt (σ, τ) is the maximal expected payoff, as seen at time
t, which can be achieved by the holder of N by varying his strategy on [t, T ].
In this section we aim to establish the following important result regarding the gener-
alised Snell envelope.
Proposition 7.15. We fix a particular σ ∈ S−N and we consider the generalised Snell
envelope from Definition 7.14.
(i) The map Uσ is F-adapted and Hσ-predictable, in the following sense: for all τ, τ ′ ∈ SN ,
Uσt (σ, τ) = U
σ
t (σ, τ
′) on the event
{
h[0,t)(σ, τ) = h[0,t)(σ, τ
′)
}
, a.s..
(ii) For any fixed σ ∈ S−N and τ ∈ SN , the process Uσt (σ, τ) is a (Q,F)-supermartingale.
(iii) Furthermore, Uσt (σ, τ) is integrable for all t ∈ [0, T ] in the discrete-time case. In the
continuous-time case, if the process Uσ(σ, τ) has a ca`dla`g modification, then it is a class D
supermartingale.
To clarify part (iv) of the above proposition, recall that a process X is of class D if it is
ca`dla`g and the family {Xρ : ρ ∈ T[0,T ]} is uniformly integrable. For our purposes it suffices
to check that EQ(ess supρ∈T[0,T ] |Xρ|) <∞.
Before we prove Proposition 7.15, a few auxiliary definitions and results are required.
In particular, we introduce the lattice property.
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Definition 7.16. Let (Yi)i∈I be a family of random variables with E(ess supi∈I |Yi|) <∞.
It is said to have the lattice property if, for all i, j ∈ I, there exist k, l ∈ I such that
Yk ≥ Yi ∨ Yj , Yl ≤ Yi ∧ Yj , a.s..
The following proposition includes some useful examples of sets with the lattice property.
Proposition 7.17. Fix t ∈ [0, T ], N ∈ M and s ∈ S. For any N ′ ∈ M which may or
may not be equal to N , the following sets have the lattice property:{
EQ
(
V̂ N
′
ϑ (σ, τ)
∣∣∣Ft) : τ ∈ SNt (s)}, for some fixed σ ∈ S−Nt (s), (7.8){
ess sup
σ∈S−Nt (s)
EQ
(
V̂ N
′
ϑ (σ, τ)
∣∣∣Ft) : τ ∈ SNt (s)}, (7.9){
ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
EQ
(
V̂ N
′
ϑ (σ, τ)
∣∣∣Ft) : τ ∈ SNt (s)}. (7.10)
Proof. Each of the sets in (7.8)–(7.10) may be represented by the form (Yτ )τ∈SNt (s) where
each Yτ is Ft-measurable. Note that in each case EQ(ess supτ∈SNt (s) |Yτ |) <∞ follows from
Assumption 7.11. We first show that they all have the following property: for any event
E ∈ Ft and τ, τ ′ ∈ SNt (s)
τ1E = τ
′1E , a.s. =⇒ Yτ1E = Yτ ′1E , a.s.. (7.11)
By the H-adaptedness of the termination time and payoff, we must have
Vϑ(σ, τ)1E = Vϑ(σ, τ
′)1E , a.s. ∀σ ∈ S−Nt (s).
Since 1E is Ft-measurable, in all cases we must have Yτ1E = Yτ ′1E a.s., thus establishing
(7.11).
Now we show the lattice property. For any τi, τj ∈ SNt (s), define the strategies τk, τl by
τk = 1{Yτi≥Yτj }τi + 1{Yτi<Yτj }τj , τl = 1{Yτi≥Yτj }τj + 1{Yτi<Yτj }τi.
Since the event {Yτi ≥ Yτj} is Ft-measurable, it is clear that τk, τl are F-adapted, H-
predictable mappings satisfying
h[0,t)(σ, τk) = h[0,t)(σ, τl) = h[0,t)(σ, τi) = h[0,t)(σ, τj) = h[0,u)(s), ∀σ ∈ S−Nt (s).
Hence τk, τl must belong to SNt (s). Under the condition (7.11), we have Yτk = Yτi ∨Yτj and
Yτl = Yτi ∧ Yτj . Therefore, the lattice property is established for (7.8)–(7.10).
Now that we have seen some sets with the lattice property, we will prove the following
important lemma which allows us to commute essential supremums (or infimums) with
expectations.
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Lemma 7.18. Let (Yi)i∈I be a family of Fu-measurable random variables the lattice prop-
erty and such that E(ess supi∈I |Yi|) <∞. Then the following statements hold.
(i) There exist two sequences (in)n∈N, (jn)n∈N of indices such that the sequences (Yin)n∈N
and (−Yjn)n∈N are almost surely non-decreasing and
ess sup
i∈I
Yi = sup
n∈N
Yin = limn→∞Yin , ess infj∈I
Yj = inf
n∈N
Yjn = limn→∞Yjn , a.s..
(ii) For any t ∈ [0, u], we have
E
(
ess sup
i∈I
Yi
∣∣∣Ft) = ess sup
i∈I
E
(
Yi
∣∣Ft), E( ess inf
j∈I
Yj
∣∣∣Ft) = ess inf
j∈I
E
(
Yj
∣∣Ft).
Proof. It suffices to prove the supremum results, as the infimum results can be obtained by
considering the random variables (−Yi)i∈I .
(i) It is well-known that there exists a countable subset K = (kn)n∈N ⊆ I such that
ess supi∈I Yi = supkn∈K Ykn . Then by the lattice property, we can inductively construct
a sequence (in)n∈N such that for n = 1, 2, . . ., the following inequality is satisfied almost
surely,
Xin ≥ max
(
Xk1 , . . . , Xkn , Xin−1
)
.
This sequence can be checked to satisfy the required property.
(ii) Since for all k ∈ I, ess supi∈I Yi ≥ Yk, we have
E
(
ess sup
i∈I
Yi
∣∣∣Ft) ≥ ess sup
i∈I
E
(
Yi
∣∣Ft).
To establish the other direction, we use the sequence (Yin)n∈N constructed from (i). By the
dominated convergence theorem,
E
(
ess sup
i∈I
Yi
∣∣∣Ft) = E( lim
n→∞Yin
∣∣∣Ft) = lim
n→∞E
(
Yin
∣∣Ft) ≤ ess sup
i∈I
E
(
Yi
∣∣Ft).
Hence the desired equality is established.
Now we may return to the proof of Proposition 7.15.
Proof of Proposition 7.15. (i) Recall that, by definition, Uσt (σ, τ) only depends on SNt (σ, τ),
which only depends on h[0,t)(σ, τ
′). It follows immediately that Uσ(σ, τ) is F-adapted and
Hσ-predictable.
(ii) It was proven in Proposition 7.17 that the set{
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ
′)
∣∣∣Fu) : τ ′ ∈ SNu (σ, τ)}
has the lattice property. Now Lemma 7.18 implies
EQ
(
Uσu (σ, τ)
∣∣∣Ft) = EQ( ess sup
τ ′∈SNu (σ,τ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ
′)
∣∣∣Fu) ∣∣∣Ft)
= ess sup
τ ′∈SNu (σ,τ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ
′)
∣∣∣Ft). (7.12)
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The supermartingale property follows immediately from (7.12) as well as the inclusion
SNu (σ, τ) ⊆ SNt (σ, τ),
EQ
(
Uσu (σ, τ)
∣∣∣Ft) ≤ ess sup
τ ′∈SNt (σ,τ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ
′)
∣∣∣Ft) = Uσt (σ, τ).
(iii) Define a positive martingale Mt by
Mt = EQ
(
ess sup
s∈S
∣∣V̂ Nϑ (s)∣∣ ∣∣∣Ft).
Assumption 7.11 implies that EQ(Mt) <∞, so the martingale Mt is well-defined. Now, for
any t ∈ [0, T ],∣∣Uσt (σ, τ)∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ ess sup
τ ′∈SNt (σ,τ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ
′)
∣∣∣Ft)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ess sup
τ ′∈SNt (σ,τ)
EQ
(∣∣V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ ′)∣∣ ∣∣∣Ft)
≤ EQ
(
ess sup
τ ′∈SNt (σ,τ)
∣∣V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ ′)∣∣ ∣∣∣Ft) ≤ EQ( ess sup
s∈S
∣∣V̂ Nϑ (s)∣∣ ∣∣∣Ft) = Mt.
Hence in the discrete-time case, Uσt (σ, τ) is integrable.
In the continuous-time case, suppose Uσt (σ, τ) has a ca`dla`g modification. Using the fact
that any martingale is continuous under the Brownian filtration as well as the optional
sampling theorem (see, e.g., Karatzas and Shreve [28], Section 1.3), we may deduce that
EQ
(∣∣Uσρ (σ, τ)∣∣) ≤ EQ(Mρ) = M0 <∞, ∀ ρ ∈ T[0,T ].
Therefore, the family {Uσρ (σ, τ) : ρ ∈ T[0,T ]} is uniformly integrable and Uσt (σ, τ) is a class
D supermartingale, as required.
We are now in a position to address the question presented in the beginning of the
section, that is to find the possible prices of piNt (G, s) for some fixed t, s and N which
avoids arbitrage in (B,S,N ). We will first focus on the discrete-time case before moving
on to the continuous-time case.
7.2.2 Discrete-Time Case
We now work under the discrete-time market model introduced in Section 6.1.1. It was
proven that any European contingent claim with payoff Xt at time t is attainable. This
implies the existence of an Ft−1-measurable portfolio φt−1 satisfying
d∑
i=0
φit−1S
i
t = Xt, a.s..
Due to the arbitrage-free assumption, it is known that all such portfolios have the same
value at time t − 1, but the uniqueness of such a portfolio is not guaranteed since our
complete market may still have redundancies.
In the beginning of this chapter, we alluded to the following result for the discrete-
time model: given any H-predictable wealth process (whose discounted process is a Q-
martingale), it is possible to choose an H-adapted trading strategy from Ψ(H) to match it.
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It essentially means that whenever two wealth processes X and Y are equal at time t, their
underlying trading strategies should be equal at time t− 1. This requires the selection of a
canonical replicating portfolio out of the ones available. The idea is to define the portfolio
on the time interval [t− 1, t] based on the state reached at time t− 1. This is possible since
we are working under a finite state market model.
Formally, we partition Ω into disjoint events from Ft−1
Ω =
⋃
i
Ωi, Ωi ∈ Ft−1, Ωi ∩ Ωj = ∅, ∀ i 6= j,
such that Ft−1 is generated by {Ωi}. In particular, any Ft–measurable random variable Xt
can be uniquely represented as
Xt =
∑
i
Xt1Ωi .
Fix a particular i, we will define the canonical portfolio for each Xt1Ωi individually. For any
Ft-measurable random variables Xt1Ωi and Yt1Ωi , define the following equivalence relation
Xt1Ωi ∼i Yt1Ωi ⇐⇒ Xt1Ωi = Yt1Ωi , a.s..
Now for each equivalence class, we select a canonical replicating portfolio of Xt1Ωi on the
time interval [t− 1, t]. Denote this portfolio by ϕt−1(·). So ϕt−1(·) is an Ft−1-measurable,
Rd+1-valued vector satisfying:
ϕt−1(Xt1Ωi)1Ωj = ϕt−1(Xt1Ωi)δij ,
Xt1Ωi ∼i Yt1Ωi ⇐⇒ ϕt−1(Xt1Ωi) = ϕt−1(Yt1Ωi), a.s.,
Z(ϕt−1(Xt1Ωi)) = Xt1Ωi , a.s.,
where δij is the Kronecker delta. Finally, define the canonical portfolio of Xt by summing
all i,
ϕt−1(Xt) =
∑
i
ϕt−1(Xt1Ωi), Z(ϕt−1(Xt)) =
∑
i
Z(ϕt−1(Xt1Ωi)) = Xt, a.s..
The following lemma is a direct consequence of the above definitions.
Lemma 7.19. Suppose Xt and Yt are Ft-measurable random variables. On any Ft−1-
measurable event E, the following implication must hold,
Xt1E = Yt1E , a.s. =⇒ ϕt−1(Xt)1E = ϕt−1(Yt)1E , a.s.. (7.13)
Proof. The basic idea is to consider E as a union of Ωi.
ϕt−1(Xt)1E =
∑
i
ϕt−1(Xt1Ωi)1E
=
∑
i
ϕt−1(Xt1Ωi)
∑
Ωi⊆E
1Ωi
=
∑
Ωi⊆E
ϕt−1(Xt1Ωi).
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By noting
Xt1E = Yt1E , a.s. ⇐⇒ Xt1Ωi = Yt1Ωi , a.s., ∀Ωi ⊆ E,
the required result follows immediately.
Lemma 7.19 allows for the construction of an H-adapted trading strategy which attains
a given H-predictable wealth process, as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 7.20. Suppose M :H× [0, T ]× Ω→ R satisfies the following properties:
(i) For any s ∈ S, M(s) = M(h(s)) is a martingale.
(ii) M is H-predictable in the following sense: for all t ∈ [1, T ] and s, s′ ∈ S
Mt(s) = Mt(s
′), a.s. on the event
{
h[0,t−1](s) = h[0,t−1](s′)
}
.
Then there exists a trading strategy φ ∈ Ψ(H) such that Ẑ(φ) = M almost surely and φ is
H-adapted in the following sense: for all t ∈ [0, T ] and s, s′ ∈ S
φt(s) = φt(s
′), a.s. on the event
{
h[0,t](s) = h[0,t](s
′)
}
.
The result still holds if we replace H and [0, T ] by Hσ and [t, T ], respectively.
Proof. Simply define φ(s) as the canonical replicating portfolio of BM(s), that is,
φσt−1(s) = ϕt−1
(
BtMt(s)
)
,
for t ∈ [1, T ]. The H-adapted property follows immediately from Lemma 7.19.
Back to the problem at hand, the following proposition shows that, for any fixed (σ, τ) ∈
S, there exists an issuer’s super-hedging strategy (φσ, σ) whose discounted time t value is
given by the generalised Snell envelope Uσt (σ, τ). This is a crucial step to establishing the
upper bound in Theorem 7.23.
Proposition 7.21. Fix σ ∈ S−N and t ∈ [0, T ]. For any τ ∈ SN , on the event {ϑ(σ, τ) ≥
t}, there exists an Hσ-adapted trading strategy φσ ∈ Ψ(Hσ) (with an Hσ-predictable wealth
process Z(φσ)) such that (φσ, σ) is an issuer’s super-hedging strategy whose discounted time
t value is given by the generalised Snell envelope Uσt (σ, τ). In other words,
Ẑt(φ
σ(σ, τ)) = Uσt (σ, τ) = ess sup
τ ′∈SNt (σ,τ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ
′)
∣∣∣Ft), (7.14)
Ẑϑ(σ,τ)(φ
σ(σ, τ)) ≥ Uσϑ(σ,τ)(σ, τ) = V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ), (7.15)
where Ẑ(φσ(σ, τ)) = B−1Z(φσ(σ, τ)) is the discounted wealth process.
Proof. By Proposition 7.15, the Snell envelope Uσ(σ, τ) is an integrable Q-supermartingale.
Applying Doob’s decomposition theorem, there exists a Q-martingale Mσ(σ, τ) and a non-
decreasing, integrable, predictable process Aσ(σ, τ) such that
Uσ(σ, τ) = Mσ(σ, τ)−Aσ(σ, τ), Aσ0 (σ, τ) = 0,
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and the decomposition is almost surely unique.
For a fixed t, we define the wealth process candidate Ẑσu (σ, τ) := M
σ
u (σ, τ) − Aσt (σ, τ),
which is a Q-martingale on [t, T ]. We fix arbitrary τ, τ ′ ∈ SN and consider the F-stopping
time
ρ := min
{
u ∈ [0, T ] : hu(σ, τ) 6= hu(σ, τ ′)
} ∧ T.
For each u ∈ [0, T ], Proposition 7.15 implies that Uσu (σ, τ) = Uσu (σ, τ ′) holds on the Fu-
measurable event {h[0,u)(σ, τ) = h[0,u)(σ, τ ′)} = {u ≤ ρ}. By the uniquness of the Doob
decomposition, we obtain
Uσ·∧ρ(σ, τ) = U
σ
·∧ρ(σ, τ
′), Mσ·∧ρ(σ, τ) = M
σ
·∧ρ(σ, τ
′), Aσ·∧ρ(σ, τ) = A
σ
·∧ρ(σ, τ
′),
which in turn implies that Ẑσu (σ, τ) = Ẑ
σ
u (σ, τ
′) for every u ∈ [t, T ] if {h[0,u)(σ, τ) =
h[0,u)(σ, τ
′)}. We conclude that the process Ẑu(σ, τ), u ∈ [t, T ] is Hσ-predictable.
For each u = t + 1, . . . , T , let φσu−1(σ, τ) be the canonical replicating portfolio of the
process BuẐ
σ
u (σ, τ). So,
φσu−1(σ, τ) = ϕu−1
(
BuẐ
σ
u (σ, τ)
)
, Ẑu(φ
σ(σ, τ)) = Ẑσu (σ, τ) = M
σ
u (σ, τ)−Aσt (σ, τ). (7.16)
It is clear that φσ(σ, τ) is F-adapted and admissible. It remains to establish (7.14) and
(7.15). These follow immediately from the following fact: for u = t, . . . , T ,
Ẑu(φ
σ(σ, τ)) = Mσu (σ, τ)−Aσt (σ, τ) = Uσu (σ, τ) +Aσu(σ, τ)−Aσt (σ, τ) ≥ Uσu (σ, τ),
with equality if u = t.
Remark 7.22. Proposition 7.21 may be interpreted as follows. Suppose the issuer also
holds the tranche −N . By playing the strategy σ ∈ S−N , while executing the Hσ-adapted
trading strategy φσ specified by (7.16), the issuer is super-hedging his position, that is,
the value of the portfolio will always cover the required payoff for the holder of N . By
construction, φσ is also cheapest (at time t) of such super-hedging trading strategies for a
fixed σ, whose discounted time t investment is given by the generalised Snell envelope
Uσt (σ, τ) = ess sup
τ ′∈SNt (σ,τ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ
′)
∣∣∣Ft).
Recall Proposition 7.10, which states that, in order to avoid an issuer’s arbitrage, the
price of tranche N is bounded above by the value of any issuer’s super hedging strategy.
This means Uσt (σ, τ) is an upper bound of the discounted arbitrage price. As Theorem 7.23
shows, the best upper bound possible is achieved when we take the infimum of Uσt (σ, τ)
over all possible choices of σ ∈ S−N .
Using the underlying symmetry, a similar result can be obtained for the lower bound
using Proposition 7.10 and the holder’s super-hedging strategies.
The following theorem is the main result of this section.
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Theorem 7.23. Suppose the payoffs of the game G satisfy Assumption 7.11, that is,
EQ
(
ess sup
s∈S
∣∣∣V̂ Nϑ (s)∣∣∣) <∞, ∀N ⊆M.
We fix N ⊆ M and we consider the tranche MGCNt (G, s). There is no arbitrage in
(B,S,N ) if and only if the discounted time t price piNt (G, s) = B−1t piNt (G, s) satisfies
ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ)
∣∣∣Ft) ≤ piNt (G, s) ≤ ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ)
∣∣∣Ft),
(7.17)
where Q is a unique martingale measure for the market model (B,S).
Proof. We will prove that the upper bound of (7.17) holds if and only if no issuer’s arbitrage
exists. For the corresponding statement regarding the lower bound and holder’s arbitrage,
the same argument can be applied by considering a game contingent claim MGC(G˜) with
payoffs defined by
V˜ −N (σ, τ) = −V N (σ, τ).
For the proof, we will once again make use of the notation
Uσt (s) = ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ)
∣∣∣Ft)
for each σ ∈ S−Nt (s). Therefore, the upper bound of (7.17) can be rewritten as
piNt (G, s) ≤ ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
Uσt (s). (7.18)
[No issuer’s arbitrage =⇒ (7.18) holds] By Proposition 7.21, for each σ ∈ S−Nt (s), there
exists an issuer’s super-hedging strategy (φσ, σ) whose discounted time t value is given by
Uσt (s). Proposition 7.10 tells us that if there is no issuer’s arbitrage, then we must have
the inequality
piNt (G, s) ≤ Uσt (s). (7.19)
The upper bound (7.18) follows immediately as (7.19) holds for all σ ∈ S−Nt (s).
[Issuer’s arbitrage =⇒ (7.18) does not hold] Assume that (φ, σ) is an issuer’s arbitrage. So
there exists an event E with positive measure such that on the event E:
Ẑt(φ) < pi
N
t (G, s), Ẑϑ(σ,τ)(φ) ≥ V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ), ∀ τ ∈ SNt (s), a.s..
Since Ẑ(φ) is a martingale, by the optional sampling theorem, we have, on the event E,
Ẑt(φ) = EQ
(
Ẑϑ(σ,τ)(φ)
∣∣∣Ft) ≥ EQ(V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ) ∣∣∣Ft), ∀ τ ∈ SNt (s), a.s..
Hence by the definition of the essential supremum, on the event E
piNt (G, s) > Ẑt(φ) ≥ ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ)
∣∣∣Ft) = Uσt (s) ≥ ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
Uσt (s), a.s..
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Therefore,
P
(
piNt (G, s) > ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
Uσt (s)
)
> 0
and thus (7.18) fails to hold. This completes the proof.
Remark 7.24. In the continuous-time case, the analogue of Proposition 7.21 is Proposition
7.30, which holds under Assumption 7.26. The exact argument used in the proof of the
main discrete-time result, Theorem 7.23, can be applied to its continuous-time analogue
Theorem 7.31.
7.2.3 Continuous-Time Case
In this section, we work under the continuous-time model first introduced in Section 6.1.2.
In particular, the aim is to establish the following bounds for the arbitrage price process of
tranche N of MGC(G), if the model is arbitrage-free in the sense of Definition 7.6,
ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ)
∣∣∣Ft) ≤ piNt (G, s) ≤ ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ)
∣∣∣Ft).
It is the continuous-time analogue of Theorem 7.23.
The approach here is similar to the discrete-time case. We again begin with the gener-
alised Snell envelope
Uσt (σ, τ) = ess sup
τ ′∈SNt (σ,τ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(σ,τ ′)(σ, τ
′)
∣∣∣Ft),
which is known to be a Q-supermartingale for fixed (σ, τ) ∈ S according to Proposition
7.15. In order to apply decomposition theorems in the continuous-time model, Uσ(σ, τ)
must be of class D. From Proposition 7.15, it is enough to verify that Uσ(σ, τ) has a ca`dla`g
modification. We will use the following theorem borrowed from Karatzas and Shreve [28]
(see Section 1.3 therein).
Theorem 7.25. Assume the filtration F satisfies the usual conditions of Dellacherie. Let
U be an F-adapted submartingale (supermartingale). Then U has a right-continuous mod-
ification if and only if the function t → E(Ut) is right-continuous. If this right-continuous
modification exists, it can be chosen to be a ca`dla`g, F-adapted submartingale (supermartin-
gale).
Hence for Uσ(σ, τ) to have a ca`dla`g modification, it suffices to check that the process
EQ(Uσt (σ, τ)) is right-continuous in t. By (7.12) in Proposition 7.15,
EQ(Uσt (σ, τ)) = EQ
(
ess sup
τ ′∈SNt (σ,τ)
V̂ Nϑ(σ,τ ′)(σ, τ
′)
)
= sup
τ ′∈SNt (σ,τ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(σ,τ ′)(σ, τ
′)
)
. (7.20)
In general, the right-continuity of (7.20) is not guaranteed. For the purposes of our work,
we shall make the following standing assumption in regard to the game G, which in turn
allows us to choose a ca`dla`g version of Uσ(σ, τ).
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Assumption 7.26. Let G be a continuous-time game, whose discounted payoff function
V̂ satisfies the following right-continuity condition. For any t ∈ [0, T ], N ⊆ M and s =
(σ, τ) ∈ S−N × SN :
lim
u↓t
sup
τ ′∈SNu (s)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(σ,τ ′)(σ, τ
′)
)
= sup
τ ′∈SNt (s)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(σ,τ ′)(σ, τ
′)
)
, (7.21)
lim
u↓t
inf
σ′∈S−Nu (s)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(σ′,τ)(σ
′, τ)
)
= inf
σ′∈S−Nt (s)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(σ′,τ)(σ
′, τ)
)
. (7.22)
Proposition 7.27. Under Assumption 7.26, for any fixed (σ, τ) ∈ S, the Snell envelope
Uσ(σ, τ) has a ca`dla`g modification which is a class D supermartingale.
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Theorem 7.25, Proposition 7.15(iii) and formula
(7.20).
The next step is to apply the Doob-Meyer decomposition theorem to obtain an equation
of the form
Uσ(σ, τ) = Mσ(σ, τ)−Aσ(σ, τ), Aσ0 (σ, τ) = 0.
We require the following lemma.
Lemma 7.28. Let U and U ′ be two ca`dla`g supermartingales of class D, whose Doob-Meyer
decompositions are given by
U = M −A, U ′ = M ′ −A′,
where M,M ′ are uniformly integrable, right-continuous martingales and A,A′ are uniformly
integrable, right-continuous, F-predictable, non-decreasing processes with A0 = A′0 = 0.
Suppose that that there exists an F-stopping time ρ such that the stopped processes
(Ut∧ρ)t∈[0,T ] and (U ′t∧ρ)t∈[0,T ] are indistinguishable. Then the stopped processes (Mt∧ρ)t∈[0,T ]
and (M ′t∧ρ)t∈[0,T ] are indistinguishable martingales.
Proof. By the optional sampling theorem (see, e.g., Karatzas and Shreve [28], Section
1.3), the stopped process (Ut∧ρ)t∈[0,T ] and (U ′t∧ρ)t∈[0,T ] are also supermartingales. Their
respective Doob-Meyer decompositions are given by
U·∧ρ = M·∧ρ −A·∧ρ, U ′·∧ρ = M ′·∧ρ −A′·∧ρ,
where M·∧ρ and M ′·∧ρ are martingales (again by the optional sampling theorem). The
required indistinguishability then follows from the fact that the Doob-Meyer decomposition
is unique, up to indistinguishability of stochastic processes.
The final step involves extracting an adaptive trading strategies using the martingale
representation theorem on the H-adapted martingale Mσ(σ, τ), analogous to Proposition
7.20. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, in the continuous-time case, for a
fixed H-adapted wealth process, it is not necessary for an adaptive trading strategy to be
H-adapted. Instead, the following proposition shows that the adaptive strategy satisfies
certain uniqueness conditions in L2(W ). Note that when F is the Brownian filtration, any
martingale has a continuous version.
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Proposition 7.29. Suppose M :H× [0, T ]× Ω→ R satisfies the following properties:
• For any s ∈ S, M(s) = M(h(s)) is a continuous, uniformly integrable martingale.
• M is H-predictable, in the sense that for all t ∈ [0, T ] and s, s′ ∈ S:
Mt(s) = Mt(s
′) a.s. on the event
{
h[0,t)(s) = h[0,t)(s
′)
}
.
Then there exists a trading strategy φ ∈ Ψ(H) such that Ẑ(φ) = M and for all u ∈ [0, T ]
and s, s′ ∈ S:
EQ
(∫ u
0
∣∣γt(s)− γt(s′)∣∣21{h[0,t)(s)=h[0,t)(s′)} dt) = 0 (7.23)
where γt(s)
′ = (φ1t (s), . . . , φdt (s))D̂tσt, D̂t is the diagonal matrix of the discounted stock
prices and | · | is the Euclidean norm. The result still holds if we replace H and [0, T ] by
Hσ and [t, T ].
Proof. For each s ∈ S, by the martingale representation theorem, there exists an F-
predictable, Rd-valued, locally square integrable process γ(s) such that
Mu(s) = M0(s) +
d∑
j=1
∫ u
0
γjt (s) dŴ
j
t , u ∈ [0, T ],
where Ŵ is the d-dimensional Q-Brownian motion. As we did for European options in
Section 6.1.2 and American options in Section 6.2.2, we set
(φ1u(s), . . . , φ
d
u(s)) = γu(s)
′σ−1u D̂
−1
u , φ
0
u(s) = Ẑu(s)−
d∑
i=1
φiu(s)Ŝ
i
u.
where γu(s)
′ is the transpose of γu(s). It is routine (for example, see proof of Theorem
6.25) to check that φ(s) is indeed an admissible trading strategy with Ẑ(φ(s)) = M(s).
It remains to check that (7.23) holds. For any s, s′ ∈ S, consider the F-stopping time
defined by
ρ := inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : ht(s) 6= ht(s′)
} ∧ T. (7.24)
This is well-defined since the Ft-measurable outcome ht(s) takes values in a discrete action
space A and is a right-continuous map of t by Assumption 1.21. Furthermore, the event{
h[0,u)(s) = h[0,u)(s
′)
}
is equivalent to
{
u ≤ ρ}.
Now the stopped process M·∧ρ(s) is a martingale by the optional sampling theorem.
Moreover, its representation as a stochastic integral is given by
Mu∧ρ(s) = M0(s) +
d∑
j=1
∫ u
0
γjt (s)1{t≤ρ} dŴ
j
t , u ∈ [0, T ].
Note that 1{t≤ρ}, as a map of t, is F-predictable.
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By the continuity and the H-predictability of M , the martingale M·∧ρ(s)−M·∧ρ(s′) is
identically zero. Hence its quadratic variation is also zero, or
EQ
(∫ u
0
∣∣(γt(s)− γt(s′))1{t≤ρ}∣∣2 dt) = 0.
Therefore, (7.23) must hold after noting the equality
{
h[0,t)(s) = h[0,t)(s
′)
}
=
{
t ≤ ρ}, as
required.
We will now formally prove the continuous-time results on the price piNt (G, s). The
following proposition is the continuous-time analogue of Proposition 7.21.
Proposition 7.30. Fix σ ∈ S−N and t ∈ [0, T ]. For any τ ∈ SN , on the event {ϑ(σ, τ) ≥
t}, there exists an adaptive trading strategy φσ ∈ Ψ(Hσ) (with an Hσ-predictable wealth
process Z(φσ)) such that (φσ, σ) is an issuer’s super-hedging strategy whose discounted
time t value is given by the generalised Snell envelope Uσt (σ, τ). In other words,
Ẑt(φ
σ(σ, τ)) = Uσt (σ, τ) = ess sup
τ ′∈SNt (σ,τ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(σ,τ ′)(σ, τ
′)
∣∣∣Ft), (7.25)
Ẑϑ(φ
σ(σ, τ)) ≥ Uσϑ(σ,τ)(σ, τ) = V̂ Nϑ(σ,τ)(σ, τ). (7.26)
Furthermore, a trading strategy φσ satisfies (7.23).
Proof. From Proposition 7.27, Uσ(σ, τ) is a Q-supermartingale of class D. Applying the
Doob-Meyer decomposition theorem, there exists a continuous, uniformly integrable Q-
martingale Mσ(σ, τ) and a non-decreasing, uniformly integrable, right-continuous and F-
predictable process Aσ(σ, τ) satisfying
Uσ(σ, τ) = Mσ(σ, τ)−Aσ(σ, τ), Aσ0 (σ, τ) = 0,
and the decomposition is unique almost surely.
Now we define the following wealth process candidate Ẑσ. For u ∈ [t, T ], set
Ẑσu (σ, τ) = M
σ
u (σ, τ)−Aσt (σ, τ).
It is easily checked that Ẑσ(s) is indeed a uniformly integrable Q-martingale, and we may
choose a continuous version since it is under the Brownian filtration. In other words we
have
Ẑσ(σ, τ) = Mσ(σ, τ)−Aσt (σ, τ), a.s.. (7.27)
Now we show that Ẑσ(s) is Hσ-predictable. Fix any s = (σ, τ), s′ = (σ, τ ′), define the
F-stopping time ρ as in (7.24),
ρ = inf
{
u ∈ [0, T ] : hu(s) 6= hu(s′)
} ∧ T.
For each u ∈ [0, T ], Proposition 7.15 implies that on the event {h[0,u)(s) = h[0,u)(s′)} ={
u ≤ ρ},
Uσu (s) = U
σ
u (s
′), a.s..
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By the right-continuity of Uσ and Lemma 7.28 we must have
Uσ·∧ρ(s) = U
σ
·∧ρ(s
′), Mσ·∧ρ(s) = M
σ
·∧ρ(s
′), Aσ·∧ρ(s) = A
σ
·∧ρ(s
′), a.s..
From (7.27), Ẑσ satisfies
Ẑσ(s) = Mσ(s)−Aσt (s) = Mσ(s′)−Aσt (s′) = Ẑσ(s′), a.s. (7.28)
on the time interval [t, ρ]. Hence theHσ-predictability of Zσ on [t, T ] follows from (7.28) and
the fact that, for any u ≥ t, the event {h[0,u)(s) = h[0,u)(s′)} is equivalent to {t ≤ u ≤ ρ}.
By Proposition 7.29, we are able to choose φσ ∈ Ψ(Hσ) such that Ẑ(φσ) = Ẑσ.
Finally, it remains to check (7.25) and (7.26). Recall (7.27), we see that for any F-
stopping time ϑ ∈ [t, T ]:
Ẑϑ(φ
σ(σ, τ)) = Mσϑ (σ, τ)−Aσt (σ, τ) = Uσϑ (σ, τ) +Aσϑ(σ, τ)−Aσt (σ, τ) ≥ Uσϑ (σ, τ), a.s.
with equality if ϑ = t. This completes the proof.
Finally, the following theorem is the main result in the continuous-time model.
Theorem 7.31. Suppose the payoffs of G satisfy Assumptions 7.11 and 7.26. Fix N ⊆M,
consider the tranche MGCNt (G, s). There is no arbitrage in (B,S,N ) if and only if the
discounted time t price piNt (G, s) = B
−1
t pi
N
t (G, s) satisfies
ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ)
∣∣∣Ft) ≤ piNt (G, s) ≤ ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ (σ, τ)
∣∣∣Ft).
(7.29)
Proof. Having established Proposition 7.30, the proof of Theorem 7.31 is identical to the
discrete-time version, Theorem 7.23.
7.2.4 Super-Hedging Interpretations
We have shown in Theorems 7.23 and 7.31 that the market has no arbitrage in (B,S,N )
if and only if the discounted price of tranche MGCNt (G, s) lies between the upper price
piNt (G, s) and the lower price piNt (G, s), which are defined as follows,
piNt (G, s) := ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
V̂ Nt (σ, τ),
piNt (G, s) := ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
V̂ Nt (σ, τ),
where
V̂ Nt (s) := EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ (s)
∣∣Ft)
is the expected discounted payoff under the martingale measure Q. Observe that we estab-
lished the following inequalities under the arbitrage-free assumptions,
piNt (G, s) ≤ piNt (G, s) ≤ piNt (G, s). (7.30)
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Unlike two-person game options, the arbitrage-free condition restricts the price to an
interval rather than producing a single value. This is due to the fact that we are considering
a general game G with arbitrary payoff functions. It is difficult to make further progress
without being more specific about G.
In Theorems 7.23 and 7.31, the upper and lower prices (7.30) were derived using mar-
tingale pricing arguments. In this section, we shall explain and interpret (7.30) using super-
hedging arguments. Recall that super-hedging strategies were introduced in Definition 7.8.
Before diving into the details, let us note the following property.
Proposition 7.32. There exist two sequences of strategies, (σn)n∈N from S−Nt (s) and
(τn)n∈N from SNt (s), such that the sequences(
ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
V̂ Nt (σn, τ)
)
n∈N
and
(
ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
V̂ Nt (σ, τn)
)
n∈N
are almost surely non-increasing and non-decreasing, respectively. Furthermore, they con-
verge to the upper and lower prices,
lim
n→∞ ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
V̂ Nt (σn, τ) = inf
n∈N
ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
V̂ Nt (σn, τ) = pi
N
t (G, s),
lim
n→∞ ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
V̂ Nt (σ, τn) = sup
n∈N
ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
V̂ Nt (σ, τn) = pi
N
t (G, s).
Proof. From Proposition 7.17, the sets{
ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
V̂ Nt (σ, τ) : σ ∈ S−Nt (s)
}
,
{
ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
V̂ Nt (σ, τ) : τ ∈ SNt (s)
}
(7.31)
have the lattice property. The existence of the desired sequences is then implied by part
(i) in Lemma 7.18.
Suppose the issuer holds the tranche−N and plays the strategy σ ∈ S−Nt (s) while super-
hedging using (φσ, σ). The upper price piNt (G, s) is the infimum of Ẑt(φσ) (the discounted
time t value) over all possible σ ∈ S−Nt (s). Even though the infimum is not necessarily
achievable, Proposition 7.32 showed that there exists a sequence of (σn)n∈N such that
Ẑt(φ
σn) is non-increasing and converging to piNt (G, s).
One may consider this scenario to be somewhat extreme as it requires the issuer to hold
tranche −N . But in general, the buyer of tranche N cannot rule out this possibility, since
he has no control over the trading of tranche −N . Intuitively, the buyer of tranche N
will be reluctant to pay more than piNt (G, s) at time t. Otherwise, his expected discounted
payoff could be restricted to be lower than the price paid, and as shown by Theorems 7.23
and 7.31, leads to an issuer’s arbitrage.
Similarly, the holder of the tranche N plays the strategy τ ∈ SNt (s) and super-hedges
the negative of his payoff using (φτ , τ). The lower price piNt (G, s) is the supremum of
−Ẑt(φτ ) over all possible τ ∈ SNt (s). Again the supremum is not necessarily achieved,
but Proposition 7.32 showed that there exists a sequence of (τn)n∈N such that −Ẑt(φτn) is
non-decreasing and converges to piNt (G, s).
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Intuitively, it is undesirable for the issuer to sell tranche N for a price cheaper than
piNt (G, s). Otherwise the holder of tranche N will be able to guarantee an expected dis-
counted payoff greater than the price. As shown in Theorems 7.23 and 7.31, this leads to
a holder’s arbitrage.
7.3 Arbitrage Pricing of a Multi-Person Game Claim
In the previous section, we focused on valuation of a fixed combined tranche N of the
claim MGCNt (G, s). Theorems 7.23 and 7.31 showed that, in the absence of arbitrage in
the underlying market model (B,S,N ) (see Definition 7.6), an arbitrage price at time t of
a combined tranche N is bounded between the upper and lower prices, that is,
piNt (G, s) ≤ piNt (G, s) ≤ piNt (G, s). (7.32)
If the market has no arbitrage in (B,S,N ) for any non-empty subset of tranches N ⊆M,
then (7.32) actually describes a total of 2(2m − 1) inequalities. In this section, we shall
further explore how the prices of different collections of tranches relate to one another. In
particular, we aim to address the following questions:
• Apart from (7.32), should there be other constraints on the price of tranches?
• Should the price of a combined tranche be equal to the sum of prices of all single
tranches, which constitute a combined tranche?
• Under which assumptions, a consistent valuation of all tranches (hence of a multi-
person game claim) is feasible?
7.3.1 Super-Additivity of Lower Prices
First, we will show that the lower prices piNt (G, s) are inherently super-additive.
Proposition 7.33. The lower price of MGCNt (G, s), which is defined by
piNt (G, s) = ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
V̂ Nt (σ, τ),
has the following super-additive property: if N1,N2, . . . ,Nk is a partition of N , then
piNt (G, s) ≥
k∑
i=1
piNit (G, s).
Proof. According to Proposition 7.32, for each of the sets Ni, we may choose a sequence
(τNin )n∈N from SNit (s) such that the sequence
ess inf
σ−Ni∈S−Nit (s)
V̂ Nit
(
σ−Ni , τNin
)
, n ∈ N
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is non-decreasing and converges to piNit (G, s). Now define the strategy τn ∈ SNt (s) for n ∈ N
by τn := (τ
N1
n , . . . , τ
Nk
n ). For each i = 1, . . . , k and for all σ ∈ S−Nt (s), we have
V̂ Nt (σ, τn) =
k∑
i=1
V̂ Nit (σ, τn) ≥
k∑
i=1
ess inf
σ−Ni∈S−Nit (s)
V̂ Nit
(
σ−Ni , τNin
)
.
Since this holds for all σ ∈ S−Nt (s), the above inequality implies that
ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
V̂ Nt (σ, τn) ≥
k∑
i=1
ess inf
σ−Ni∈S−Nit (s)
V̂ Nit
(
σ−Ni , τNin
)
and thus
piNt (G, s) = ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
V̂ Nt (σ, τ) ≥ sup
n∈N
ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
V̂ Nt (σ, τn)
≥ sup
n∈N
k∑
i=1
ess inf
σ−Ni∈S−Nit (s)
V̂ Nit
(
σ−Ni , τNin
)
=
k∑
i=1
piNit (G, s),
which completes the proof.
The super-additive property from Proposition 7.33 can be easily explained as follows.
First note that, by Proposition 7.32, the holder of any individual tranche may choose a
strategy to guarantee an expected discounted payoff which is arbitrarily close to its lower
price. So by playing these strategies over a collection of tranches, one can guarantee a total
expected discounted payoff arbitrarily close to the sum of individual lower prices, which is
in turn no greater than the lower price of the collection of tranches.
Unfortunately, no analogous additive properties exist for the upper prices piNt (G, s).
Furthermore, from the analysis so far, there is no reason for the prices piNt (G, s) themselves
to satisfy any additive properties either. Does that mean the bounds described by (7.32)
are the only important constraints when pricing game contingent claims? The following
example illustrates that, even if the inequalities (7.32) are satisfied, the resulting prices
may still be problematic from the financial point of view.
Example 7.34. Consider the famous prisoner’s dilemma, here G is a deterministic game
with two players, each having the action space of {a, b}. The payoff function is given by:
V (σ, τ) τ = a τ = b
σ = a (1, 1) (−1, 2)
σ = b (2,−1) (0, 0)
Note that there is an optimal equilibrium at (σ∗, τ∗) = (b, b) and the unique value is (0, 0).
Consider the contract MGC(G) where there is no interest rate. It is easy to see that
for each individual tranches, the upper and lower prices are both $0. Hence the arbitrage
price for each tranche must be pi1(G) = pi2(G) = 0. But when we consider the collection of
tranches M = {1, 2}, the unique arbitrage price is
piM(G) = ess sup
s∈S
(V 1(s) + V 2(s)) = V 1(a, a) + V 2(a, a) = 2. (7.33)
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In particular, note that pi1(G) + pi2(G) 6= piM(G).
Now interpret this from the perspective of the issuer and the two prospective holders
who are about to enter the contract MGC(G). For the issuer, the total selling price for the
two tranches cannot be less than $2, since there is nothing stopping the two holders from
working together for a combined payoff of $2. For the prospective holders of tranche 1, the
buying price cannot be more than $0, since there is nothing stopping the holder of tranche
2 from playing b, and limiting the payoff of tranche 1 to at most 0. In fact, it is strictly
better for the holder of tranche 2 to play b than a in all cases. A similar analysis can be
made for the prospective holder of tranche 2.
So it is impossible for any deal to strike between the three parties. The issuer will
always be demanding more than what the prospective holders are willing to pay. The only
way to resolve this situation is for at least two of the three parties to agree to work together
and share their payoffs in some way. For example, the two holders agree to buy the two
tranches for $2 and play (a, a); or the issuer agrees to sell the tranches for $0, but requiring
one of the holders to play b.
7.3.2 Additivity of Prices
Example 7.34 shows that, even if the bounds of (7.32) (and hence the no arbitrage property
of Definition 7.6) are satisfied, they do not necessarily lead to sensible pricing of the contract.
There are two main causes of this discrepancy. First, each party simply cannot rule out
the possibilities of the others colluding. This perceived possibility of collusion can also be
interpreted as the uncertainty over the identity of the other holders, that is, multiple holders
(or issuer) may actually be the same person. Second, the arbitrage prices in Example 7.34
do not satisfy the additivity of prices.
Definition 7.35. By the additivity of prices, we refer to the following equalities,
piNt (G, s) =
∑
k∈N
pikt (G, s), ∀N ⊆M.
In general, the problem highlighted by Example 7.34 occurs under the following con-
ditions. Suppose there are k prospective buyers, looking to purchase tranches N1, . . . ,Nk
respectively while the issuer intends to keep tranche −N = −(N1 ∪ · · · ∪ Nk). It is not
possible to reach agreements on prices if the lower price of tranche N exceeds the sum of
upper prices of tranche Ni,
k∑
i=1
piNit (G, s) < pi
N
t (G, s) =⇒
k∑
i=1
piNit (G, s) < pi
N
t (G, s). (7.34)
In this case, the issuer will always demand more than the what the holders are willing to
pay. However, if the additivity of prices described by Definition 7.35 holds, then (7.34)
cannot occur.
Example 7.34 offered some justification to why the additivity of prices is a desirable
condition. To further consolidate this belief we shall introduce a second form of arbitrage
called reselling arbitrage. In the previous section, Theorems 7.23 and 7.31 prevent arbitrage
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opportunities (as per Definition 7.6), which are executed by holding a fixed collection of
tranches from time t until settlement time. A reselling arbitrage simply involves buying
some tranches at time t then instantly selling them, but in different groupings, for a higher
total price. We will define this formally.
Definition 7.36. (Reselling Arbitrage) Consider the game contingent claim MGCt(G, s)
at time t. For each N ⊆ M, denote the price of tranche N by piNt (G, s). A reselling
arbitrage consists of two different partitions of some subset N ⊆M,
N = N1 ∪ · · · ∪ Nk = N ′1 ∪ · · · ∪ N ′l ,
such that the inequality
k∑
i=1
piNit (G, s) <
l∑
j=1
pi
N ′j
t (G, s)
holds on some Ft-measurable event E with positive measure.
In European and American option pricing models, reselling arbitrages are implicitly
avoided due to the law of one price. In multi-person game contingent claims, the ability
to purchase collections of tranches has reintroduced this possibility. It is easy to see that
reselling arbitrages are avoided whenever the additivity of prices holds.
Proposition 7.37. There is no reselling arbitrage if and only if the additivity of prices
holds. In other words,
piNt (G, s) =
∑
k∈N
pikt (G, s), ∀N ⊆M.
Proof. This is trivial from the definition of reselling arbitrage.
Combining Proposition 7.37 with Theorems 7.23 and 7.31, we offer the following char-
acterisation of prices which avoids both types of arbitrage mentioned.
Theorem 7.38. Suppose G is a multi-person stochastic game whose payoffs satisfy the
appropriate conditions (Assumption 7.11 for discrete-time; Assumptions 7.11 and 7.26 for
continuous-time). For every N ⊆ M, let piNt (G, s) be the discounted time t price of the
combined tranche N in MGCNt (G, s). Then there is no arbitrage in (B,S,N ) for all N ⊆
M and no reselling arbitrage if and only if the following two conditions are satisfied:
(i) the random vector (pi1t (G, s), . . . , pi
m
t (G, s)) lies in the following random subset of Rm,{
(X1, . . . , Xm) : ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
V̂ Nt (σ, τ) ≤
∑
i∈N
Xi (7.35)
≤ ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
V̂ Nt (σ, τ), ∀N ⊆M
}
,
where X1, . . . , Xm are Ft-measurable random variables.
(ii) piNt (G, s) =
∑
k∈N pi
k
t (G, s) for all N ⊆M.
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Remark 7.39. In some game contingent claims MGC(G), such as Example 7.34, the
conditions of Theorem 7.38 cannot be satisfied because the set in (7.35) is empty. This
means that some game contingent claims MGC(G) simply do not admit prices under our
arbitrage-free assumptions. Occasionally this may be remedied if the identities of the
holders (or the possibility of collusion) is known to everyone in advance, but in these cases
MGC(G) is equivalent to a (simpler) contract with less tranches.
7.3.3 Arbitrage Prices and Optimal Equilibrium
From a purely game theoretic point of view, the upper and lower prices are also the minimax
and maximin values of the coalitionN in the subgame of G on [t, T ]. Note that the expected
discounted payoff under the martingale measure Q is used in this case. As shown in Section
7.2.4, the properties of minimax and maximin strategies may be interpreted using super-
hedging arguments.
In general, the infimum in the upper price and the supremum in the lower price are
not necessarily achieved. But if G is known to have an optimal equilibrium s∗, then from
Corollary 1.13, the maximin and minimax values for each player (or equivalently, the lower
and upper prices of individual tranches) are achieved by V̂t(s
∗), or the unique value of the
game. Hence the prices of individual tranches must be equal to the unique value of the
game.
But as Example 7.34 demonstrates, the mere existence of optimal equilibria still does
not lead to additive prices. However, Proposition 1.16 showed that if the game G is also
known to satisfy some further conditions (e.g., zero-sum), then coalition values V ∗N exist
and satisfy the additive property. Thus the prices of collections of tranches are also unique
and satisfy the additivity of prices.
We summarise these results in the following theorem. Note that the date t ∈ [0, T ) is
fixed, but arbitrary.
Theorem 7.40. Consider a game G whose payoffs satisfy the appropriate conditions (As-
sumption 7.11 for discrete-time; Assumptions 7.11 and 7.26 for continuous-time) and the
associated game contingent claim MGC(G). Assume that the strategy profile s[0,t) ∈ S[0,t) is
played before time t and ϑ(s) ≥ t. Denote the expected discounted payoff under the martin-
gale measure by V̂t(σ, τ) = EQ
(
V̂ϑ(σ, τ)
∣∣Ft). Suppose that the subgame on the time interval
[t, T ] has an optimal equilibrium s∗ = (σ∗, τ∗) ∈ St(s), that is,
V̂ kt (σ
∗, τ∗) = ess inf
σ∈S−kt (s)
V̂ kt (σ, τ
∗) = ess sup
τ∈Skt (s)
V̂ kt (σ
∗, τ), ∀ k ∈M. (7.36)
(i) Then for any k ∈M, there is no arbitrage in (B,S, k) if and only if the discounted time
t price of a single tranche k satisfies
pikt (G, s) = V̂
k
t (s
∗).
(ii) Assume, in addition, that the optimal equilibrium s∗ satisfies the following condition∑
k∈M
V̂ kt (s
∗) = ess sup
s′∈St(s)
∑
k∈M
V̂ kt
(
s′
)
. (7.37)
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Then for any N ∈M, there is no arbitrage in (B,S,N ) if and only if the discounted time
t price of a combined tranche N has the following additivity property
piNt (G, s) =
∑
k∈N
V̂ kt (s
∗) = V̂ Nt (s
∗). (7.38)
Moreover, there is no reselling arbitrage if and only if (7.38) is satisfied for all N ⊆M.
Proof. (i) Let us recall Corollary 1.13, which states that all optimal equilibria achieve the
minimax and maximin values simultaneously. Since Theorems 7.23 and 7.31 showed that
the arbitrage price must be between the upper and lower prices, which are identical to the
minimax and maximin values, the arbitrage price must match the unique value achieved
by any optimal equilibria.
(ii) Recall Proposition 1.16, which states that under (7.37), coalition values exist and have
the additive property. Then (7.38) follows immediately Theorems 7.23 and 7.31 since the
arbitrage price of a combined tranche must match the coalition value. The lack of reselling
arbitrage follows from Proposition 7.37 and the additive property.
Remark 7.41. Theorem 7.40 further justifies the choice of the optimal equilibrium as a
solution concept when studying multi-person game contingent claims, as it produces unique
arbitrage prices for individual tranches. This is not possible with weaker solution concepts,
such as the Nash equilibrium.
Remark 7.42. Condition (7.37) implies the existence of unique and additive arbitrage
prices. Some examples of games which satisfy (7.37) include:
• Any zero (constant)-sum game that admits an optimal equilibrium,
• Multi-period redistribution games MRG(X,α),
• Affine stopping games ASG(X,G) in which G is a K†-matrix with non-negative col-
umn sums.
7.4 Options Based on Stopping Games
All of the results so far in this chapter pertains to game contingent claims which are based
on general stochastic games G. Since most of the thesis specifically deals with the class of
stopping games, it makes sense to discuss how the established concepts and results may be
applied to game contingent claims based on stopping games.
First introduced in Chapter 1, a stopping game is a stochastic game in which the action
space of all players is given by A = {stop, continue}. The game is then stopped as soon
as at least one player stops, and the payoff is determined by the set of stopping players at
that moment. Recall that it is equivalent to characterise the strategy of each player i by a
stopping time τ i ∈ T[0,T ]. The termination time ϑ is then given by ϑ(τ) =
∧
i∈M τ
i.
In the same way general game contingent claims are defined, we can define a claim
MGC(G) based on a stopping game G. A simple example of this is the two person game
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option GCC(X,Y ) from Section 6.3, which is based on the standard two-person Dynkin
game DG(X,Y,X). One may also describe this by the notation MGC(DG(X,Y,X)) =
GCC(X,Y ). A more complex multi-person example can be found in Section 7.4.1 in the
form of an affine game option, a contract based on affine stopping games.
As a convention, whenever we consider the stopping game G at any time t ∈ [0, T ],
it is implicitly assumed that the game has not been stopped before time t, or ϑ(τ) ≥ t.
Also the strategy or stopping time available to each player is given by τ it ∈ T[t,T ]. When
considering the claim MGCt(G, s) at time t, where s[0,t) was played before time t, we shall
adopt the same convention. In particular, we assume the strategy s[0,t) corresponds to all
players choosing ‘continue’ during [0, t), or equivalently, ϑ(s) ≥ t. This indicates that the
role of s is not as important in comparison to the general case (where G is not a stopping
game), so we may omit s and simply write MGCt(G) whenever G is a stopping game.
All the previous results can be readily applied to the claim MGCt(G). Some of the
important results include Theorems 7.23 and 7.31 (no arbitrage in (B,S,N )), Theorem
7.38 (no reselling arbitrage and additivity), Theorem 7.40 (arbitrage price and optimal
equilibrium), etc. To demonstrate the notational differences in the current context of G
being a stopping game, we shall present the result on the price of MGCNt(G) which avoids
arbitrage in (B,S,N ), for a fixed combined tranche N (i.e., Theorems 7.23 and 7.31).
We work under the discrete and continuous-time models introduced in Chapter 6. In
particular, the market is frictionless, complete and free of arbitrage in (B,S). The proba-
bility space of interest is (Ω,F,Q) where Q is the unique martingale measure. Let G be an
m-person stopping game whose discounted payoff function V̂ϑ satisfy the appropriate con-
ditions (Assumption 7.11 for discrete-time; Assumptions 7.11 and 7.26 for continuous-time)
and consider the multi-person game contingent claim MGCt(G) at time t. For any fixed
N ⊆ M, let piNt denote the discounted time t price of the combined tranche MGCNt (G).
Then there is no arbitrage in (B,S,N ) (in the sense of Definition 7.6) if and only if the
following inequality is satisfied,
ess sup
τNt ∈T n[t,T ]
ess inf
σ−Nt ∈T m−n[t,T ]
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ
(
σ−Nt , τ
N
t
)∣∣∣Ft) ≤ piNt (7.39)
≤ ess inf
σ−Nt ∈T m−n[t,T ]
ess sup
τNt ∈T n[t,T ]
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ
(
σ−Nt , τ
N
t
)∣∣∣Ft),
where n = |N | and the settlement time is given by ϑ(σ−Nt , τNt ) = (
∧
i∈N τ
i
t ) ∧ (
∧
j /∈N σ
j
t ).
7.4.1 Multi-Person Affine Game Options
The purpose of this section is to extend the affine stopping game to a multi-person game
contingent claim. Since the affine stopping game was only defined in the discrete-time
model, we will adopt the discrete-time market model as presented in Section 6.1.1. In
particular, the market is frictionless, complete and free of arbitrage in (B,S). For the
purpose of valuation, it suffices to work under the probability space (Ω,F,Q) where Q is
the unique martingale measure.
The definition of an affine stopping game ASGt(X,G) can be found in Section 5.3.2.
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Without going into too much detail, we reproduce the main payoff function here for con-
venience:
V iϑt(st) =
{
Xiϑt , i ∈ E ,
E
(
V ∗iϑt+1
∣∣Fϑt)+GiE(GEE)−1(XEϑt − E(V ∗Eϑt+1 ∣∣Fϑt)), i /∈ E ,
where V ∗ϑt+1 is the value of ASGϑt+1(X,G). Alternatively, the payoff vector can written in
the simpler form of
Vϑt(st) = E
(
V ∗ϑt+1
∣∣Fϑt)+G·E(GEE)−1(XEϑt − E(V ∗Eϑt+1 ∣∣Fϑt)),
with the convention of V ∗T+1 = XT and G·M
(
GMM
)−1
= I (in case G is singular).
The main difficulty in creating a claim based on the affine stopping game ASGt(X,G)
comes from the recursive term E
(
V ∗iϑt+1
∣∣Fϑt) of the payoff function. It represents the
time ϑt expected value of an affine stopping game ASGϑt+1(X,G) starting at ϑt + 1. This
indicates that the payoff of the corresponding contingent claim is also recursive. The natural
financial interpretation of this would be the discounted time ϑt price of a contract starting
at time ϑt + 1.
We now formally propose the affine game contingent claim.
Definition 7.43. Suppose X is an F-adapted, integrable process and G is a deterministic
K†-matrix. For each t = [0, T ], define the affine game contingent claim AGCt(X,G) =
MGC(ASGt(X̂,G)) to be the game contingent claim based on the affine stopping game
ASGt(X̂,G).
In particular it is a contract with m tranches starting at time t. The holder of each
tranche i chooses an F-stopping time sit ∈ T[t,T ]. Let st = (s1t , . . . , smt ) be the m-tuple of
stopping times and let ϑt = s
1
t ∧ · · · ∧ smt be the minimal stopping time. We denote by
E = E(st) =
{
i ∈M : sit = ϑt
}
the (random) set of earliest stopped tranches.
The game contract is settled at the random maturity date ϑt. The issuer pays the
holders Vϑt(st) = (V
1
ϑt
(st), . . . , V
m
ϑt
(st)), which is recursively defined by
V kϑt(st) =
{
Xkϑ , k ∈ E ,
pikϑt,ϑt+1 +GkE
(
GEE
)−1(
XEϑt − piEϑt,ϑt+1
)
, k /∈ E , (7.40)
where pikϑt,ϑt+1 = piϑt
(
AGCkϑt+1(X,G)
)
represents the discounted time ϑt value of a portfolio
replicating the time ϑt + 1 price of the claim AGCϑt+1(X,G). Note that the second case
of (7.40) is only invoked when E 6=M, which implies GEE is non-singular and ϑt < T .
As is with affine stopping games, the payoff vector (7.40) maybe more compactly written
as
Vϑt(st) = piϑt,ϑt+1 +G·E
(
GEE
)−1(
XEϑt − piEϑt,ϑt+1
)
,
with the conventions of piT,T+1 = XT and G·M
(
GMM
)−1
= I (in case G is singular).
The intuition behind the affine game contingent claim is as follows. The contract is
stopped as soon as any holder chooses to stop, characterised by the stopping time ϑt. For
the holder of each stopped tranche i ∈ E , the stopping Xiϑt .
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On the other hand, the holder of each non-stopping tranche i ∈ M \ E will receive an
adjusted payoff relative to piϑt
(
AGCϑt+1(X,G)
)
, which is the time ϑt value of the contract
if it continued to time ϑt + 1. The exact adjustment is given by the unique vector which
lies in the subspace spanned by the columns of GE (unless E =M, in which case everyone
receives Xϑt).
In some sense, the columns of G represent how the holder of each tranche may (linearly)
affect the payoff vector by exercising. This interpretation is more easily seen in the case of
a zero-sum redistribution game in Chapter 3, where the column vectors represent how the
non-stopping holders will share the burden of delivering the payoff Xϑ to the holders who
stopped.
Now we present the main results regarding the valuation of the affine game contin-
gent claim. Just as in affine games, recursively define the Ft-measurable vector Ut =
(U1t , . . . , U
m
t ) by UT = X̂T and
Ut = SOL
(
X̂t,EQ
(
Ut+1
∣∣Ft), G), 0 ≤ t < T, (7.41)
where SOL is the unique Nash equilibrium payoff of an affine game, see Definition 5.27.
Also define the optimal stopping times τ∗t = (τ∗1t , . . . , τ∗mt ) by
τ∗it = inf
{
u ∈ [t, T ] : U iu = X̂iu
}
. (7.42)
The following theorem follows immediately from the main results of affine stopping games
(Theorems 5.32 and 5.33) and general game contingent claims (Theorem 7.40).
Theorem 7.44. For all N ⊆M, denote the discounted time t price of the combined tranche
N of the affine game option AGCt(X,G) by piNt .
(i) For each i ∈M, there is no arbitrage in (B,S, i) if and only if
piit = U
i
t = EQ
(
V̂ iϑt(τ
∗
t )
∣∣Ft).
(ii) If the column sums of matrix G are non-negative, then for any N ⊆ M, there is no
arbitrage in (B,S,N ) if and only if
piNt =
∑
i∈N
U it =
∑
i∈N
EQ
(
V̂ iϑt(τ
∗
t )
∣∣Ft). (7.43)
Furthermore, there is no reselling arbitrage if and only if (7.43) is satisfied for all N ⊆M.
Proof. From Theorem 5.32, τ∗t is an optimal equilibrium of the affine stopping game
ASGt(X̂,G) and Ut is the unique value. The required results then follow from a direct
application of Theorem 7.40 to the affine game option.
Part (i) follows from Theorem 7.40(i). For part (ii), if the column sums of matrix G are
non-negative, then by Theorem 5.33, the coalition value of ASGt(X,G) has the additive
property. Finally by Theorem 7.40(ii), this additive property must also appear in the
arbitrage price process.
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The proof of Theorem 7.44, relied upon the established results in affine stopping games
and general game contingent claims. For the case of G being a K-matrix (non-singular),
an alternate approach is presented in Section 8.4.2. Section 8.4.2 looks at a more general
framework which includes market frictions, and pricing will be done using multi-dimension
reflected BSDEs and super-hedging arguments. In particular, the result of Theorem 7.44(i)
may be recovered by setting the cost of trading to zero.
Chapter8
Multi-Dimensional Reflected
BSDEs
Backward stochastic differential equations or BSDEs, first introduced by Bismut [4], refer
to a class of one-dimensional or multi-dimensional diffusion equations in continuous-time.
They have numerous applications in optimal control theory, studies of non-linear expecta-
tions and mathematical finance. Pardoux and Peng [41] proved the existence and uniqueness
of their solutions in general settings. A reflected BSDE or RBSDE, first discussed by El
Karoui et al. [15], is a variant of the BSDE which employs an auxiliary reflection process
to maintain its solution process above a reflecting barrier. RBSDEs can be applied to
various obstacle problems and the pricing of American options. Dynkin games and two
person game options, on the other hand, are closely connected to doubly reflected BSDEs
or DRBSDEs. As the name suggests, a DRBSDE has two reflecting barriers, bounding the
solution process from both above and below. There is a plethora of publications in this
field, for example, Cvitanic´ and Karatzas [9], Hamade`ne and Hdhiri [19], Hamade`ne and
Wang [20], Cre´pey and Matoussi [8] and Karatzas and Li [27].
There are two less-known topics in BSDEs relevant to our work: discrete-time BSDEs
and multi-dimensional RBSDEs. The discrete-time analogues of BSDEs are known as
backward stochastic difference equations, also BSDEs. They were introduced by Cohen and
Elliott [6], who established some sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of
solutions. In contrast to the continuous-time versions, the amount of published work in the
discrete-time case is somewhat scarce. The multi-dimensional extensions of RBSDEs have
also attracted relatively little attention. Some notable publications include: Hamade`ne and
Zhang [22], Hu and Tang [24], Petit and Pardoux [43], Ramasubramanian [46, 47], and a
recent work by Nie and Rutkowski [38], which is closely related to the topic of this thesis.
The emphasis of this chapter is on discrete-time multi-dimensional RBSDEs. Section
8.1 provides the basic definitions and methodologies for discrete-time BSDEs. Then Section
8.2 introduces the discrete-time DRBSDE. Aside from modelling the two-person Dynkin
game, the DRBSDE is also used to price two-person game options in the presence of market
frictions. In particular, we assume that maintaining any portfolio incurs a cost of trading,
which is modelled by the driver term of the BSDE. The main result, Theorem 8.16, proves
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that the arbitrage price of the two-person game option under market frictions lies within
an interval described by the solutions of two DRBSDEs.
In order to model multi-person stopping games and multi-person game options, we
require multi-dimensional RBSDEs. There has only been a few existing work in developing
multi-dimensional versions (e.g., Petit and Pardoux [43], Hu and Tang [24], Hamade`ne and
Zhang [22]) and they are all in continuous-time. In Section 8.3 we introduce a general class
of multi-dimensional RBSDEs in discrete-time, which closely relates to a class of problems
in optimisation known as variational inequalities. Some examples are given, involving both
general convex domains as well as rectangular regions.
Section 8.4 then applies the multi-dimensional RBSDE to affine stopping games as well
as affine game contingent claims under market frictions. For affine stopping games, the
existence and uniqueness of the value, first established in Chapter 5, is reaffirmed using
BSDEs. For affine game contingent claims, we extend the formulation of Section 7.4.1 to
include the cost of trading. Due to the recursive definition of the claim, two possible formu-
lations are presented, depending on the order of payoff settlement and cost deduction. The
main results of the section, Theorems 8.36 and 8.38, prove that under certain assumptions
of the cost function, the individual tranches of the affine game contingent claim have unique
arbitrage prices in both formulations.
Finally, Section 8.5 gives a brief survey of the existing results in continuous-time multi-
dimensional RBSDEs. Theorem 8.48 proposes a continuous-time multi-dimensional RBSDE
inspired by the earlier discrete-time versions, and provides some sufficient conditions for
the existence and uniqueness of solutions. The section closes with a brief discussion of how
the continuous-time RBSDE may be used to motivate continuous-time extensions of the
affine stopping game and the affine game contingent claim.
8.1 Introduction to BSDEs
Generally speaking, a backward stochastic differential equation refers to an equation of the
form
xt +
∫ T
t
f(u, xu, yu) du+
∫ T
t
g(u, xu, yu) dWu = ξ (8.1)
where the following are given:
(i) Wt, t ∈ [0, T ] is a standard d-dimensional Brownian motion defined on (Ω,F,P);
(ii) ξ is a m-dimensional, FT -measurable random vector;
(iii) a mapping f : [0, T ]× Rm × Rm×d × Ω→ Rm, known as the driver function;
(iv) a mapping g : [0, T ]× Rm × Rm×d × Ω→ Rm×d.
A solution to the BSDE is a pair of F-adapted processes (xt, yt) taking values in Rm×Rm×d
which solves (8.1).
The key difference between BSDEs and standard stochastic differential equations (SDEs)
is that the time T value xT = ξ is given in advance instead of x0 and there is a second
unknown process y in the dynamics. BSDEs have a wide range of applications in solving
optimal stopping, stochastic control, and obstacle problems, etc.
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A classic result in solving a general BSDE was established by Pardoux and Peng [41].
They showed that if f is uniformly Lipschitz with respect to both x and y, while g is
bijective in y, then the BSDE (8.1) has a unique solution. The full result is presented later
as Theorem 8.42 in Section 8.5 which addresses continuous-time BSDEs.
Since the emphasis in this thesis is on discrete-time models, we will now focus on the
discrete-time analogues of BSDEs, known as backward stochastic difference equations. They
were introduced by Cohen and Elliott [6] and also abbreviate to BSDEs. In the discrete-
time settings, we work under a finite state model with the probability space (Ω,F,P) and
the filtration {Ft, t = 0, 1, . . . , T}. Before presenting the discrete-time BSDE, let us define
the following properties.
Definition 8.1. Let N be an Rd-valued, (P,F)-martingale. Write ∆Nt = Nt − Nt−1 for
t = 1, . . . , T .
(i) Two Rm×d-valued, F-adapted processes φ1 and φ2 are said to be N -equivalent if, for all
t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1,
φ1t∆Nt+1 = φ
2
t∆Nt+1.
A process is said to be N -unique if it is unique up to N -equivalences.
(ii) The martingale N has the predictable representation property if for every Rm-valued,
(P,F)-martingale L, there exists an Rm×d-valued, F-adapted and N -unique process φ such
that, for all t = 1, . . . , T − 1,
Lt = L0 +
t∑
u=1
φu−1∆Nu.
Remark 8.2. In the work of Cohen and Elliott [6], the filtration F is generated by a finite
state process X, taking values in the standard basis vectors of Rd. The martingale N is
defined by the martingale increments ∆Nt = Xt − EP(Xt | Ft−1), which naturally has the
predictable representation property with respect to F. For our purposes, the predictable
representation property of N will simply be taken as an assumption.
Now we formally define the discrete-time BSDE.
Definition 8.3 (Discrete-time BSDE). A discrete-time backward stochastic difference equa-
tion or BSDE has the form
xt −
T−1∑
u=t
f(u, xu, yu) +
T−1∑
u=t
yu∆Nu+1 = ξ (8.2)
with the following data:
(i) Nt, t ∈ [0, T ] is an Rd-valued, (P,F)-martingale, with the predictable representation
property with respect to F. Also ∆Nt = Nt −Nt−1;
(ii) ξ is a m-dimensional, FT -measurable random vector;
(iii) a mapping f : [0, T ]× Rm × Rm×d × Ω→ Rm, known as the driver function.
A solution to the discrete-time BSDE is a pair of F-adapted processes (xt, yt) taking values
in Rm × Rm×d which solves (8.2). The solution (xt, yt) is said to be unique if xt is unique
up to indistinguishability and yt is N -unique.
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Note that it is possible to replace the term yu∆Nu+1 by a more general version such as
g(u, xu, yu)∆Nu+1, but for our purposes it suffices to focus on the simpler version.
The standard procedure in solving the discrete-time BSDE (8.2) is as follows. Incre-
menting t and taking the difference, we have
xt − f(t, xt, yt) + yt∆Nt+1 = xt+1, t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1. (8.3)
The approach is to use backward induction on t, with xT = ξ as the base case. Taking the
conditional expectation in (8.3) with respect to Ft, and using the martingale property of
N , we have
xt − f(t, xt, yt) = EP(xt+1 | Ft). (8.4)
Compare (8.4) with (8.3) yields
yt∆Nt+1 = xt+1 − EP(xt+1 | Ft). (8.5)
Hence finding a solution to the BSDE (8.2) is equivalent to solving the equations (8.4) and
(8.5) for all t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1. At this point of the induction, both EP(xt+1 | Ft) and xt+1
are known. So the value of yt is automatically determined up to N -uniqueness, due to the
predictable representation property of N . It remains to invert the map xt − f(t, xt, yt) to
obtain xt. This leads to the following result.
Theorem 8.4 (Cohen and Elliott [6]). Consider the discrete-time BSDE from Definition
8.3,
xt −
T−1∑
u=t
f(u, xu, yu) +
T−1∑
u=t
yu∆Nu+1 = ξ. (8.6)
For all ξ, the BSDE has a unique solution (xt, yt) if and only if the following conditions
holds.
(i) For each t ∈ [0, T ] and y ∈ Rm×d, the map x→ x− f(t, x, y) is bijective.
(ii) For each t ∈ [0, T ] and x ∈ Rm, the map y → f(t, x, y) is invariant under N -
equivalences, that is f(t, x, y) = f(t, x, y′) for any y′ which is N -equivalent to y.
8.2 Discrete-Time Doubly Reflected BSDEs
The solution process x in a standard continuous-time BSDE is a diffusion process driven by
the function f and g as well as an underlying martingale. For some practical applications, it
may be useful to restrict the solution process within a (possibly infinite) stochastic interval
[L,U ]. This lead to a special class of BSDEs known as reflected BSDEs, BSDEs with
reflection or simply RBSDEs.
El Karoui et al. [15] first introduced the reflected BSDEs in continuous-time, in which
the solution process is kept above a reflecting barrier by an additional process. This process
is non-decreasing, and only increases whenever the solution process coincides with the
barrier, as in the classic Skorokhod problem. The reflected BSDEs with a single barrier
can be applied in various obstacle problems and the pricing of American options.
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In this section, we look at the class of doubly reflected BSDEs or DRBSDEs which
involves both an upper barrier as well as a lower barrier. DRBSDEs are closely related
to Dynkin games (Chapter 2) and two-person game options (Section 6.3). We will give a
detailed analysis of the discrete-time case. A summary of the continuous-time case can be
found in Section 8.5.1.
Definition 8.5 (Doubly Reflected BSDE). Consider the following doubly reflected BSDE
or DRBSDE with data (ξ, F,N,L, U),
Zt −
T−1∑
u=t
F (u, Zu, φu) +
T−1∑
u=t
φu ∆Nu+1 −KT +Kt = ξ, (8.7)
where (i) ξ is an FT -measurable random variable;
(ii) F : [0, T ]× R× Rd × Ω→ R is an F-adapted map;
(iii) N is an Rd-valued (P,F)-martingale with the predictable representation property;
(iv) L and U are F-adapted processes satisfying −∞ < L ≤ U <∞ and LT ≤ ξ ≤ UT .
A solution to DRBSDE(ξ, F,N,L, U) is a triple (Z, φ,K) of F-adapted, real-valued processes
satisfying the following conditions:
(a) the inequalities Lt ≤ Zt ≤ Ut are satisfied for every t = 0, . . . , T − 1;
(b) the F-predictable process K satisfies K0 = 0 and:
T−1∑
t=0
1{Zt>Lt}∆K
+
t+1 =
T−1∑
t=0
1{Zt<Ut}∆K
−
t+1 = 0, (8.8)
where ∆K+t+1 = (Kt+1 −Kt)+ and ∆K−t+1 = (Kt+1 −Kt)−. The solution (Z, φ,K) is said
to be unique if Z and K are unique up to indistinguishability and φ is N -unique.
Note that if we set KLt =
∑t−1
u=0 ∆K
+
u+1 and K
U
t =
∑t−1
u=0 ∆K
−
u+1, then K
L and KU
are non-decreasing, F-predictable process satisfying K = KL−KU . Under condition (8.8),
the processes KL and KU serve to keep the solution process Z above L and below U ,
respectively. The following proposition presents some sufficient conditions for the existence
and uniqueness of the solution.
Proposition 8.6. If for every t, φ, the map v → v − F (t, v, φ) is strictly increasing and
continuous, then the following statements are true:
(i) The DRBSDE(ξ, F,N,L, U) has the unique solution (Z, φ,K).
(ii) If F = 0 then the DRBSDE(ξ, 0, N, L, U) has the unique solution (Z, φ,K) where Z is
defined by setting ZT = ξ and, for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1,
Zt = min
{
Ut, max
{
Lt,EP(Zt+1 | Ft)
}}
. (8.9)
Proof. To establish part (a), we proceed by the backward induction. For t = T , we have
ZT = ξ. Next, we observe that for t = 0, . . . , T − 1,
Zt − F (t, Zt, φt) + φt ∆Nt+1 −∆Kt+1 = Zt+1. (8.10)
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By taking the conditional expectation with respect to Ft and using the martingale property
of N , we obtain
Zt − F (t, Zt, φt)−∆Kt+1 = EP(Zt+1 | Ft). (8.11)
Taking the difference of (8.10) and (8.11), we get
φt ∆Nt+1 = Zt+1 − EP(Zt+1 | Ft). (8.12)
By the induction assumption, the random variable Zt+1 is known. So the right hand side
of (8.12) represents a known martingale increment. Thus the predictable representation
property of the martingale N ensures the existence and N -uniqueness of φt.
In the next step, we assume that Zt+1 and φt are already known. Denote
f(Zt) = Zt − F (t, Zt, φt)− EP(Zt+1 | Ft).
Then equation (8.11) can be rewritten as f(Zt) = ∆Kt+1. So ∆Kt+1 is determined by Zt
and
f(Zt)
+ = ∆K+t+1, f(Zt)
− = ∆K−t+1.
Taking into account the conditions on Zt, ∆K
+
t+1 and ∆K
−
t+1, it suffices to solve following
deterministic problem: To establish the existence and uniqueness z ∈ R satisfying
z ∈ [L,U ],
f(z) > 0 =⇒ z = L, (8.13)
f(z) < 0 =⇒ z = U.
It is easy to see that the existence of a solution to (8.13) holds under any of the following
non-exclusive conditions:
(A.1) If a zero z0 of f belongs to [L,U ] then z = z0 is a solution.
(A.2) If f(L) > 0 then z = L is a solution.
(A.3) If f(U) < 0 then z = U is a solution.
It is clear that are no other possibilities for the existence of a solution to (8.13), and the
solution is unique whenever exactly one of (A.1)–(A.3) is satisfied. In particular, it suffices
to have either of the following properties:
(B.1) f is a strictly increasing and continuous function,
(B.2) if f(L)f(U) < 0 then there exists a unique z0 ∈ (L,U) such that f(z0) = 0.
In particular (B.1) completes the proof of part (i). Part (ii) is easy to establish since F = 0
clearly implies that f is a strictly increasing and continuous function.
Remark 8.7. The solutions given by (A.1)–(A.3) can be compactly written as follows. A
real number z is a solution to the system (8.13) if and only if z is a zero of Γ : [L,U ] → R
defined by
Γ(z) = (z − L)f(z)+ + (U − z)f(z)−. (8.14)
To show that solutions of (8.13) are zeroes of (8.14), it is enough to individually verify
each of the three cases:
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(A.1) f(z) = 0 and z ∈ [L,U ]: this is equivalent to f(z)+ = f(z)− = 0;
(A.2) f(z) > 0 and z = L: this is equivalent to z − L = f(z)− = 0;
(A.3) f(z) < 0 and z = U : this is equivalent to U − z = f(z)+ = 0.
To show that zeroes of (8.14) are solutions of (8.13), first note that all four terms
(z − L), f(z)+, (U − z), f(z)− are non-negative. In order to have Γ(z) = 0, we either have
one of the three earlier cases (A.1)–(A.3), or z−L = U−z = 0. In this last case, z = L = U
is always solution regardless of the sign of f(z).
Remark 8.8. If we have either Lt = −∞ or Ut =∞ for some t, then some additional condi-
tions on F are required to ensure the existence of solutions in DRBSDE(ξ, F,N,L, U). For
example, it suffices to check that the map z → z−F (t, z, φt) is continuous and unbounded
from both above and below.
8.2.1 Dynkin Games
The resemblance between the solution process (8.9) of the DRBSDE and value process of
the Dynkin game Definition 2.4 suggests that the DRBSDE result, Proposition 8.6, can be
immediately applied to solve zero-sum Dynkin games as described in Section 2.1. Recall
that the Dynkin game GDG(X,Y,M) is defined by the payoff
R(τ, σ) = 1{τ<σ}Xτ + 1{σ<τ} Yσ + 1{σ=τ}Mσ. (8.15)
Note that M is used instead of Z because Z is used for the BSDE solution.
In order to solve the Dynkin game, it suffices to consider the following simplified DRB-
SDE.
Definition 8.9. Consider the following simplified DRBSDE, denote by DRBSDE(ξ, L, U):
ZT = ξ, Zt −Kt+1 +Kt = EP(Zt+1 | Ft), t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1. (8.16)
where
(i) ξ is an FT -measurable random variable;
(ii) L,U are F-adapted processes satisfying L ≤ U and LT ≤ ξ ≤ UT .
A solution to the simplified DRBSDE(ξ, L, U) given by (8.16) consists of a pair (Z,K) of
real-valued processes such that:
(a) Z is an F-adapted process which satisfies the inequality Lt ≤ Zt ≤ Ut for every t =
0, 1, . . . , T ;
(b) K is an F-predictable process satisfying K0 = 0 and
T−1∑
t=0
1{Zt>Lt}∆K
+
t+1 =
T−1∑
t=0
1{Zt<Ut}∆K
−
t+1 = 0, (8.17)
where ∆K+t+1 = (Kt+1 −Kt)+ and ∆K−t+1 = (Kt+1 −Kt)−.
The key difference between the simplified DRBSDE(ξ, L, U) and the full version from
the previous section is that the simplified DRBSDE does not have a driver term F , nor does
it depend on the existence of N , a martingale with the predictable representation property.
However, comparing the simplified DRBSDE(ξ, L, U) given by (8.16) with equation (8.11),
we may readily apply Proposition 8.6 to obtain the following result.
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Proposition 8.10. The DRBSDE(ξ, L, U) has the unique solution (Z,K) where Z satisfies
ZT = ξ and, for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1,
Zt = min
{
Ut, max
{
Lt,EP(Zt+1 | Ft)
}}
. (8.18)
Now we apply this to the Dynkin game.
Corollary 8.11. Consider the Dynkin game GDG(X,Y,M) from Section 2.1.
(i) If the inequality
Xt ≤Mt ≤ Yt, t = 0, 1, . . . , T, (8.19)
is satisfied, then by Proposition 2.5, the value process V ∗ satisfies the equality V ∗ = Z
where (Z,K) is the unique solution to DRBSDE(MT , X, Y ).
(ii) Suppose (8.19) does not hold. Let (Z,K) be the unique solution to DRBSDE(MT , X ∧
M,Y ∨M). If
Xt ∧ Yt ≤ Zt ≤ Xt ∨ Yt, t = 0, 1, . . . , T, (8.20)
then GDG(X,Y,M) has a unique value process given by V ∗ = Z.
8.2.2 Two-Person Game Options with Market Frictions
In order to apply DRBSDE to two-person game options in the discrete-time case, we have
to be more specific about the underlying model. In particular, the discrete-time market
model from Section 6.1.1 will be adopted. So we work under the probability space (Ω,F,Q)
where the filtration F represents the information available to market participants and Q is
the unique martingale measure induced by the complete and arbitrage-free market. Now
N is an Rd+1-valued, (F,Q)-martingale defined by ∆Nt+1 = Nt+1 −Nt = Ŝt+1 − Ŝt, where
Ŝ is the vector-valued process of discounted prices of stocks. Since the market is assumed
to be complete, the martingale N enjoys the predictable representation property.
Recall that in the game contingent claim GCC(X,Y ), as introduced in Section 6.3, the
F-adapted processes X and Y satisfy Y ≥ X. The payoff function is given by
V (τ, σ) = Xτ1{τ≤σ} + Yσ1{σ<τ}. (8.21)
Comparing the main results for two-person game options (Theorem 6.35), Dynkin games
(Proposition 2.5) and DRBSDEs (Proposition 8.6), it should not be surprising that the so-
lution process of DRBSDE(X̂T , 0, N, X̂, Ŷ ) is also the discounted arbitrage price process of
GCC(X,Y ). Instead of using arguments involving the optimal equilibrium to deduce the
arbitrage price, as per Section 6.3.1, an alternate approach based on super-hedging argu-
ments will be presented. Moreover, we will solve the problem in a more general framework
which includes market frictions.
For the purpose of this work, the notion of market frictions refers to the existence
of additional costs while maintaining or rebalancing a portfolio. In particular, the act of
holding a portfolio during [t, t + 1] shall incur a cost of trading at time t, specified by
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an Ft-measurable cost function. The details are explained in Definition 8.12. Practically
speaking, market frictions may be used to model scenarios which include transaction fees,
taxes, different borrowing and lending rates, cost of short-selling, etc.
In this chapter, the notation for trading strategies will be slightly modified in comparison
to Chapter 6 in order to accommodate for the notation of BSDEs. In particular, a trading
strategy is denoted by the pair (φ, ζ) and the cost function is denoted by the F (t, ζt, φt),
as explained in the following definition.
Definition 8.12. (i) A trading strategy is a pair of F-adapted processes (φ, ζ) where the
Rd-valued process φt represents the portfolio of stocks (excluding the bond) to hold during
[t, t+ 1] and ζt is the discounted wealth at time t.
(ii) The discounted cost of trading, or simply cost, incurred by maintaining the trading
strategy (φ, ζ) during [t, t+ 1] is given by the Ft-measurable cost function F (t, ζt, φt). The
cost of trading is payable at time t and is deducted from the wealth ζt.
(iii) A trading strategy (φ, ζ) is admissible if for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1,
ζt+1 = ζt − F (t, ζt, φt) + φt(Ŝt+1 − Ŝt) = ζt − F (t, ζt, φt) + φt∆Nt+1.
For convenience, given t and φ, we introduce the notation F˜t,φ(ζt) := ζt − F (t, ζt, φt).
The function F˜t,φ(ζt) can be interpreted as the discounted post-trading wealth after the
portfolio φ was rebalanced at time t, that is, after the associated costs were deducted from
the pre-trading wealth ζt at time t.
The following assumption states that everyone, including the issuer and the holder of
the game option, is affected by the same cost function,
Assumption 8.13. All market participants are subject to the cost function F (t, ζt, φt).
Before we can study the effect of market frictions, we need to some further conditions
on the cost function F , in the form of Assumption 8.14. In particular, Assumption 8.14(i)
states that two portfolios with identical initial wealth ζt and identical gains from stock
movements during [t, t + 1], or φt∆Nt+1 = φ
′
t∆Nt+1, should incur the same cost at time
t. Assumption 8.14(ii) states that for any fixed portfolio of stocks φt, given the net wealth
F˜t,φ(ζt), it is always possible to uniquely recover the initial wealth ζt before the cost de-
duction. Furthermore, larger values of the net wealth F˜t,φ(ζt) should correspond to larger
values of initial wealth ζt.
Assumption 8.14. (i) For any t and ζt, the map φt → F (t, ζt, φt) is invariant under N -
equivalences. That is if φt∆Nt+1 = φ
′
t∆Nt+1 then F (t, ζt, φt) = F (t, ζt, φ
′
t).
(ii) For any fixed t and φ, the R → R map ζt → F˜t,φ(ζt) = ζt − F (t, ζt, φ) is bijective and
increasing (hence continuous). Denote the inverse of F˜t,φ by F˜
−1
t,φ .
In Chapter 7, the concepts of arbitrage (Definition 7.3) and super-hedging (Definition
7.8) were introduced in the context of a general contingent claim. In this chapter, we
can reuse these definitions, provided that the definition of admissible trading strategies is
adjusted, as per Definition 8.12. Also in the current context, we will only be concerned
with contingent claims based on stopping games, that is, all strategies are stopping times.
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Explicitly, at time t, an issuer’s super-hedging strategy consists of a stopping time
σ ∈ T[t,T ] and an admissible trading strategy (φσ, ζσ) such that
ζσσ∧τ ≥ V̂ (τ, σ), ∀ τ ∈ T[t,T ].
Similarly, a holder’s super-hedging strategy consists of a stopping time τ ∈ T[t,T ] and an
admissible trading strategy (φτ , ζτ ) such that
ζτσ∧τ ≥ −V̂ (τ, σ), ∀σ ∈ T[t,T ].
Proposition 7.10 showed that if the market has no arbitrage (as per Definition 7.6, or equiv-
alently, Definition 6.34), then the discounted arbitrage price process pi must be bounded
between
−ζτt ≤ pit ≤ ζσt ,
for any choices of τ and σ.
From Section 6.3, we saw that in a frictionless market (i.e., no cost of trading), a unique
arbitrage price is derived for GCC(X,Y ). In the presence of market frictions, the existence
and uniqueness of the arbitrage price is no longer ensured. Before presenting the main
result, Theorem 8.16, we introduce the following notations.
Consider two different DRBSDEs, the issuer’s DRBSDE(X̂T , F,N, X̂, Ŷ ) as well as the
holder’s DRBSDE(−X̂T , F ′, N,−Ŷ ,−X̂) where
F ′(t, Zt, φt) := −F (t,−Zt,−φt).
As the names suggest, the two DRBSDEs are used to model the GCC(X,Y ) from the
perspectives of the issuer and the holder.
Lemma 8.15. Both the issuer’s DRBSDE(X̂T , F,N, X̂, Ŷ ) as well as the holder’s DRBSDE
(−X̂T , F ′, N,−Ŷ ,−X̂) have unique solutions.
Proof. It is clear from the definition that both F and F ′ satisfy Assumption 8.14. The
existence of unique solutions follows from Proposition 8.6.
Denote the unique solution of the issuer’s and holder’s DRBSDEs by the triples (Z, φ,K)
and (Z ′, φ′,K ′) respectively. We may define an admissible trading strategy (φ, ζ) on [t, T ]
whose stock holdings is specified by φ and discounted time t investment is given by Zt.
Similarly, let (φ′, ζ ′) be the admissible trading strategy defined by φ′ and Z ′t. So the
discounted wealth processes ζ and ζ ′ are given by the following forward equations on [t, T ],
ζt = Zt, ζv = Zt −
v−1∑
u=t
F (u, ζu, φu) +
v−1∑
u=t
φu∆Nu+1, (8.22)
ζ ′t = Z
′
t, ζ
′
v = Z
′
t −
v−1∑
u=t
F (u, ζ ′u, φ
′
u) +
v−1∑
u=t
φ′u∆Nu+1. (8.23)
Moreover, for each t = 0, 1, . . . , T , let us define the following stopping times,
σ∗t := min
{
u ∈ {t, t+ 1, . . . , T} |Zu = Ŷu
}
, (8.24)
τ∗t := min
{
u ∈ {t, t+ 1, . . . , T} |Z ′u = −X̂u
}
. (8.25)
We have the following result regarding GCC(X,Y ) in the presence of market frictions.
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Theorem 8.16. Assume the cost function satisfies Assumption 8.14. Consider the game
option GCC(X,Y ). Define (φ, ζ), (φ′, ζ ′), σ∗t , τ∗t as in (8.22)–(8.25). Then (φ, ζ, σ∗t ) is an
issuer’s super-hedging strategy on [t, T ] while (φ′, ζ ′, τ∗t ) is a holder’s super-hedging strategy
on [t, T ]. Furthermore, if the game option GCC(X,Y ) can be traded at time t at the
discounted price of pit without creating an arbitrage in (B,S,GCC(X,Y )) (or equivalently,
arbitrage in (B,S, pit)), then we must have the inequality,
−Z ′t ≤ pit ≤ Zt. (8.26)
Proof. We first focus on the issuer’s DRBSDE(X̂T , F,N, X̂, Ŷ ), whose unique solution
(Z, φ,K) satisfies
Zt −
T−1∑
u=t
F (u, Zu, φu) +
T−1∑
u=t
φu ∆Nu+1 −KT +Kt = X̂T , (8.27)
T−1∑
t=0
1{Zt>X̂t}∆K
+
t+1 =
T−1∑
t=0
1{Zt<Ŷt}∆K
−
t+1 = 0, (8.28)
X̂t ≤ Zt ≤ Ŷt, ∆K+t+1 = (Kt+1 −Kt)+, ∆K−t+1 = (Kt+1 −Kt)−. (8.29)
We will show that (φ, ζ, σ∗t ) is an issuer’s super-hedging strategy. By Proposition 7.10, this
will also imply the upper bound of (8.26).
Note that by the definition of σ∗t , for any u ≥ t,
u < σ∗t =⇒ Zu < Ŷu =⇒ ∆Ku+1 ≥ 0.
Consider the admissible strategy (φ, ζ) on [t, T ] from (8.22). We shall prove that ζu ≥ Zu
for u ∈ [t, σ∗t ] by induction. The base case is clear since ζt = Zt. Now assume ζu ≥ Zu.
Using the fact that F˜u,φ(ζu) = ζu − F (u, ζu, φu) is increasing, we have, for u ∈ [t, σ∗t ),
Zu+1 = F˜u,φ(Zu) + φu∆Nu+1 −∆Ku+1
≤ F˜u,φ(ζu) + φu∆Nu+1 −∆Ku+1
≤ F˜u,φ(ζu) + φu∆Nu+1
= ζu+1,
and the induction is complete. So ζu ≥ Zu for u ∈ [t, σ∗t ].
Suppose the issuer chooses the stopping time σ∗t while maintaining the portfolio (φ, ζ).
If the holder chooses the stopping time τ ∈ T[t,T ], the contract is settled at time τ ∧ σ∗t .
Using the fact that Zσ∗t = Ŷσ∗t (by the definition of σ
∗
t ) and X̂ ≤ Z ≤ Ŷ , we have
Zτ∧σ∗t = Zτ1{τ≤σ∗t } + Zσ∗t 1{τ>σ∗t } ≥ X̂τ1{τ≤σ∗t } + Ŷσ∗t 1{σ∗t<τ} = V̂ (τ, σ∗t ).
Hence
ζτ∧σ∗t ≥ Zτ∧σ∗t ≥ V̂ (τ, σ∗t ), ∀ τ ∈ T[t,T ]. (8.30)
Therefore, (φ, ζ, σ∗t ) is indeed an issuer’s super-hedging strategy.
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Using similar arguments on the holder’s DRBSDE(−X̂T , F ′, N,−Ŷ ,−X̂), we may con-
clude that the admissible strategy (φ′, ζ ′) from (8.23) satisfies ζ ′τ∗t ∧σ ≥ Z
′
τ∗t ∧σ ≥ −V̂ (τ
∗
t , σ).
Hence (φ′, ζ ′, τ∗t ) is a holder’s super-hedging strategy. By Proposition 7.10, since the market
is arbitrage-free, the lower bound of (8.26) must hold. This completes the proof.
Remark 8.17. The inequality (8.30) given by
ζτ∧σ∗t ≥ Zτ∧σ∗t ≥ V̂ (τ, σ∗t ), ∀ τ ∈ T[t,T ],
is the key result behind the proof of Theorem 8.16. It has the following interpretation.
Suppose the issuer chooses the stopping time σ∗t and the holder chooses τ .
• If the holder stops ‘too late’, then ζτ∧σ∗t > Zτ∧σ∗t .
• If the holder stops ‘too early’, then Zτ∧σ∗t > V̂ (τ, σ∗t ).
• If the holder stops ‘optimally’, then ζτ∧σ∗t = V̂ (τ, σ∗t ).
Note that sense of optimality mentioned above refers to the holder’s stopping decision from
the perspective of the issuer, which corresponds to the stopping time given by
min
{
u ∈ {t, t+ 1, . . . , T} |Zu = X̂u
}
,
associated with the issuer’s DRBSDE(X̂T , F,N, X̂, Ŷ ). Due to the existence of market
frictions, this is not the same as the holder’s actual optimal stopping time τ∗t , defined by
τ∗t = min
{
u ∈ {t, t+ 1, . . . , T} |Z ′u = −X̂u
}
,
associated with the holder’s DRBSDE(−X̂T , F ′, N,−Ŷ ,−X̂).
Remark 8.18. In general, the inequality −Z ′t ≤ Zt is not necessarily satisfied. Note that
Theorem 8.16 implies that if we have −Z ′t > Zt, then the arbitrage price does not exist.
In other words, it is not possible to trade GCC(X,Y ) without creating an arbitrage in
(B,S,GCC(X,Y )) (or (B,S, pit)).
Remark 8.19. In the special case where the cost function satisfies
F (t, Zt, φt) = −F (t,−Zt,−φt) = F ′(t, Zt, φt),
the issuer’s DRBSDE(X̂T , F,N, X̂, Ŷ ) and the holder’s DRBSDE(−X̂T , F ′, N,−Ŷ ,−X̂)
are equivalent. Then (Z, φ,K) = (−Z ′,−φ′,−K ′) and the discounted arbitrage price is
uniquely determined by −Z ′t = pit = Zt. And in the even more special case of a frictionless
market, obtained by setting F (t, Zt, φt) = 0, we recover the standard two-person game
option result of Theorem 6.35.
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8.3 Discrete-Time Multi-Dimensional Reflected BSDEs
There are many ways to generalise the one dimensional RBSDE to higher dimensions. The
exact formulation depends on the intended application. The main feature we would like to
preserve is the idea of ‘reflecting’ the solution process within the boundary of a convex set.
Denote by D an F-adapted region in Rm. Out first goal is to construct an RBSDE
whose solution process Z is bounded within the domain D in general settings. The main
difference here to a standard, unrestricted, BSDE is the presence of a reflection process J ,
which pushes the process Z into D.
Definition 8.20. Consider the following m-dimensional RBSDE with data (ξ,D, N, F,A)
Zt −
T−1∑
u=t
F (u, Zu, φu) +
T−1∑
u=t
φu∆Nu+1 − (JT − Jt) = ξ (8.31)
where
(i) for each t ∈ [0, T ], Dt : Ω→ B(Rm) is an F-adapted subset of Rm;
(ii) N : [0, T ]×Ω→ Rd is a (P,F)-martingale with the predictable representation property;
(iii) F : [0, T ]× Rm × Rm×d × Ω→ Rm is an F-adapted random map;
(iv) A : [0, T ]× Rm × Rm×d × Ω→ B(Rm) is an F-adapted subset of Rm;
(v) ξ : Ω→ Rm is an FT -measurable random vector satisfying ξ ∈ DT .
A solution of the RBSDE (8.31) is a triple (Z, φ, J) of processes such that:
(a) Z : [0, T ] × Ω → Rm is an F-adapted process such that equation (8.31) is satisfied for
every t = 0, . . . , T ; in particular, ZT = ξ;
(b) the condition Zt ∈ Dt is satisfied for every t = 0, . . . , T ;
(c) φ : [0, T ]× Ω→ Rm×d is an F-adapted process;
(d) J : [0, T ]× Ω→ Rm is an F-predictable process satisfying
∆Jt+1 = Jt+1 − Jt ∈ A(t, Zt, φt) ⊂ Rm. (8.32)
For fixed t, Z and φ, the function A(t, Zt, φt) specifies the subset of Rm from which ∆Jt+1
is chosen from.
Remark 8.21. Typically, we want the process J to only ‘activate’ if Z is on the boundary
of D, or ∂D. Explicitly, we have additional constraints
{0} = A(t, z, ·), for z ∈ D \ ∂D,
{0} ∈ A(t, z, ·), for z ∈ ∂D.
Proposition 8.22. Suppose F and A satisfy the following condition: for t = 0, . . . , T − 1
and all y ∈ Rm×d, we have⋃
z∈Dt
{
z − F (t, z, y)− x : x ∈ A(t, z, y)} = Rm. (8.33)
Then the RBSDE (8.31) has a solution (Z, φ, J). Moreover, if the union in (8.33) is
disjoint, then the solution (Z, φ, J) is unique, where the uniqueness of φ is in the sense of
N -uniqueness.
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Proof. In order to solve the RBSDE (8.31), we proceed via standard arguments, using the
backward induction. The time t equation reduces to
Zt − EP(Zt+1 | Ft)− F (t, Zt, φt)−∆Jt+1 = 0.
Incorporating the constraint of ∆Jt+1 ∈ A(t, Zt, φt), it reduces to
Zt − EP(Zt+1 | Ft)− F (t, Zt, φt) ∈ A(t, Zt, φt).
Since EP(Zt+1 | Ft) and φt are known at this stage, it is equivalent to solve for z in the
following deterministic problem,
z − p− F (z) ∈ A(z), z ∈ D (8.34)
where p is a constant, F (z) = F (t, z, φt), A(z) = A(t, z, φt) and D = Dt.
To solve (8.34), it suffices to find z such that p is contained in the set z − F (z)−A(z).
It is clear that a solution exists if condition (8.33), or⋃
z∈D
{
z − F (z)− x : x ∈ A(z)} = Rm,
is satisfied. Furthermore, if the union is disjoint, the choice of z and hence the solution to
the RBSDE is unique.
Definition 8.20 introduces a very general class of RBSDEs. In applications, we need to be
more specific about the choice of A(t, z, φt). For now A(t, z, φt) and Jt can be considered as
place-holders, which will be eventually replaced by explicit representations. The following
examples illustrate this.
Example 8.23. Consider the following choice of A(t, z, φt),
A(t, z, φt) =
{
λz ∈ Rm : λ ∈ R, λ ≥ 0}.
Then the condition of ∆Jt+1 ∈ A(t, z, φt) can be rewritten as ∆Jt+1 = ∆λt+1Zt where λ
is an increasing F-predictable process. Now the corresponding BSDE can be represented
without A(t, z, φt) or Jt:
Zt −
T−1∑
u=t
F (u, Zu, φu) +
T−1∑
u=t
φu∆Nu+1 −
T−1∑
u=t
∆λu+1Zu = ξ.
A solution triple would then be referring to (Z, φ, λ), and its uniqueness would be deter-
mined by the uniqueness of Z,
∑t−1
u=0 ∆λu+1Zu and the N -uniqueness of φ.
Example 8.24. Let k(i, j) where i, j ∈ M be positive constants which satisfy k(i, j) +
k(j, l) ≥ k(i, l) for i, j, l ∈M. Define the convex set
D =
{
x ∈ Rm : xi ≤ xj + k(i, j), ∀ i, j ∈M, j 6= i
}
.
If we set
A(t, z, φt) =
{−v ∈ Rm : v ≥ 0,1{zi<minj 6=i(zj+k(i,j))}vi = 0, ∀ i ∈M},
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then the corresponding BSDE would be
Zt −
T−1∑
u=t
F (u, Zu, φu) +
T−1∑
u=t
φu∆Nu+1 + (KT −Kt) = ξ,
where K is a non-decreasing Rm-valued process satisfying
T∑
t=0
1{Zit<minj 6=i(Zjt+k(i,j))}∆K
i
t+1 = 0
for i = 1, . . . ,m. This is in fact the discrete-time analogue of the BSDE with oblique
reflection presented in Hu and Tang [24].
One of the aim of this section is to introduce a new and useful class of multi-dimensional
RBSDEs which encompasses the notions of projections and reflections. But before we do
so, let us briefly review a related class of problems known as variational inequalities.
8.3.1 Variational Inequalities
In Section 5.1.1, we introduced the linear complementarity problem, which looks for a
vector z ∈ Rm satisfying
z ≥ 0, q +Mz ≥ 0, z · (q +Mz) = 0.
If the affine map q+Mz is replaced by a general map F , we have what is simply known as
a non-linear complementarity problem,
z ≥ 0, F (z) ≥ 0, z · F (z) = 0. (8.35)
In non-linear complementarity problems, the solution z is restricted in the orthant Rm+ .
Using the arguments from Proposition 5.13, we see that z is a solution to (8.35) if and only
if
F (z) · (y − z) ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ Rm+ .
This condition in fact allows us to generalise complementarity problems to an arbitrary set
D ⊂ Rm. The resulting class of problems is known as variational inequalities. An in-depth
analysis of variational inequalities can be found in Facchinei and Pang [16], while Harker
and Pang [23] provides a nice summary of the main results.
Definition 8.25 (Variational Inequalities). Let D be a subset of Rm and F :D → Rm be
a map. The variational inequality problem VI(D, F ) is to find a vector z ∈ D such that
F (z) · (y − z) ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ D.
Remark 8.26. Typically, D is assumed to be closed and convex, while F is assumed to be
continuous. The solution to VI(D, F ) is also the solution to the equation
z = piD
(
z − F (z)).
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If F is the affine map F (z) = q+Mz, then VI(Rm+ , F ) is equivalent to LCP(q,M). For
LCP(q,M), we have seen in Proposition 5.10 that if M is a P-matrix, then the existence
and uniqueness of solution is guaranteed. Similar existence and uniqueness results are also
known for VI(D, F ). In particular, Theorems 8.27 and 8.28 can be found in Harker and
Pang [23].
Theorem 8.27. Let D be a non-empty, closed, convex subset of Rm and let F :D → Rm
be a continuous mapping.
(i) If F is strictly monotone on D, that is,
(F (x)− F (y)) · (x− y) > 0, ∀x, y ∈ D, x 6= y,
then VI(D, F ) has at most one solution.
(ii) If F is strongly monotone on D, that is, there exists c > 0 such that
(F (x)− F (y)) · (x− y) ≥ c‖x− y‖2, ∀x, y ∈ D, x 6= y,
then VI(D, F ) has a unique solution.
Again consider the case of LCP(q,M) where F (z) = q +Mz. The property of F being
strictly (or strongly) monotone corresponds to M being a positive definite matrix. The
class of positive definite matrices is a proper subset of P-matrices, so Proposition 5.10 is
still a stronger result for LCP(q,M) than Theorem 8.27. However, if we restrict the shape
of D to a rectangular region (such as the orthant Rm+ ), there is a analogue of Proposition
5.10 for VI(D, F ). It involves P-functions, the generalisation of P-matrices to non-linear
functions.
A rectangular region is defined as follows. Let l, u ∈ Rm be vectors satisfying −∞ ≤
li ≤ ui ≤ ∞ for i = 1, . . . ,m. The rectangular region bounded by l and u is the set{
x ∈ Rm : l ≤ x ≤ u}.
Denote this rectangular region by O(l, u), or simply O. We have the following result
regarding VI(O, F ).
Theorem 8.28. Let O be a rectangular region in Rm and let F :O→ Rm be a continuous
mapping.
(i) If F is a P-function on O, that is,
max
1≤i≤m
(Fi(x)− Fi(y))(xi − yi) > 0, ∀x, y ∈ O, x 6= y, (8.36)
then VI(O, F ) has at most one solution.
(ii) If F is a uniform P-function on O, that is, there exists c > 0 such that
max
1≤i≤m
(Fi(x)− Fi(y))(xi − yi) ≥ c‖x− y‖2, ∀x, y ∈ D, x 6= y,
then VI(O, F ) has a unique solution.
The property of a P-function as described by (8.36) is analogous to the ‘non-reversing’
property of the P-matrix from Lemma 5.9
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8.3.2 BSDE based on Variational Inequalities
Now we are in a position to define a class of RBSDEs based on variational inequalities. For
each t, let Dt be an Ft-measurable, non-empty, closed, convex region. For the remainder of
this section, define A(t, z, φt) by
A(t, z, φt) =
{
G(t, z, φt, k) ∈ Rm : k ∈ Rm, k · (z′ − z) ≥ 0, ∀ z′ ∈ Dt
}
, (8.37)
where G is an F-adapted map. The RBSDE(ξ,D, N, F,A) from Definition 8.20 can then be
written as
Zt −
T−1∑
u=t
F (u, Zu, φu) +
T−1∑
u=t
φu∆Nu+1 −
T−1∑
u=t
G(u, Zu, φu,∆Kt+1) = ξ, (8.38)
where the F-predictable, Rm-valued process K satisfies
∆Kt+1 · (Z ′ − Zt) ≥ 0, ∀Z ′ ∈ Dt. (8.39)
Recall Proposition 8.22, solving the RBSDE (8.38) can be reduced to solving a de-
terministic problem via backward induction. Fix t, ω and φt. Consider the deterministic
functions F (z) = F (t, z, φt), G(z, k) = G(t, z, φt, k) and the deterministic region D = Dt.
For some given p ∈ Rm, we want to find (z, k) ∈ Rm × Rm such that
z − F (z)−G(z, k) = p, z ∈ D, (8.40)
k · (z′ − z) ≥ 0, ∀ z′ ∈ D.
If it is known further that, for any fixed z, G is a bijective map in k with inverse G−1z ,
then we may write k = F˜ (z) = G−1z (z − F (z) − p), which reduces (8.40) to finding z ∈ D
such that
F˜ (z) · (z′ − z) ≥ 0, ∀ z′ ∈ D.
This is precisely the variational inequality VI(D, F˜ ). We can then apply known results in
variational inequalities, such as Theorems 8.27 and 8.28, to find conditions on F˜ (and hence
F and G) for the existence and uniqueness of solutions.
Example 8.29 (Projection in a Convex Domain). In Petit and Pardoux [43], a BSDE with
projection in a convex domain is presented. A discrete-time analogue can be reproduced
under the formulation of (8.38), by setting G(t, z, φt, k) = k. We then obtain the following
RBSDE.
For each t ∈ [0, T ], let Dt : Ω → B(Rm) be an F-adapted, closed, convex subset of Rm.
Consider the following m-dimensional RBSDE with data (ξ,D, N, F )
Zt −
T−1∑
u=t
F (u, Zu, φu) +
T−1∑
u=t
φu∆Nu+1 − (KT −Kt) = ξ (8.41)
with solution triple (Z, φ,K). Apart from the usual conditions onN,F,Z and φ as described
in Definition 8.20, we also require K to be an F-predictable process which satisfies
∆Kt+1 · (Z ′ − Zt) ≥ 0, ∀Z ′ ∈ Dt. (8.42)
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Applying Theorem 8.27, there exists a unique solution to the RBSDE (8.41) if F˜ (z) =
z − F (t, z, φt) − p is continuous and strongly monotone for all t, φt and p. This translates
to the following sufficient condition. For any t and φt, there exists c > 0 such that
(F (x)− F (y)) · (x− y) ≤ (1− c)‖x− y‖2, ∀x, y ∈ D, x 6= y.
8.3.3 Reflected BSDE in a Rectangular Region
In the case where Dt is chosen to be a rectangular region{
(x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Rm : Lit ≤ xi ≤ U it , 1 ≤ i ≤ m
}
for −∞ ≤ L ≤ U ≤ ∞, its boundary is made up of (m − 1)-dimensional faces. The set A
can be chosen as
A(t, z, φt) =
{
G(t, z, φt, k) ∈ Rm : k ∈ Rm, k · (z′ − z) ≥ 0, ∀ z′ ∈ Dt
}
.
Since Dt is a rectangular region, it is easy to show that, for z ∈ Dt,{
k ∈ Rm : k · (z′ − z) ≥ 0, z′ ∈ Dt
}
=
{
k ∈ Rm : 1{z>Lt} · k+ = 1{z<Ut} · k− = 0
}
. (8.43)
The equality in (8.43) is precisely the link between variational inequalities and non-linear
complementarity problems for rectangular regions.
This is reminiscent of the one dimensional DRBSDE, but here the upper and lower
boundaries are employed in every component. The ith components of k+ and k− are only
active when the solution process reaches the boundaries Li and U i, respectively. We will
now formally define the relevant RBSDE.
Definition 8.30. Given Rm-valued processes L and U satisfying −∞ ≤ L ≤ U ≤ ∞ for
i = 1, . . . ,m, let the rectangular region bounded by L and U be denoted by
Ot =
{
(x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Rm : Lit ≤ xi ≤ U it , 1 ≤ i ≤ m
}
for t = 0, . . . , T . Consider the following m-dimensional RBSDE with data (ξ, F,N,L, U,G),
Zt −
T−1∑
u=t
F (u, Zu, φu) +
T−1∑
u=t
φu∆Nu+1 − (JT − Jt) = ξ, (8.44)
where
(i) N is an Rd-valued, (P,F)-martingale with the predictable representation property;
(ii) F is an F-adapted, Rm-valued random map;
(iii) G is an F-adapted, Rm-valued random map;
(iv) L and U are F-adapted Rm-valued processes with Li ≤ U i for i = 1, . . . ,m;
(v) ξ is an FT -measurable random variable in Rm with LiT ≤ ξi ≤ U iT for i = 1, . . . ,m.
A solution of the RBSDE (8.44) is a triplet (Z, φ, J) of processes such that:
(a) Z is an F-adapted, Rm-valued process such that equation (8.44) is satisfied for every
t = 0, . . . , T ; in particular, ZT = ξ,
(b) the condition Zt ∈ Ot is satisfied for every t = 0, . . . , T ;
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(c) φ is an F-adapted, Rm×d-valued process;
(d) J is an F-predictable, Rm-valued process satisfying
Jt =
t−1∑
u=0
G(u, Zu, φu,∆Ku+1). (8.45)
Futhermore, the F-predictable, Rm-valued process K satisfies
∆Kt+1 · (Z ′ − Zt) ≥ 0 ∀Z ′ ∈ Ot (8.46)
for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1.
Remark 8.31. As mentioned earlier in (8.43), we could replace (8.46) by
T−1∑
t=0
1{Zt>Lt} ·∆K+t+1 =
T−1∑
t=0
1{Zt<Ut} ·∆K−t+1 = 0.
where ∆Ki+t+1 = ∆K
i
t+11{∆Kit+1>0} and ∆K
i−
t+1 = −∆Kit+11{∆Kit+1<0} for each i = 1, . . . ,m.
Typically, the role of ∆K+ (resp. ∆K−) is to push the solution process up towards L
(resp. down towards U). So G is usually chosen so that ∆K and ∆J = G(u, Zu, φu,∆Ku+1)
do not point in the ‘opposite’ directions. In other words, k ·G(t, z, φt, k) ≥ 0.
If the function G(t, z, y, k) has an inverse G−1t,z,y with respect to k, we could once again
reduce the RBSDE from Definition 8.30 to the variational inequality problem VI(Ot, F˜ ),
where F˜ is defined by F˜ (z) = G−1t,z,φt(z − F (t, z, y) − p). Theorem 8.27 showed that F˜ (z)
being strongly monotone guarantees the existence and uniqueness of solutions. But since
the region Ot is a rectangular region rather than an arbitrary convex set, it suffices to use
the more relaxed condition from Theorem 8.27, that is, F˜ (z) being a uniform P-function.
8.4 Multi-Person Stopping Games and Game Options
Now we will apply the multi-dimensional RBSDE from the previous section to multi-person
affine stopping games and affine game contingent claims.
8.4.1 Affine Stopping Games
In Section 8.2, we discussed the connection between DRBSDEs and two-player Dynkin
games. Whenever KL (resp. KU ) is positive, it represents the amount to be gained if the
max-player (resp. min-player) chooses to stop. To generalise this notion to m person games
and multi-dimensional reflected BSDEs, the processes K1, . . . ,Km should serve a similar
purpose, while the process J captures the deviation of the payoff vector due to stopping.
In Section 5.3.2, we introduced the m-player affine stopping game ASGt(X,G) on [t, T ],
where X is an F-adapted vector and G is a K†-matrix. Each player selects a stopping
time sit ∈ T[t,T ] to make up the strategy profile st ∈ St. The minimal stopping time is
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ϑt = s
1
t ∧ · · · ∧ smt and the set of exercising players is E = E(st) = {i ∈ M : sit = ϑt}. The
payoff at time ϑt is recursively defined by
V iϑt(st) =
{
Xiϑt , i ∈ E ,
EP
(
V ∗iϑt+1
∣∣Fϑt)+GiE(GEE)−1(XEϑt − EP(V ∗Eϑt+1 ∣∣Fϑt)), i /∈ E .
Here V ∗ϑt+1 is the value of ASGϑt+1(X,G). In fact, the payoff vector be simply written as
Vϑt(st) = EP
(
V ∗ϑt+1
∣∣Fϑt)+G·E(GEE)−1(XEϑt − EP(V ∗Eϑt+1 ∣∣Fϑt)),
with the convention of V ∗T+1 = XT and G·M
(
GMM
)−1
= I (in case G is singular). The
expected payoff at time t is given by Vt(st) = EP
(
Vϑt(st)
∣∣Ft).
Definition 8.30 presented a general RBSDE in a rectangular region based on variational
inequalities. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, the single period dynamic of the affine stop-
ping game reduces to solving a particular linear complementarity problem. Since linear
complementarity problems are special cases of variational inequalities, it should be of no
surprise that the value process of the affine stopping game can be computed by solving a
reflected BSDE based on a variational inequality.
In particular, we will be restricting to the case of G being a (non-singular) K-matrix,
since linear complementarity problems with singular matrices may fail to have a solution.
The following RBSDE is a simplified version of the RBSDE from Definition 8.30, where
F (t, z, φ) = 0, L = X, U =∞, G(u, z, φ, k) = Gk and a martingale N is omitted.
Definition 8.32. Suppose X is an F-adapted Rm-valued process and G ∈ Rm×m is a
K-matrix. The simplified RBSDE(X,G) is given by
ZT = XT , Zt − Jt+1 + Jt = EP(Zt+1 | Ft). (8.47)
A solution is a pair (Z, J) which satisfies:
(i) Z is an F-adapted, Rm-valued process satisfying Zt ∈ Ot (or Zt ≥ Xt).
(ii) J is an F-predictable, Rm-valued process satisfying
Jt =
t−1∑
u=0
G∆Ku+1 (8.48)
where K is an F-predictable, Rm-valued, non-decreasing process satisfying
T−1∑
t=0
1{Zt>Xt} ·∆Kt+1 = 0. (8.49)
Proposition 8.33. The simplified RBSDE(X,G) in Definition 8.32 has a unique solution
pair (Z, J). Moreover, Z = V ∗ where V ∗ is the value process of ASG(X,G).
Proof. Under the standard backward induction arguments used throughout this chapter,
solving the BSDE(X,G) reduces to the following deterministic problem:
z −Gk = p, z ≥ x, k ≥ 0, 1{z>x}k = 0,
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where z = Zt, k = ∆Kt+1, x = Xt. This is now equivalent to LCP(p− x,G) (or VI(Ot, F˜ )
where F˜ (z) = G−1(z−p)). Since G is a K-matrix (and thus also P-matrix), by Proposition
5.10, there exists a unique solution z.
We conclude that the solution Zt may be written as ZT = XT and
Zt = SOL
(
Xt,EP(Zt+1 | Ft), Gt
)
.
By Theorem 5.32, this is the value process of ASG(X,G).
8.4.2 Affine Game Options under Market Frictions
In Section 8.2.2, we presented bounds for the arbitrage price of a two-person game con-
tingent claim with the presence of market frictions (or cost of trading). In this section,
we will explore how market frictions affects both the definition and valuation of an affine
game contingent claim. The affine game contingent claim AGC(X,G) was first introduced
in Section 7.4.1.
We work under the discrete-time market model as described in Section 8.2.2. Aside
from the market being complete and arbitrage-free in (B,S), we also have the cost function
F , as defined by Definition 8.12. In particular, the Ft-measurable cost function F (t, ζt, φt)
represents the discounted cost of holding a portfolio of stocks specified by φt with the
discounted wealth of ζt (before the cost deduction) during [t, t+ 1].
We also work under Assumptions 8.13 and 8.14. Assumption 8.13 states that all market
participants are subject to the same cost function F . Assumption 8.14 postulates that the
map φt → F (t, ζt, φt) is invariant under N -equivalences and the map ζt → ζt − F (t, ζt, φt)
is bijective and increasing.
As before, if t and φ are known, define F˜t,φ(ζt) := ζt − F (t, ζt, φt). Since Assumption
8.14 specifies that F˜t,φ is bijective, we may denote its inverse by F˜
−1
t,φ . The function F˜
−1
t,φ
represents the required initial wealth to hold the portfolio of stocks φt, before the cost
deduction. The same notation will be used in the multi-dimensional case. As a slight abuse
of notation, if z ∈ Rm and y ∈ Rm×d, the functions F (t, z, y), F˜t,y(z) and F˜−1t,y (z) take
values in Rm, where each component is independently defined in the obvious way. For
example, for each i = 1, . . . ,m, we have F i(t, z, y) = F (t, zi, yi·).
The main challenge here is to find a suitable extension of the affine game contingent
claim AGCt(X,G) in the presence of market frictions. In the definition of AGCt(X,G) for
a frictionless market (Definition 7.43), the payoff function is given by
V̂ϑt(st) = piϑt,ϑt+1 +G·E
(
GEE
)−1(
X̂Eϑt − piEϑt,ϑt+1
)
.
The term piϑt,ϑt+1 = EQ(piϑt+1 | Fϑt) represents the discounted time ϑt price of the claim
AGCϑt+1(X,G). This price is obtained by taking the conditional expectation under the
martingale measure Q because the discounted wealth process of any replicating portfolio
is a Q-martingale. But if we have cost of trading, this is no longer the case. The wealth
processes of any replicating strategies must factor in the additional cost. There are two
main approaches to reconcile this issue.
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Payoff Settlement before Cost Deduction
The natural approach is to redefine the discount time ϑt price of AGCϑt+1(X,G) as
piϑt,ϑt+1 = F˜
−1
ϑt,φ
(
EQ(piϑt+1 | Fϑt)
)
, (8.50)
and use it to compute the payoff. Here φ satisfies φϑt∆Nϑt+1 = piϑt+1 − EQ(piϑt+1 | Fϑt).
The term piϑt,ϑt+1 from (8.50) can be interpreted as the discounted wealth required at time
ϑt to replicate piϑt+1 at time ϑt + 1. Then the corresponding discounted payoff function of
the affine game contingent claim AGCt(X,G) is given by
V̂ϑt(st) = F˜
−1
ϑt,φ
(
EQ(piϑt+1 | Fϑt)
)
+G·E
(
GEE
)−1(
X̂Eϑt − F˜−1ϑt,φ
(
EQ(piEϑt+1 | Fϑt)
))
. (8.51)
with the usual conventions of piT+1 = XT and G·M
(
GMM
)−1
= I.
Recall in two-person game options with cost of trading, the existence and uniqueness of
the arbitrage price is not guaranteed. However, as mentioned in Remark 8.18, if it is known
that the cost function satisfies F (t, ζt, φt) = −F (t,−ζt,−φt), then there exists a unique
arbitrage price. In the current context of multi-person affine game option AGCt(X,G), since
the recursive payoff definition relies on the existence and uniqueness of piϑt+1 (the price of
AGCϑt+1(X,G)), it makes sense to only consider cost functions which satisfy F (t, ζt, φt) =
−F (t,−ζt,−φt). So let us take this condition as a standing assumption in this section, with
the hope of inducing a unique arbitrage price for AGCt(X,G).
Assumption 8.34. The cost function F satisfies F (t, ζt, φt) = −F (t,−ζt,−φt) for all
t ∈ [0, T ].
Before presenting Theorem 8.36, the main result on the arbitrage pricing of AGCt(X,G),
we require the following preliminary result regarding a particular multi-dimensional RBSDE
which will be used to model the arbitrage price process.
Proposition 8.35. The multi-dimensional RBSDE(X,F,N,G) given by
Zt −
T−1∑
u=t
F (u, Zu −G∆Ku+1, φu) +
T−1∑
u=t
φu∆Nu+1 −
T−1∑
u=t
G∆Ku+1 = X̂T , (8.52)
Zt ≥ X̂t,
T−1∑
t=0
1{Zt>X̂t}∆Kt+1 = 0. (8.53)
has a unique solution (Z, φ,K). In particular, the process Z satisfies ZT = X̂T and
Zt = SOL
(
X̂t, F˜
−1
t,φ
(
EQ(Zt+1 | Ft)
)
, G
)
, t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1. (8.54)
Here the notation SOL represents the unique Nash equilibrium payoff of the single period
affine game AG
(
X̂t, F˜
−1
t,φ
(
EQ(Zt+1 | Ft)
)
, G
)
. This is equivalent to the statement that Zt −
X̂t is the solution of LCP
(
F˜−1t,φ
(
EQ(Zt+1 | Ft)
)− X̂t, G).
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Proof. We will again be using the standard backward induction argument. The base case is
given by ZT = X̂T . By taking conditional expectation of the one-period equation between
t and t+ 1, we see that the process φ is determined up to N -equivalences by the equation
φt ∆Nt+1 = Zt+1 − EQ(Zt+1 | Ft).
The RBSDE is then reduced to the following deterministic problem:
z −Gk = p, z ≥ x, k ≥ 0, 1{z>x}k = 0,
where z = Zt, k = ∆Kt+1, x = X̂t and p = F˜
−1
t,φ
(
EQ(Zt+1 | Ft)
)
. This is equivalent to
LCP(p − x,G). Since G is a K-matrix (and hence P-matrix), by Proposition 5.10, there
exists a unique solution z and it is given by (8.54).
Since the existence and uniqueness of a solution (Z, φ,K) of the BSDE is now estab-
lished, we may define the following optimal stopping times. For any fixed t ∈ [0, T ], let us
introduce the following notation for each i ∈M. First, we define the stopping time
τ it = inf
{
u ∈ [t, T ] : Ziu = X̂iu
}
. (8.55)
As a slight abuse of notation, we will write σ−it to denote both the stopping strategy
(τ jt : j 6= i) ∈ S−i as well as the minimal stopping time
∧
j 6=i τ
j
t . The exact usage should
be clear from the context.
Next, for each i ∈ M, define the admissible trading strategies (φi·, ζi) on [t, T ] whose
stock holdings is specified by φi· and the discounted time t investment is given by Zit . The
discounted wealth processes ζi is given by the forward equation
ζit = Z
i
t , ζ
i
v = Z
i
t −
v−1∑
u=t
F (u, ζiu, φ
i·
u) +
v−1∑
u=t
φi·u∆Nu+1. (8.56)
Under Assumption 8.34, F (u, ζiu, φ
i·
u) = −F (u,−ζiu,−φi·u) and it is clear that (−φi·,−ζi) is
also an admissible trading strategy. In particular its discounted wealth process −ζi is given
by the forward equation
−ζit = −Zit , −ζiv = −Zit −
v−1∑
u=t
F (u,−ζiu,−φi·u)−
v−1∑
u=t
φi·u∆Nu+1. (8.57)
So as the notation suggests, (−φi·,−ζi) is exactly the negative of (φi·, ζi) and its admissi-
bility is implied by Assumption 8.34. Now we present the pricing result for an affine game
option under market friction.
Theorem 8.36. Suppose Assumption 8.34 holds and the market is arbitrage free. If tranche
i of AGCt(X,G) is traded at the discounted price of pi
i
t at time t, then Z
i
t = pi
i
t. Furthermore,
(φi·, ζi, σ−it ) is an issuer’s super-hedging strategy while (−φi·,−ζi, τ it ) is a holder’s super-
hedging strategy.
Proof. First note that if t = T , then the contract is stopped and settled at time T with
ZT = V̂T (sT ) = XT . All statements hold trivially. So we will assume, by backward
induction, that the statements hold for AGCt+1(X,G). Let us consider AGCt(X,G) and
186 Chapter 8: Multi-Dimensional Reflected BSDEs
let us fix some i ∈ M. It suffices to show that (φi·, ζi, σ−it ) is an issuer’s super-hedging
strategy while (−φi·,−ζi, τ it ) is a holder’s super-hedging strategy, since then Proposition
7.10 tells us that under an arbitrage-free market,
Zt = −(−ζit) ≤ piit ≤ ζit = Zt,
and the equality Zit = pi
i
t is established.
Consider the admissible trading strategy (φi·, ζi) on the interval [t, T ] defined by (8.56),
we will prove the following inequalities:
ζiu ≤ Ziu, u ∈ [t, τ it ]; (8.58)
ζiu ≥ Ziu, u ∈ [t, σ−it ], (8.59)
by a forward induction on u ∈ [t, T ]. Note that this induction is on u ∈ [t, T ], nested inside
the main backward induction on t. The base case is clear since ζit = Z
i
t . The one period
increment of the BSDE (8.52) can be written as
F˜u,φi·(Z
i
u −Gi·∆Ku+1) + φi·u∆Nu+1 = Ziu+1.
Since F˜u,φi· is increasing, it is useful to determine the sign ofGi·∆Ku+1. From the definitions
of the stopping times τ it and σ
−i
t , we have
u < τ it =⇒ Ziu > X̂iu =⇒ ∆Kiu+1 = 0; (8.60)
u < σ−it =⇒ ∆Kju+1 = 0, ∀ j 6= i. (8.61)
Now recall that G is a K-matrix, which means Gii > 0 and Gij ≤ 0 for j 6= i. Since
∆Ku+1 ≥ 0, (8.60) and (8.61) imply
Gi·∆Ku+11{u<τ it} ≤ 0, Gi·∆Ku+11{u<σ−it } ≥ 0. (8.62)
Back to the induction, first we establish (8.58). For u ∈ [t, τ it ), we have
ζiu+1 = F˜u,φi·(ζ
i
u) + φ
i·
u∆Nu+1
≤ F˜u,φi·(Ziu) + φi·u∆Nu+1
≤ F˜u,φi·(Ziu −Gi·∆Ku+1) + φi·u∆Nu+1
= Ziu+1.
To show that (8.59) holds, it suffices to note that all the inequalities above can be reversed
for u ∈ [t, σ−it ). This completes the induction on u, proving (8.58) and (8.59).
Let us now return to the main backward induction, where we are trying to show that
(φi·, ζi, σ−it ) and (−φi·,−ζi, τ it ) are issuer’s and holder’s super-hedging strategies, respec-
tively. In view of (8.58) and (8.59), the problem can be reduced to the following inequalities:
Zi
σ−it ∧τ
≥ V̂ i
σ−it ∧τ
(σ−it , τ), ∀ τ ∈ Sit = T[t,T ], (8.63)
Ziτ it∧σ ≤ V̂
i
τ it∧σ(σ, τ
i
t ), ∀σ ∈ S−it = T m−1[t,T ] . (8.64)
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In these statements, we may assume, without loss of generality, that σ−it ∧τ = τ it ∧σ = t, as
otherwise the argument is reduced to the analysis of AGCt+1(X,G), which may be included
in the inductive hypothesis.
Since AGCt(X,G) is stopped at time t and the inductive hypothesis gives us Zt+1 =
pit+1, the discounted payoff may be written as
V̂t(st) = F˜
−1
t,φ
(
EQ(Zt+1 | Ft)
)
+G·E
(
GEE
)−1(
X̂Et − F˜−1t,φ
(
EQ(ZEt+1 | Ft)
))
, (8.65)
where E is the set of tranches stopping at time t. Also, it is worth noting that φ here satisfies
φt ∆Nt+1 = pit+1−EQ(pit+1 | Ft) = Zt+1−EQ(Zt+1 | Ft), which is consistent with the φ from
the RBSDE. Now the payoff in (8.65) is equivalent to the payoff of the single period affine
game AG
(
X̂t, F˜
−1
t,φ
(
EQ(Zt+1 | Ft)
)
, G
)
. But recall (8.54) from Proposition 8.35, Zt is the
unique Nash equilibrium payoff of this affine game. Moreover, since G is a K-matrix, this
affine game is WUC and Zt must be its value. By the property of the affine game, as well as
the construction (8.55) of τt, we see that (σ
−i
t , τ
i
t ) corresponds to an optimal equilibrium.
Inequalities (8.63) and (8.64) now follow immediately from the properties of the value and
the optimal equilibrium.
Finally, the combination of (8.58), (8.59), (8.63) and (8.64) gives us the required super-
hedging properties:
ζi
σ−it ∧τ
≥ Zi
σ−it ∧τ
≥ V̂ i
σ−it ∧τ
(σ−it , τ), ∀ τ ∈ Sit = T[t,T ],
ζiτ it∧σ ≤ Z
i
τ it∧σ ≤ V̂
i
τ it∧σ(σ, τ
i
t ), ∀σ ∈ S−it = T m−1[t,T ] .
This completes the induction and thus ends the proof.
Payoff Settlement after Cost Deduction
In the previous formulation of AGC(X,G) where payoff settlement occurs before cost de-
ductions, the driver term of the RBSDE, F (u, Zu − G∆Ku+1, φu), depends on the term
G∆Ku+1. This is different to the usual RBSDE formulations found in the current chapter,
where the driver terms did not depend on K. It is then natural to ask whether a more
‘standard’ RBSDE, whose driver term is given by F (u, Zu, φu), can be used to model an
alternate variant of AGC(X,G) in the presence of market frictions. The answer will be
given here.
Instead of converting the price piϑt+1 to its pre-cost value, F˜
−1
ϑt,φ
(
EQ(piϑt+1 | Fϑt)
)
, before
payoff calculation, we shall instead convert the time ϑt payoffs, V̂ϑt(st) and X̂ϑt , to their
post-cost values for payoff calculation. In particular, the payoff is given by the equation
F˜ϑt,φ
(
V̂ϑt(st)
)
= EQ(piϑt+1 | Fϑt) +G·E
(
GEE
)−1(
F˜ϑt,φ
(
X̂Eϑt
)− EQ(piEϑt+1 | Fϑt))
or, equivalently,
V̂ϑt(st) = F˜
−1
ϑt,φ
(
EQ(piϑt+1 | Fϑt) +G·E
(
GEE
)−1(
F˜ϑt,φ
(
X̂Eϑt
)− EQ(piEϑt+1 | Fϑt))),
where φ satisfies φϑt∆Nϑt+1 = piϑt+1 − EQ(piϑt+1 | Fϑt). This formulation is arguably less
natural than the previous one. Nevertheless, it retains an important feature that the holder
of any stopped tranche i ∈ E receives X̂iϑt .
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If the function F˜t,φ (and hence F ) is known to be linear, then this formulation equiv-
alent to the previous one. It should not be surprising that all the important results from
previous formulation have analogous versions here with similar proofs. For brevity, in the
proofs to follow, we will only explain in detail the differences in comparison to the previous
formulation.
As already mentioned, the RBSDE used to model AGC(X,G) is the ‘standard’ one in
which the driver term F (u, Zu, φu) does not depend on ∆Ku+1.
Proposition 8.37. The RBSDE(X,F,N,G) given by
Zt −
T−1∑
u=t
F (u, Zu, φu) +
T−1∑
u=t
φu∆Nu+1 −
T−1∑
u=t
G∆Ku+1 = X̂T , (8.66)
Zt ≥ X̂t,
T−1∑
t=0
1{Zt>X̂t}∆Kt+1 = 0. (8.67)
has a unique solution (Z, φ,K). In particular, the process Z satisfies ZT = X̂T and
F˜t,φ(Zt) = SOL
(
F˜t,φ
(
X̂t
)
,EQ(Zt+1 | Ft), G
)
, t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1. (8.68)
Here the notation SOL represents the unique Nash equilibrium payoff of the single period
affine game AG
(
F˜t,φ
(
X̂t
)
,EQ(Zt+1 | Ft), G
)
. Equivalently, F˜t,φ(Zt)− F˜t,φ
(
X̂t
)
is the solu-
tion of LCP
(
EQ(Zt+1 | Ft)− F˜t,φ
(
X̂t
)
, G
)
.
Proof. Similarly as in the proof of Proposition 8.35, the standard backward induction ar-
gument quickly reduces the problem to:
F˜ (z)−Gk = p, F˜ (z) ≥ F˜ (x), k ≥ 0, 1{F˜ (z)>F˜ (x)}k = 0,
where z = Zt, k = ∆Kt+1, x = X̂t, p = EQ(Zt+1 | Ft) and F˜ = F˜t,φ. This in turn is
equivalent to LCP(p − F˜ (x), G). Since G is a K-matrix, by Proposition 5.10, the unique
solution F˜ (z) is given by (8.68) and the bijectivity of F˜ is invoked to determine z uniquely.
As before, once the solution (Z, φ,K) of the RBSDE is established, we may define the
following terms for each i ∈M and t ∈ [0, T ]:
τ it = inf
{
u ∈ [t, T ] : Ziu = X̂iu
}
, (8.69)
ζit = Z
i
t , ζ
i
v = Z
i
t −
v−1∑
u=t
F (u, ζiu, φ
i·
u) +
v−1∑
u=t
φi·u∆Nu+1, (8.70)
−ζit = −Zit , −ζiv = −Zit −
v−1∑
u=t
F (u,−ζiu,−φi·u)−
v−1∑
u=t
φi·u∆Nu+1. (8.71)
Here, τ it is an optimal stopping times and (φ
i·, ζi) is an admissible trading strategy. Under
Assumption 8.34, F (u, ζiu, φ
i·
u) = −F (u,−ζiu,−φi·u), so the trading strategy (−φi·,−ζi) is
admissible as well. We are in a position to present the pricing result for AGC(X,G).
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Theorem 8.38. Suppose Assumption 8.34 holds and the market is arbitrage free. If tranche
i of AGCt(X,G) is traded at the discounted price of pi
i
t at time t, then Z
i
t = pi
i
t. Furthermore,
(φi·, ζi, σ−it ) is an issuer’s super-hedging strategy while (−φi·,−ζi, τ it ) is a holder’s super-
hedging strategy.
Proof. The proof here is analogous to the proof of Theorem 8.36, so we will only highlight
the differences. Backward induction on t will be used. The base case of t = T is trivial. The
aim is to show that (φi·, ζi, σ−it ) is an issuer’s super-hedging strategy while (−φi·,−ζi, τ it ) is
a holder’s super-hedging strategy, since then Proposition 7.10 implies the equality Zit = pi
i
t.
Once again, there are two main steps. First, we will establish the following inequalities:
ζiu ≤ Ziu, u ∈ [t, τ it ], (8.72)
ζiu ≥ Ziu, u ∈ [t, σ−it ], (8.73)
using a forward induction on u ∈ [t, T ]. The base case u = t is trivial. Using the same
argument as for (8.62), we obtain
Gi·∆Ku+11{u<τ it} ≤ 0, Gi·∆Ku+11{u<σ−it } ≥ 0.
To establish (8.72), we note that for u ∈ [t, τ it ),
ζiu+1 = F˜u,φi·(ζ
i
u) + φ
i·
u∆Nu+1
≤ F˜u,φi·(Ziu) + φi·u∆Nu+1
≤ F˜u,φi·(Ziu) + φi·u∆Nu+1 −Gi·∆Ku+1
= Ziu+1.
To show that (8.73) holds as well, it suffices to note that all the inequalities above are
reversed for u ∈ [t, σ−it ). Thus we have proven (8.72) and (8.73), and completed the first
step. The next step is to prove the inequalities:
Zi
σ−it ∧τ
≥ V̂ i
σ−it ∧τ
(σ−it , τ), ∀ τ ∈ Sit = T[t,T ], (8.74)
Ziτ it∧σ ≤ V̂
i
τ it∧σ(σ, τ
i
t ), ∀σ ∈ S−it = T m−1[t,T ] . (8.75)
Since F˜t,φ is a strictly increasing function, it is equivalent to prove that
F˜σ−it ∧τ ,φ
(
Zi
σ−it ∧τ
) ≥ F˜σ−it ∧τ ,φ(V̂ iσ−it ∧τ (σ−it , τ)), ∀ τ ∈ Sit = T[t,T ], (8.76)
F˜τ it∧σ,φ
(
Ziτ it∧σ
) ≤ F˜τ it∧σ,φ(V̂ iτ it∧σ(σ, τ it )), ∀σ ∈ S−it = T m−1[t,T ] . (8.77)
By the inductive hypothesis, we may assume, without loss of generality, that σ−it ∧ τ =
τ it ∧ σ = t. In other words, AGCt(X,G) is stopped at time t. Also from the inductive
hypothesis, we have Zt+1 = pit+1. Hence the discounted payoff satisfies
F˜t,φ
(
V̂t(st)
)
= EQ(Zt+1 | Ft) +G·E
(
GEE
)−1(
F˜t,φ
(
X̂Et
)− EQ(ZEt+1 | Ft)), (8.78)
where E is the set of tranches stopped at time t.
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Now the right-hand side of (8.78) is equivalent to the payoff of the single period affine
game AG
(
F˜t,φ
(
X̂Et
)
,EQ(Zt+1 | Ft), G
)
. But from (8.68) of Proposition 8.37 and the fact
that G is a K-matrix, this affine game is WUC and F˜t,φ(Zt) is its unique value. By the
construction (8.69) of τt, we see that (σ
−i
t , τ
i
t ) corresponds to an optimal equilibrium. The
inequalities (8.76) and (8.77) follow immediately from the properties of the value and the
optimal equilibrium, as well as the fact that F˜ is bijective.
Finally, the combination of (8.72), (8.73), (8.74) and (8.75) yields the required super-
hedging properties, thus completing the induction and the proof of the theorem.
Remark 8.39. We required G to be a K-matrix, so that we can apply BSDE argu-
ments. But, in general, the two formulations of the affine game contingent claim are still
consistent if G is allowed to be a K†-matrix, provided that we adopt the convention of
G·M
(
GMM
)−1
= I to address the possibility of G being singular, even though the current
BSDE method no longer applies.
Remark 8.40. If the cost function is non-linear, the two versions of AGC(X,G) under
market frictions are not equivalent. If there are only two tranches
G =
(
1 −1
−1 1
)
and X1 +X2 ≤ 0, then we recover the two-person (zero-sum) contingent claim from Section
8.2.2. Interestingly, in this case the two formulations (payoff settlement either before or
after cost deduction) are actually equivalent. To see this, we argue as follows:
(i) If, without loss of generality, the holder of tranche 1 stops, then the payoff vector will
be (X̂1ϑt ,−X̂1ϑt) in both formulations.
(ii) The two corresponding RBSDEs reduce to the following two VIs or LCPs:
F˜ (z − k) = p, x1 ≤ z ≤ x2, k+(z − x1) = k−(x2 − z) = 0; (8.79)
F˜ (z)− k = p, x1 ≤ z ≤ x2, k+(z − x1) = k−(x2 − z) = 0, (8.80)
where p, x1, x2 are constants and F˜ is bijective and increasing. If we write k
′ = F˜ (z) −
F˜ (z − k), then the variables k′ and k have the same sign. Now, let us note that (z, k) is a
solution of the (8.79) if and only if (z, k′) is a solution of (8.80). In particular, both have
the same solution in z and thus both RBSDEs have the same solution process.
Remark 8.41. In principle, it would be possible to postulate that each holder has a
different cost function F i(t, z, y). Under Assumption 8.14, the function F˜ it,y(z) = z −
F i(t, z, y) is bijective in z, so both formulations of the affine game contingent claim are still
valid. But the problem arises when discussing the issuer or holders of multiple tranches.
What should be their cost of trading? It is not possible to proceed without addressing this,
since the role of ‘an issuer holding tranche M \ {i}’ is required to establish the issuer’s
super-hedging strategy and the uniqueness of the arbitrage price.
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8.5 Continuous-Time Reflected BSDEs
In the continuous-time case, we work under the filtered probability space (Ω,F,P) in which
F is augmented filtration generated by the standard d-dimensional Brownian motion Wt =
(W 1t , . . . ,W
d
t ), t ∈ [0, T ] and the probability measure P is the real-world measure.
When applying BSDEs to financial contracts, the continuous-time market model of
Section 6.1.2 will be employed. In particular we work under the probability space (Ω,F,Q)
where Q is the unique martingale measure. Also, any occurrence of the P-Brownian motion
W is automatically replaced by the Q-Brownian motion Ŵ .
As mentioned in the very beginning of the chapter, Pardoux and Peng [41] established
the classic result for the unrestricted continuous-time BSDE. It is stated here as the fol-
lowing theorem.
Theorem 8.42 (Pardoux and Peng [41]). Consider the BSDE with data (ξ, f, g)
Zt +
∫ T
t
f(u, Zu, φu) du+
∫ T
t
g(u, Zu, φu) dWu = ξ, (8.81)
such that:
(i) ξ is a square-integrable, Rm-valued, FT -measurable random variable;
(ii) the map f : Ω × [0, T ] × Rm × Rm×d → Rm is F-progressively measurable, uniformly
Lipschitz and f(·, 0, 0) is square-integrable;
(iii) the map g : Ω× [0, T ]× Rm × Rm×d → Rm×d is F-progressively measurable, uniformly
Lipschitz and g(·, 0, 0) is square-integrable.
Then there exists a unique pair of square-integrable, F-adapted processes (x, y) taking values
in Rm × Rm×d which satisfies the BSDE (8.81).
8.5.1 One-Dimensional Doubly Reflected BSDEs
We will now present the main result for continuous-time doubly reflected BSDEs as well
as discuss multi-dimensional generalisations. Let us stress that multi-dimensional reflected
BSDEs in continuous-time framework still requires much further research.
The mechanics of the continuous-time doubly reflected BSDE or DRBSDE is more or
less identical to its discrete-time counterpart from Section 8.2. An auxiliary process K is
used to keep the solution process Z within the random interval [L,U ]. The main result for
the DRBSDE is due to Cvitanic´ and Karatzas [9].
Theorem 8.43 (Cvitanic´ and Karatzas [9]). Consider the DRBSDE with data (ξ, f, L, U),
Zt −
∫ T
t
f(u, Zu, φu) du+
∫ T
t
φu · dWu − (KT −Kt) = ξ, (8.82)
such that:
(i) L and U are continuous, real-valued, F-progressively measurable processes satisfying
E(supt L2t ) <∞, E(supt U2t ) <∞ and L ≤ U ;
(ii) ξ is a square-integrable, real-valued, FT -measurable random variable satisfying LT ≤
ξ ≤ UT ;
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(iii) the map f : Ω× [0, T ]×R×Rd → R is F-progressively measurable, uniformly Lipschitz
and f(·, 0, 0) is square integrable.
Then there exists a unique solution triple (Z, φ,K), which satisfies the following conditions:
(a) Z is a real-valued, F-progressively measurable process satisfying L ≤ Z ≤ U ;
(b) φ is a square-integrable, Rd-valued, F-predictable process;
(c) the real-valued process K satisfies K0 = 0 and has the decomposition K = K
+ −
K− where K+ and K− are continuous, non-decreasing, F-adapted processes satisfying
E((K+T )
2) <∞, E((K−T )2) <∞ and∫ T
0
(Zu − Lu) dK+u =
∫ T
0
(Uu − Zu) dK−u = 0.
Note that K+ and K− are not the positive and negative components of K. Instead,
they are non-decreasing processes capturing the increasing and decreasing portions of K,
that is, the pathwise Jordan decomposition of K. Typically, we also have the convention
of setting K+0 = K
−
0 = 0. However, these initial conditions (or lack thereof) do not affect
the existence and uniqueness of K = K+ −K−.
Much like the discrete-time case in Section 8.2, the continuous-time DRBSDE is closely
related to the standard two-person Dynkin game (Section 2.2) and two-person game options
(Section 6.3.2). The main results in this vein can be summarised as follows.
Theorem 8.44. Let X,Y and M be continuous, R-valued, F-progressively measurable pro-
cesses with E(suptX2t ) <∞, E(supt Y 2t ) <∞ and X ≤M ≤ Y .
(i) The unique value process V ∗ of the continuous-time Dynkin game DG(X,Y,M) satisfies
the equality V ∗ = Z where (Z,K) is the unique solution of the DRBSDE(MT , 0, X, Y ) under
the real-world probability measure P.
(ii) The unique discounted arbitrage price process pi of the continuous-time two person game
option GCC(X,Y ) satisfies the equality pi = Z where (Z,K) is the unique solution of the
DRBSDE(X̂t, 0, X̂, Ŷ ) under the unique martingale measure Q.
8.5.2 Multi-Dimensional Reflected BSDEs
There have been a few existing formulations of multi-dimensional RBSDEs. We shall first
present some examples without proofs, before proposing our own continuous-time RBSDE
as an extension of the discrete-time results.
The first formulation involves a projection in a convex domain, which was introduced
and studied by Petit and Pardoux [43]. Its discrete-time analogue can be found in Example
8.29.
Theorem 8.45 (Petit and Pardoux [43]). Consider the following m-dimensional RBSDE
with data (ξ, f,D):
Zt −
∫ T
t
f(u, Zu, φu) du+
∫ T
t
φu dWu − (KT −Kt) = ξ, (8.83)
such that:
(i) D is a fixed, non-empty, closed, convex subset of Rm;
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(ii) ξ is a square-integrable, Rm-valued, FT -measurable random variable with ξ ∈ D almost
surely;
(iii) the map f : Ω × [0, T ] × Rm × Rm×d → Rm is F-progressively measurable, uniformly
Lipschitz and f(·, 0, 0) is square integrable.
There exists a unique solution triple (Z, φ,K) to RBSDE (8.83) which satisfies the following
conditions:
(a) Z is an Rm-valued, F-progressively measurable process satisfying E(supt |Zt|2) <∞ and
Z ∈ D;
(b) φ is an Rm×d-valued, square-integrable, F-progressively measurable process;
(c) K is an Rm-valued, continuous, F-progressively measurable process with K0 = 0 such
that for all F-progressively measurable processes z ∈ D we have∫ T
0
(zt − Zt) · dKt ≥ 0. (8.84)
The next formulation involves a multi-dimensional BSDE with an oblique reflection.
Theorem 8.46 (Hu and Tang [24]). Consider the following m-dimensional RBSDE with
data (ξ, f, k)
Zit −
∫ T
t
fi(u, Z
i
u, φ
i
u) du+
∫ T
t
φiu · dWu + (KiT −Kit) = ξi, i = 1, . . . ,m, (8.85)
such that:
(i) k(i, j) are non-negative constants defined for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, such that
k(i, j) + k(j, l) > k(i, l)
for 1 ≤ i, j, l ≤ m;
(ii) ξ is a square-integrable, Rm-valued, FT -measurable random variable which satisfies
ξi ≤ xj + k(i, j)
for any i 6= j;
(iii) for each i = 1, . . . ,m, the map fi : Ω×[0, T ]×R×Rd → R is F-progressively measurable,
uniformly Lipschitz, and the process fi(·, 0, 0) is square-integrable.
Then there exists a unique solution triple (Z, φ,K) to RBSDE (8.85), which satisfies the
following conditions:
(a) Z is an Rm-valued, F-predictable process with E(supt |Zt|2) <∞ and
Zi ≤ min
j 6=i
(
Zj + k(i, j)
)
;
(b) for each i = 1, . . . ,m, φi is an Rd-valued, square-integrable, F-predictable process;
(c) for each i = 1, . . . ,m, Ki is an R-valued, continuous, non-decreasing, F-predictable
process with Ki0 = 0 and ∫ T
0
(
Ziu −min
j 6=i
(
Zju + k(i, j)
))
dKiu = 0. (8.86)
Another version of the multi-dimensional BSDE with oblique reflections, in which more
general driver terms and reflecting boundaries are considered, can be found in Hamade`ne
and Zhang [22].
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8.5.3 Continuous-Time Stopping Games and Game Options
In Theorems 8.45 and 8.46 the domain D considered is static. In the context of stopping
games and game options, this assumption is too restrictive, since the stopping payoffs are
given by stochastic processes. It is thus a bit surprising that there has been very little
work on multi-dimensional RBSDE with a stochastic domain D. The following result is
taken from Nie and Rutkowski [38] who in turn extended the works by Ramasubramanian
[46, 47].
Theorem 8.47 (Nie and Rutkowski [38]). Consider the following m-dimensional RBSDE
with data (ξ, f,X, r):
Zt −
∫ T
t
f(u, Zu) du+
∫ T
t
φu dWu −
∫ T
t
r(u, Zu) dKu = ξ, (8.87)
such that:
(i) ξ is a bounded, Rm-valued, FT -measurable random variable with ξ ≥ X;
(ii) X is a bounded, Rm-valued, continuous semimartingale of the form
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
Uu du+
∫ t
0
Vu dWu,
where U is a bounded, Rm-valued, F-progressively measurable process and V is a square-
integrable, Rm×d-valued, F-progressively measurable process;
(iii) the map r : Ω×[0, T ]×Rm → Rm×m is F-predictable, uniformly Lipschitz and it satisfies
rii(·, ·) = 1;
(iv) there exists a fixed matrix Λ such that |rij(·, ·)| ≤ Λij for i 6= j, Λii = 0, (I −Λ)−1 ≥ 0
and
∑m
i 6=j,i=1 aiΛij ≤ αaj for some constants aj > 0 and 0 < α < 1.
Then there exists a unique solution triple (Z, φ,K) to RBSDE (8.87) which satisfies the
following:
(a) Z is an Rm-valued, F-adapted, continuous, integrable process with Z ≥ X;
(b) φ is an Rm×d-valued, square-integrable, F-progressively measurable process;
(c) for each i = 1, . . . ,m, Ki is an real-valued, F-adapted, continuous, non-decreasing
process with Ki0 = 0 and ∫ T
0
(Ziu −Xiu) dKiu = 0.
In the spirit of our earlier in discrete-time RBDSEs and affine game options, we are
interested in RBSDEs of the form (8.87), where r(u, Zu) is replaced by a fixed K-matrix G.
We are in a position to state the main original result of this section.
Theorem 8.48. Consider the RBSDE with data (ξ, f,X,G) given by
Zt −
∫ T
t
f(u, Zu) du+
∫ T
t
φu dWu −
∫ T
t
GdKu = ξ, (8.88)
where ξ,X, f, Z, φ and K satisfy their respective conditions from Theorem 8.47. If G is a
fixed K-matrix, then the RBSDE (8.88) has a unique solution.
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The proof of Theorem 8.48 relies on Theorem 8.47. But first, we have to establish the
connection between the classes of K-matrices and M-matrices. In particular, M-matrices
are defined as follows.
Definition 8.49. An M-matrix A is a Z-matrix that has the decomposition A = sI − B
where B ≥ 0 and s ≥ ρ(B). Here I is the identity matrix and ρ is the spectral radius.
In Plemmons [44], there was an extensive discussion on the class of non-singular M-
matrices. In fact, Plemmons [44] presented a total of 40 equivalent characterisations of
non-singular M-matrices. We only present here the few properties, which are relevant to
our problem.
Lemma 8.50 (Plemmons [44]). Let A be a Z-matrix. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) A is a non-singular M-matrix.
(ii) All the principal minors of A are positive, that is, A is a K-matrix.
(iii) A is inverse-positive, that is, A−1 exists and A−1 ≥ 0.
(iv) A is semi-positive, that is, there exists x > 0 with Ax > 0.
Note that even though non-singular M-matrices are equivalent to K-matrices, it does
not mean that M-matrices correspond to K†-matrices. A counter example is(
1 −1
0 0
)
,
which is an M-matrix but not a K†-matrix. Now we present the proof of Theorem 8.48.
Proof of Theorem 8.48. By scaling the components of K by positive constants, we may
assume, without loss of generality, that the diagonal terms of G consist of 1’s. This does
not alter the K-matrix property of G. The formulation of Theorem 8.47 can be recovered
if we let r(u, Zu) = G. To check the required conditions on r(u, Zu), we can set Λij =
|rij(u, Zu)| = −Gij for i 6= j. Hence I − Λ = G.
Now, the property of (I−Λ)−1 ≥ 0 is equivalent to G−1 ≥ 0, or the inverse-positivity of
G. This is true by Lemma 8.50. In order to have
∑m
i 6=j,i=1 aiΛij ≤ αaj for some constants
ai > 0 and 0 < α < 1, it suffices to establish the following inequality,
aj −
m∑
i 6=j,i=1
aiΛij > 0, (8.89)
as then we may set α = maxj(
∑m
i 6=j,i=1 aiΛij)/aj . By our choice of Λ, condition (8.89) is
equivalent to
∑m
i 6=j,i=1 aiGij > 0. Hence it suffices to find a vector a > 0 such that a
′G > 0
where a′ is the transpose of a. This is true by the semi-positivity of G, which is again true
by Lemma 8.50.
Therefore, all the conditions of Theorem 8.47 are satisfied, completing the proof.
Remark 8.51. Since the discrete-time affine stopping game and the affine game contingent
claim use recursive formulations, there are no immediate continuous-time extensions. One
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possible approach can be found in Nie and Rutkowski [38]. Specifically, a continuous-
time stopping game based on the multi-period redistribution game was proposed, using the
solution of a particular RBSDE (instead of a recursive subgame value) in payoff calculations.
The same idea can be applied to construct a continuous-time affine stopping game. The
continuous-time RBSDE (8.88) is a promising choice since it is a natural extension of the
discrete-time RBSDEs associated with the discrete-time affine stopping game. We can use
its unique solution (established in Theorem 8.47) in the payoff definition of the continuous-
time affine stopping game. Futhermore, the same approach can perhaps be used to define
a continuous-time version of the affine game contingent claim. In any case, this is still a
very open area and requires further research.
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